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The aim of this thesis is to analyse the treatment 
which the notions of identity, individuality and 
indistinguishability have received from physicists 
in the two domains of classical and quantum physics, 
Thus in Chapter 1 we outline certain of the 
philosophical positions which have been adopted with 
regard to these concepts, emphasising those aspects 
which will be of relevance to our later discussions. 
In Chapter 2 we consider classical physics and 
show that it is consistent with either of two views 
regarding particle individuality, which we call 
'Transcendental Individuality' and 'Space-Time 
Individuality' respectively. 
We begin Chapter 3 with the formal treatment of 
indistinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, 
suitably generalised to accomodate paraparticles 
as well as bosons and fermions. In particular we 
consider the statistical behaviour of paraparticles 
and conclude that it differs significantly from 
that exhibited by a 'paragas' of the kind first 
proposed by Gentile in 1940. These considerations 
are then used to support our conclusion that quantal 
particles can either be regarded as 'non-individuals' 
or as individuals subject to constraints on the set 
of states they can occupy. 
Our final chapter re-examines certain philosophical 
questions in the light of our conclusions. In 
particular we discuss in detail the Principle 
of Identity of Indiscernibles and demonstrate that 
questions regarding its validity within quantum 
physics are dependent both on the form of the 
Principle which is taken and on the status of so- 
called 'mixed states' in the theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
IDENTITY, INDIVIDUALITY AND INDISTINGUISHABILITY 
1.1 Introduction 
The notions of identity, individuality and indistin- 
guishability have been extensively discussed and 
analysed in the philosophical literature. The primary 
aim of this thesis is to consider the treatment these 
notions have received from physicists and to discuss 
the consequences of this for the traditional philo- 
sophical arguments about these matters. In their most 
basic form these arguments have centred on the following 
two questions: 
1) What is it that confers individuality upon a 
thing? The desire to find some satisfactory answer 
to this has generated a long and profound search for 
a fundamental individuator or 'Principle of Individua- 
tion'. In this thesis we shall primarily be concerned 
with two candidates for this role: substance and loca- 
tion in space-time. 
2) What is it that re-identifies a thing at one time 
as the 'same' thing at some other time? ', his is 
the problem of change and the various solutions to tt 
have occupied almost every conceivable position between 
the two extremes of 'everything is changing' and 'nothing 
is changing'. 
of course, an answer to the first question may also 
provide an answer to the second. Thus it has been 
argued that substance is both the individuator and also 
that which allows us to re-identify a thing across time. 
This chapter will be concerned with certain of the 
answers which have been given to these questions. 
Before discussing these however, we shall find it useful 
to give a preliminary sketch of how we shall use various 
terms in this thesis. 
Identity is a relation that may exist between items, 
either particulars or universals, in some domain of dis- 
course. The statement that item a is identical with 
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item b, written symbolically a=b, means informally 
that there are not in reality two distinct items at all 
but only one which may be referred to indifferently as 
a or b. 
A physical individual, or just individual for short, 
is a particular which exists in the physical world and 
can be distinguished from other sorts of particulars 
such as events or states of affairs which may be said to 
occur or obtain rather than to exist. Individuals which 
have well defined spatial locations are commonly referred 
to in the literature as 'things'. 
We are now confronted with the first of our questions 
above, what confers individuality upon physical 
individuals? If one rejects the view that the concept 
of individuality is metaphysically basic and cannot be 
explicated further, then a suitable 'individuator' 
must be put forward in answer to this question. One 
candidate for this role is the unknowable substantial 
substratum which'supports', or to which is 'attached', 
the attributes of an individual. If an individual ac- 
quires its individuality by something which transcends 
its attributes in this way then we shall say that it 
exhibits 'Transcendental Individuality' or T. I. for 
short. As we shall see this notion has been strongly 
criticised by many philosophers, particularly those 
within the empiricist camp. 
An alternative view is to argue that physical indivi- 
duals are individuated by their location in space and 
time. If this position is adopted then we shall say 
that the individual exhibits 'space-time individuality' 
or S. T. for short. The problem of re-identification 
through time, of supplying the grounds for claiming 
that an individual b at time t2 is the same individual 
a at an earlier time tl, is then solved in terms of 
the spatio-temporal continuity of the trajectory joining 
the location of a at time tl, and the location of b at 
time t2 together with some requirement, such as that the 
two individuals must be impenetrable, to ensure that two 
or more trajectories do not intersect at the same spatial 
point at the same time. A proponent of T. I. might agree 
that spatio-temporal continuity is what allows one to infer a 
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re-identification across time but would claim that it 
is the persistent T. I. which, ontologically speaking, 
confers the re-identifiability, 
In this context it is worth noting the point that 
that which confers individuality upon a 
physical individual may be regarded as distinct from 
that which distinguishes that physical individual from 
other individuals. Thus, if the position involving 
T. I. is adopted, one can argue that although the spatio- 
temporal location of an individual may allow us to 
distinguish that individual from others, it is the sub- 
stance underlying the attributes which confers indiv- 
duality upon it. T. I. may be regarded as intrinsic to 
an individual and unrelated to other physical indiv- 
iduals in a way that location in space-time may not be. 
On the other hand an advocate of S. T., recalling Ockham's 
famous 'razor', may argue that a metaphysical economisa- 
tion is effected if that which distinguishes individuals 
from each other, their location, is also taken to be 
that which confers individuality upon them. 
The S. T. view encounters difficulties also, principally 
with regard to what is meant by spatio-temporal location. 
On a relational view of space and time the locations of 
physical individuals involves their relations with other 
physical individuals. Thus, a circularity develops with 
regard to individuation. The circularity can be avoided 
by adopting an absolute theory of space and time but 
then one is required to give an account of what it is 
that confers individuality on the points of space and 
instants of time themselves. We shall discuss these 
problems in more detail in Chapter Two. 
A third possibility is to argue that an individual is 
individuated by its attributes and that it can be reduced 
to nothing more than a bundle of properties or attributes. 
However, since these properties are universals and can 
be predicted of more than one individual, there is then 
the possibility, at least in principle, that two (non- 
identical) physical individuals can have all the same 
attributes in common. We shall say that such individuals 
are indistinguishable. In order to be able to individuate 
on this view, this possibility must be eliminated. 
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This can be done by invoking Leibniz's famous 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles which states 
that if two individuals are, apparently, indistinguishable 
then they are, in fact, identical in the sense of being 
actually just one individual, and so indistinguishable 
individuals cannot exist. The Principle thus denies 
that the distinction between identity and indisting- 
uishability exists in fact. (Whether this is true or 
not it is important to draw a distinction in principle. 
Many authors, particularly non-philosophers, do not 
and thus create a great deal of confusion). 
An important issue here is whether or not properties 
of spatio-temporal location are included in the collection 
of attributes possessed in common by two indistinguishable 
individuals. We can accordingly distinguish two forms 
of Leibniz's Principle, a strong form which states that 
two individuals cannot possess all properties, including 
spatio-temporal ones, in common and a weak form which says 
that two individuals cannot possess all properties, 
excluding spatio-temporal ones in common. It can 
immediately be seen that if the individuals are regarded 
as impenetrable then the strong form of the Principle is 
automatically satisfied. As we shall see in Chapter Four, 
the question of whether or not the Principle is violated 
by the results of physics, classical or quantum, turns 
precisely on the above distinction. 
The entities we shall be concerned with in this thesis 
are the particles and fields of physics. In view of the 
points mentioned above it can be argued that indisting- 
uishability for elementary particles should be taken to 
mean possessing all non-spatio-temporal properties in 
common. In our discussions we shall always make it clear 
whether we mean indistinguishability in this narrow sense 
or not. The non-spatio temporal properties of an elerr- 
tary particle have also been called its 'intrinsic' 
properties. It is then an interesting question whether 
these 'intrinsic' properties are also the 'essential' 
properties which determine what it is for the particle 
to be a particle of that kind. We shall consider this 
question and some of the problems associated with 
essentialism and natural kinds in Chapter Four. 
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Finally we must briefly consider the notion of relative 
identity which is captured in the expression 'a is the same 
S as b' for some sortal predicate S. This immediately 
invites the question 'can a be the same S as b but not 
the same T? ' which has provoked a great deal of discussion 
in the philosophical literature. We shall briefly consider 
some aspects of the controversy in a subsequent section 
of this chapter. 
Instead of saying that 'a at time t1 is the same indiv- 
dual as b at time t2', this notion of relative identity 
allows us to make the claim that 'a at time t1 is the same 
S as b is at the time t2', for some sortal predicate S. 
This is the kind of reidentification that is involved for 
processes rather than things. 
Having indicated what we mean by identity, individuality 
and indistinguishability, we shall now give a brief hist- 
orical account of some of the positions which have been 
adopted with regard to these concepts. 
It is not our intention, in what follows, to analyse 
these positions in any depth. We merely wish to draw 
attention to those aspects which are of relevance to this 
thesis. In particular, we shall emphasise the work of 
Locke, Leibniz, and certain points arising from the more 
recent discussions of these matters. 
1.2 A Brief History of the Philosophy of Individuality etc 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem facing the early 
thinkers was that of accounting for change in the observable 
world. The solutions to this problem have occupied a wide 
variety of positions between the two extremes of Parmenides 
and Heraclitus. The former condemned all change as 
illusory whereas the latter argued that everything was in 
a state of controlled change. In between these two views 
lies the class of solutions which derives from the claim 
that to say that something is changing presupposes something 
A remains the same. In other words change can 
be accounted 
for in terms of something invariant underlying the change. 
Within this broad approach we can further discern two 
opposing tendencies, which we may call Monism and Pluralism 
respectively. Thü. s the Pre-Socratic Milesian systems 
were dominated by the idea of a single primary material 
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(1) out of which all the others were produced, whose nature 
remained the same but whose qualities changed to produce 
the changing things observed in the world. 
Empedocles and the Atomists however, explained change 
in terms of the rearrangement of a multiple of entities; 
for the former these were the four 'roots', Earth, Air, 
Fire and Water, whereas for the latter these were the 
atoms, distinct particles moving about in the void. The 
Aristotelian system represents a return to N'onism with 
'prime matter', unknowable and unqualified by any 
properties, being regarded not only as the substratum 
underlying change but also as the ultimate subject of 
predication and the principle of individuation for 
material substances. (2) 
This system was subsequently taken up and extended by 
the Scholastics, although it is worth noting that Duns 
Scotus departed from the Aristotelian line by arguing 
that the principle of individuation was a primitive 
'thisness' or haecceieý by which the common nature, common 
to all individuals of the same kind, became the nature of 
this individual. (3) Suarez made the interesting 
distinction between individuality and distinguishability, 
the latter involving a dependence on the existence of 
other things whereas the former does not. Thus he argued 
that individuals are distinguished by their matter but 
that their individuality must be ascribed to their form:. 
The Cartesian system can be regarded as partly a 
continuation of the Scholastic tradition and partly a 
reaction against it based on the new scientific 
discoveries made by Descartes himself and others. These 
led him to take even further Galileo's attempt to geo- 
metrize mechanics and formulate its laws in terms of 
factors involving space and time only. Thus Descartes 
believed that the only essential properties of any 
corporeal substance were geometrical and kinetic (4) 
1. For a discussion of these systems see G. S. Kirk and 
J .E. Raven (1957) or E. Hussey (1972) 
2. Aristotle. in D. Ross (1962), esp. Physics I, De Gen. et 
Corr. I and metaphysics. Also see D. Ross (1945) 
p. 166-177. 
3. Duns Scotus in C. R. S. Harris (1927) Vol. II p. 115 
4. Descartes Principles II 64, in E. S. Haldane and D. 
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i. e. shape , size, position and motion-or-rest. 
Substance itself was regarded as '... that which can 
exist by itself without the aid of any other substance. ' 
(5) and also as that in which the attributes of things 
are embedded and which is known only by inference (6). 
In his famous argument concerning the heating of a piece 
of wax he concluded that the individuality of the wax 
itself, which he took to confer upon it its identity 
through time, must lie in its being some&k extended, 
flexible and changeable (7). This could be interpreted 
as an attempt by Descartes to isolate the substance, as 
a subject, from the properties which it supports. However, 
it is difficult to reconcile this with his final 
characterisation of the wax in terms of the properties 
of being extended flexible and changeable (8). An 
alternative view is that the argument is concerned with 
the essentialist doctrine that that which is essential to 
an individual is that which is necessarily involved in 
its being what it is, and what remains the same, however 
else the thing may change. On this interpretation the 
main point of Descartes' argument is that the essence of 
the wax does not consist in any of its sensible properties 
and that what remains invariant through change is merely 
its being something extended, flexible and changeable. 
The physical consequences of the Cartesian system and 
their conflict with observation are well known. In these 
terms his programme was ultimately unsuccessful and was 
eventually superseded by the Newtonian mechanics which 
added mass as a fundamental concept to the Galilean duo 
of space and time. r"etaphysically, however, it had a 
profound impact, for by regarding matter primarily as 
'that-which-is-opposed-to-spirit' rather than the 
Aristotelian substratum underlying substance, Descartes 
took this concept out of the realm of the ontologically 
5. Descartes Principles II 64, in E. S. Haldane -and D. Ross 
p. 101 (1955) 
6. Ibid p. 53 
7. Ibid p. 154 
8. B. Williams (1978) p. 213-225 
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indeterminate and epistemologically unreachable. Prior 
to Descartes there was no single general term covering the 
sorts of things to which physical science applied. Matter 
was now invoked to fulfill this role and came to be 
regarded as the subject of the new and powerful science 
of mechanics. The idea that it was a Platonic 'co- 
principle' with form was abandoned and explanations 
in terms of Aristotelian substantial forms gradually gave 
way to explanations in terms of metrical properties 
from which their motions could be logically derived. 
Descartes can thus be seen as a major figure in the 
metaphysical movement away from the concepts and modes 
of thought of the Greeks, In particular this movement, 
and the rise of Newtonian mechanics in general, led to 
the adoption of a new way of individuating physical objects 
The notion of state description was central to the new 
physics and for this to work physical objects had to be 
capable of being uniquely specified in terms of certain 
properties which in turn lent themselves to metrical 
specification. Thus geometrically defined space and time 
parameters came to be used to distinguish one physical 
body from another. In other words material bodies came 
to be distinguished and hence individuated by their 
separation in space and time. Spatio-temporal location 
thus came to be regarded as the principle of individuation. 
This view rapidly took hold among the mechanical 
philosophers and has remained one of the fundamental 
me+physical principles subscribed to by physicists ever 
since. The power of the new science was such that all talk 
of individuality virtually ceased among the mechanical 
philosophers, with the exception of Leibniz as we shall 
see. Thu. s the 17th century saw a steady diverging between 
those who were concerned with the new mechanics and its 
related concepts and problems, and those who remained 
concerned with the traditional philosophical puzzles, 
such as those regarding substance, change etc. 
Thus we can discern two metaphysical lines of thought 
regarding the individuality of. physical objects. One 
view holds that individuality is conferred through a 
material substratum underlying the object's properties, 
whereas the other claims that it is location in space 
and time which fulfills the role of individuator. As 
we shall see in subsequent chapters an examination of 
the physics of elementary particles will reveal that 
this fundamental component of physical science is 
consistent with either of the above metaphysical 
positions. 
The former) 'substantivalist' position was restated 
by Locke, although his reappraisal of the notion of 
substance led, according to some, to its destruction 
as a metaphysical category. In order to fully grasp 
the nature of this re-examination it is important to 
distinguish between Locke's conception of particular 
substances and his notion of the general idea of 
substance. Both concepts were discussed in 'An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding' (9) and nowhere was his 
empiricism more in conflict with his rationalism. He 
believed that we are conversant only with particular 
substances through experience yet his rationalism 
would not permit him to abandon completely the general 
idea of substance. Thus although he initiated the 
empiricist attack he failed to follow it though - some- 
thing which was left to Berkeley and Hume to do. 
Locke began with a consideration of particular sub- 
stances, remarking that the mind often notices that a 
certain number of simple ideas go constantly together. 
Thus, he wrote '... not imagining how these simple ideas 
can subsist by themselves we accustom ourselves to 
suppose some substratum wherein they so subsist, and from 
which they do result, which therefore we call substance' 
(10). It is naive to interpret this passage as 
indicating that it was the notion of substance as the 
substratum necessary for the existence of qualities which 
was the important sense of the word for Locke at this 
point. (11) 
9. J. Locke (1959), 
10. Ibid p. 390-391 
11. D. 08Connor (1967) p. 75 
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Rather it is meant to show that the complex idea of a 
particular substance is produced in the mind by sensory 
phenomena being found to co-exist in aggregates in our 
experience (12). The idea of a particular substance 
is formed by the combination of many simple ideas 
together, a process completely opposite to that 
which produces the general idea of substance. 
This latter idea is formed by the process of abstraction 
from particular substances and was discussed by Locke in 
the next section. Thus he wrote 'So that if anyone will 
examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance 
in general, he will find he has no other idea of it all, 
but only a supposition of he knows not what support of 
such qualities which are capable of producing simple 
ideas in us, which qualities are commonly called accidents! 
(13) Thus, the general idea of substance is a 'suppos- 
ition of, we know not what, support'. In other words 
all that we can know about substance is that it acts as 
a support for the accidents and that is all. We cannot 
know it in any way beyond that it is a mysterious 
'something' to which the qualities attach (14). 
This is clearly a major step along the road towards 
the complete abolition of substance from metaphysics 
altogether. Locke himself did not ýo this far although 
I think that his whole line of thought is clearly leading 
to it. Perhaps he saw that to reduce substance to a 
mere fiction would resolve reality with the sceptics 
into nothing more than a succession of impressions (as 
Hume later showed) and that this was the inevitable 
conclusion of his empiricism (15) -a conclusion from 
which he quickly and firmly recoiled (16). 
Locke's distinction between the two notions of sub- 
stance is closely connected to another he made between 
nominal and real essences. Thus the complex idea of the 
12. See R. Woolhouse (1971) p. 61 ff and R. Aaron (1963) 
p. 173-177 
13. Locke op cit p. 391 
14. Ibid p. 392 
15. This was pointed out to Locke by Stillingfleet who 
accused him of having 'discarded substance'. See 
O'Connor op cit. p. 77 
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common characteristic of a type of thing is the nominal 
essence of that thing (17) which is abstracted by 
leaving out characteristics peculiar to individual 
things as individuals and retaining their common 
characteristics. The real essence of a thing is its 
real, but known, constitution which cannot be abstracted 
and from which comes the qualities of a thing which 
distinguishes it from other things. (18) Locke 
considered this to be no more useful than the analogous 
idea of substance as an unknowable 'something we know 
not what'. Real and nominal essences are related but 
are always different in substances (19). 
The nominal essence is the abstract idea of the observ- 
able common characteristics to which corresponds a 
real essence of inner corpuscular constitution which is 
some configuration of insensible particles and which 
explains the co-instantiation in many particulars of 
the properties taken into account of in the nominal 
essence (20). 
As regards reidentification through time Locke 
believed that this lay in the fact that the object in 
question could be uniquely described and identified in 
terms of space and time coordinates. Thus he wrote that 
when we observe an object in a certain place at a certain 
time we are sure that it is that object and not some 
other, similar or even indistinguishable object in 
another place at another time, ' For we never finding 
nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same 
kind should exist in the same place at the same time, 
we rightly conclude that whatever exists anywhere at 
any time excludes all of the same kind, and is there 
itself alone'. (21) 
Thus Locke's notion of self-identity depends upon what 
we call the Impenetrability Principle, that no two 
things can exist in the same place at the same time. (22) 
18. Locke op cit p. 2728 
19. Ibid p. 29 
20. Ibid p. 61 
21. Ibid p. 439-440 
22. It is interesting to note that Locke restricts 
this principle to things of the 'same kind', thus 
allowing the possibility that things of different 
kinds may occupy the same place at the same time. 
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He then went on to say that it follows from this that 
one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence nor 
two things one beginning. (23) As we shall see this 
implies that a material individual cannot retain its 
identity through a creation and annihilation process. 
Thus a thing's identity is related to the spatio-temporal 
point at which it began its existence. This led on to his 
idea of what constituted the principle of individuation, 
as he wrote, 'From what has been said it is easy to 
discover what is so much inquired after, the principium 
individuationis; and that it is plain is existence 
itself; which determines a being of any sort to a 
particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings 
of the same kind , (24) . Thus for Locke it is a thing's 
actual existence which confers individuality upon it and, 
by underpinning the Impenetrability Principle, allows 
us to infer its identity at a particular place and time. 
This is clearly very similar to the view we have called 
T. I. 
Locke also gave a compositional account of the re- 
identification of inorganic compound objects. Thus he 
gave the example of a mass of matter formed by the joining 
of two or more atoms. This mass will remain 'the same' 
through time so long as the same atoms are joined together, 
but if one of them is taken away or a new one added then 
the mass is no longer the same mass as before and loses 
its identity. (25) This is obviously an atomist solution 
to the problem of the reidentification of compound 
objects and relies, for its efficacy, on an account of the 
reidentification through time of the atoms themselves - 
an account which Locke has already given as we have 
seen. (26) 
Finally it is interesting to note that whereas Aristotle 
considered matter to be the indeterminate substratum 
and a constituent of substance, Locke inverted this 
relationship and made substance the substratum and 
constituent of matter. 
23. Ibid. p. 440 
24. Ibid. p. 441-442 
25. Ibid. p. 442 
26. Thus Quinton's criticism that Locke's account is 
viciously regressive is incorrect. See A. Quinton 
(1973) P. 65. 
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Of course by his time matter had acquired its new meaning 
as the subject of mechanics. Substance was thus called 
upon to fill the metaphysical role of the substratum 
underlying the properties which matter had left vacant. 
The sceptical consequences of Locke's analysis of 
substance were further unravelled by Berkeley and Hume. 
The former's 'immaterialist hypothesis' (27) urged the 
elimination of material substances that could never be 
directly apprehended to be replaced, as the cause of 
our sensations, by God. Hume went even further, and not 
content to write off substance alone as an unintelligible 
chimaera, applied the sceptical arguments to God and 
even 'the self', rationalising both out of existence in 
a similar way. (28). Causality also was relegated to 
the status of a myth and thus the world of events was 
reduced to nothing more than a series of fleeting percep- 
tions with no external object, no enduring subject to which 
they could belong, and not themselves even bound to one 
another. 
It is not surprising therefore, that Hume also regarded 
identity through time as ultimately a metaphysical 
illusion. Thus he argued that the idea of identity is 
simply the product ofAmistake into which we naturally 
fall when we think about time. It arises, he believed,, 
from a propensity of the mind to attribute invariableness 
or uninterruptedness to an object while tracing it, 
without a break in the attention of time, -a propensity 
which Hume considered to be nothing more than a fiction. 
(29). 
We now turn our attention to the man whose rationalistic 
philosophy laid much of the foundation of the modern 
approaches to identity and whose Principle of the Identity 
of Indiscernibles must be included in any account of 
these matters. 
27. Berkeley (1962) esp. p. 156 ff 
28. D. Hume (1962) 
29. Ibid p. 200-201. 
21 
1.3 Leibniz 
As we have noted the new mechanics of the 17th century 
encouraged the view that material bodies could be 
individuated by their locations in space and time and 
subsequently all discussions of individuality virtually 
ceased among the more scientifically minded natural 
philosophers. It remained a problem for Leibniz 
however. He rejected Newton's conception of an absolute 
space and thus also the idea that position in this 
space could serve to individuate an object, but had 
difficulty in developing a completely coherent view of 
his own, as we shall see. 
Leibniz's metaphysics can be taken to begin with his 
analysis of subject - predicate propositions in which 
he made the predicate part of the subject concept (30). 
When many predicates can be attributed to one and the 
same subject while this subject cannot be made the predicate 
of any other subject then the former was called an 
individual substance (31). Furthermore, he believed that 
every predicate, necessary or contingent, past present 
or future, is comprised in the notion of the subject. 
This is the concept of the Complete Notion of an Individual 
(32). 
The principle according to which the states of a substance developed. 
(was called its activity', regarded as essential to every 
substance. The notion of an individual substance differed 
from a mere collection of general notions by being capable 
of wholly distinguishing its subject and involving 
circumstances of time and place. The nature of an 
individual substance was to possess so complete a notion 
as to suffice for comprehending and deducing all its 
predicates. Hence he concluded that no two substances 
could be exactly alike, which is the Principle of Identity 
of Indiscernibles. From this stage, with the help of 
the premiss that perception gives knowledge of the external 
world, the doctrine of monads easily follows. The 
monads themselves were immaterial, unextended substances. 
30. See B. Russell (1904), t L. Couturat (1903) 
31. G. W. Leibniz in N°ason (1967) p. 51 
32. Broad called it the 'Predicate-in-Notion Principle' 
whereas Rescher terms it 'the program'. C. D. Broad 
(1975) p. 6 ; N. Rescher (1967) p. 14. 
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As they were unrelated to one another and could not 
interact any change had to come fron within each monad 
itself (its activity). As we shall see there are 
problems as to how the monads are individuated. 
Thus an important and fundamental part of Leibniz's 
system is the Complete Notion of an Individual (33) 
which can be thought of as the sum of all that can 
ever be said about an individual, including its 
relations and interactions with other individuals - 
so each individual is a world unto itself - and serves 
to distinguish an individual as that individual. 
In one of his letters (34) Leibniz tries to explain 
what he means by this notion, using Adam as an example. 
Thus he wrote that the Complete Notion of an Individual 
(C. N. I. ) as it. applied to Adam was identical with the 
knowledge God had of Adam when he created him. 'Specific 
notions' such as that of the sphere, were distinguished 
from individual notions, such as that of Adam, on the 
grounds that the former applied to an indefinite 
number of actual or possible individuals and was therefore 
incomplete, in a way which the individual notion was not. 
There is then the problem of alternative possible 
individuals with the same proper name, for example 
several alternative possible Adams. Arnauld remarked 
(35) that he found such phrases obscure and that the 
contention that God could actualize one out of several 
possible individuals and leave the rest as unrealized 
possibilities was meaningless. In his reply (36) 
Leibniz conceded the point that the phrase 'several 
alternative possible Adams' was meaningless if one took 
the word 'Adam' to be the proper name of a certain 
complete individual, but then claimed that when he used 
the phrase he took the word 'Adam' to connote only a 
33. See Russell op cit p. 29; Broad op cit p 6-9; Rescher 
op cit p. 14 ff. 
34. Leibniz in Mason op cit p. 53-66 
35. Arnauld in Mason ibid p. 24-34 
36. Ibid p. 53-66. 
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certain limited collection of properties which are a 
sub-set of the larger group denoting the Complete 
Notion of an Individual. Because the name 'Adam' is 
only a label in this sense, it can also be applied to 
other individuals possessing the same subset of 
properties. These others will not actually be 
indistinguishable because they will differ as regards 
their other properties lying outside this subset which, 
together with the subset, go to make up their CNI. The 
CNI of Adam, the sum of all his predicates, is the 
only description which suffices to distinguish the 
actual Adam from all other individuals, actual or 
possible. 
Elsewhere (37) Leibniz wrote that only God can completely 
and distinctly comprehend an indiv4ual's CNI, so human 
beings have to depend on experience or hearsay for their 
knowledge of many of the facts about individuals. 
As this concept plays such an important role in 
Leibniz's work, it is worth making a few remarks about 
it. 
Firstly, the idea is a profound and original way of 
characterising what it is to be an individual, but the 
CNI is of no practical use as a principle of individuation 
because it must be an infinite set of predicates (38). 
Therefore, as Leibniz himself noted, only God can have a 
full knowledge of any CNI and thus only God is truly 
capable of individuating objects. 
Secondly, it can be seen how easily the Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles follows from this idea. If 
every individual has a distinct complete notion then 
two things which are completely indiscernible, and which 
therefore possess all predicates in common and so have the 
same complete notions, must in fact be the same thing. 
According to Leibniz, if we are presented with two things 
which appear indistinguishable then if we look long enough 
and hard enough we will discover a predicate which one 
37. Leibniz 'Discours de Netaphysique' in Parkinson (1973) 
p. 18-19. 
38. An individual persists for a finite time, so the notion 
of an individual involves an infinite number of 
propositions specifying its states at a continuous 
series of moments. See Russell op cit. p. 29. 
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has and the other doesn't and which will serve to 
distinguish them. 
However, it can be argued that Leibniz cannot 
simultaneously hold both this idea of a C. N. I. and a 
relativist theory of space. Adherence to the former 
implies rejection of the latter and the adoption of an 
absolute theory of space, something Leibniz would have 
sought to avoid given his professed belief in the 
relativist position. The argument is essentially 
similar to that put forward by Black (39). 
Imagine a universe totally empty exceptfor two distinct 
individuals. which possess exactly the same set of predicates - 
volume, mass, colour, history etc. The only difference 
in their complete notions which could serve to individuate 
them is provided by their separation in space. But, in 
the absence of any other body, even an observer, the 
spatial relation of one object A, say, to the other B, 
is exactly the same as that of B to A. Therefore, if a 
relativist view of space is adopted, the object's 
spatial separation cannot provide the difference in the 
set of predicates which is necessary to distinguish their 
complete notions. The only way in which the spatial 
separation can do this is if an absolutist view of space 
is taken, so that the position of A in this absolute 
space is different from that of B. Which difference 
then provides the difference in the set of predicates 
distinguishing their complete notions and thus 
individuating the two objects. Thus Leibniz cannot 
simultaneously hold both the idea of a complete notion and 
his relativist view of space. We shall consider this 
form of argument again in Chapter Four. 
A fourth point is that Leibniz has clearly distinguished 
between universals ('specific notions'), proper names 
and individuals. Universal notions are incomplete because 
they apply to more than one individual and so do not 
completely individuate a substance. Proper names also 
do not serve to individuate since they are merely labels 
for a certain subset of properties out of all the 
innumerable properties which comprise a complete notion. 
39, V. Black (1952). 
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Individual notions are complete and completely individuate 
a particular substance. All that will ever happen to that 
substance is inherent in its complete notion. 
Finally, let us consider the individuality of the monads- 
Leibniz's unextended immaterial substantial 'basic' 
building blocks' (to steal a phrase from modern physics). 
A fundamental problem with the doctrine of monads is 
how were they individuated? The C. N. I. implied that each 
and every monad was an individual. If two monads shared 
the same set of properties then it necessarily followed 
from the C. N. I., that they were in fact the same monad. 
This is his Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, also 
derived, although only contingently, from his Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, as we shall see. However, the Principle 
of Identity of Indiscernibles resolves individuality with 
the predicates ( as does the C. N. I. from which it is 
derived), and thus gives encouragement to those (for 
example Russell later) who would do away with substance 
altogether, as an individuator, and regard objects as 
mere bundles of properties. It is hard to see how Leibniz 
could have stomached this, committed as he was, through 
his subject-predicate distinction, to the notion of 
substance. He regarded substance as that which can only be 
a subject, not a predicate, which has many predicates and 
which, subsequently, persists through change. Eliminate 
substance and you eliminate the subject and hence the 
subject-predicate division upon which Leibniz's whole 
system was based. 
But. then what exactly constituted this substance which 
existed over and above the properties? In answering this 
question Leibniz would have been unable to appeal to 
some kind of Aristotelian prime matter, because he had 
stated that the monads were immaterial and spiritual- The 
only choice, it seems, would have been to individuate the 
monads in terms of spirit somehow. This, with its attendant 
whiff of Scholasticism, is another conclusion Leibniz would 
have rejected. Thus individuality remained a problem for 
him. 
Of course, a completely coherent position could have 
been arrived at if he had used location in a Newtonian 
space as individuator, but given his firm adherence to the 
relativist view, this would have been irrpossible. 
26 
It is worth examining Leibniz's view of substance in a 
little more detail. We have noted that Descartes defined 
substance in two ways: as that which is the subject of 
various qualities and as that which is capable of 
independent existence. Leibniz believed that the relation 
to subject and predicate was more fundamental than the 
somewhat doubtful inference to independent existence, 
and., therefore, brough&his concept of substance into 
dependence upon the former logical relation. He 
attacked Locke on the grounds that there is good reason 
to assume the existence of substance since we conceive 
several predicates in one and the same subject and this 
is all that is meant by the words 'support' or 'substratum' 
which Locke used as synonymous with 'substance'. (40) 
However Leibniz agreed that the word 'substance' also 
meant the notion of a something persisting through change 
or a subject which preserves its identity whilst its 
qualities alter. He held that this idea is not, therefore, 
independent of subject and predicate, but is subsequent 
to it - it is the notion of subject and predicate applied 
to what is in time (41). 
Furthermore, he wrote that '... the nature of an 
individual substance is to have a notion so complete that 
it suffices to comprehend and to render deducible from it, 
all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is 
attributed'. (42) In other words, an individual substance 
is not only the subject of various predicates and is not 
attributed to any other subject, but also possesses a 
Complete Notion. To say that all the states of a substance 
are involved in its Complete Notion is merely to say that 
the predicate is contained in the subject. It then follows 
that every substance, every monad, is a world apart, 
independent of all else except God. All it will ever do 
or be expressed in its Complete Notion and so nothing 
external to it can every affect it, except God. 
40. Leibniz 'New Essays ... ' in Langley 
(1916) p. 225 
41 See Russell ap cit p. 42-43 
42. Leibniz, trans in Russell Ibid p. 213-214. It is 
interesting to note that Leibniz equates individual 
notion with haeccity here. 
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How then do the monads change? Leibniz believed that 
there must be, in every state of a substance, sore 
element or quality in virtue of which that state is not 
permanent but tends to pass into the next, and this 
element is what Leibniz meant by 'activity'. (43) 
This view is similar to the Heraclitean doctrine that 
all, things are laws. Indeed Leibniz stated that a 
monad can be redidentified through time '... by the 
persistence of the same law of the series or of 
continuous simple transition, which leads us to the 
opinion that one and the same subject or monad is 
changing. That there should be a persistent law, involving 
the future states of that which we conceive as the same is 
just what I assent to constitute it the same substance 1 (44). 
However, a substance is not, for Leibniz, merely the sum 
of its states, but on the contrary, those states cannot 
exist without a substance in which to inhere. (45) The 
important point is that the actual basis for assuming 
substance is purely logical. All that we observe are states 
of substance which are the only things given in experience. 
One makes the inference that they are states of substance 
because they are held to be of the logical nature of 
predicates, and thus to demand subjects of which they may 
be predicated. 
Russell has raised the criticism that a consequence of 
this view, particularly as regards the reducibility of 
t. i'me and place to predicates, is that the substance re'rains 
on its own, distinct from its predicates and totally 
destitute of meaning (46). One then has to face the 
Lockean problem of how such a meaningless term can be of 
any use 
One of the most important aspects of Leibniz's philosophy 
from the point of view of this thesis anyway, iS the 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, which was stated 
43. Leibniz in Duncan (1890) p. 117 
44. Leibniz in Russell op cit p. 264 
45. Leibniz in Duncan op cit p. 118 
46. Russell op cit p. 50 
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in different ways in different places. Thus he wrote that 
it asserts'... that there are not in nature two 
indiscernible real absolute beings' (47), or '... that it is 
not possible for there to be two individuals entirely alike 
or differing in number only 
1(48) 
or, again, that '... no 
two substances are completely sirrilar, or differ solo nu-ero' 
(49). It should immediately be noted that this Principle 
applies only to substances; existent attributes may, in 
fact, be indiscernible, as Leibniz explained in discussing 
place. (50) 
This principle occurs frequently in the letters to 
Clarke, where it is used in connection with the controversy 
between the absolute and relational theories of space. 
However, there is some confusion as to which of the 
following two alternatives Leibniz meant to assert : 1) 
That the very supposition that there might be two things 
exactly alike in all their qualities is self-contradictory 
and meaningless; i. e. the principle is necessary.. 2) That 
although the supposition is logically possible we can 
be-sure that God would not create two such things i. e. 
the principle is contingent. As Clarke pointed out, 
Leibniz asserted first one view and then the other Thus 
in the Fourth letter he wrote that the proposition that there 
could exist two indistinguishable things was self-contradic- 
tory and meaningless. (51) On the other hand, in the Fifth 
letter Leibniz took the second alternative and said, 
explicitly, that it was not absolutely impossible for 
there to be two things exactly alike, but that it would 
such 
be contrary to God's wisdom to create twoAbodies and 
therefore we can be certain that there are none (52). 
A plausible explanation for this inconsistency is that 
this discourse shows Leibniz shifting and moderating his 
position in response to criticise exposing its weaknesses. 
(53). It may also not be unconnected with the fact that 
47. Leibniz in Duncan op cit p. 259 
48. Leibniz in Eason op cit p. 45 
49. Leibniz in Russell op cit p. 433 
50. Leibniz in Duncan op cit p. 266 
51. Leibniz in Alexander (1956) p. 37 
52. Ibid P. 61 
53. IC Ma bQ ©SS, ble nr C-I. ýS ý0 ýA CL. 1' cý r n"ac. 
" b be a 
to oiAt- a eas of L. 4 L ;z IS work also. Se 1-I. Cas(aAecta (Ia7+4. ) 
P. `3 8 3. 
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Leibniz deduced the Principle in two ways. One was from 
the C. N I., which makes the principle necessary, and the 
other was from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which 
causes the Principle to be contingent. (54) 
Leibniz himself said the P. I. I. could be deduced from 
C. N. I. but. never actually gave this deduction in full. 
Thus after outlining the concept of the C. N. I. he wrote 
'From this follow several considerable paradoxes, as, 
amongst others, that it is not true that two substances 
resemble each other completely and differ only 
numerically. 
i The argument can easily be reconstructed. 
Each individual substance has a unique Complete Notion 
which is the set of all its predicates and contains all of 
its qualities and relations (as every extrinsic denomination 
every relation, has an intrinsic foundation, a corresponding 
p_rediccate), past, present and future. To say that two, 
apparently distinct, things are completely indiscernible 
means that they must possess the same set of predicates, 
qualities and relations. Therefore they must possess the 
same Complete Notion and therefore, by uniqueness, they 
must in fact be one and the same individual. Thus 
if two things are indiscernible they must in fact be 
identical, in the sense of being the same thing. Indis- 
cernibility implies identity, and C. N I. implies P. I. I. 
It. is impossible for two, 'true-', individuals to be 
res t 
indistinguishable because theyXhave unique Complete Notions 
to be individuals and so there must be a difference in 
predicates somewhere which could serve to distinguish 
them. Thus P. I. I. is a necessary consequence of C. N. I. 
Russell also outlines the deduction and presents the 
following example: suppose A and B were two indiscernible 
substances. A differs from B in the sense that they are 
different substances. But to be thus different is to have 
a relation to B. This relation raust have a corresponding 
predicate of A. But since B does not differ frorr. itself 
B cannot possess the same predicate. Hence A and B will 
differ as to predicates contrary to hypothesis. (55) 
54. Leibniz in Russell p. 433. See also Leibniz in Nasor 
op cit p. 45 
55. Russell op cit p. 58 
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Thus two individuals cannot be indiscernible. If the 
premiss of the C. N. I. is accepted, and if it is agreed 
that every external relation corresponds to some internal 
predicate, then P. I. I. is necessary. (56) 
Elsewhere Leibniz deduced P. I. I. from the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (57). The argument runs as follows. 
Suppose that there co-existed two material particles a 
and b which were exactly alike as regards all their 
qualities and relations. They would have to be in 
different places at any moment of their co-existence. 
It does not matter whether an absolute or relational view 
of space iS adopted here. If x and y are points of an 
absolute space then there could be no reason for preferring 
to put a at x and b at y rather than vice versa. However, 
a similar consequence follows on the relational account. 
In this case x is defined by certain spatial relations to 
a certain set of material objects taken as a system of 
reference and y is defined by certain other spatial relations 
to the same set of objects. Now if a and b are exactly 
alike in all their qualities and dispositional properties 
then there can be no reason for preferring to put a into 
the former relation and b into the latter rather than the 
other way round. 
If, then, on either view, God were to create two such 
particles he would 1) be bound to put them into different 
places, and yet 2) have no reason for choosing between the 
two alternatives which would arise by imagining the two 
particles being interchanged. Now God never acts without 
a sufficient reason (Principle of Sufficient Reason). So 
we can conclude either that the supposition is meaningless, 
or that, if it is not, God will never create two exactly 
similar particulars and therefore there will never be two 
such particles. Thus when P. I. I. is deduced from P. S. R. 
in this way it is contingent. (58) 
This argument)resting as it-does on the supposition of 
56. The difficulty in fact is to prevent the argument 
from proving that there cannot be two substances at 
all, and degenerating into Spinozism. See Russell 
Ibid p. 58 
57. Leibniz in Alexander op cit p. 36-45 and also p. 62. 
58. This form of the argument gets round Russell's 
criticism of it. 
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some external creative agent (i. e. God) who acts 
according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is far less 
cogent and persuasive than the previously necessary 
deduction from C. N. I. Clarke was certainly not satisfied 
with it and argued that by Leibniz's own principle God 
would actualise neither a nor b simply because he cannot 
actualise both, and has no reason to prefer one to the 
other. (59) 
The Identity of Indiscernibles has been discussed by 
several authors (60) of whom we take Quinton to be an example. 
He argues (61) that there are two forms of the principle. 
If position is included as one of the properties of a thing 
then the principle is necessarily true; this is the 'wide' 
form of the principle. If the set of properties of a 
thing includes only qualitative properties then the 
principle is only contingently true; this is the narrow 
form. Quinton then writes that Leibniz was compelled 
to take the principle in its narrow qualitative sense 
since by denying that space and time were fully real he 
was committed to the view that positional properties were 
the more or less misleading appearances presented by 
underlying qualities. A symptom of this is the fact that 
he attempted to derive the principle from the law of 
sufficient reason, which he took to rule out the 
possibility that there could be two qualitively indis- 
tinguishable things in distinct places. (62). 
This misses the point that Leibniz did try to reduce 
position, as a relation, to apredicate of the individual 
(63) and more importantly, that he gave a more fundamental 
deduction of P. I. I. from his idea of the C. N. I. 
P. I. I. has been considered in some detail here in order 
to prepare the ground for our later discussions of its 
validity within classical and quantum physics. 
We shall now outline some aspects of the modern 
approaches to these problems. 
59. Clarke in Alexander op cit p. 45-53 
60. See Black (1952) ;P Strawson (1965)) T. Vinci (1974) 
P-195. D. Armstrong (1978)) Also Russell 
Broad and Rescher op cit. 
61. Quinton op cit p. 24 
62. Ibid p. 25 
63. Leibniz in Langley op cit p. 238. 
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1.4 Relative Identity and Proper Names 
Frege can be regarded as one of the principal architects 
of the modern approach to identity and initiated its 
characteristic involvement with the theory of meaning. 
Thus he pointed out that if identity is interpreted 
simply as a relation between an object and itself 
then one is faced with the following paradox. It 
is clear that the sentences 'a = a' and 'a = b' generally 
have different cognitive significance, as can be seen 
by comparing 'The Morning Sa 
e d& 
ar is identical with the 
o,, c ý tke. iMo r. ai4 StoJ- Cs c-ic. a( wcý t4 eE vý. ý:. t¬. Secr; 
IV°orning Stark. Howe fer if a and b are the same object 
and identity is interpreted as above, then it is imposs- 
ible to explain how the two sentences can differ in 
cognitive content. Frege therefore concluded that 
identity should be regarded as a relation holding between 
the names or signs of objects (64). 
Frege's solution to the above problem thus went 
straight to the heart of the theory of meaning. He 
argued that as well as names and the objects they refer 
to one must distinguish a third element, the meaning 
or sense of the name in virtue of which, and only in 
virtue of which, it refers to the object. Thus 
he wrote 'It is natural, now, to think of there being 
connected with a sign (name, combination of words, 
letter) besides that to which the sign refers, which 
may be called the reference of the sign, also what I 
should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein 
the mode of presentation is contained'. (65) 
Thus in the above example the reference of 'the 
Morning Star' would be the same as that of the 'Evening 
Star', i. e. the planet Venus, but not the sense. The 
sense gives the node of presentation of the object and 
the object is illuminated, (partially), by the sense 
of the expression. It is because the two expressions 
'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star' have different 
senses that factual information can be conveyed and 
thus the statement differs in cognitive significance 
from the analytic uninformative sentence 'The Morning 
Star is identical with the morning Star', in which 
64. G. Frege in P. Geach and M. Black (1952) p. 56 ff 
65. Ibid p. 57 
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both of the denoting expressions have not only the 
same referent but has the same sense also. 
This work had two profound consequences which we shall 
consider here - one concerning the status of'Leibniz's 
Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals' in 'classical' 
identity theory and the other concerning the philosophy 
of proper names. We shall consider the former first. 
The line of research initiated by Frege led, in the 
early part of this century, to widespread agreement among 
philosophers and logicians that the notion of meaning was 
ambiguous and that a distinction should be drawn between 
the meaning of an expression in the intensional and 
extensional senses. Consideration of Frege's problem 
also led to questions concerning synonymity - under what 
circumstances could expressions have the same meaning. 
Consequently, it was shown that Liebniz's law, which 
can be taken as saying that synonymous expressions may be 
interchanged in any context without change of truth 
value, does not hold generally and is true only of 
extensional contexts. (66) 
This law is central to the 'classical' theory of iden- 
tity and can be expressed thus : 'If two things are 
identical then whatever is true of one is true of the 
other'. (67) or in second order predicate calculus 
( V>0 ( V4 )L _Y_ =I --> (V 0) (0 cx-) *--ip qý (-I ýI where 'x' and 'y' are syntactical individuated variables 
and '0 ' is a syntactical predicate variable. 
Written thus the Law is broad enough to be the converse 
of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. 
From this can be derived all the valid theorems or 
propositions of the 'classical' theory of identity, 
such as the Identity of Indiscernibles: 
(VZ. L)(Vj)C(V')(Ocx -'$c))_a _1-1 Reflexivity: ( V'o) Cxc = ýý-) 
Symmetry: CV ate) 
and Transitivity: (\ c)( )CV ý) (ý 7C=j as = 
rý 
66. See L. Linsky (1952), especially the essays by Good- 
man p. 67, Quine p. 77 and mates p. 111 
67. Mates (1965) p. 145 
68. P. T. Geach (1972) p. 239 
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This 'classical' theory is also known as the'absolute 
identity theory (69) because it follows from Leibniz Law 
that if two objects are 'identical' then they are 'identical' 
in all respects - they are 'absolutely identical' (70) 
This theory is a well established branch of logic (71) 
and its principles are employed in many philosophical 
reasonings in which questions of identity arise. However, 
although the theory is both powerful and simple it has been 
attacked on various grounds, particularly recently. 
Thus it is argued that it fails to capture the notion 
of identity as used in ordinary language where the relation 
'x is the same such-and-such as y' is frequently used 
and in ways which are not adequately encompassed by the 
statement 'x is identical with y' or 'x=y'. (72) A possible 
avenue of escape for the absolute identity theorist is 
to say that identity is being loosely or even incorrectly 
used in these situations and that it is actually 'similar- 
ity' that is being referred to. 
There are other difficulties, however, Leibniz's Law 
makes no allowance for an individual changing its 
properties over a period of time, yet remaining 'the same' 
individual. In other words the absolute theory faces 
problems with regard to reidentification through time (73). 
The Law also displays what Quine has called 'referential 
opacity' (74) in leading from true propositions to false 
ones when, for example, non-extensional predicates are 
substituted for ' 06oc)' . 
These, and other difficulties, have led to a variety 
of alternative theories being proposed in which the class- 
ical two place identity relation is replaced by a three 
place one, the third place being taken up by a general 
noun which specifies the respect in which identity is 
69. N. Griffin (1977) p. 2 ff 
70. If spatial, positions or relations are included as, or 
reduced to, predicates of the objects then 'numerical 
identity', two objects being 'identical' in all res- 
pects but separate in space, is not true identity in 
this sense. Indeed we would prefer to call it 
indistinguishability rather than identity. 
71. See P. T. Geach (1972) p. 239 
72. Griffin op cit p. 10 
73. Ibid p. 5 
74. W. O. Quine (1961) p. 139 
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intended. These alternatives can broadly be classified as 
'relative identity theories'. 
A central tenet of these approaches is that the x and y 
of an identity statement must be taken to fall under, or 
be instances of, the same substantial concept of a thing 
or natural kind. (75) Thus Geach has written 'When one 
says 'x is identi l with y' this I hold is an incomplete 
expression, it is short for 'x is the same A as y' where 
'A'represents some count noun understood from the context 
of utterance ... ' (76) He also wrote 'On my own view of 
identity I would not object in principle to different 
A's being one and the same B' (77). This position receives 
support from examples of the use of identity' statements 
in ordinary language, such 'that box is the same colour 
as this box' or 'these two boxes have the same colour 
but different volumes', and is therefore regarded as an 
improvement over the absolute theory. 
The above two quotes introduce two important theses. 
The first has been called 'D' by Wiggins (78) and it 
consists of the following : absolute identity statements 
of the form 'a is the same as b' are incomplete and a term 
A must be introduced to give a statement of the form 'a is 
the same A as b'. The completing term A must be a general 
term which is either a noun or noun phrase. There are 
several varieties of general nouns which lead to several 
variants of 'D' each different in scope or restrictiveness 
(79). 
The second of Geach's remarks introduced the 'R' thesis 
which holds that 'a may be the same A as b but not the same 
B'. There are at least as many variations of R as there 
are of 'D' since each variant of 'D' will give-a different 
way of completing 'A is the same such-and-such as B'. 
Setting aside these variations these two theses in 
combination generate three broad positions according to 
whether one or other or both are accepted. Thus some 
philosophers have accepted both 'DI and 'R', others have 
75. P. T. Geach (1968) p. 39 
76. Ibid p. 238 
77. Ibid p. 157 
78. D. Wiggins (1967) p. 1 and (1980) p. 15 
79. See Griffin op cit p. 14-15 
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accepted only 'D', while others have accepted only 'R'. 
Typical of the first position is Geach whose view we 
have already touched upon. Wiggins can be regarded as 
a representative of the second alternative. In his ear- 
lier work he presented 'R' in the form of a question, 
'Can a be the same x as b and not the same y as b? (80) 
and noted that the possibility of this, the 'R' thesis, 
is commonly taken to provide the principal ground for 'D'. 
He then argued that 'R' could not be the rationale of 'D', 
if 'D' had any rationale at all, in fact 'R' cannot be 
a possibility at all, i. e. he rejected it entirely. 
According to Wiggins the only defence of 'D' which is 
correct is the one that states '... to say what a is is 
automatically to provide an f which determines the truth 
grounds of a=b'. (81) The grounds for rejecting 'R' rest 
on. a demonstration that the thesis is incompatible with 
the formal requirements of classical identity theory. 
In particular Wiggins argued that if Leibniz Law were 
true, then 'R' must be false. (82) 
The third of our three positions is advocated by Griffin 
in an attempt to meet the difficulties of both the re- 
lative and absolute identity theories. His aversion to 
'D' rests on the grounds that '... the arguments in its 
favour are very weak and often rely on unacceptable 
postulates... ' (83) Nevertheless, he believes, the 'P' 
relativists have uncovered an important point in that 
'... the notion of an individual item is incoherent 
without reference to a set of individuative principles. 
It is the role of sortals in natural language to provide 
these principles'. (84) This forms the core of his own 
theory in which it is argued that we cannot individuate 
items in a domain without reference to some sortal. Thus 
equating individuation with counting, it is instances 
80. Wiggins (1967) p. l. 
81. Ibid p. 41 
82. Wiggins (1967) & (1980). For criticisms of this view 
see H. W. Noonan (1976) p. 559 & S. Shoemaker in N. 
Munitz (1971) p. 103, Griffin has recently pointed out 
that in order to carry this last argument through 
Wiggins must amend the classical theory, which leaves 
him open to the claim that 'R' can be retained rovided 
this argument is dropped. Griffin op cit p. 19 
J1978) 
83. Griffin (1977) p. 21 
p. 576. 
84. Ibid p. 131 
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of F's and G'S (where F and G are sortal constants), 
rather than items that are counted and so relative 
identities are regarded as fundamental. It is only after 
this individuation process is complete that one can est- 
ablish whether an individual F and an individual G possess 
all properties in common and thus whether they are 
'absolutely identical'. 
it follows from Griffin's view that a proper name 
cannot be significantly assigned to an individuated item 
except by reference to a sortal because, he argues 
without the latter we have no means of knowing what we 
have named (85). This brings us on to the role of proper 
names in problems of identity and individuality and thus 
the second consequence of Frege's work. 
We have noted how in the name-referent relation, Frege 
introduced a third element, the sense of the name. He 
believed that all names have senses and wrote 'A proper 
name expresses its sense, stands for or designates its 
reference ' (86). Thus he argued that names essentially 
have a sense but only contingently have a reference - 
they refer if and only if there is an object which satis- 
fies their sense. This encapsulates the 'sense theory' 
of proper names which holds that proper names are only 
disguised definite descriptions. Every proper name is 
equivalent in meaning to such a description, namely the 
one which gives an explicit formulation of its sense. 
The opposing view i5 the 'no-sense theory' which argues 
that proper names simply stand for objects and have no 
sense or meaning other than standing for objects. Thus 
a proper name only denotes its bearer and names necessarily 
have a reference but no meaning whatsoever. Proper names 
are regarded as the special connection between words and 
the world. 
One can summarise the difference between these two 
theories thus: on the no-sense theory naming is prior to 
describing, on the sense theory describing is prior to 
naming forZname dnly names by describing the object it 
names. Representatives of the latter view include Frege, 
obviously and Quine who used Russell's theory of singular 
85. Ibid p. 198 
86. Frege op cit p. 61 
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descriptions to reduce proper names to descriptions. 
In Quine's view Russell's theory shows clearly how one 
can meaningfully use seeming names without supposing 
that there exist the entities allegedly named, by 
reducing the seeming name to a description. And, 'where 
descriptions are concerned there is no longer any 
difficulty in affirming or denying being' (87). Quine 
believes that when Russell's theory goes to work on 
a statement of being or non-being such a statement '... 
ceases to contain any expression which even purports 
to name the alleged entity whose being is in question 
so that the meaningfulness of the statement no longer 
can be thought to presuppose that there be such an 
entity'(88). Thus by reducing proper names to 
descriptions in this way a statement of existence or non- 
existence does not contain any expression naming the 
entity whose existence is in question so that whether the 
statement means anything or not no longer presupposes that 
such an entity exists. Quine wrote 'We need no longer 
labour under the delusion that the meaningfulness of 
a statement containing a singular term presupposes 
an entity named by the term. A singular term need not 
name to be significant (88). As we have noted such a 
split between meaning and naming had been made previously by 
Frege. Thus Quine holds that proper names can ultimately 
be reduced to descriptions (and then removed 
a la 
Russell). 
Advocates of the no-sense position include Wittgenstein 
and Mill. Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of 
a proper name is simply the object for which it stands and 
wrote 'A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ' 
(90). He also contended that 'Only propositions have 
sense, only in the nexus of a proposition does a name 
have meaning. ' (91) 
87. W. O. Quine (1964) p. 7; see also N. Goodman (1951) 
p. 160 and A. J. Ayer (1954) p. 16 
88. Quine op cit p. 7 
89. Ibid p. 9 
90. L. Wittgenstein (1963) p. 23 
91. Ibid p. 25 
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Mill held the view that proper names have denotation 
but not connotation (92). For him a common noun like 
'horse' had both a connotation and a denotation - 
it connotes those properties which would be specified 
in a definition of the word 'horse' and it denotes all 
horses. A proper name on the other hand only denotes 
its bearer. 
Both views are open to criticism. It would seem 
to be intuitively obvious that proper names as they are 
ordinarily used are not equivalent to definite 
descriptions because to call something by its name is 
not to describe it. Naming prepares the way for 
describing, not vice versa. Not only do we not possess 
definitions of most proper names, it is unclear how 
such definitions could be obtained. If one tried to give 
a complete description of the object as the sense of the 
name a consequence would be that any true statement about 
the object that used the name as subject would be 
analytic and any false one would be self-contradictory. 
The meaning of the name and perhaps the identity of the 
object would change every time there was a change in 
the object, and the same name would have different meanings 
for different uses of the name. 
Frege himself realized that different people may attribute 
a different sense to the same proper name (93). Further- 
more if the Fregean view is being held that a single 
description can be substituted for a name, then it may not 
be clear which description out of a whole set of possible 
descriptions of the object in question should be so 
substituted. In particular care must be taken to ensure 
that a contingent property is not selected for this purpose. 
Thus, for example, it might be decided that the name 
'Planck' means 'the person who first regarded energy as 
quantised'. But then this would imply that the statement 
'Planck was the first person who regarded energy as 
quantised' is a tautology, which is counter-intuitive as 
it expresses something which, with a little historical 
investigation, could be shown to be false. 
92. J. S. Mill (1843) Ch. 2 
93. G. Frege (1949) p. 86 
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Some philosophers have attempted to meet such objections 
by suggesting that a cluster of descriptions, rather than 
any single description, determines the referent of a name. 
(94). The referent of a particular name is then that 
object which satisfies most (in some sense) of the 
descriptions in this set. Strawson appears to believe 
that all the properties in the set should be given equal 
weight in determining the referent (95). This seems 
inherently implausible; surely some properties should 
Count for more' than others? Even if this is accepted 
there are still problems with this view. It is still 
held that it is a necessary truth that an object, or a 
person, has the properties which are usually attributed 
to it or them. Thus Searle wrote '... it is a necessary 
fact that Aristotle has the logical sum inclusive 
disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him ... 
(96). Again this seems intuitively implausible. Surely 
it is possible for Aristotle not to have been the teacher 
of Alexander? If this question is answered in the 
affirmative then one must provide some justification for 
referring to this person who has not the teacher of 
Alexander as 'Aristotle' . 
Kripke has attempted to do this in terms of his 
notion of a 'rigid designator'. A rigid designator is 
something which designates the same object in every 
possible world, where, as a non-rigid, or accidential 
designator is something for which this is not the 
case (97). Kripke believes that proper names are rigid 
designators because they satisfy this 'intuitive test'. 
Thus he wrote '... although someone other than the U. S. 
President in 1970 might have been the U. S. President in 
1970 (e. g. Humphrey might have) no one other than Nixon 
might have been Nixon'. (98) and also '... although the 
man (Nixon) might not have been the President it is not 
94. J. R. Searle (1958) p. 166-173. 
95. P. F. Strawson (1964) p. 191-192 
96. Searle (I 9 6q) p. 17 3 
97. S. Kripke (1980) p. 48 and also in Munitz op cit p. 135 
98. Ibid p. 49 
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the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he 
might not have been called 'Nixon') '. (99) 
We can fix the reference of a proper name by a property, 
essential or accidental, in this, the actual world. The 
proper name then rigidly designates the object possessing 
that property in the actual world, in all possible 
worlds (100). Even if, in these counterfactual situations, 
the object no longer possesses the property used to fix 
the reference in the actual world, the proper name still 
rigidly designates that object. In other words once 
its reference is fixed in the actual world the designation 
of the proper name is unaffected by possible changes in 
the actual world which we can imagine (101). 
Thus we may pick out the reference of 'Aristotle' in 
this, the actual world as the man who taught Alexander. 
In a possible world in which someone else gained this 
position we would not refer to that someone else as 
'Aristotle' If Aristotle had never become a scholar he 
would not have possessed this property which we use in the 
actual world to fix the reference of his name. This is 
precisely because the proper name 'Aristotle' rigidly 
designates a certain man. Eventhough the property we have 
used to fix the reference of the name is an accidental one 
we still use the name to designate the man in all 
possible worlds. 
Having outlined some of the criticisms of the sense 
theory, we shall now briefly consider some possible 
failings of the no-sense approach. 
Firstly, as Frege demonstrated this view does not account 
for the occurrence of proper names in identity statements 
that convey information. Secondly, Quine showed that the 
theory is unable to give a decent account of the occurrence 
of proper names in existential statements. Thus in 
'Pegasus does not exist' the proper name cannot be said to 
refer because no subject of an existential statement can 
really refer. Existence is not a predicate. An affirmative 
existential statement expresses a concept and states that 
it is instantiated, rather than referring to an object and 
99. Ibid p. 49 
100. We shall not discuss the question of the status of 
possible worlds. See D. K. Lewis (1968) p. 114)C G1 
(I fl). 
101. Kripke (1980) p. 75 
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stating that it exists. So if a proper name occurs in an 
existential statement it must have some conceptual or 
descriptive content. But if so, then this lends support 
to the Fregean view because the descriptive, content could 
only be the sense of the proper name. 
The nature of the existence of the referents of proper 
names also raises certain problems. A change such as the 
destruction of an object cannot destroy the meaning of 
words, because any change in the world must still be 
describable by words. Thus if one adopts Wittgenstein's 
position the existence of those objects which are named 
by genuine proper names cannot be an ordinary contingent 
fact. This then forces one into the view that there is a 
class of objects in the world possessing a necessary 
existence - those objects which are the meaning of the 
real proper names. But if this is accepted then it would 
make no sense to assert or deny the existence of the objects 
named by genuine proper names. 
Thus the no-sense view, although supported by our initial 
intuitive feelings as to how proper names work, runs into 
difficulties with the existence of referents and identity 
and existential statements (102). 
Although it seems implausible to claimthat proper names 
are merely a kind of shorthand for definite descriptions, 
the sense theory does at least give an account of the 
latter kinds of statements. 
Strawson adopts a version of the Fregean theory as we have 
said, and discusses proper names with particular regard to 
individuality. (103) He argues that the fundamental 
presupposition underlying the use of names is that in 
our linguistic and conceptual structure we presuppose that 
all particulars., to which we refer are individuals in 
the sense that they are unique. And they are unique 
because there is something about each particular that is 
true of it and nothing else. Particulars which are sensibly 
present can, he believes, be demonstratively identified. 
102. Yagisawa has recently tried to get round these 
difficulties, and also solve Fregean paradoxes without 
using disguised descriptions, by regarding proper 
names as bound variables See T. Yagisawa (1984) p. 195 
103. Strawson op cit p. 20 ff. 
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Particulars which are not sensibly present cannot be 
identified simply by names because '... it is no good 
using a name for particular unless one knows who or what 
is being referred to by the use of the name. ' (104) 
Descriptions in general terms alone are also rejected on 
the grounds that there is no guarantee that such a 
description is unique and the possibility of massive 
reduplication remains open, 
Strawson's solution is that a particular which cannot 
itself be demonstratively identified can be '... 
identified by a description which relates it uniquely 
to another which can be demonstrably identified. 1 
(105). Thus a linguistic chain is set up in which 
particulars which are not sensibly present are uniquely 
related to those which are and which can be pointed 
to (verbally and/or physically) by the speaker. 
It might be asked if there are any basic particulars 
or if they are all on an equal standing in this chain. 
Strawson's answer is that material objects are the basic 
particulars. The general conditions of particular 
identification require a unified system of spatio-temporal 
entities that can be publicly observed. Such a system is 
formed by the material universe and material objects can 
therefore be identified independently of the identification 
of particulars in other categories but the latter 
particulars cannot be identified without reference to 
material objects (106). 
Quinton has put forward a view which is similar to 
Strawson's 4n the respect that things are individuated by 
demonstrably referring them to the 'here and now' (107), 
The basic argument here is that individuals owe their 
unique individuality necessarily to their position in 
space and time (108). Qualitatively indiscernible 
distinct things can always be distinguished by reference 
to their respective spatial positions. The proof of this, 
Quinton believes, lies in the metaphysical truth that 
no two things can be in the same place at the same time. 
104. Ibid p. 20 
105. ibid p. 21 
106. Ibid p. 39 
107. Quinton op cit p. 12-20 
108. Ibid p. 17. Similarly Goodman has proposed that place & 
time be considered as essential individuators. See 
Goodman op cit. 
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(109). In other words individuals are impenetrable-Thus 
Quintons view of individuality is crucially dependent 
upon the Impenetrability Assumption. As we shall see 
in subsequent chapters there are things described by 
the laws of physics to which this assumption does not 
apply, and to this extent Quinton's scheme is fatally 
flawed, (as indeed are all others which try to argue 
that spatio-temporal location is a necessary 
individuating property. There can be no guarantee that 
the points of space-time are either vacant or only 
uniquely occupied and indeed a case can be made for say- 
ing this is precisely what is not true in quantum 
physics). 
Thus, according to Quinton to state the spatio-temporal 
position of a thing is to predicate a conjunction of 
properties of it and is necessarily to individuate 
it (110). This would seem to support the 'bundle 
theorists' claim that a thing is simply the collection 
of its properties sans substance, because one can now 
solve the problem of individuation by including positon 
in this collection. However, it is not quite so 
straight forward as Quinton further believes that 
positional predicates are different fr an other properties 
in the sense that '... to ascribe a position to an 
individual in space or time involves an essential 
and ineliminable reference to another individual or 
position (ill). Thus again a kind of individuating chain 
is set up relating individuals to other individuals and 
thus transforming them into more than mere bundles of 
properties. 
Of course an infinite regress can only be avoided if 
the chain ends with some basic or primary positional pre- 
dicate which specifies an individuals unique position in 
space and time. Such a primary positional predicate is, 
according to Quinton, provided by the 'here and now'. 
Thus he writes 'The position where I am at the present 
moment is, then, the absolute point of origin of all my 
positional characterisations of things. It is the one 
109. Ibid. p. 17 
110. Ibid p. 17 
111. Ibid p. 17-18 
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position I do not have to pick out by its relation to 
something else and by their relation to which in the 
end everything else is individuated. The linguistic 
correlate of this absolute point of origin or absolute 
position is the demonstrative part of language, such 
terms as 'here's 'now'. 'this', and III, which require 
for their understanding in any particular employment a 
knowledge of the context in which they are uttered. 
There is a demonstrative aspect to the understanding of 
every singular term that purports to refer to a unique 
individual. It may be practically sufficient to explain 
a singular term to someone by enumerating the properties 
of its bearer but misidentification can be ruled out 
conclusively only by bringing in the position of the 
thing in question. But any reference to position that 
is sufficient to individuate must connect it to the 
here-and-now. ' (112) . 
One can easily criticise this view on the grounds that 
it implies a commitment to a theory of absolute space, 
using 'again our Blackian universe in which there exists 
two things which have all their qualities in common 
and yet which are distinct. The only thing which can 
individuate them, according to Quinton, is their spatial 
positions. However, their spatial relations are only 
to each other and are identical. Thus if spatial position 
is the principle of individuation then the two things 
cannot be individuated on a relational view of space. 
Therefore, if Quinton is to maintain his position he 
must also hold an absolute theory of space. An absolute 
spatial substratum will provide the difference in 
positional predicates necessary to individuate the things. 
We shall consider this problem again in Chaptr Four, 
but now we turn our attention to the problem ofAreident- 
ification of individuals through time. 
1.5 Reidentification Through Time 
This problem arises from the obvious fact that both 
the spatial positions and certain, accidental, 
qualities of individuals change with time. How then is 
112. Ibid p. 20 
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the individual to be reidentified through these changes? 
Whether we adopt the T. I. (113) or S. T. view of 
individuality this problem remains, namely, what grounds 
can be supplied for claiming that an individual b at 
time t2 is the same individual a at an earlier time t1? 
The most obvious solution is in terms of the spatio- 
temporal trajectory joining the location of a at time t1 
with the location of b at time tz. Thus Quinton writes 
'Two things can be identical through time ... only if 
there is a continuous spatial path between the places 
at which they occur. (114) 
Shoemaker has also noted that spatio-temporal continuity 
is a logically necessary condition of 'identity through 
time' (115) and Coburn has given a detailed analysis of 
this criterion in terms of the set theoretic concept 
of the linear continuum (116). 
Although necessary this condition is not sufficient, 
because there are an infinite number of continuous 
spatio-temporal paths between any two points in space-time 
spearated by a non-vanishing interval. This leads to 
the suggestion that a criterion of qualitative continuity 
is required. Thus a necessary condition for a 
particular space-time path to correspond to the career 
of some individual is that any individual-stage on the 
path should be qualitatively similar to a neighbouring, 
or adjacent, individual stage on the path (117). 
This is a very vague condition, the vagueness residing 
principally in the word 'similar', but it is plausible. 
As it stands this condition limits the range of 
admissable qualitative variation of the individual. Thus 
its acceptance implies the rejection of the assumption that 
an individual can retain its identity whatever 
qualitative changes it undergoes. Drastic qualitative 
113. Shoemaker has discussed the connection between the 
substantivalist approach and the analyzability of 
identity statements. S. Shoemaker (1963) p. 57-63 
and p. 254-260. 
114. Quinton op cit p. 66. See also Strawson op cit p. 57 
115. Shoemaker op cit p. 4-5. See also B. Williams (1956-57) 
p. 230 
116. Coburn in Munitz op cit p. 51-103. 
117. Quinton op cit p. 67 Also see E. Hirsch (1982) p. 10-15. 
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changes are effectively forbidden. 
However spatio-temporal and qualitative continuity are 
still not enough. The analysis given so far would not 
prevent us from tracing an individual in such a way that 
we combine stages of the individual with stages of some of 
its parts. (118)Thus a further criterion is needs. This is 
provided by the so called 'Sortal Constraint' which states 
that for a succession of individual stages to correspond 
to a persisting individual there must be some sortal 
term S such that every individual stage in the succession 
comes under, or is an instance of, S. (119) It is not 
our intention to discuss what a sortal, or substantial 
term is. Wiggins has given a very detailed analysis (120) 
as has Hirsch who defines a sortal in terms of the above 
constraint. Thus he gives the following definition : 
'The general term F is a sortal' means: It is a conceptual 
truth (a rule of language) that any spatio-temporally and 
qualitatively continuous succession of F-stages corres- 
ponds to (what counts as ) stages in the career of a 
single persisting F-thing. ' (121). Examples of sortals 
include nouns like car, tree or mountain, but not 
adjectives like green or hard. However, it is difficult 
to establish a clear distinction between what does and 
what does not count as a sortal term, as Hirsch 
demonstrates. 
Underlying the sortal constraint is the less exact but 
conceptually more basic idea that for a succession of thing 
stages to correspond to stages in the career of a single 
persisting thing the succesion must minimize change, 
except of course mere change in location (122). An objects 
career should be traced by following a spatio-temporally 
and qualitatively continuous path which minimises change 
as much as possible. 
Thus we have the following three conditions which are 
neceSSa-+`y for a space-time path to correspond to the 
space-time path or world line, ofAsingle persisting 
individual or for a succession of individual stages to 
correspond to the career of a single persisting individual. 
116. Hirsch Ibid p. 32-33 
119. Quinton op cit p. 67. Hirsch op cit. p. 36 
120. Wiggins (1967) p. 35 ff 
121. Hirsch p. 37-38 
122. Hirsch ibid p. 72-82 
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1) the path or succession must be spatio-temporally 
continuous. 
2) the path or succession must be qualitatively 
continuous in the sense given above, and 
3) there is a sortal term S such that the succession is 
a succession of S-stages, or the path underlies such 
a succession. (123) 
These are still only necessary and not sufficient 
conditions as there are further criteria which may be 
required. For example a compositional criteria might be 
needed to deal with cases such as that of a watch which 
is taken apart, has some parts replaced and is then 
reassembled again. More importantly from the point of 
view of this thesis, two further conditions have been 
suggested, in addition to the three above, as being 
necessary for the identity of a thing. These are 
compositional continuity, which states that the matter 
of which a thing is composed at one moment should be the 
same, or almost the same) as the matter of which it is 
composed at the next moment, and the causality condition 
which holds that there must be a causal relationship 
between the states of a thing at successive moments (124) 
The first of these extra criteria can be rejected on 
the grounds that it assumes the acceptance of a concept 
of matter, a concept which modern physics has to a 
certain extent cast doubt upon (125). The second can 
not be eliminated quite so easily. Hirsch thinks it can 
but his counter examples are at best borderline cases. 
For example he believes that successive stages of a shadow 
are causally independent because each stage is the effect 
of the body which has the shadow and not an effect of 
previous stages. (126) However, while the shadow-stages 
are not directly causally related they are indirectly 
so related through the body casting the shadow. There is 
a direct causal relationship between the body and a shadow 
stage and therefore an indirect relationship between each 
123. Quinton op cit p. 67; Hirsch op cit p. 36. 
124. Shoemaker in French, Uehling and Wettstein (1979) 
p. 326. 
125. Hirsch op cit p. 217 
126. Ibid p. 219 
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stage. In the case of the identity through time of a 
classical elementary particle there is certainly a 
causal link between successive particle-stages as 
expressed by the laws of motion. Indeed these laws 
embody both causal and spatio-temporal continuity. 
The situation is not quite so transparent in the case 
of quantum physics as here there is some doubt about 
whether the fundamental laws describing the motion of 
particles could be described as causal or not. Electron 
transitions within the atom might be candidates for 
events violating this causality requirements, but 
given the Q. F. T. description of such events in terms 
of particle creation and annihilation, they could 
just as easily be regarded as violations of the criterion 
of spatio-temporal continuity also. In this case it 
is not possible to refer to 'the same' electron before 
and after the transition. We shall examine these points 
in greater detail in Chapters Two and Three. 
Thus we conclude that b at time t2 is the same 
individual as a at time tl, if we can trace a spatio- 
temporally and qualitatively continuous succession of 
stages between a and b which all fall under some sortal 
term thus minimizing change. Of course if circularity 
is to be avoided the stages themselves must not be extended 
in time. The S-Stages must be momentary in the sense 
that they themselves do not depend on any criteria 
for reidentification through time. (127) 
This concludes our account of the problems of 
individuality, identity and reidentification. The point 
we wish to emphasise is that historically, as we have 
seen, there were two main candidates proposed for the 
role of individuator. The first is an unknown and 
unknowable 'something', Aristotelian prime matter, or 
Lockean substance, which supports the properties possessed 
by an individual. The other is location in space and time, 
with the individual reidentified through time by its 
continuous spatio-temporal trajectory. Proponents of the 
former view might agree as we have said that 
127. p. 104 
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reidentifiability can be inferred by spatio-temporally 
continuity but that it is conferred, ontologically 
speaking, by the persistent substantial substratum. 
In the following chapter we shall examine the extent 
to which the individuality of elementary particles, 
as described by classical physics, can be analysed in 
terms of the above two positions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN CLASSICAL 
PHYS ICS 
2.1 Particles. v. Fields 
Classical physics can be regarded as comprising two 
kinds of theories : particle theories and field 
theories. The distinction between the two is most 
obvious when one considers the question of matter 
and its interactions. Thus one account holds 
that matter is composed of particles which interact 
via fields of force. Various alternative views have, 
of course, been propounded and vigorously supported, 
such as the Boscovichean 'field' theory of matter 
and the 'action at a distance' view of interactions 
(usually associated with a 'pure' particle theory 
of matter), (1) and we acknowledge that the distinc- 
tion as expressed here is a crude one. 
As it stands it is clearly linked to a difference 
in the underlying ontologies of the theories; in 
particular as regards their fundamental individuals. 
A field theory can be defined as one in which certain 
properties are associated with every point of space- 
time. There are then two possibilities. One is to 
argue that the field is ontologically independent of 
these points, in much the same way as particles can 
be said to be, but with some correspondence existing 
between the points and the field quantities. Fields 
are then granted the status of independent, real 
entities which, furthermore, may be regarded as sub- 
stantial if the term 'substance' is taken to mean that 
which possesses, or is the repository of, energy. Thus 
it can be argued that fields exhibit T. I. 
The alternative view is to say that, on the contrary, 
fields are not independent of the points of space-time 
since they are nothing more than properties of these 
points. On this interpretation it is the space-time points 
1. For a good account of these various theories see 
M. Hesse (1961) 
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which are the primary individuals and which stand in 
the same relation to the fields as a subject doesAits 
predicates. We shall discuss the individuality of 
classical fields in more detail in section 2.4 of this 
chapter. 
A particle theory, on the other hand, is one in which 
various properties, including spatio-temporal ones, 
may be attributed to certain individuals, the particles. 
These characterisations bring out the different role 
which the points of space-time may play in particle 
and field theories respectively. In one interpretation 
of the latter, the second given above, they are the 
individuals possessing certain properties whereas in 
the former they are regarded as the properties poss- 
essed by individuals. 
This distinction between particle and field theories 
does not, however, uniquely and rigidly classify the 
subject matter of classical physics since it can be 
shown that the classical particle mechanics of equal 
point masses can, in fact, be rewritten in terms of 
fields. (2) This underdet . rMi. nation (3) of the particle 
and field interpretations is obviously accompanied by 
a similar ontological 'underdetermination' in the 
sense that one can regard either the particles, 
considered to be substantial, or the points of space- 
time as one's primary individuals. This 'underdeter- 
mination' as regards individuality which, we shall argue, 
occurs in both classical and quantum physics, represents 
our central thesis. 
The realisation that a particle theory could always 
be reformulated in terms of fields occurred very early 
in the history of classical physics in the work of 
Newton. (4) The theory of particle mechanics 
associates with each particle a set of properties, 
2. M. Redhead (1983) Section 2. 
3. See W. O. Quine (1970) p. 179 and, in 
W. Newton-Smith (1980) P. 68-73 and 
a good discussion of this concept. 
it in more detail in section 5.4 of 
4. I. Newton in H. R. Hall and M. B. Hal 
140. 
particular, 
p. 231-242, for 
We shall examine 
Chapter Four. 
1 (1962) p. 138- 
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including their positions and momenta which can be 
represented as the particle's location in a 6-dimen- 
sional phase space. The dynamical state of a system of 
N particles can then be represented in 6N-dimensional 
phase space with qj , pý , i=1, ..., N. as the co- 
ordinates and momenta respectively. Such a theory 
can be rewritten in field theoretic terms in the 
following way. (5) 
A particle can be repýsented by a dichotomic field 
which can possess only two values: 
Yes, No . The value 'Yes' indicates that a 
particle is present at that particular space-time 
location and 'No' indicates that a particle is not 
present. Newton identified 'particle' in this field 
formulation with the property of impenetrability. The 
possession of the value 'Yes' by the field at the 
point (r, t) simply meant that this point had associated 
with it the property of impenetrability, in the sense 
that no other'particle' could occupy this point. 
Thus, if the field has the VakuQ 'Yes' at a point 
(r, t) then this is taken to mean that there is a 
particle disturbance at this point. However, a field 
is only completely specified if the field amplitude 
at all points is specified (unlike the particle case, 
where spatial locations 'other than the one at which 
the particle is observed are not considered). Thus 
if the field has the value 'Yes' at some point then it 
must be specified to have the value 'No' everywhere 
else. A particle will therefore be represented by an 
infinitesimally thin, sharp 'spike' in the field and 
its motion will be translated into motion of this spike 
in the field. 
If we consider for simplicity motion in one dimension 
labelled x, then this can be discussed in terms of 
'blip space' which can be represented graphically by 
taking the x-axis as the real number line and y-axis 
as having only two values, 'Yes' and 'No'. Our 
dichotomic field can now be represented by a mathemat- 
ical function F(x) whose domain is the real numbers 
5. M. Redhead op cit 
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and whose range is the two-element set i Yes., Nol ; 
F. ' (R I /es) IJa 1ý Fcx); ooºvt F= 3, Gr F -j1es No 
In the particle description motion is represented ' in 
terms of the particle at time tl being at location xl 
and moving at time t2 to location x2. In terms of 
the dichomatic field in 'blip space' this can be 
represented as a change in field configuration from 
the spike at x1 to the spike at x2 (see Fig. l. ) 
In other words the movement of particles in space- 
time can be reformulated as the movement of spikes 
or 'blips' in the dichotomic field in 'blip space'. 
In the particle description an individual, the 
particle, has moved from xl at tl to x2 at t2. In 
the dichotomic field representation some property, 
impenetrability say, has been paced from location 




This is a typical field description and just 
as Quantum Field Theory (QFT) describes the creation 
and annihilation of particles in a very'natural'way 
so this description allows one to introduce these 
concepts into classical physics also. This is done 
by introducing Fock space into classical mechanics, 
in which the motion of particles is described in 
terms of creation and annihilation operators operating 
on the spikes in the dichotomic field (6) 
We consider a single classical particle, the time 
development of the state of which takes place in a 
6-dimensional phase space S1. The motion of the 
6. See M. Redhead, Ibid, Section 3, for a discussion 
of the use of Fock space in QFT and Section 4, for 
its application to classical particle mechanics. 
x` Z 
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Adapting the dichotomic field description above we 
can represent the field as the limiting case of 
a continuous distribution ; C) where 
p,; u vL c, Cj, are the momentum and position 
coordinates of the particle which is strongly peaked 
around the location of the particle in S1. The time 
development of /0 specifies a transformation which 
maps A in S1 onto point B, and is determined by 
Liouville's equation 
C, 2'P` cj, ý1 
where 1.1 C p, c ;) iS the Hamiltonian function. 
An operator Q can be introduced to represent this 
transformation such that Q 19 CA) = (2 C 13, ) 
If we now introduce the Liouville operator, defined by 
we obtain 
c. --ý = 
Le 3. 
This equation can be integrated to give 
cý) ePc Co) '-. 
showing the value 
as produced by the 
ýCL-) o 












7. M. Redhead Ibid p. 25 
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We can illustrate the movement of the particle from 
A to B, or the passing of the value of the distribu- 
tion p rr' Alt C Via) to in 'blip' 





In the Fock space formulation of second quantisation 
the quantum mechanical operators can be decomposed 
into creation and annihilation operators. Likewise 
we can formally factorize our transformation operator 
e=ý, a 
o+- Q=a6. 
where 0( is an annihilation operator which takes 
us from the initial field 19(6) to the vacuum, defined 
by f=o, and 0 is a creation operator, which 
recreates the particle from the vacuum in the final 
state PCO . In other words p( annihilates the blip 
at A and transforms it from the space S, to the Space 
So, the vacuum state. (3 transforms the blip from So 
back to S, and recreates it at point ß. t 0 
Thus the motion of the particle from A atA to B at 
t can be decomposed into two parts: first the particle 
is annihilated at A, second it is re-created at. B. 




This procedure can be generalised to take account 
of more than, 
particle 
and in general the transformation 
operator Q can be written as a product of many creation 
and annihilation operators. 
Q -- r". .. `06/V s4"(, 
where N is the number of particles. The phase space 
in which this transformation takes place is then 
decomposed into the union of several phase spaces, of 
smaller dimension: 
8=S,, ) This is the classical Fock space in which the creation 
and annihilation of 'particles' takes place. 
Returning to our single particle moving from A at time Ea 
to B at time to one can obviously regard the interval 
between to and t as being composed of a denumerable 
infinity of instances tl, t2,... ti,... 
The above description in terms of creation and annili- 
ation operators can then be introduced for each 
successive pair of instants Our 
description therefore consists essentially in the claim 
that the particle is being destroyed at every instant 
tL and recreated at the successive instant 6L+1 
This description is remarkably similar to the view 
of a group of 10th Century Islamic philosophers, called 
the Mutakallimim (8). The fundamental proposition of 
their system was that all things are composed of atoms 
which were indivisible, point like and indistinguishable. 
(9) The number of atoms was not regarded as constant 
as the Mutakallimim believed they could be created 
and that their annihilation was therefore not impossible. 
(10). The motion of these atoms, which gives rise to 
change together with a version of the Impenetrability 
Assumption (11), compelled them to postulate the 
8. M. Maimonides (1904) p. 120-133 
9. Ibid p. 120 
10. However no specific arguments were given for the 
reciprocity of these two processes, see J. Bromberg 
(1977) p. 147-157. 
11. Maimonides op cit p. 121 
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existence of a vacuum, devoid of all substance, in 
which the atoms move about. 
The third proposition of their system was perhaps 
the most unorthodox of all : time. they believed, was 
discrete, composed of indivisible 'time elements'. 
This notion of 'time atoms' was held to be a logical 
consequence of the first proposition, and it was also 
believed that the atomicity of space then necessarily 
followed from that of time. (12 ) 
One can even obtain an estimate of the size of one of 
these time-atoms: An hour is e. g. divided into sixty 
minutes, the minute into sixty seconds, the second 
into sixty parts, and so on; at last after ten or more 
successive divisions by sixty, time elements are 
obtained ... '(13). This gives a maximum size, or 
rather duration, for a time-atom of 11(60) io of a second 
or I. 65 XIo$s 
The main conclusion which the Mutakallemim drew from 
these three propositions concerned the nature of motion. 
This, they believed, consisted in the translation of 
each atom of a body from one space element and time 
atom to the next. (14) Motion was thus explained in 
terms of a series of momentary leaps, each atom occupy- 
ing in succession different individual space - and time- 
atoms. Physical motion was thus reduced to a discontin- 
uous process. 
Furthermore, since by the sixth proposition 'Accidents 
do not continue in existence during two time atoms' 
(15) this process is one of creation and annihilation. 
The essential characteristic of an accident was believed 
to be in incapability of enduring over two time atoms. 
Immediately (16) after its creation it is utterly 
destroyed, and another accident of the same kind 
created, this process continuing for as long as God pleases. 
12. Ibid p. 121 
13. Ibid p. 121 
14. Ibid p. 121 
15. Ibid p. 120 and p. 124 
16. It is difficult to reconcile the term 'immediately' 
with the belief in time atoms. It would perhaps be 
more consistent to say that an accident persisted 
during a time atom but was then destroyed about I. 6Sx Iö 
of a second after its creation. 
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Thus we see a remarkable parallel between the views of 
the Mutakallemim and those of modern physics. The 
Islamic scholars also believed that atoms were 
indistinguishable , variable in number, and could be 
created andannihilated. Space and time were regarded 
as discrete and motion was considered to be a process 
of continuous creation and annihilation. The 
similarities with the fundamental precepts of QFT are 
quite striking! 
It is not our intention here to examine the history 
of creation and annihilation processes, although it is 
worth noting the point that this history did not begin 
with Dirac's theory of electrons. (17) As Bromberg has 
demonstrated (18) the coricepe of the annihilation of 
pairs of oppositely charged elementary particles dates 
from the turn of the 20th century when it was offered 
as an explanation of radioactivity. (19) This process 
subsequently became important in astrophysics where it 
was posited as a possible source of stellar energy (20), 
and was thus regarded as a familiar and acceptable 
concept by quantum theorists. The advent of quantum 
mechanics did change the situation in so far as prior 
to its development a belief in annihilation did not 
entail. a belief in creation whereas afterwards it did. 
The great value of Dirac's work, according to Bromberg, 
was to substitute a mathmatically precise handling of 
these processes for qualitative speculations. We shall 
return to some of these points in section 3.8 of Chap- 
ter Three. 
Thus we conclude that particle mechanics can be re- 
written as a field theory and there is no observable 
difference between these two descriptions in the sense 
that no experiment will ever decide which is correct. 
This conclusion will be used in Section 2.2.2. to show 
that it is not necessary, in classical physics, to 
17. P. A. Dirac (1927) p. 243-265 
18. Bromberg op cit. 
19. J. Jeans (1904) P-101 
20. Eddington (1921) p. 351 
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regard the individuality of particles in terms of 
(Transcendental Individuality'. Before we do this, 
however, we must consider this view as it applies 
to classical particles. 
2.2 Individuality In Classical Statistical Mechanics 
We begin by considering the distribution of two 
indistinguishable (in the sense of possessing the 
same set of intrinsic properties, such as mass, charge 
etc. ) particles over two one particle energy states. 
In classical statistical mechanics the following 
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Each of these is assigned equal a priori weights in 
the counting procedure used to calculate the 
probability of a particular distribution. 
Classical, Maxwell-Boltzmann, statistics clearly 
distinguishes between arrangements 1) and 2) and 
counts them as distinct; that is, the arrangement in 
which the two particles have been permuted is regarded 
as distinct in some way, although not observably 
distinguishable from the unpermuted arrangement. 
This implies that the particles are regarded as 
being distinct individuals capable of being identified 
as such through a permutation. 
There are two ways in which individuality can be 
granted to these particles, corresponding to the 
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particle and field approaches in classical physics 
respectively. We shall consider each in turn. 
2.2.1 Transcendental Individuality 
The first way essentially corresponds to a naive 
Lockean substance approach. An individual is regarded 
as a thing composed of an underlying substantial 
substratum bearing certain properties. The bare 
substratum is indicated by a proper name or label, 
which picks out that individual as itself at one 
particular time and reidentifies it as the same 
individual at different times. The labels/proper names 
stand for or designate that which individuates the 
particles i. e. the underlying substance. 
This kind of individuality has been called Trans- 
cendental Individuality (or T. I. for short) by Post, 
because it resides in something, the substratum, which 
transcends the properties of a thing. Thus he writes 
'... we mean by individuality something that transcends 
observable differences - what I will call 'transcend- 
ental individuality'. (21) Arrangements 1) and 2) 
above are observably indistinguishable but are counted 
as distinct. Therefore, that which allows them to be 
so counted, their individuality, must reside in some- 
thing over and above their observable properties. This 
'some-thing' ('we know not what' perhaps, although we 
shall discuss this in Chapter 4) is the substantial 
substratum which remains invariant through a change in 
the properties and allows a thing, a particle in this 
case, to be individuated and reidentified through such 
changes. 
we shall consider the philosophical arguments 
surrounding the nature of this substantial substratum 
in Chapter Four, where we shall argue that the way 
proper names function in classical physics accords with 
the view that we termed the 'no-sense theory' in Chapter 
One. For the moment we merely wish to note that 
21. H. Post (1963) p. 15 See also Reichenbact (1956) p. 225 
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according to the view involving T. I. a particle is 
individuated and reidentified by an underlying 
substance, in which the properties predicated of the 
particle inhere, and which is designated by a label 
or proper name. 
However distasteful this concept may be philosoph- 
ically, it is usually taken to be the way in which 
classical physics treats individuals. Thus it is 
commonly accepted that T. I. is implicit in Boltzmann's 
Combinational Approach, which is the foundation of 
classical equilibrium statistical mechanics. Post, 
for example, has said 'Boltzmann, who founded 
statistical mechanics at the end of the last century, 
extended this notion of transcendental individuality 
implicitly to the atomic realm'. (22) As we shall see 
historical evidence can be adduced in favour of T. I., 
but the support is perhaps not so extensive as is 
usually thought; principally because of the crucial 
role played by Liouville's Theorem, which is essentially 
dynamical in character. It is also open to question 
whether one can in fact 'do' classical statistical 
mechanics solely in terms of T. I., as we shall now 
demonstrate. 
2.2.2. Is T. I. necessary? 
The assignment of weights to the macrostates in 
classical statistical mechanics (the arrangement 
0o for example is given weight two, 
corresponding to the two ways in which it can be realised, 
through a permutation of the particles) can be regarded 
in either one of two ways. One view takes the weighting 
assignments to be part of the axioms of the theory, 
with ., no 
justification required for these assignments. 
In this case T. I. would be sufficient for classical 
statistical mechanics. Alternatively, it can 
be argued 
22. Post op cit p. 15 
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that some justification of the weighting assignments 
must be given, by employing some sort of ergodic 
approach together with Liouville's theorem, with its 
inherent reliance on spatio-temporal continuity of 
path, in which case T. I. must be supplemented with 
some notion involving spatio-temporal continuity 
of the particle trajectories. However, even if the 
weighting assignments are taken to be axiomatic and 
T. I. is taken to be-sufficient it can be shown that 
it is not necessary to classical statistical mechanics. 
One can do this by rewriting the whole theory in 
terms of fields and representing the particles as 
dichotomic Yes-No fields as outlined above. A two 
particle system can then be represented as two 'blips' 
in 'blip space' which move around in this space as 
the particles move. Obviously, T. I. cannot be 
introduced into 'blip space' because now there is 
no underlying substance, merely a property (which 
Newton took to be impenetrability) passing from one 
location to another. The problem now is how such a 
'blip' can be reidentified. 
The solution involves the notion of relative 
identity outlined in Chapter One. We recall that a 
and b are described as being identical in the relative 
sense if a at time t1 is the same F as b at time t2 for 
some sortal concept F. In this case the term 'blip' is 
acting as the sortal concept and the grounds for 
referring to the 'same' blip at t1 and t2 rest on the 
continuous well defined spatio-temporal trajectory of 
the blip. 
Similarly, in our two particle case, if the two blips 
are permuted then the change in the situation is 
revealed through the change in the blips trajectories 
in space-time. The permutation can be represented in 





where we go to three dimensions in order that the 
particles may actually move around one another. Thus 
it is their trajectories in space-time which confer 
individuality upon the blips. 
The next problem is how to obtain the correct 
weighting assignments, while working within this field 
description of classical mechanics. 
In the particle approach the configuration "" 
is given the weight two because it can be achieved 
in two ways, obtained by permuting the particles. T. I. 
is then introduced to indicate that the two complexions 
are regarded as distinct. In the field, or 'blip' 
approach, however, the two configurations are the same 
and, in the absence of an underlying substance, there 
is no way of ontologically distinguishing them. How 
then can the correct weights be obtained? 
If one does not ascribe T. I. to the particles then 
the 'natural' description of the system would be in 
what can be called 'occupation number space', in which 
one associates with each energy box the number of 
particles in that box, in the particle approach, or 
associates with a given spike configuration the number 
of particles in it, o or 1, in the blip approach. 
One can represent this occupation number space as a 






space as a multi- 
dimensional function 
space 
(There are infinitely many axes in this space) The 
system is represented by a point P which moves about 
in this space as the system undergoes change. (By the 
Recurrence Theorem (24) it will eventually return 
arbitrarily close to the point from which it started). 
All the dynamics can be done in this space. 
23. M. (. Zea-kear, (01-15) p. i i- 
24. H. Poincare (1890) p. l. 
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However, one also needs some way of assigning the 
weights to the accessible states in order to perform 
the necessary counting procedure. In occupation number 
space this counting procedure is applied to the 
particles occupying the states and permutations of 
particles can only be counted as distinct if T. I. is 
introduced, since these permutations do not cause any 
change in the position of P. Thus it would appear that 
to attach the correct weights to the states in 
occupation number space one must follow the particle 
approach, introduce T. I. and abandon the field, 
/blip 
approach. One can, however, discover the required 
weights by transforming to another space in which 
particle permutations can be counted as distinct 
without necessarily resorting to T. I. This other space 
is an r-dimensional phase space, where r is the number 
of degrees of freedom of the system. Thus, considering 
more than just two states, our two blip system can be 
represented by a point in a 2-dimensional phase space: 
1'e t7 i'ý$ BGL c-t, & OE cite 
/s 
( SySreM. i. 1 r Z- 
d. 
<, e. tisL cs 
2 
The axes of this phase space have been labelled in 
this graphical representation. These axis labels 
could be used to ascribe T. I. to the particles/blips but 
the important point is that there is no need to do so 
(unlike the case of occupation number space) because there 
is another method available for individuating the blips 
as we shall now see. 
The point representing the system will move around 
the phase space as the system changes. The line at 450 
through this space represents the set of points where 
the blips pass each %other as they move about. For 
any point i there will be a mirror image point f)the 
reflection of i through the 450 line. The permutation 
of two blips is then described by the movement of i 
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to F thus : 
8 
So in this two dimensional phase space the permutation 
of the blips can be represented and distinguished by 
a continuous trajectory which allows the permuted 
complexions to be counted without requiring T. I. 
Thus the individuality of the blips is now grounded 
in the continuity of a trajectory in this two-dimen- 
sional phase space. 
The system can be represented in occupation number 
space but in order to obain the correct weights one 
must either invoke T. I. or transform to this phase 
space. As regards a permutation of the blips when 
one makes such a transformation, the point in 
occupation number space is 'exploded' into the two points 
i and F thus: (25) 
e 
OCC. LLPI 
n wpb E 
Spo-ce 
(Of course in the case of n particles, the point 
P in occupation number space will 'explode' into n! 
i and F type points in phase space). 
The problem now is how to assign the statistical 
mechanical weights to the state represented by the 
point in occupation number space. If an axiomatic 
approach is adopted then one simply assumes that each 
such point has a factor n! assigned to it. If, 
however, one feel compelled to justify these axioms 
then one can transform to the r-dimensional phase 
ý- 
z 
'- S rc&ce 
25. E Sudarshan and3Mehra have outlined a similar 
programme .CIß -to) p. 246 
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space where this point is 'folded out' into the i 
and Ftype points, thus giving the weighting factor 
without necessarily having to use T. I. In this case 
one must justify the (implicit) assignment of equal 
probabilities to the points in this phase space by 
adopting some sort of ergodic approach. 
If one remains in occupation number space then 
the weight assignment for permutations can only be 
carried out by introducing T. I. If one moves 
to the phase space, however, such a procedure can be 
carried out by counting the 'exploded' points in this 
space and employing some form of ergodic theorem. Thus 
T. I. is not required because the permuted complexion 
is di,., stinguished from the umpermuted one by the 
continuity of the system's trajectory in phase space, 
linking points i and F above, for example. 
This trajectory continuity allows the blips to be 
labelled and thcts individuates them in this phase 
space. 
Our conclusion is, therefore, two fold: 
1) tt. is sufficient but not necessary for classical 
statistical mechanics because the required weighting 
assignments can always be discovered in our multi- 
dimensional phase space, where the single representative 
point in occupation number space is 'exploded' into 
many points, and the individuality is conferred, not 
through T. I., but through distinct, continuous trajectories. 
2) we can obtain the correct weights using the blip/ 
field approach, and thus this obstacle to the adoption 
of a field theoretic description of classical mechanics 
has been removed. As we have noted before, although 
there is an ontological difference between the particle 
and field approaches, there is no observable difference 
between them, in the sense that no experiment would 
ever decide which is correct. This is an example 
of the underdetermination of theories by empirical data 
which we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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2.2.3 Space-Time Individuality 
The above account gives us our second way of 
conferring individuality upon classical particles; 
they can be labelled and hence individuated by their 
space-time trajectories. Clearly one can distinguish 
the two particles, and hence arrangements 1) and 2) 
above, by their different trajectories. These allow 
a particle to be reidentified as the same individual 
at different times and through a permutation. 
Such a re-identification depends on at least the 
following two criteria being satisfied (26): 
1) the two particles must never share any part of their 
space time trajectories, i. e. they must not both 
occupy the same place at the same time. Thus we must 
make an Impenetrability Assumption in order that the 
trajectories be distinct and well defined. 
2) the particles must not 'jump' instantaneously 
across space. The trajectories must be continuous, 
this is guaranteed by the equations of motion. 
These criteria are usually taken to be satisfied 
for classical particles. However, as we shall see in 
Chapter Four, quantum physics presents us with examples 
of entities which fail to satisfy one or both of them. 
We shall now examine these criteria in a little more 
detail. 
Clearly the efficacy of a trajectory in space-time 
as an individuator depends on such a trajectory being 
unique. Two particles can share the spatial components 
of their trajectories, but only at different times. 
Likewise two particles can obviously exist at the same 
time but only if they occupy different spatial 
positions. Two space-time trajectories can never inter- 
sect, because given the indistinguishability of 
particles of the same species, it would then be impossible 
to decide which particle was which after the inter- 
section, and hence the possibility of individuation and 
reidentification would be lost. (As we shall see later 
this is exactly the situation which arises in the case 
of fields). 
26. Recall our discussion at the end of Chapter One. 
69 
Thus if their space-time trajectories are to be used 
to individuate the particles then it must be 
assumed that they are impenetrable in the sense that 
no two particles can occupy the same spatial position 
at the same time. We have called this the Impene- 
trability assumption and it can be stated in the 
following form, due to Quinton 'A complete, that is 
to say spatial and temporal position is either 
monogamous or virginal, ontologically speaking'(27). 
As well as being distinct the space-time trajectory 
of a particle should also be continuous, in order that 
one could always, at least in principle, follow or 
'keep track'of the trajectory and hence individuate 
and reidentify the particle. At any particular time 
a particle can be individuated by its position in 
space, i. e. by specifying its spatial co-ordinates. 
Likewise at any particular space a particle can be 
individuated through its 'position' in time i. e. by 
specifying its temporal co-ordinates. Thus at any 
initial space and time a particle can be individuated 
by its initial space-time co-ordinates. These set 
down the initial conditions of the situation. 
The particle's subsequent spatial and temporal 
positions are then given by the classical equations 
of motion governing it. These can be written in the 
Hamiltonian or canonical, form as 
where t is the time, H the 'Hamiltonian', q the 
generalised co-ordinate and p the conjugate generalised 
momentum. The uniqueness of the solutions of these, 
equations of motion then guarantees the re-identif- 
iability and individuality of the particle through 
space and time and, in particular, through a particle 
permuation. Thus what we shall call the 'space-time 
individuality' of the particles is conferred through 
the initial conditions together with the equations of 
27. Quinton op cit p. 17 
70 
motion. 
At the root of this notion lies the assumption that 
even in the absence of an intrinsic difference of 
quality, i. e. even if the particles are indisting- 
uishable, the extrinsic difference of kinematical 
behaviour is a sufficient condition for their 
U .1 41 individuality and identifiab' This difference 
derives its operational meaning from the assumption 
of an unrestricted possibility of establishing 
an unbroken connection between the object at time 
ti with the object at time t2 '... by continuous 
observation (either direct or indirect) through all 
intermediate time' (28). It is this unbroken 
connection which is effected by space time 
individuality. 
Various authors have discussed this, and similar 
notions. Thus Pais has given the following illustration 
of what is meant by it: 'Suppose I show someone two 
identical balls lying on a table. Next I ask him to 
close his eyes and a few moments later'to open them 
again. I then ask him whether or not I have meanwhile 
exchanged the two balls. He cannot tell, since the 
balls are identical. Yet I do know the answer. If 
I have exchanged the balls then I have been able to 
follow the continuous motion which brought the balls 
from the initial to the final configuration. ' (29) 
Pais then makes the historical point that Boltzmann 
himself held this view of space-time individuality 
because in his 1897 'Lectures on Mechanics' -he 
stated that the assumption that indistinguishable 
particles, which cannot come infinitely close to 
each other, can be distinguished by their initial 
conditions and by the continuity of their motion, '... 
gives us the sole possibility of recognising the same 
material point at different times. (30) We shall 
consider this point in more derail later when we 
discuss the history of classical statistical mechanics. 
28. P. W. Bridgman (1927) p. 92 
1 9. A. Pais (1979) . ý93 0. L. Boltzmann (19p14 Vol. 1. P. 9 
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Pais's example is, of course, light hearted in the 
sense that space-time individuality requires 
continuous obervation in principle only and 
blinking, sleeping, or closing the eyes in general 
are not regarded as forming a serious basis for any 
non-trivial counter argument, (sceptical arguments 
notwithstanding). 
As regards the relation between space-time 
indivudality and particle permutations, Tolman has 
noted that '... our procedure in regarding the inter- 
change of two similar molecules as corresponding to a 
significant change in the mechanical state of a system, 
eventhough not in its condition, evidently implies the 
possibility of keeping a continuous observation on the 
system which would let us know whether two similar 
molecules do change roles or not. This, however, is 
in entire agreement with the point of view of the 
classical mechanics, which would permit such a 
continuous observation, at least in principle,... 
(31). 
The reidentification of particles has been discussed 
by Jammer who remarked that in classical mechanics 
... it was claimed that two particles, once 'told 
apart', can always be 'told apart', for they can always 
be reidentified, thanks to the unique v 
ness of the 
solutions of the equations of motion' (32). He 
continued, 'If the motion of each particle is re- 
presented by its four-dimensional world line in space- 
time, a family of non-intersecting lines is obtained 
each of which can be used to characterize or label 
uniquely the particle whose trajectory it is. It 
was therefore thought it is always possible, at least 
in principle, to decide unambiguisly whether or not 
a particle found at a certain time at a certain place 
is the same as a particle found at another time at 
the same or another place'. (33) Thus Jammer's 
interpretation of the classical view is that the world- 
line of a particle can be used to uniquely label and 
hence individuate it. 
31 R. C. Tolman (1962) p. 77 
32. M. Jammer (1966) p. 341-342 
33. Ibid p. 342 
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On this view the space-time trajectory confers 
individuality upon the particles and hence allows 
them to be reidentified. It should be noted, however, 
that space-time individuality does not necessarily 
underpin particle reidentifiability. One may, of course, 
adopt the alternative view in which the particle is 
regarded as exhibiting T. I. with the underlying substance, 
ontologically speaking, conferring reidentifiability upon 
the particle. It is now T. I. which underwrites) as it 
were, the reidentification of the particles. Thus 
ter Haar writes 'In classical mechanics it was regarded 
as permissible to imagine labels attached to each 
of the ... particles, eventhough they are identical. 
in that way each of them could be followed along its 
orbit and localized at every moment'. (34) . Particles 
are 'localized' in this sense, that we can label them 
separately and 'keep track' of them. 
Reichenbach effectively subsumed both T. I. and space- 
time individuality under his term 'material genidentity' 
(35). Genidentity is the relation which connects different 
states of the same thing at different times and the 
properties of this relation are, according to 
Reichenbach, what the notion of physical identity is 
essentially based upon. There are two kinds of gen- 
identity: material and functional. The former is 
defined in terms of three characteristics. 'First, 
we associate material genidentity with a certain 
continuity of change' (36). This is clearly equivalent 
to our requirement that the space-time trajectory of a 
particle be continuous. 'Second, it is a character- 
istic of material objects that the space occupied by 
one cannot be occupied by another 
1(36) 
. This is a 
statement of the Impenetrability Assumption. 'Third, 
we find that whenever two material objects exchange 
their spatial positions this fact is noticeable. We 
usually recognise this change of position by the use 
of specific marks on the objects .... These marks 
remain on the object in accordance with the continuity 
34. f). ter Haar (1958) p. 71 
35. H. Reichenbach ((q T4) p. 38 and. p. 255 ff 
36. Ibid p. 225 
73 
criterion and permit an identification of the objects 
even when no observation during the change of spatial 
positions was made and the continuity criterion 
cannot be applied. In other words an inter-change of 
spatial positions is a verifiable change even though 
no records of the act of interchanging are available: 
(36). It is not clear whether Reichenbach regarded 
these 'marks' as 'dynamically irrelevant unused 
structures' or not. If he did not, then they would 
render the particles distinguishable, and there would 
be no need to talk of T. I. or space-time individuality 
because this difference in their extrinsic properties 
would individuate the particles. If the 'marks' were 
regarded as dynamically irrelevant, like proper names, 
then Reichenbach is essentially advocating T. I. in this 
passage. 
If, however, he is restricting his discussion to an 
outline of what we have called space-time individuality 
then this third'characteristic'is unnecessary. The 
stated justification of this requirement is to allow 
reidentification over periods when no actual ob- 
servation is made. However, a commitment only to 
continuous observation at least in principle is 
sufficient, and if the above, rather than any advocacy 
of T. I. is the only justice fcation then this last 
characteristic is clearly redundant. 
It is easy to give examples to show that these three 
characteristics are necessary but not sufficient. 
Reichenbach himself gives the following: if a house 
is pulled down the resulting heap of rubble is not 
called the same thing as the original house even though 
all three* criteria are satisfied (37). This is clearly 
a problem of relative identity and one needs to 
supplement Reichenbach's three characteristics with 
some view of relative identity, involving the kind 
of sortal concept which, in the above example, would 
37. Ibid p. 225 
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cover both the house and the heap of rubble. 
'Functional genidentity' is associated with processes 
such as water waves. Things possessing this kind of 
genidentity may easily violate the second and third 
characteristics but not, usually the first. We shall 
discuss this in a little more detail when we come to 
consider individuality and fields. 
Reichenbach believed that 'We can define 'genidentity 
to suit our purposes' (38), but that, nevertheless, it 
does make sense to distinguish between different 
kinds of genidentity, such as the material genidentity 
of a billiard ball and the functional genidentity of 
the associated travelling kinetic energy. The problem 
now is how are these two forms of genidentity to be 
distinguished in the case of elementary particles, where 
the macroscopic means of identification are inappli- 
cable. Reichenbach correctly identifies the solution 
(39) as lying in the statistical mechanical view which 
replaces the examination of particles with inferences 
based on the statistical properties of an assemblage 
of such particles. A central notion in this programme 
is that of the arrangement of particles situated in 
different cells (in some parameter space), two such 
arrangements being regarded as distinct when they 
result from one another by an interchange of particles 
between two cells. Reichenbach then writes 'The third 
characteristic of material genidentity, the require- 
ment that exchange of spatial position should lead into 
an observable difference, is thus translated into a 
statistical property; it supplies the definition of 
arrangement. 
' (40) 
The parallel with our notion of T. I. is obvious. 
Reichenbach goes further to argue that experimental 
tests of the physical laws involving entropy constitute 
a test for the assignation of 'material genidentity' to 
the particles because such laws are based, fundamentally 
on the classical Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution formula 
38. Ibid p. 226 
39. Ibid p. 228-229 
40. Ibid p. 229 
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which in turn is based on the above definition of 
arrangement. Such tests, he claims have been 
positive in the realm of classical physics, but 
negative in quantum physics. The conclusion is that 
in the latter material genidentity must be replaced 
by functional 8. enidentity. As we have said, we shall 
discuss this in more detail in a later section, 
It should be noted that, contrary to Reichenbach's 
claims, these 'experimental tests' do not constitute 
a test for material genidentity as a whole but only 
for his 'third characteristic', corresponding to what 
we have called T. I. They are not, therefore, also 
tests of space-time individuality and no inferences 
can be drawn from them as regards the validity of this 
notion. 
We shall conclude this outline of the views of other 
writers by noting that Newton characterised the elements 
of his 'proto' - theory of classical mechanics in terms 
of 1) Impenetrability, 2) mobility, and 3) the 
ability to excite the senses. Again, the parallel 
between our characterisation of space-time 
individuality and Newton's criteria 1) and 2) is clear. 
We must now examine the ontology underlying this 
second kind of individuality for classical particles. 
On this view there is no underlying substance 
carrying' the individuality. There is merely the set 
of properties predicated of the particle moving along 
a well defined, continuous path in space-time. Now it 
is not necessarily true that the entire set of 
properties remains invariant between one space-time point 
and the next. Some of the properties may change during 
the particle's history. However, if the particle is to 
be reidentified as a particle of the same kind then a 
certain subset of properties must remain invariant 
over space and time. This subset may be identified with 
the particle's essential properties, where an 'essential 





possess at all times if it is to remain a particle of 
that kind. (41) We shall discuss essentialism and 
natural kinds in Section 4.3 of Chapter Four. 
Thus if an electron 'becomes', through some 
peculiar interaction, a proton, say, then we must say 
that at a certain point an electron was destroyed and 
a proton created. As we have noted, the formalism of 
Quantum Field Theory allows us to handle creation and 
annihilation processes. 
On the other hand if an electron merely changes its 
velocity then we refer to the particle before and 
after the change as 'the same' electron. Properties 
such as this have been called 'extrinsic' properties 
by Jauch, (42) since they are dependent upon the state of 
the particle. Properties which are not dependent upon 
the state, such as charge, rest-mass, etc., are 
termed 'intrinsic' properties. Thus our subset of 
invariant properties may be referred to as the 
intrinsic properties of the particle. 
In the last section of Chapter One we noted that 
for an object to be reidentified through time the 
three sufficient conditions of spatio-temporal 
continuity, qualitative continuity and the so-called 
'sortal constraint' must be satisfied. In terms of 
these conditions we can discuss the reidentification of 
elementary particles through changes in their extrinsic 
properties as follows : - 
First of all, as we have emphasised in the discussion 
at the beginning of this section, classical 
elementary particles satisfy the requirement that 
their trajectories be spatio-temporally continuous. 
Secondly, the extrinsic properties of the particles 
change in a continuous manner and 'drastic', or 
discrete, changes do not occur. Thus the condition of 
qualitative continuity is also satisfied, and can be 
formulated for the specific case of classical 
particles thus: for any succession of particle stages 
to correspond to the career of a particle any particle 
stage inAsuccession must be qualitatively similar as 
regards the particle's extrinsic properties, to any 
neighbouring particle stage in the succession. 
41. E. Hirsch 44 M" K" 0"1t&stkz (101 11) P-31 
42 . J. M. Jauch (1966 
) CG, IS, 
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Of course, this requirement may not be fulfilled in 
quantum physics where discontinuous phenomena, of the 
sort prohibited by the corO ition of qualitative 
continuity, do occur. However, in these cases 
particle reidentification is precluded by the failure 
of the requirement of spatio-temporal continuity 
anyway, and it is precisely in these situations (such 
as electron transitions within atoms for example) 
that creation and annihilation processes are 
introduced. 
Finally, we note that, whereas the requirement of 
qualitative continuity is concerned with the 
extrinsic properties of the particle, the Sortal 
Constraint is concerned with its intrinsic properties. 
Thus the relatively small set of intrinsic properties 
which may be taken to define what it is to be that 
kind of particle, also define the sortal term covering 
a particle. The sortal 'electron', for example, is 
explicaed.. in terms of a certain rest mass, certain 
charge, etc. which are precisely those properties 
used, together with spatio-temporal continuity to 
reidentify an electron through time. (43). Thus the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties 
reveals how much closer the relationship is between 
sortal terms and natural kinds for elementary particles 
compared with macroscopic objects. 
So, if classical particles are taken to exhibit 
'Space-Time' Individuality then, on this view, there 
is simply an underlying trajectory of space-time 
points alongwhich the set of properties predicated of 
the particle is moving. There is nothing more than 
a set of properties and an underlying sequence of 
space-time points at which this set is instantiated. 
There is nothing extra, nothing attributed to the part- 
icle, over and above its set of properties. So by 
grounding the individuality of the particle in 
space-time in this way, . 
this view has, in effect, 
transferred this individuality from the particle to a 
43. See P. E. Hodgson (1980) for a discussion of the 
particle identification criteria actually 
used by praticising high energy physicists. 
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point, or set of points, in space-time. This point, 
or set of points, then form the primary individuals to 
which the particles are related and in terms of which 
the particles are individuated. 
Clearly a description of classical particles in 
these terms is)recalling our definitions in Section I 
of this chapter, equivalent to the field description. 
The particles are now regarded as nothing more than 
properties of the points of space-time, with their 
individuality residing at the most fundamental level, 
in these points. The question, now of course, is how 
is individuality to be attributed to the space-time 
points themselves? We shall return to a brief 
consideration of possible answers to this question in 
Chapter Four. 
Thus we conclude that the individuality of classical 
particles can be described in terms of either of the 
two positions outlined in the introduction to Chapter 
One, namely T. I. and S. T. Individuality. These two 
views correspond to, in the sense of ontologically 
underpinning, the two interpretations of classical 
mechanics in terms of particles or fields respectively. 
There is no way of experimentally distinguishing 
between these two interpretations, although they are 
clearly metaphysically quite distinct. 
In the next section we shall examine the 
relationship between our second view of particle 
individuality above and the nature of space-time 
itself. 
2.2.4 Space-Time Individuality and Space-Time 
Broadly speaking considerations of the nature of space 
and time fall into two opposing camps, the relation- 
alist and the absolutist, or substantivalist. We shall 
briefly consider each of these in turn. 
If a relational account of space-time is adopted 
then it is difficult to see how one can simultaneously 
hold the view that it is out notion of space-time 
individuality which supplies the Principle of 
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Individuation for material patricles. The naive 
relationist position claims that space-time is given 
simply by the relations between things no more and no 
less, and that ultimately reality rests solely with the 
latter. In particular it is argued that there is 
no underlying substratum of space-time in which the 
individuality of a material object can be embedded. A 
relationist cannot therefore ground the individuality 
of an object on the continuity of its spatio- 
temporal trajectory and must look elsewhere for a 
principle of Individuation'. (44) 
It is equally clear that if the alternative, absolutist, 
position is taken up then space-time individuality can 
be consistently invoked, although it is not necessary 
that it should be since one could say that T. I. could 
be attributed both to the material objects and the 
points of space-time with perhaps some sort of 'matching' 
between them. The naive absolutist view holds that 
space-time is a fixed substratum or some sort of 
'aether', in which material objects are somehow 
embedded. Both the latter and space-time itself are 
granted the status of real entities, existing, to a 
certain extent which will be made clear shortly, 
independently of one another. This is the common 
element of all such absolutist views, whether of space 
alone or time, or space-time, namely '... the claim 
that the structure in question can be said to exist and 
to have specified features independently of the existence 
of any ordinary material objects... '(45) Space-time 
is thus regarded as a substratum underlying material 
objects and is the 'arena' in which events take place. 
Clearly an absolutist can ground the individuality 
of an object in this underlying space-time via its 
spatio-temporal location and can reidentify it through 
time by the set of points which compose the object's 
trajectory. One could even go further and regard 
44. One possibility is to attribute T. I. to the objects, 
another is to invoke the Principle of Identity of 
Indiscernibles and individuate them by the set of 
properties which they possess. Leibniz's Complete 
Notion of an Individual represents a particularly 
extreme version of this alternative, illustrating 
perhaps the lengths whi, 
Arelationists may be forced 
to go ' to . 
At; _ r. _sklar 
(1977) p. 161 
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space-time as the primary particular in the sense that 
all others are derived from it. This would be a 
version of the view in which material objects are 
regarded as mere manifestations of the underlying 
spatio-temporal plenum, (c. f. certain interpretations 
of the field equations of General Relativity). If 
material objects are regarded as properties of the 
points of a substantial space-time in this way then 
the view involving space-time individuality must be 
adopted, if any such position is to be sought for. 
The notion of 'support' is used here in the same 
way as in the substantivalist account of material 
particulars and is thus open to the same philosophical 
objections which we shall rehearse in Chapter 4. 
Indeed the absolutist account of space-time in general 
falls into the substantivalist camp and arguments for 
and against the former bear a close resemblance to 
those produced in discussions of the latter. (46) 
It is important to note that we are considering here 
space-time, not space or time alone. Special 
Relativity compels one to reject an absolute theory 
of space, in which it is taken to be separate from 
time. Thus observers in relative motion to one another 
will take their space and time axes at different angles 
to one another. 'slicing' space-time at different 
angles. However, S. R. is quite consistent with either 
an absolute or a relational account of space-time 
since the fact that it can be sliced at different angles 
does not prevent it from being regarded as some thing 
existing independently of material objects. 
The situation is somewhat more complicated when we 
come to the space time of General Relativity since 
there now exists a lawlike connection between keS 
structure and the distribution of non- gravit- 
ational mass-energy 'contained' in it. This connection 
is established through the field equations. 
J_ 10, R &k -, ýzj, (Z = -rl. 1ýlz . 
where &k. is the g-function, R the scaler curvature, 
the Ricci tensor, Fý is a coAsea. & and Tý is the 
'stress-energy' tensor. The terms on the left hand 
46. Ibid Ch. III 
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side give the structure of the gravitational field 
regarded as the intrinsic geometry of space time, and 
the term on the right gives the distribution of mass- 
energy over this space-time. 
The extent to which G. R. can be used to attack the 
absolutist position then depends on whether or not 
these equations are regarded as completely ruling out 
the term 'independently' in the characterisation of 
this view. If they do, if, for example, they are 
interpreted as implying that the curvature of any 
portion of space-time is 'produced' by the matter in 
it, then it is difficult to see how the absolutist 
account can be retained and some alternative must be 
adopted. However, it is not at all clear that they 
do imply this. 
First of all the equations can equally well be read 
from the left or the right. Thus it could just as well 
be said that the structure of space-time 'produces' 
the mass-energy distribution, as the reverse that the 
latter 'causes' the former. Indeed the interpretation 
that matter consists simply in regions of special 
curvature of space-time lies at the heart of the 
geometrodynamics programme in Ne. (ai-(, vL S& -. - 
cosmology (47), which can be regarded as the ultimate 
in substantivalist programmes. 
Secondly, there exist solutions of these equations 
which predict that there would be a curvature and 
hence a structure of space-time even if there were a 
total absence of matter. The following historical 
point: is worth noting. In the years immediately 
following the publication of the field equations 
Einstein believed that in their correct form they 
should have no solutions at all in the absence of 
matter (48). However, in 1917 de Sitter found a solution 
47. J. Wheeler (1962) p. 361; A. Grunbaum (1957) p. 525 
see also the discussions by Reichenbach and 
Robertson in P. A. Schilpp (1951) 
48. A. Pais (1982) p. 287. 
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in which the mass density is equal to zero (49) and 
although Einstein looked for ways in which this solution 
could be eliminated, he quickly came to realise that 
it could not. 
In general G. R. is compatible with a number of 
different possible space-times, of varying metric 
structure, each of which could be the space-time of a 
universe devoid of non-gravitational mass-energy. 
These solutions weigh heavily in favour of the 
absolutist position since a relationist clearly 
encounters severei. difficulties in talking about or 
even conceiving of, totally empty space (50), 
counterfactually or otherwise. 
Finally the relationship between the mass-energy 
distribution and space-time structure as expressed 
by these equations is not a simple causal one, in 
either direction. The stress energy tensor takes into 
account not just the amount of mass distributed over 
space-time but also how it is distributed and thus 
this tensor itself expresses metric features of the 
mass-energy distribution. It is therefore somewhat 
naive to argue that the latter causes the structure 
of space-time in a way in which the relationist would 
like it to do. 
These brief points suggest that G. R. provides 
little evidence to support the relationist position. 
As regards the independence of space time from matter, 
presupposed by the absolutist view, all that one can 
deduce from the field equations is that the structure 
of space-time is not causally independent from the 
mass energy distribution. However, it may be 
ontologically independent and, indeed the points outlined 
above indicate that this may be so. Whether this is 
enough to save the latter view is a matter for further, 
49. W. de Sitter (1917a) p. 1217 and (1917b) p. 229 
50. As we have seen the relationist account also has 
difficulty in discussing a universe containing 
only two indistinguishable objects. 
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more detailed, consideration. 
Fi/ºa. lly, it is worth noting that it may be possible 
to adopt a view of space-time which falls into neither 
the relationist nor the absolutist camp. Thus although 
Newton is most commonly identified as belonging to 
the latter, in a manuscript published after his death 
he argued'that space and time may be neither substantial 
nor mere relations between objects but may belong to 
a different ontological category of their own. This 
argument was based on the claim that '... it is only 
by their mutual order and positions that the parts of 
time and space are understood to be the very same 
which in truth they are, and they do not possess any 
principle of individuation apart from that order and 
those positions. '(51) In other words the points of 
space-time can only be individuated up to an automor- 
phism of the space-time structure. We shall return to 
a consideration of this last point in Chapter 4. For 
the moment it is sufficient to note that neither S. R. 
nor G. R. conclusively rule out the absolutist view 
of space-time, nor, consequently, space-time 
individuality. 
2.3 The History of Classical Statistical mechanics 
Our intention in this section is to show that our 
philosophical conclusion is supported by an historical 
analysis of the development of statistical 
mehcanics in the 19th century. In particular we shall 
consider Boltzmann's two approaches to this subject 
: 1. The H-Theorem Approach, based on a consideration 
of collisions between molecules traversing well defined 
continuous spatio-temporal trajectories, and 2. The 
Combinatorial Approach, based on a consideration of the 
distribution of individual molecules over cells in 
phase space, or energy states and free, to an extent 
which will be made clear, from 'dynamical' under- 
pinning. These approaches implicitly attributed space 
-time and transcendental 
individuality, respectively, 
51. Newton in A. R. Hall and M. B. Hall (1978) p. 100. It 
was a review article by Torretti which drew my 
attention to this paper. R. Torretti (1984) p. 280. 
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to the atoms whose behaviour they described. 
2.3.1. The Introduction of Statistical Considerations 
into the Kinetic Theory of Matter 
The kinetic theory of matter can be described as 
the attempt to explain the empirical regularities occur- 
ring in the macroscopic properties of material 
'things' in terms of the microscopic behaviour of their 
atomic and molecular constituents which obeyed 
Newtonian mechanical laws. The early studies in the 
revival of kinetic theory which occurred in the second 
half of the 19th century(52), assumed that all the atoms 
travelled at the same velocity and that the influence 
of intermolecular impacts and forces were negligible 
and were therefore limited in explanatory and predictive 
power. The development of the subject took a major 
step forward when Maxwell allowed intermolecular 
collisions to play a role and demonstrated that their 
effect was to produce a statistical distribution of 
molecular velocities in which all velocities would 
occur with a known probability. (53) The nature of 
this distribution was given by Maxwell's distribution 
Z/ L 
- ýz a. law: ._ e_ ( c4-) ýt. 
where a is some constant and x in the component of 
velocity in the x direction. The original proof of 
this law was widely regarded as unsatisfactory and sub- 
sequent attempts to derive it more rigourously can 
be 
divided into four types: 1). If a Maxwellian 
distribution is already established then conservation 
of energy implies that further collisions will 
leave it 
unchanged and hence this distribution 
is the only one 
which is stable. This was the line taken 
by Maxwell 
52. This revival was dependent upon a conceptual change 
from the idea of heat as substance to that of heat 
as motion of atoms and also the 
development of 
mathematically tractable models of 
the motion of 
particles. See Brush 
(1970) 
53. J. C. Maxwell (1860) 
5'4. -S-C- tAO-X weI1 c1 8qo) P-380. 
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himself in 1867. (55). 2). One may define a 
quantity, H, which depends on the velocity distribu- 
tion and then show that the effect of molecular 
collisions is always to decrease H, unless the 
distribution is Maxwellian in which case H remains 
constant. This constitutes the essence of Boltzmann's 
'H-Theorem approach'. 3). The molecular velocities 
may be regarded as random quantities and the best 
possible estimate of their distribution, given fixed 
total energy, mass and momentum, obtained using 
probability theory. Maxwell's derivation may be 
improved by simply calculating all possible ways of 
dividing the energy amongst the molecules, given 
finite total energy and number of molecules. This 
was the approach suggested by Boltzmann in 1872 and 
Maxwell in 1879, and which subsequently developed into 
the 'Combinatorial Approach'. , 4). The Maxwellian 
distribution may simply be treated as a primitive 
postulate of the theory and justified on the basis 
of its predictive power (56). In what follows we 
shall be almost exclusively concerned with the second 
and third approaches. 
Using this law Maxwell was able to demonstrate that 
the fundamental linear transport processes in a gas - 
vCscosity, heat conduction and diffusion - could all 
be conceptualized as special cases of a generalised 
transport process in which a physical quantity is 
carried by molecular motion and transferred from one 
molecule to another by collisions. (57) Maxwell 
distinguished this theory, based on the statistical 
method of explanation, fran one concerned with the 
motions of individual molecules and, therefore based 
on the 'dynamical' method, arguing that such motions 
were unobservable and impossible to compute in practical 
55. J. C. Maxwell Ibid Vol LL p. 26 
56. See J. P. Andrews (1928) p. 118 
57. J. C. Maxwell (1890) Vol. II p. 33/374. See also 
P. M. Heimann (1970) p. 201 
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terms. This formed the basis for his later 
argument that the Second Law of Thermodynamics was 
a statistical, rather than a dynamical, law. 
Nevertheless his transport theory was explicitly 
grounded on a detailed study of intermolecular 
collisions and at the base level the molecules were 
still, of course, regarded as traversing distinct, 
continuous space-time trajectories, obeying 
Newtonian mechanics in a strictly deterministic manner 
The statistical anaylsis was introduced purely as a 
matter of convenience, to overcome the practical 
problems in handling enormously large numbers of 
molecules. (58) 
This work had a great influence on Boltzmann and 
completely changed the direction of his attempts to 
arrive at an explanation of the irreversibility of natu- 
ral processes as expressed by the Second Law of Thermo- 
dynamics. 
2.3.2. Boltzmann's Initial Attempts 
In 1865 Clausius restated the Second Law in terms of 
his newly introduced entropy function. <59). The task of 
kinetic theory was then two fold: first, to demonstrate 
the existence of an entropy function satisfying 
Clausius's definition and secondly to show that this 
function can only increase in an irreversible 
adiabatic process. 
Boltzmann's first attempt at providing a kinetic 
explanation of the Second Law began with the stated 
intention of deriving Clausius's results as purely 
mechanical theorems. (60) Although he claimed to 
have done just this, in fact he only managed to construct 
a mechanical counterpart of the entropy for systems which 
were strictly periodic, and his later studies compelled 
him to renounce his assertion that the irreversible 
aspect could be identified with the least action 
principle. 
58. A belief in determinism was not. held quite so strong- 
ly by the classic al physicists as is usually thought. 
Thus Maxwell himself repudiated this doctrine on 
several occasions. See Brush (1983) p. 83 and K. 
Popper (1950) p. 117 and p. 173. 
59. R. Clausius (1865) p. 
60. L. Boltzmann (1968) Vol. i p. 9 
85 
After reading Maxwell's 1867 paper Boltzmann 
realised that the key to a successful reduction of the 
Second Law lay in the molecular distribution function 
rather than the complete set of molecular variables. 
In a series of papers in 1968 and 1871 he derived 
and extended Maxwell's results and also, in 1868, sketched 
an alternative derivation which was free from any 
assumptions regarding inter-molecular collisions. (61) 
Thus he simply assumed that there was a fixed 
total amount of energy to be distributed over a finite 
number of molecules in such a way that all combin- 
ations of energies were equally probable. By regarding 
the total energy as being divided into small but 
finite packets, Boltzmann could treat this as a problem 
in combinatorial analysis and thus he obtained a 
complicated expression which reduced to the Maxwell 
distribution law in the limit of an infinite number 
of molecules a nd infinitesimal energy elements. This 
is the first indication of what was to develop into 
his Combinatorial Approach of 1877. (62) 
However he did not imme&Lately pursue this line of 
thought but went on to lay the foundations of his 
IH-Theorem Approach'. It is interesting to note 
that in two papers published in 1871 Boltzmann 
introduced what was later called the lergodic hypothesis' 
in order to establish the equivalence of two meanings 
which could be given to the distribution function: 
1) that it determines the fraction of any suitably long 
time interval during which the velocity of any parti- 
cular molecule has values within precribed limits; 
2) that it determines the fraction of the total number 
of molecules in the case which has velocities within 
the precribed limits at any given moment. Initially 
Boltzmann thought that no analysis of this equivalence 
61. Ibid p. 49 
62. Boltzmann subsequently realised that dividing up the 
energy continuum, as he did in 1868, leads to the 
Maxwell distribution in two dimensions only. To 
treat the three dimensional case a division of the 
three-dimensional velocity space must be considered. 
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was necessary but he subsequently realised that some 
hypothesis was called for, to the effect that in 
the course of time, the molecular coordinates and 
momenta take on all values consistent with the fixed 
total energy. (63) As we shall see this hypothesis 
plays an absolutely crucial role in the justification 
of the weighting assignments in the Combinatorial 
Approach and in establishing a connection between this 
and the H-Theorem Approach. 
In the same year, 1871, Boltzmann began a new assault 
on the Second Law. (64) By using the general 
distribution law to distinguish the heat added to the 
system from the work done on it in any process, 
something which was not possible when the system 
was described directly in terms of its atomic variables, 
he was able to write down an expression for the entropy 
of a system in purely mechanical terms. Furthermore 
this specified a definite procedure for calculv, ating 
the entropy of a system in thermodynamic equilibrium. 
Thus Boltzmann not only demonstrated that an entropy 
function exists, he also established a procedure for 
finding it. (65) The second half of the reduction of 
the Second Law-giving a mechanical explanation of 
irreversibility- was to be completed the following 
year. 
2.3.3. The H-Theorem Approach 
In 1872 Boltzmann discussed the behaviour of the entropy 
function in irreversible processes by considering the way 
in which the velocity distribution changed with time 
due to intermolecular collisions (66). This work can 
be regarded either as an attempt to complete the 
reduction of the Second Law, or as an alternative approach 
to the problem of thermal equilibrium, by assuming 
that the gas was not in equilibrium and then attemp- 
ting to show that the effect of collisions would 
63. Ibid p. 50, P284. 
64. Ibid p. 288 
65. For a detailed discussion of this work see E. E. 
Daub (1969) p. 326. 
66. L. Boltzmann (1872) p. 275, (1968) Vol. I p. 316. 
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be to bring equilibrium about. Viewed in this way 
two fundamental aspects of this work can be linked 
together: 1) the attempt to demonstrate the unique- 
ness of the Maxwell velocity distribution, i. e. that 
the distribution law is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for equilibrium; 2) the derivation of an 
integro-differential equation for the non-equilibrium 
velocity distribution function, now known as 'the 
Boltzmann transport equation'. From this it 
immedULately follows that the Maxwellian distribution 
represents the equilibri state, in the sense that 
one obtains a zero valueI4, ly direct substitution. 
Thus Boltzmann began his 1872 study with a detailed 
analysis of the collision processes by means of 
which the molecules in a gas can change their energies. 
(67), restricting himself to the case of a spatially 
homogenous gas, with no external forces and of 
sufficiently low density that only binary collisions 
need to be considered. On the basis of '... an exact 
consideration of the collision process'; (68) he 
determined the rate at which the energy distribution 
changes due to such collisions# by deriving an 
expression for the rate of change of the number of 
molecules having a given energy xe due. to these L'S 
encounters. This equation for in fact a special e L"rLtkoe6e9). If the case of the Boltzmann transpit 
0 
distribution is Maxwellian then the right hand side of 
the equation vanishes identically for all values of 
the variables and -ý&, = 0. Thus in this sense the 
Maxwellian distribution is indeed stationary. Once it 
is achieved no further change in the distribution 
function can occur and the system will remain in the 
equilibrium state. 
This is little more than an elaboration of previous 
work, but now, with an explicit 
formula for C)P .4 bbr 
67. Boltzmann chose energy rather than velocity as the 
basic variable. This merely introduces square root 
terms in the resulting equation which do not appear 
in its modern form. 
68. L. Boltzmann op cit p. 329 
69. Ibid p. 334 
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Boltzmann was able to show that ýC7L,, O alway 
tends towards the Maxwellian form, (the emphasis on 
the word 'always' is important as we shall see). Thus 
to demonstrate the uniqueness of this distribution he in- 
-troduced (70) an auxiliary quantity E. (later called 




By considering the symmetrical character of the collision 
and the possibility of inverse collisions, and assuming 
as Maxwell had before him, that the velocities of 
the two molecules before they collide are 
statistically independent, (this is the randomness 
assumption known as the Stosszahlansatz). Boltzmann 
demonstrated (72) that E could only decrease with 
time i. e. 
1,5 <0 13. 
E cannot decrease to infinity and so the distribution 
function must approach a form for which E has a minimum 
value and its derivative vanishes. At this value the 
function haso and can only have, the Maxwellian form. 
The equation encapsulates the essence of 
the H-Theorem. Thus the Hti function I always decreases 
under the effect of collisionso unless the distribution 
is Maxwelliano in which case it remains constant. 
Since E, or H. decreases in a strictly monotonic 
fashion with timee -E clearly increases in the irrevers- 
ible approach to equilibrium and therefore behaves 
like the entropy function in the form given by 
Boltzmann the previous year. Furthermore he was able to 
produce an explicit form for the minimum value for E 
which differed by only a multiplicative and additive 
constant from the expression for the equilibrium entropy 
obtained in the 1871 study. Thus -E not only 
behaved like the entropyl it was actually proportional 
to it in the equilibrium state. This implied, as 
70. probably through a combination of educated guesswork 
and trial and error. See S. G. Brush 
(1976) Vol. II 
p. 351 & 449. 
71. L. Boltzmann op cit p. 335 
72. The proof is quite straightforward and relies on 
the fact that the quantity (a-b) log (b/a) is always 
negative 3if -3a 4and 
b are real positive numbers. 
I p. 
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Boltzmann wrote (73), an entirely new approach to 
proving the Second Lawl one that could deal with 
the increase in entropy in irreversible processes as 
well as With its existence as an equilibrium state 
function. Thus the H-Theorem effectively extended 
the definition of entropy to non-equilibrium 
situations (74) and thus completed the kinetic proof 
of the Second Law. 
However, thisderivation contains a major flaw, as 
was subsequently realised. In the form as given here 
the H-Theorem is strictly deterministic. The 
distribution function, however, is coarse grained in 
he sense that an infinite number of different possible 
arrangements of the molecules within each cell of 
phase space are compatible with the same form for 
This combination of a statistically based distribu- 
tion function and an apparently fully deterministic 
kheory gave rise to a tension within Boltzmann's work 
in which statements describing the statistical nature 
of the H-Theorem are juxtaposed with more frequent 
passages describing its results in purely deterministic 
terms. 
To carry his derivation through Boltzmann wrote 
in a form explicitly dependent upon timey developed 
a differential equation for its time dependence 
and then treated its form at t0 as an initial 
condition which the appropriate solution of the 
equation must satisfy. However this treatment, although 
adequate for a non-statistical function of the system's 
coordinateso is inappropriate for the problem 
Boltzmann was considering. Although the form 
of 
P describes the actual distribution of 
molecular energies at t0, its coarse grained nature 
prevents it -,, from functioning as an initial condition 
in the strict classical sense. Each of the possible 
73. Ibid p. 345-346. 
74. See Brush op cit p. 443; Klein (1970) p. 102 
For a note of dissent see Kuhn op cit p. 42 
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molecular arrangements which it allows corresponds 
to a different initial condition for completely 
specified mechanical system and each results in a 
different trajectory for that system over time. The 
The actual form given to F at to does not 
therefore determine its form at later times. (75) 
Boltzmann's equations for F and H actually 
determine only average or most probable values 
and many other rates of change are compatible both 
with the given initial distribution and mechanics. 
Although Boltzmann eventually recognised, through 
outside criticism, many of the problems which resulted 
from his initial misconceptions, he never actually 
revised his proof to eliminate the explicit dependence 
of f upon t. or to permit a family of F curves 
to be generated from a given initial form for F- 
His notable failure to consider fluctuations is due, 
in large part, to the deterministic way of regarding 
the time dependence of F and HI which obscured the 
realisation that physical conditions could exist 
underAthe theory would break down, such as very high and 
low gas densities for example. 
The alternative approach, first hinted at in 1868, 
also briefly appears in this 
1872 work and Boltzmann considered it 
to be ... much clearer and much more intuitive'. 76) 
Again the energy was treated as a discrete variable 
so that the possible energy values of the system were 
restricted to the set 0, E> ZE., -, &, pE where p 
is an integer and 6 is a small energy unit. The 
Boltzmann Equation was then replaced by a set of 
ordinary differential equations in time (77), and the 
forms of r and C) & 
derived. This is 
clearly another precursor of the Combinatorial Appraoche 
although the technique, as it stood, was not so general 
as to be used to obtain an expression for the entropy. 
75. Except of course for times so close to t that 
few, if any, intermolecular collisions have taken 
place. 
76. Boltzmann op cit p. 346 
77. i. e. non-linear coupled stochastic equations. 
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With the exception of this digression this 1872 
analysis was based upon considerations of binary colli- 
sions between Molecules traversing distinct continuous 
trajectories which, implicitly at least, individuated 
them. The introduction of the coarse grained 
distribution function prevents an exact calculation 
of the separate trajectories but insofar as it is still 
grounded on a consideration of such trajectories, this 
only makes the space-time individuality implicit 
rather than explicit. 
2.3.4. Loschmidt's Criticisms 
Boltzmann's conclusion, that the H function always 
decreased, was recognised by Maxwello Tait and Thompson, 
as a result that could not, in fact, hold with 
universal validity, (78) Unaware of these discussions, 
Loschmidt presented a theorem intended to demonstrate 
the impossibility of deriving the Second Law from 
mechanics. He began by noting that in any system 
the entire course of events will be retraced if 
at some instant the velocities of all its parts are 
reversed. ' (79) If entropy is a specifiable 
function of the positions and velocities of the particles 
of a system, and if that function increases during 
some particular motion of the system, then reversing the 
direction of time in the equations of motion will 
specify a trajectory through with the entropy must 
decrease. For every possible motion that leads towards 
equilibrium there is another, equally possible, that 
leads away and is therefore incompatible with the 
Second Law. Loschmidt concluded that if kinetic 
theory were true then the Second Law could not be 
universally valid and therefore Boltzmann's proof of 
the H-Theorem could not be correct. 
78. See the discussions in M. J. Klein (1970) p. 84 
and E .E. Daub 
(1970) p. 213 
79. J. Loschmidt (1876) p. 139 
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Boltzmann himself was quick to realise this last 
point and replied to this suggestion of a 
Ireversibility paradox' the following year. (80) 
In print he conceded littleo arguing that the criticism 
could easily be accomodated within his H-Theorem Approach. 
In fact, however, he conceded a great deal, and from 
that moment on was forced to explicitly confront the 
following problem : how can the manifest irreversibility 
and uniform entropy increase observed in all natural 
processes and codified in the Second Law, be reconciled 
with the view that all thermodynamic systems consist 
of small particles obeying the time-reversible laws 
of mechanics? 
Thus he admitted that one could not, in fact, prove 
that entropy increased 'with absolute necessity' and 
that, according to probability theory, even the most 
improbable non-uniform distribution is still not 
absolutely impossible. (81) However, he then argued 
that the existence of improbable entropy decreasing 
situations did not contradict the fact that for the 
overwhelming majorit of initial states the entropy 
could be counted on to increase and that the improb- 
abilities associated with the former case were for all 
pra ical purposes impossibilities. 
The force of Loschmidt's argument was therefore 
neutralised through the claim that it actually 
illuminated the fundamentally probabilistic aspect of 
the H-Theorem. Boltzmann argued in fact that it followed 
from this theorem that the number of states leading 
to a uniform distribution after a certain time 
interval, must be much larger than the number leading 
to a non-uniform distribution, since there are 
infinitely many more uniform than non-uniform states 
(82). No justification was given for this argument 
although Boltzmann intimated where such justification 
could be found: 'One could even calculate the 
probabilities of the various states from the ratios 
of the number of ways in which their distributions 
80. L. Boltzmann (1877a) p. 62, in (1968) Vol. II p. 112 
81. Ibid p. 122 
82. ibid p. 120 
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could be achieved, which could perhaps lead to an 
interesting method of calculating thermal 
equilibrium' (83). This 'interesting method' 
was subsequently elaborated later that same year. 
Thus Boltzmann accepted Loshmidt's deterministic 
assumption but evaded the criticism with his 
probabilistic reasoning, providing a further example 
of the tension noted above. A second, related, 
point is that the impression given that the paradox 
has not forced him to introduce any new concepts 
into his work is very misleading. There is absolutely 
no indication in the 1872 study that any exceptions 
to the H-Theorem could be conceived of and indeed 
Boltzmann had claimed that he had given a rigourous 
proof that whatever the initial state of the system 
the entropy must necessarily increase (84). The reply 
to Loschmidt is therefore deceptive in containing no 
acknowledgement of this or that a conceptual change 
has been introduced, expressed, in part by the 
difference between the H-Theorem and Combinatorial 
Approaches. 
Boltzmann's shift in position regarding his use of 
probability can be characterised as a move from 
microprobabilistic considerations, of the probability 
of the velocity of a single molecule lying within a 
certain range, for example, to macroprobabilistic ones 
involving collections of particles. This change was 
necessary for the further development of the 
Combinatorial Approach, as we shall see. 
Finally, similar conclusions were reached by Tait, 
Thompson, Maxwell and Gibbs, the latter writing that 
I ... the impossibility of an uncompensated 
decrease 
of entropy seems to be reduced to improbability' 
(85). 
83. Ibid p. 120 
84. Boltzmann (1968) Vol. I p. 345 
85. J. W. Gibbs (1961) Vol. I p. 167 
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2.3.5. Boltzmann's Combinatorial Approach 
In 1877 Boltzmann presented a new and radical 
alternative to this 1872 Approach, (86) the goal of 
which was I ... not to limit ourselves to thermal 
equilibrium but to investigate the relations between 
these probability theorems and the second law of 
the mechanical theory of heat (87). This Combina- 
torial Approach was elaborated in a slow and 
labourious fashion by taking the reader through a 
series of computations of increasing complexity 
and closer approximation to the real physical situation. 
His first model was the oversimplified and 
explicitly fictional discrete energy model previously 
introduced in 1868 and 1872. Thus he considered 
a collection of n molecules whose individual energies 
were restricted to the finite set 0., C, ZE. ý, --- PE - 
The total energy of the gas was taken to be fixed and 
equal to AE where A, and p. are integers. 
if L,. Dk is the number of molecules in the collection 
with energy kE then the set of numbers . &>LOP 
is sufficient to define a particular macro-state 
(Zustandverteilung) of the gas. (88) Boltzmann 
noted that such a macro-state could be achieved in 
many different ways, each of which he called a 
complexion (89), depending on which molecules possess 
which energy values. In general if a complexion was 
specified by a set of numbers each fixing the energy 
kLE of the i1th molecule, then, he wrote, a second 
complexion belonging to the same macro-state would be 
achieved by any permutation of two molecules i and j 
which have different energies. Thus a permutation of 
particles between energy states was regarded as giving 
rise to a different macro-state of the system as a 
whole. 
86. L. Boltzmann 
We cannot ag. 
was merely a 
work. Klein 
87. Boltzmann op 
88. Ibid p. 168 
89. Ibid p. 169 
(18776) p. 373, in (1968) Vol. II p. 164. 
ree with Klein's claim that this study 
continuation of Boltzmann's previous 
in Cohen and Thirring (1973) p. 77 
cit p. 166 
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The number of such complexions for a given dist- 
ribution can be found using well known combinatorial 
techniques, and was written thus: 
(90) 
where -JP is the 'permutabilityl of the macro-state, b. 
not the probaility. The most probable macrostate was A- -1 then found by maximising subject to the constraints 
fv' 
on the total number of particles and total energy, in 
the well known way. 
So, with this discrete model the new method is very 
straightforward. A complete specification of a micro- 
state, or complexion, would require a listing of the 
energy of each molecule. A macro-state, specified 
only by the occupation numbers Wo. (J, )--- L4-9p is 
generally compatible with a number of different, 
complexions, which number was called the permutability 
measure and is given by the above expression. 
As far as this thesis is concerned, the most import- 
ant point to note about this derivation is that by 
counting as distinct those complexions obtained by 
permuting any two indistinguishable particles, Boltz- 
mann clearly, although only implicitly, attributed 
some form of individuality to the particles. The usual 
interpretation (91) is that this must be T. I. because, 
it is claimed, the Combinatorial Approach is free 
from dynamical considerations. However, as we shall 
see, this is not strictly correct because in order to 
justify the assignment of equal apriori probabilities 
to the complexions, a form of Liouville's Theorem was 
used. 
As for Boltzmann himself, in his later 'Theory of 
Mechanics' he advocated a version of what we have called 
90. Ibid p. 176 
91 H. R. Post (1963), for example 
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1 space-time I individuality, as we noted in section 
2.2-3. 
To illustrate what was meant by 'complexion' and 
Ipermutability measure'., Boltzmann invoked the image 
of a large urn filled with numbered sl-ips, the number 
on each slip determining the number of energy elements 
to be assigne4ý to a particle. A drawing of all the 
slips from the urn determined a complexion and the 
most probable state will be that for which is 
largest. 
What Boltzmann was doing here was taking the 
permutability measure as proportional to the probab- 
ility of a distribution (92) 0j Wo, LO,., -, - _> 
LOp ý 
To be exact, he set the probability W equal to the 
ratio of -1P for a given distribution to the sum 
of all values for all allowed distributions. (93) 
When he. took the number of complexions compatible 
with a given distribution as a measure of the probability 
of that distribution Boltzmann emphasised that any 
particular complexion was as likely to occur as any 
other i. e. all complexions are equally probable. 
Returning to the general problem Boltzmann noted 
that finding the most probable state by maximizing 
T\j was equivalent to minimizing the denominator 
of (i 
! 
since n, the total number of C 00 0 (WI). 1 --- 
molecules, is fixed, or, for the sake of computational 
ease, to minimizing its logarithm. Stirling's 
approximation and standard variational techniques 
lead directly to the conclusion that, for p>>n, 
will be a maximum if the occupation numbers are 
A46 Se//t 
given by (, Dlt = ýý (94) . where 1A 
is the average energy of a molecule and s is 
'Boltzmann's constant'. This specifies the most 
probable distribution which is what Boltzmann was after. 
Giving a realistic interpretation to the finite energy 
elements, i. e. not going to the limit of infinitesimal 
92. In fact, as we shall see, he took -P to be 
proportional to the logarithm of the probability. 
93. Boltzmann op cit p. 169 
94. Ibid p. 186 
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E- cA-S Planck, at least implicitly, did in 1900) 
takes this model from the realm of fiction to 
that of reality. Thus the above concepts and techniques 
are, virtually all that is needed to establish quantum 
statistical mechanics - 
Boltzmann however, could only regard the E's as a 
convenient device and was required to move towards 
a classically more realistic model by allowing the 
molecules to possess continuous values of energy. 
Thus he bega 
-, 
n by again dividing up the energy 
continuum into finite intervals kF, to k( E +1) and 
wrote the occupation numbers as 45 
fC kE) (95) 
where F_ F(kF, ) is the number of particles with 
energies in the range KF to (k+l)E , and 
ý- is the 
molecular distribution function. Thereafter he 
proceeded much as before except that he took the 
limit and wrote the sums as integrals. Stan- 
dard manipulations then give for the most probable 
distribution: F co d6 =_ C_ e- 
kE 
Cý 6 (96) 
Boltzmann immeidately pointed out tho-t this 
corresponds to the Maxwellian distribution in &Loo 
rather than three dimensions. In order to treat the 
latter one must divide up the three dimensional 
velocity space rather than the energy continuum, and 
thus Boltzmann commenced to elaborate the third of 
his models. 
The permissible velocity components Lk,,, %rý L--T 
were specified to lie in the ranges a_E_ 60 
(44") E >6 ýý ec) 
C6'j_j) ý' CT. The 
_& 
(C-4-I)t where aj, b., c, and integers 
occupation numbers then become 
C06- 6c =- 6S 'l- f- ( CL E., ý 
and the permutability measure is given by 
95. ibid p. 187 
96. Ibid p. 190. See also Kuhn op cit p. 50 
97. Ibid p. 191 
98 
(98) 17. 
rT !I IT co-6. 
=: - P, 6-- -1, - ý: -r 
Boltzmann then changed the interpretation of 
so that it now became the relative frequency of 
occurrence of the corresponding distribution in 
velocity space. fS was then maximised as before, 
by minimizing the product in the denominator and 
introducing logarithms for convenience. The problem 
was thus reduced to that of maximizing the expression -t-00 
F ("r) Ot U- C1 L. -r 
subject to the usual constraints. Expressed in 
this form the problem had. already been solved because 
JI 
, the 'permutability measure' (Permutabilitatmass) 
(99) is just the negative of the H function introduced 
five years previously. At that time Boltzmann had 
proved that H reaches a minimum when F corresponds to 
the Maxwellian distribution and he felt that he did 
not need to repeat this in 1877. Reference to this 
demonstration then completed his proof that the case 
of thermal equilibrium, corresponding to a minimum 
for HI also corresponded to the most probable state 
of the gas. 
However, as Boltzmann himself realised, in going 
over from the discrete to the continuous case, the 
previous basis for the assignment of apriori 
probabilities, or statistical weights, haJ been lost 
(100) -A new procedure is then required and Boltzmann 
introduced the assumption that equal weights were 
now to be assigned to equal volumes of molecular phase 
space, using a form of Liouville's Theorem as a 
guiding principle for selecting the correct weight 
function. However, as we shall see, not only did 
Boltzmann use this theorem incorrectly, the mere fact 
that it was introduced erodes the claim that this 
98. Ibid p. 191 
99. Ibid p. 192 
100. Ibid p. 195 
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approach is entirely free of dynamical considerations. 
Thus after progressing through three models of a gas, (101) 
Boltzmann had arrived at the conclusion that the most 
probable distribution was the Maxwellian one, already 
familiar as the description of the equilibrium state. 
The equilibrium distribution was not only the unique 
stationary distribution, as had been shown in 1872, 
it was now revealed as the one most likely to occur, in 
the sense that it could be achieved in the largest 
number of ways. The state of thermal equilibrium thus 
corresponds both to a minimum of the H function and 
also to the most probable state of the gas. 
It has been pointed out (102) that Boltzmann has not 
fulfilled his promise given in reply to Loschmidt, 
of justifying the claim that there are infin-Lely more 
uniform than non-uniform states. The initial states 
from which H must increase are not even referred to 
in this paperr much less shown to be highly improbable. 
It may be that no theorem like the one he promised to 
justify could follow from the notion of probability 
he had used, and indeed that Boltzmann was aware of this. 
Boltzmann then took the first of a series of steps 
leading to the conjecture that the entropy was 
proportional to the probability of achieving a given 
macro-state. Referring to his formula for JQ 
Boltzmann wrote 'We shall call the magnitude _Q the 
permutability measure. It differs from the logarithm 
of the permutability only by an additive constant and 
it has a special importance for the material to follow. 
I also note an advantage of suppressing the constant : 
the total permutability measure of the union of a pait 
of bodies is then equal to the sum of their individual 
permutabilitY measures -1 (103) 
The final part of this quote is important, not only as 
regards the relationship between permutability measure, 
and hence probability, and entropy, but also as regards 
101. This is consistent with Boltzmann's general philo- 
sophical attitude towards physical theories. See 
L. Boltzmann (1905) 
102. By Kuhn op cit p. 52 
103. L. Boltzmann (1968) Vol. 11. p. 192 
100- 
the difference between Boltzmann's and Planck's 
conception of this relationship, as we shall see. 
It is worth noting that the permutability. measure is 
not identical to the probability - for one thing, 
Planck's probability is multiplicative whereas the 
permutability measure, like the entropy, is additive. 
Thus we can already see from the statement above, 
howJ1 is to be related to the entropy, and Boltzmann 
made this relationship explicit in the closing section 
of his study entitled 'The Relation of the Entropy to 
the Quantity I have Called the Probability of Dist- 
ribution'. (104) 
He began by substituting an explicit form for 
written in terms of molecular velocity coordinates, in 
the expression for J"I 
_'/z Integrating then gave -1 -A]iA) 00, ý) '9. 
Using the standard expressions ja=, Ajj-r+ av &A. 
1 i9v ? =, A)-r 
Boltzmann wrote down the entropy of the gas as 
C106) 20 cla Al V T_ -3 
Ignoring the additive constant C (usually considered to 
be of no physical significance since thermodynamic 
arguments determine entropy differences only) 
he then equ cL ted this with the expression for and 
obtained, -_ CIO (107) T 
Thus the entropy of the gas is equal to two-thirds of 
the permutability measure. 
it should be noted that Boltzmann does not, in this 
work, equate entropy and probability via S= klogW, 
as is commonly believed. Rather he equated the entropy 
with J1 , which was proportional to the log of the 
permutabilityp which in turn was related to the 




12. =; Io1 -72 -4- C: 3 
0S=C, ý 10, -e,, n + C3ý +- CZ : u. C) C 
where C1=2/3, C2 is the thermodynamic difference, and 
C3 is the constant difference mentioned above. It is 
104. Ibid p. 215 
105. Ibid p. 216 
106. Ibid p. 216 
107. Ibid p. 216 
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interesting to note that Planck proceeded by the 
Opposite route in 1900, arguing that the entropy is 
proportional to the log of the probability, which is 
proportional to the number of complexions, i. e. the 
permutability. Thus we have: 
Boltzmann: CC AOL 0( 10 
i Planck: VC 6a- ý 'LL- FrDýO_LL' X 0ý tv r13 
Thus it seems that Boltzmann had achieved a successful 
ScLL-Con 
characteri of the thermodynamic concept of 
equilibrium entropy in terms of statistical mechanical 
principles, obtained through combinatorial 
techniques. For the first time the entropy associated 
with a molecular di-,,, ýtribution had been explicitly 
equated with the probability of obtaining that 
distribution. 
The next step was to extend the Combinatorial 
Approach to non-equilibrium situations and explain 
irreversible behaviour using the same principles. 
ThUs Boltzmann emphasised that and hence log-'Y' 
was well defined whether or not the system was in 
equilibrium so this function could serve as a suitable 
generalisation of the entropy (108). In equilibrium 
situations its behaviour must match that of the 
entropy as given by the Second Lawo i. e. it must A Loir-i-4p-a-s e- 
,, or, 
for reversible processes, remain constant. This 
characteristic was then extended to transitions between 
non-equilibrium states, which do not obey the 
Maxwellian distribution, and for which the entropy 
had not previously been well defined. He pointed out 
that J*"L was well defined for both classes of states 
and that it '... can always be computed; and its 
value surely will be necessarily greater after the 
change that before. 
'(109). 
Boltzmann then asserted, as a general theoremo thate 
for an arbitrary change between states that need not 
be characterised by equilibrium, '... the total 
108. Ibid p. 218 
109. Ibid p. 217 
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permutability measure of all the bodies will increase 
continuously during the change of 8tate and it can 
at most rPYT)ain constant if all the bodies throughout 
the transformation approximate thermal equilibrium 
infinitely closely (a reversible change of state. ) 
(110). This was Boltzmann's reformulation of the 
Second Law as the statement that systems go from 
less to more probable states (111)r thus extending 
the meaning of the entropy concept into contexts where 
it was thermodynamically ill-defined. 
However, it has been argued (112)., correctly, that 
this extension is essentially ill-founded, because of 
a circularity in Boltzmann's arguments. After demon- 
strating that the state of thermal equilibrium is 
the most probable state of the gas, and establishing the 
relationship between the equilibrium entropy and J"I 
he then argued that for systems in equilibriumAmust 
increase or remain constant because it was known from 
the Second Law that the entropy function does so. As 
an argument to establish the behaviour of a mechanical 
concept from thermodynamical considerations this is 
perfectly valid, but not if it is taken in reverse 
and used to justify the claim that a mechanical 
explanation of the Second Law has been provided. 
For transitions between non-equilibrium states the 
extension was based upon two claims : 1) that _fI is 
always well defined; and 2) that its value will 
necessarily be greater after the change of state than 
before. The first is certainly true, but the second 
stands in need of some supporting argument, which is 
not given - Boltzmann merely asserts its truth, without 
reason. it may be that the relationship between the 
permutabilitY measure and the probability of a 
distribution convinced him that his arguments were 
stronger than they actually were. Certain statements 
110. ibid p. 218 
111. See Klein op cit p. 82 
112. By Planck and later Kuhn, op cit p. 53 
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in this paper and in the later 'Gas Theory' (113), 
suggest that he had in mind the plausible assertion 
that all natural changes proceed from states of low 
probability to those of higher probability. 
There are one or two other points worth noting. 
First, as we said above, Boltzmann's relationship 
was between the entropy and the permutability 
measure, the latter being related to the probability 
of a distribution. Planck rewrote this as S=klog W, 
referring to W as the 'thermodynamic probability' 
(114) .. This is an unfortunate choice of terminology 
since W cannot be summed or integrated over any 
conceivable set or space of values to give unity and 
is thus inconsistent with one of the fundamentAl 
axioms of probability theory. The problem arises from 
the imposition of discrete counting procedures over 
the continuous range of positions and velocities 
permitted by classical mechanics. Classical attempts 
at a resolution required the abandonment of absolute 
entropies in favour of relative ones. (115) However, 
quantum theory produced a more satisfactory solution 
and provided a justification of absolute entropies 
through the introduction of a unit volume of phase 
space. Given these difficulties it would perhaps have 
been more appropriate to call W the permuta,,., bility 
measure as Boltzmann did, and reserve the term 
probability for the quantity relating to molecular 
distributions. 
Howevere Boltzmann himself created confusion among 
his contemporaries by switching frcm micro- to 
macro- probabilities without drawing attention to the 
change. (116) Clarification was subsequently provided 
by the Ehrenfests who characterised the shift in terms 
of a move from a theory using the 6-dimensional phase 
space of a single molecule, ('/, t - space'), to one 
113. L. Boltzmann (1910) p. 38-47. It is significant that 
here the step involving the permutability measure 
is ommitted. 
114. M. Planck (1913) English trans. (1959) p. 120 
115. J. W. Gibbs (1902) Ch. XV. Also see R. H. Fowler (1936) 
p, 203,230 
116. See Brush op cit Ch-10 and Klein (1972) p. 108-112. 
104 
involving the 6N-dimensional phase space ((-space) of 
the whole gas of N molecules. (117) They noted that 
this was essentially a shift from a theory emphasising 
dynamics and based on the special assumptions about 
collisions underlying the Boltzmann equation (118) . to 
one emphasising combinatorial methods and independent 
from collision analyses. The move from micro- to 
macro-probabilities thus characterises the change from 
the H-Theorem to the Combinatorial Approach. 
A further problem, involving the above distinctione 
has been identified concerning Boltzmann's use of a 
weighting function in this 1877 work. (119) We have 
already noted the importance Boltzmann attached to 
selecting the correct weight function, in his discussion 
of the urn model, and his use of a form of Liouville's 
Theorem (120) to do this. Thus he argued that if the 
molecules are contained within a cell of a certain 
volume in velocity space at time t=O then., if arbitrary 
forces act on them, they will remain in a cell of the 
same volume as the gas evolves in time. (121) 
However, this argument is incorrect for two reasons. 
Firstly, the molecules of the gas will not remain within 
the same volume of velocity space as time goes on, but 
will in fact disperse throughout this space. It is only 
by going to a higher dimensional space in which the 
entire gas is represented by a single point-a move 
corresponding to the shift from /a - space to P -space 
that Liouville's Theorem can be taken to apply and one 
can say that this point will remain within a phase 
space volume of the same size at all times, thus 
supplying the necessary justification of the weighting 
procedure. Secondly, the theorem does not hold in 
a phase space constructed to represent the generalized 
117. P. & T. Ehrenfest (1912) p. 17-39 
118. Such as the 'Stosszahlansatz'. 
119. See Kuhn op cit p. 54-57 
120. Introduced by Boltzmann hilsemf in 1868 (1968) 
Vol. 1. p. 49 
121. Ibid Vol. II p. 193 
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coordinates and velocities, (122) so Boltzmann would 
also have had to replace his space constructed in 
terms of the latter by one involving generalised 
coordinates and momenta. Further discussion should 
make these points clear - 
The mechanical state of a system of N indistinguishable 
molecules can be represented by an assembly of N phase 
points in a 6-dimensional (123) 1 /. t -space', the cartesian 
coordinates of a point in which is given by components 
of the molecular position and linear momentum vectors. 
The distribution of these phase points over Ix -space at 
equilibrium is determined by the Maxwell-Boltzmann 
distribution law and the distribution functionAgives 
the density of molecules in this space, in the 
sense that the number of molecules which at time t are 
located in the volume element C1 3 t- Ct 3P constructed 
about each point C t.;, 4? ) in this space, is equal 
to F cr) '0, o CkIt- C11 P It is important to 
realise that this function changes with time because 
molecules constantly enter or leave a given volume 
element, or cell, in , tx - space (124) . 
The state* or phaseo of the systemo as a whole can be 
represented by a representative point P in a 6N- 
dimensional space, the [I - space I, spanned by the 
vectors ( ji) - .. $. v 4, pl) fri) . 
(125) Given some 
arbitrary position 
) 
of P at some given time t01 it's 
position at any other time is determined by Hamilton's 
equations of motion and thus, as time goes on, P 
described a trajectory in fl-space, lying 
entirely on the energy hypersurface. (126) 
122. This is one reason why Hamilton's equations of 
motion are used. Yourgrau van der Nerve and Raw 
(1966) p. 62 
123. If the molecules have s degrees of freedom, rather 
than just 3, then this space has 2s dimensions. 
124. One can show that the cell volume remains invariant 
in time only if certain conditions are met. See 
K. Huang (1963) p. 57-58. 
125. Again if the molecules have s degrees of freedom the 
space is 2sN dimensional. 
126. P. and T. Ehrenfest (1912) p. 18 
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In order to calculate average values of phase 
functions it is useful to introduce a large ensemble 
of virtual copies of the real system and to consider 
their distribution over this space. (127) This is 
given by the density function where 
is an abbreviation of (pi. )--. r/u,. ý$i)--, )(ým)defined so 
that C p., 1, t) 
Ip Jcý (128) gives the number of 
representative points which at time t are contained 
in the volume element cLPJcv of (I -space 
centred about the point Cp., $). ThL*. s function completely 
specifies an ensemble (129) and given some initial 
value its subsequent values are determined by the 
dynamics of molecular motion. 
Now it can be shown that Liouville's Theorem implies 
that the rate of change of /9 at a point moving along 
a trajectory in f" -space - the 'convected' rate 
of change- is given by CLP 0 X3. 
CUe 
Thus, /0 , the density in phase, remains constant in the 
neighbourhood of a representative point as it moves along 
its trajectory. (130) Furthermore it then follows that 
the volume element ctpcbý called by Gibbs the 
'extension in phase', occupied by a collection of 
representative points, remains constant in time. (131) 
Thus Liouville's Theorem can be taken as stating that 
if the representative point of some system is contained 
within a 6N-dimensional volume JpJ$ of -space at 
time t, then it will be contained in a phase space volume 
of the same size at all future times. To,., gether with 
the ergodic hypothesis this theorem can be used to 
prove that equal volumes of phase space are equiprobable. 
Some such justification of the 'correct' - in the sense 
that it leads to a theory accounting for the observable 
phenomena - weighting assignment is necessary if a 
representative ensemble is to be constructed and the 
127. This approach is due mainly to Gibbs although elements 
of it also appear in works by Maxwell and Boltzmann. 
Each system differs in phase and so the ensemble 
spreads out in a cloud over a region of fl -space. 
128. Yourgrau et al op cit p. 60 
129. Huang op cit p. 76 
130. Thus the distribution of P points moves in 
P 
-space 
like an incompressible fluid. 
131. p. and T. Ehrenfest up cit p. 20 & p. 87. TerHaar op 
cit p. 102 
107 
average values of phase functions, corresponding to 
measurable properties of the system, are to be 
calculated. (132) 
An analysis of the possible weight functions which 
were allowed, and of this' justification procedure in 
general, was given by the Ehrenfests in their 1912 
article (133). They considered two ensembles in 
fl- space and supposed that the representative points 
of the first occupy, at successive times, the regions 
A1j, A 2' A 3' ... in this space and that those of the 
second ensemble occupy, at the same times, the 
regions Bl. B2* B3 *"0 The measures of the relative 
probabilities Ai and Bit i. e. the measures for 
the relative frequency of occurrence of a distribution 
were then written as M (A i) and M(B i) respectively. 
Clearly only those measures which give the same value for 
these relative probabilities for all times are 
acceptable and this requirement should also hold for 
any arbitrary choice of the two initials regions 
AI and B 10 The possible choices of M must therefore 
satisfy the requirement (134) 
MCAJ M CAO 
-M 
CAJ (T) 
M 054 M 034 MC (3-) 
Boltzmann s choice- For this measure of relative 
probability was the volume of the corresponding 
region of fl- space; thus McAz) -= VcAz) ; MCIL) -- W-6c) 
where VC&)and \1c&) are respectively, the volumes 
of the regions and i. e. 13 z, 
V (-A - C. 
d-F J 
c' P ct$ VC-13Z) 
S13' 
Now Liouville's Theorem implies that 
VCA) VcAtJ 11 oo and condition VCG V c1sx) V C-Go 
(I) fMows immediately by substitutiono Thus if 
Liouville's Theorem is true then Boltzmann's assignment 
of equal probabilities to equal volumes of phase 
space satisfies the invariance requirement 
M. 
. it 
is also interesting to note that if the 
132. ibid p. 129-130 
133. P. and T. Ehrenfest op cit p. 95-97 
134. Ibid p. 96. Ter Haar op cit p. 100 and p. 380 
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generalized velocities are used in the construction 
of r -space, rather than the momenta, then 
requirement (I) would not, in general, be satisfied. 
Thus one must use not only C rather than , ýU-space, but p rather than , and Boltzmann's justification 
fails on both counts. 
Liouville's Theorem is not all that is required 
however. One could take for the probability measure 
MFC 'f -1ý 
(135) 
.ý 37 TZ&V-1) JPJ (ý (Y) 
which also satisfied (I) for any arbitrary F functiont 
or phase function, dependent on the energy E and ZSA)-2 
integrals of motion f6 , provided that the F is 
chosen once and for all. It can then be shown 
that this expression gives the most general way of 
selecting M. (136). Thus Liouville's Theorem and 
(I) taken together exclude all possible probability 
measures except those in the class defined by 
(II). This still leaves a range of possible choices 
and to narrow this down further to Boltzmann's 
measure other restrictions must be introduced. 
Thus the ergodic hypothesis, which states that 
there exists systems which are ergodic in the sense 
that the trajectory of the representative point of 
such a system in r -space, taken from t= - 00 to 
t= +0o , passes through all points on the energy 
hypersurface, ( as we shall see a proof of the 
impossibility of such systems was given in 1913 and 
attention then shifted to the quasi-ergodic hypothesis 
in which the trajectory on the energy hypersurface comees 
arbitrarily close to all points on this surface), 
restricts the choice of density functions to those 
dependent on the energy only and therefore the class 
of possible measures is restricted to those for which 
M -= SF 00 JP d- ck 
if the further requirement is added that the systems 
are isolated so that the ensembles possess the same 
135. Ibid p. 96 Ter Haar op cit p. 100 and p. 380 
136. Ehrenfest p. 21 and ter Haar p. 103 
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energy EO then results identical to those obtained 
using the general ergodic measure F=F(E) can be 
obtained by taking P=l. (137) In this case 
M= SOL(4$ and Boltzmann's weighting assignment 
is finally arrived at. 
The complete justification for this assignment 
of equal probabilities to equal volumes of phase 
space is therefore as follows: Liouville's Theorem 
and the plausible requirement (I) exclude all 
probability measures except those in the class given 
by (II), of which Boltzmann's measure is the simplest 
case. The ergodic hypothesis then further restricts the 
set of possible measures to those given by el= 
SFc4)drd$ 
Finally, if it is assumed that the systems are isolated 
then this reduces to MC&) -= VCAL) and M VOSJ 
as required. (138) 
Boltzmann's justification for his particular c-, oice 
of probability measure rested on the claim that if 
there were initially N molecules in a cell in,, At-space 
then they would all move together with the passage 
of time and be contained within a cell of the same 
volume always. This is only true, however, if the 
molecules are restricted to interactions with fixed 
scattering centres and intermolecular forces are zero, 
which is completely unrealistic. (139). Liouville's 
Theorem then applies, not to the cell in/(x-space but 
to the cell containing the representative point 
specifying the state of the entire system inP-space. 
it is the volume of this cell which remains invariant 
with time, whereas molecules in-tially in the same 
cell in , At-space will 
be widely dispersed over this 
space as the system evolves. This is the whole crux of 
the matter. 
137. Ehrenfest p. 96 
138. Since ergodic systems cannot actually exist 
some alternative justification must be sought. 
Thus one could use the observable consequences 
of Boltzmann's assignment to justify it, or 
simply include this assignment as part of the 
axioms of the theory. 
139. In a real gas all molecules can interact and none 
may be treated as fixed during a collision. 
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As it stands, thereforel Boltzmann's argument permits 
no conclusions to be drawn concerning the relative 
probability of the different possible space locations 
of the molecules. This is a serious deficiency in his 
theory as a whole which was not noticed by his 
contemporaries nor corrected in the 'Gas Theory' (140). 
Indeed Kuhn has suggested thatBoltzmann's attribution 
to the cells of phase space of the non-statistical 
behaviour which could not be attributed to the molecules 
is somehow symptomatic of his reluctance to completely 
relinquish deterministic dynamical considerations in 
general (141). 
Boltzmann's switch in attention from the molecules 
to the phase space cells surrounding them, which allowed 
him partially to circumvent Loschmidt's criticism and 
preserve Something akin to his original deterministically 
phrased version of the H-Theorem, is an expression of 
a general cOnflation of three different notions concerning 
the distribution of molecules. The first, which can 
be termed 'molecular; consists of those concepts 
determined by the precise specification of the position 
and velocity of each particle within a cell. The 
second notion applies to the distribution of molecules 
within cells and considers collectives of trajectories 
rather than the individual molecular trajectories 
themselves. Such concepts include, for example, the 
f-function oq& are 'concerned with micro-probabilities. 
The third group applies to the distribution of molecules 
over cells, again with nothing specificed about molecular 
positions within cells and includes macro-probabilistic 
concepts like the permutability measure. (142) 
Clearly the first and second sets are underpinned, 
1 
043) 
by the notion of space strongly and weakly respective y 
140. L. Boltzmann (1910) p. 40 
141. Kuhn op cit p. 57 
142. In 1896 Boltzmann subsumed both of our second 
and third sets under the general term of 
'molar' 
concepts. 
143. Concepts in the second set involve groups of 
trajectories taken together, and in this sense 
are weakly underpinned by s-t individu a. 
(4 e0 
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time individuality whereas the third is not necessarily, 
and thus opens itself to an alternative, such as T. I. 
It was only by moving back and forth between these 
three sets of concepts that Boltzmann was able to 
preserve forso long a predominantly deterministic way 
of discussing his H-Theorem in conjunction with a micro- 
probabilistic way of considering it, together with the 
macro-probabilistic Combinatorial Approach. There 
was thus a three-way tension in his work, (144) which 
is manifested in both his replies to Loschmidt and 
the strict failure of the mechanical reduction of the 
Second Law. 
It is also worth noting that by elimZAating time as 
a variable in the description of a system the Combin- 
atorial Approach replaces a consideration of the 
deterministic dynamics of a system by a process 
involving random choice. Thus in carrying out the 
calculation of sta-, -e probabilities Boltzmann assumed 
that the kinetic energy of each individual 
molecule is determined, as it were, by a lottery which 
is selected completely impartially from a collection 
of lotteries which contains all the kinetic energies 
than can occur in equal numbers' (145) . This is where 
the power of this approach lies; it is not restricted 
to particular molecular models for which collis,., ion 
mechanics must be worked out in detail, but can be used 
for any system for which the spectrum of possible energies 
is known. To a large extent this explains why this 
Approach was almost exclusively (146) used in the 
development of quantum statistical mechanics. The above 
difference between the two approaches as regards time 
is ref lected in that between a timeless I T. I. and 
space-time individuality. 
144 COM_PCLW_ OLtý 
I<tA-" Of C'ýt CLILk" 
[0, 
- CL &&J0 - OCL 
P-e-eLS0404. 
145. L. Boltzmann (1968) Vol. II p. 172 
146. We say 'almost exclusively' because, as we shall 
see in the next chaptere attempts were made to 
base quantum statistics on the alternative H- 
Theorem Approach, although with less than total 
success 
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In conclusion we note that by stating that a 
distribution is compatible with a number of different 
complexions and by counting as distinct those obtained 
through a permutation of the indistinguishable 
molecules, Boltzmann, at least implicitly, attributed 
some form of individuality to these particles. We 
have noted that in his later work on mechanics he 
argued in favour of some form of space-time 
individuality as he believed that the assumption 
that indistinguishable particles which cannot come 
infinitely close to one another can be distinguished 
by their initial conditions and by the continuity of 
their space-time trajectories'... gives us the sole 
possibility of recognising the same material point 
at dif f erent times -' (147) However, on the basis 
of the 1877 paper one can perhaps conjecture that, 
at this time, he actually had something more like 
T. I. in mind. For example he wrote that the Combin- 
atorial Approach enabled one to determine the 
probability of a distribution in a way 1 ... completely 
independent of whether or how that distribution has 
come about' (148). In other words the history of a 
distribution does not determine the probability with 
which it can be realised. 
T. I. would have been sufficient if Boltzmann had 
accepted the weight assignments as simply part of 
the axioms of the theory. However, he did not and 
by appealing to Liuoville's Theorem (albeit 
incorrectly! ), he introduced a dynamical component 
based on considerations of continuity of path. Thus 
the Combinatorial Approach required some consideration 
of the history of the assembly as a whole, but not of 
the individual molecules in determining the probability 
of a distribution. 
Thus we conclude that the principle of space-time 
individuality receives clear historical support from 
147. L. Boltzmann (1974) Vol. II p-9- 
148. L. Boltzmann (1968) Vol. II p. 168 
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the H-Theorem Approach but that the situation 
regarding T. I. and the Combinatorial Approach is rather 
more ambiguous. If the assignment of weights was 
included in the axioms of the theory then T. I. would be 
required by this Approach as a Principle of 
Individuation. If, on the other hand, it is felt that 
some justification of these weights must be sought 
for, then an historical component must be introduced, 
but only for the whole system not the molecules 
themselves. Thus space-time individuality is again 
required, but now as a principle of individuation for 
the entire assmebly. It is in this sense then ) that 
both of the classical views of individuality receive 
historical support. 
2.3.6. The Decline and Fall of the Combinatorial 
Approach 
After the publication of the 1877 paper it seems that 
Boltzmann again felt that he had settled the problem 
of the foundations of the Second Law and had done so 
by introducing a new approach to the subject which 
he then proceeded to apply to a number of interesting 
problems. 
Thus In two papers in 1878, Boltzmann used this 
approach to give a direct and rigo rous method for 
deriving the Maxwellian distribution, (149), and also 
to obtain, for the first time, an expression for the 
entropy of diffusion in gases which led to agreement 
with thermodynamic calculations (150). It is precisely 
because it led to novel theoretical predictions not 
contained in the laws It sought to explain that 
the 
work based on the Combinatorial Approach was a much 
more successful reduction of the Second 
Law than that 
149. L. Boltzmann Ibid p. 250 
150. Ibid p. 289 
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produced in 1871 (151) - 
However despite the obvious power and success of this 
approach Boltzmann did not develop it further. When 
he returned to statistical mechanics in the 1890's, 
amidst the furore generated by the 'English School' S 
and the criticisms of Zermelo, (who argued 
that, left to itself, any mechanical system must 
eventually return to a configuration arbitrarily 
close to the one from which it began, and therefore it 
was not, possible to give a mechanical proof of the 
Second Law) (152), it was the H-Theorem which he 
turned to and further developed in an effect to 
counter his critics (153). Thus the Combinatorial 
method was essentially just a response to Loschmidt's 
criticism and although it found some applications in 
1878, it was not thereafter significantly used or 
developed any further. 
Indeed it was not until the importance of Planck's 
derivation of the black body law came to be acknowledged, 
with its explicit use of combinatorics and references 
to Boltzmann's 1877 paper, that the Combinatorial 
Approach really began to attract attention. BY 1911, 
however, the Ehrenfests were able to report that 
the last few years have seen a sudden and wide 
dissemination of Boltzmann's ideas. '(154) W ith the 
realisation of its great computational power and 
independence from specific molecular models, this 
approach was called upon to play a predominant role 
in 
the development of quantum statistical mechanics, 
as we shall shortly see. What still requir, ý, es explanation 
however, is why it received so little attention at 
the end of the 19th century, particularly 
from the very 
151. Daub has given an excellent account of both 
reductions, and of the development of 
Boltzmann's 
ideas in general. E. E. Daub (1969) 
152. E. Zermelo (1896) p. 485 
153. Kuhn op cit p. 70 Klein 
(1970) p. 125 
154. p. T. Ehrenfest op cit p. 67. Ehrenfest must also 
take a lot of the credit for this sudden surge 
of interest. 
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man who created it. (155) 
2.3.7" Ergodic Theory -A Possible Bridge Between the 
Approaches 
One can distinguish the Combinatorial and H-Theorem 
Approaches by the meanings which Boltzmann gave to the 
term 'probability' within each. In the former he meant 
a quantity measured by phase volume, whereas in the 
latter, at least by the time of the IH-curve' 
discussions of the 1890's, he meant something 
measured by frequency in time. If it could be shown 
that these two meanings were in fact equivalent then 
the conceptual gap between the two approaches could be 
closed. It is just such an equivalence which is 
established by the ergodic hypothesiso which states, 
as we have noted, that in the course of time a system 
will pass through every point on the energy hypersurface 
in rl -space - It then follows that the fraction of 
time spent by the system in some region of this space 
will be proportional to the volume of that region 
and the average over an ensemble of systems all 
with the same energy will be equal to the time average 
taken over a suitably long interval. 
Thus, if the existence of ergodic systems could be 
demonstrated then the two meanings of 'probability' 
above would be interchangeable and the combinatorial 
arguments of 1877 could then be reinterpreted in a 
kinetic sense to explain the evolution of a system in 
time. one would then be justified in claiming that 
the Maxwellian distribution will predominate 
overwhelmingly in time over all other appreciably 
different state distributions. 
155. Boltzmann mentioned it briefly in only four 
papers after 1878: (1879) p. 653, 
(1880) p. 529. 
(1881) of which two are brief replies to r Ayer, 
one is a short elaboration. of some aspects of 
probability theory and only one contains a 
physical application. 
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A programme for constructing just such a bridge 
between the two approaches was laid by the 
Ehrenfest's in 1911. Essentially one must relate 
the H-function written in the form 
H co =ýaTý C'ýr_, e) LVL r( \J_-, Z4. 
where C ýP, e) OL "r is the number of molecules per 
unit volume which at time t possess velocities 
in the range V- &o k)-+dT to the volume Ea3 
in IP-space given by 
AJ Ij A) [7, Z. 3= 
CL 11 CLýL! . '. 0-k 
I 
". 
where to is the volume" of the cells in , a-space, each 
cell containing at any time t cLk of the N points 
representing the phases of the molecules. Thus the 
set of occupation numbers i O_hJ determines the 
distribution Z at time t and is equivalent to the 
molecular distribution function F- 
Clearly although Z is uniquely determined when the 
representative point in P -space is specified#. 
the converse is not true. Each Z corresponds to a 
domain in r -space because the molecular 
phase points are only placed in finite cells when Z 
is given and also because Z specifies only the numbers 
of molecules in each cell and not which molecules are 
in which cello Given this the volume L: -a3 
corresponding to the distribution Z can be obtained from 
the equation above. 
i then taken to be a measure of the s 
probability of the distribution Z, as Boltzmann did 
in 1877, with the equilibrium distribution possessing 
a larger 
r volume [a 3 than any other for the same 
value of energy. This is the sense in which the 
equilibrium distribution can be regarded as the most 
probable one. Boltzmann had also argued but had not 
proved that the value of EZ I corresponding to 
any distribution other than this would be very much 
less and thus that the equilibrium distribution was 
overwhelmingly the most probable. These results 
were then appealed to in order to justify his arguments 
concerning the behaviour of a system over time thus 
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shifting the meaning of probability from the first to the 
second sense above. 
Thus Boltzmann himself crossed from one approach 
to the other (156) and indeed used a form of ergodic 
hypothesis in several of his works.., (157) 
although he never actually built the kind of bridge 
envisaged by Ehrenfest. 
If this hypothesis is accepted, so that the two 
meanings of probability could be regarded as inter- 
changeable, then H could be expressed in terms of Z. 
as given by the ýCLk_j thus, 
Hc? 
') :: 
r>, CLj'4LCLjZ 2-6. 
The change in time of this function as effected by 
changes in the akis then no longer continuous but 
given in terms of discrete steps -A plot of H against 
time is now a step function and Boltzmann's H-curve 
can be interpreted as a discrete set of points chosen 
from this function at regular intervals At, taken to 
be short compared with any experimental scale but long 
comapred with the mean time between collisions (158). 
On this interpretation Boltzmann's macroprobabilistic 
version of the H-Theorem, as expressed in his later 
works, is really a series of assertions about the 
properties of the bundle of H-curves corresponding 
to a given initial distribution which radiate from a 
point t= tAs the initial time in the (t,. H)plane. 
Thus a proof of the ergodic hypothesis would allow 
H to be related to Z through the equation above, which 
constitutes the basic structure of the bridge between 
the Combinatorial and H-Theorem Approaches. 
However, such a proof cannot be given, as is well 
known. 
Although versions of this hypothesis had been 
introduced by both Boltzmann and Maxwell, (159) and 
had been extensively discussed towards the end of the 
156. This may have been a factor contributing towards 
his neglect of the Combinatorial Approach. 
157. L. Boltzmann (1968) Vol II p. 582 and Vol. III p. 122 
158. C. f. the Ehrenfests discussion of the urn model in 
1906. 
159. Boltzmann op cit ; J. C. Maxwell (1879) p. 547 
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19th century, it was the Ehrenfests who sharply 
formulated the existence problem for ergodic systems 
and who posed the question: can any deterministic 
mechanical system be ergodic as distinct from quasi- 
ergodic? (160) 
In 1913 this was answered in the negative by 
Plancheral and Rosenthal who independently produced 
proofs of the impossibility of ergodic systems. 
(161) Both proofs hinged on the fact that the ergodic 
hypothesis implies that a multi-dimensional region 
of the energy hypersurface must be mapped onto a line 
of finite length, continuously and one to one. 
Rosenthal showed that this is impossible according 
to Brouwer's proof of the invariance of dimensionality 
under continuous one to one mappings, whereas 
Plancheral argued that Lebesgue's theory of measure 
also forbids such a mapping since a line is a set of 
measure zero with respect to a region of two or more 
dimensions. 
Thus it was shown to be impossible for the represent- 
ative point of a mechanical system to pass through 
every point on the energy hypersurface in -space 
and so such a system cannot be ergodic. 
Quasi-ergodicity and the question whether, or what, 
actual systems could be described as quasi-ergodic, 
then became the subject of interest, but we shall not 
discuss these developments here. (162) 
our conclusion then is that Boltzmann's two meanings 
of probability cannot be formally equated and thus, 
strictly speaking the Combinatorial and H-Theorem 
160. The Iquasi'ergodic' hypothesis states that the 
phase point of the system passes arbitrarily near 
each point of the energy hyper-surface in 
P -space - 
161. Yi. PlanAral (1913) p. 1061 Eng. trans in Brush 
(1971) p. 287. 
A. Rosenthal (1913) p. 796 Eng. trans in Brush 
(Ibid) IE 
162. See ter Haar (1955) p. 302 ff and A Farquhar C 1964). i- aUC: S ct- 15 0 
1ý 
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Approaches remain separated, conceptually and 
formally. 
2.4 The Individuality of Fields 
Althoughp as we have noted in the sections above, 
classical particle mechanics can be given a field 
theoretic formulation, one would expect there to 
be profound differences between a principle of 
individuation for fields and one for particles. It 
is our intention in this section to examine these 
differences and to briefly discuss the 
individuality of fields in general. 
In particle mechanics corresponding to a discrete 
physics, the physical quantities, such as positions 
and momentunj, are functions of time only. In a 
field theory, however, corresponding to continuum 
physics, the physical quantities in the field, such 
as energy, are functions of both time and space. As 
we noted at the beginning of this chapter, any point 
in the field is associated at a given time with 
certain quantities which may be scalars or vectors, 
depending on the type of field considered. It can 
then be argued either that the fields are no more 
than properties of the points of space-time, and 
therefore can only be regarded as individuals if the 
latter can be so regarded, or that they are substantial 
in a sers e to be made clear shortly and can thus be 
taken to exhibit T. I. In the material to follow we 
shall consider both positions in more detail and 
in particular we shall present a series cf arguments 
against the latter view. 
The argument that fields are individuals derives from 
the idea, noted in the Introduction to Chapter One, 
that the concept of an individual captures what we mean 
by a particular. Fields are particulars - we speak 
of the electro -magnetic field, for example, and hence 
should be regarded as individuals. The fact that they 
are 'global' ps--. Lrticulars, in the sense of not being 
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localised in space is not an argument against this 
view since the size, or spatial extent of a thing 
is merely a property of that thing and thus 
cannot preclude a thing being regarded as an indiv- 
idual. It is not necessary for a particular to 
have a definite spatial position at a given time 
(163). 
Thus according to this view a field is an individual 
and can be assigned a label, or proper name, which 
designates the substance underlying the properties. 
Fields can be regarded as substantial and thus can be 
taken to possess T. I. However, an objection now arises 
because one of the most stidking developments in late 
19th and early 20th century physics was the emancipationn 
of the field concept from the notion of a material 
substance (164). Arguments based on this historical 
observation tend to be of an essentialist nature 
because they utilise a possible answer to the question 
'what is the essence of substance? ' to justify the 
exclusion of fields from the category of substance. 
Thus, for -example, one possible answer would be to say 
that an essential characteristic of substances is that 
they areo at their most fundamental levelo impenetrable. 
Fields are not impenetrable therefore they cannot 
be regarded as substantial. 
Howevero although the premise is certainly true, one 
can avoid the conclusion by rejecting this essentialist 
line and consider instead the role which the concept 
of substance has played in physics- 
Thus, whereas Descartes regarded spatial extension as 
the essential attribute of mattero Newton extended the 
set of universal properties to include extensiono hard- 
ness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia (165). 
samples of 
163. According to this argument the che,., mical elements 
can also be regarded as iiýýividuals with the dis- 
tinction between elements and atoms being one of 
continuity and discontinuity rather than non-indiv- 
iduality and individuality. 
164. Regarded as the elastic fluid aether, in various 
forms. P. M. Harman (1982) p. 72, gives a good 
account of these developments. 
165.1. Newton in A. R. Hall and ý,. Boas Hall eds. 
(1962) p. 132-144. 
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The last, in particularo was given an elevated status 
and was considered to be both an essential and a 
universal property. Leibniz argued that both active 
and passive forces, such as impenetrability, were 
phenomenal manifestations of primitive forces which 
characterised the nature of substances. (166) 
This emphasis on the status of force as a defining 
characteristic wa-S then taken up by Kant (167) who 
argued that forces were essential properties of sub- 
stances. Gradually this rather vague notion came to 
be split in two, with one aspect developing into 
the dynamic concept of force as used today and the 
other evolving into the concept of energy. Thus 
during the 19th century energy took over impenetrab- 
ility's role as the essential characteristic of 
substance. 
Faraday rejected Newtonian atomism and argued that 
the forces between bodies were mediated by an ambient 
field between them -a concept which was explicitly 
based on a metaphysics of substance in which force 
was regarded as the defining property of matter (168). 
This idea was then further elaborated by Maxwell who 
produced a highly mathematised and coherent field 
theory, with a correspondingly complicated metaphysics. 
As far as this gloss is concerned it is suffic,, _., 
ient to 
note the following points. Maxwell distinguished the 
substantial concept of matter as the material sub- 
stratum constituting physical realityo from the 
functional concept as defined by the symbolism of 
mechanical principles. Thus his analytical formalism 
of the latter did not give a representation of the 
structure of the hidden mechanism constituting the 
electromagnetic field, nor did it consider the forces 
between the particles of this mechanism. (169) 
166. G. W. Leibniz in C. I. Gerhardt ed. (1849-63) 
Vol. 6 p. 236-8, p. 241 
167. I. Kant (1902) Vol. I p. 139 
168. m. Faraday (1843) 
169. J. C. Maxwell (1896) p. 527 
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Maxwell also emphasiSO-d that the field was a 
repository of energy, maintaining that energy could 
only exist in connection with material substances 
and concluding that the aether was the repository of 
the energy of the electromagnetic field. Clearly 
Maxwell regarded this field as a material substance 
of some kind; unlike the other mechanical analogues 
of electromagnetic quantities the energy of the 
field was to be taken literally. (170) It is 
interesting to note that in his work on gas theory 
he had rejected I ... the doctrines that all matter is 
extended and that no two portions of matter can 
coincide in the same place ---' (171) -- If the 
Impenetrability Assumption is rejected for material 
substance in the form of atoms then it is obviously 
just a small step to go even further and declare 
that fields, which also violate I. A., are also 
substantial. 
Maxwell carefull distinguished the substantial 3 
concept of matter from the dynamicalp and believed that 
although the former was unknowable, the latter, 
regarded as the recipient of momentum and energy, 
formed the basis of physics. (172) In his view 
energy could not be conceived of as independent of 
the substance in which it existed and therefore as 
field theory is concerned with the distribution of 
energy in the field, this field must be substantial. 
Thus the role of substance witl-lp physics slowly 
changed from that which is impenetrable to that which 
is the recipient and carrier of energy. Subsequent 
developments dfter Maxwell continue to support this 
view. Thus the monistic theories of Thomson and 
Larmor reduced matter to a particular state of the 
aether, (173) a programme which led to the electro- 
170. Maxwell Ibid Vo. I p. 529, and p. 564 
171. Ibid p. 33 and p. 448 
172. Maxwell (1873) Vol. II p. 181 
173. See, for example, B. G. Doran (1975) p. 133 
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magnetic theories of matter of Abraham, Wien, vie 
et al, in which matter was regarded as simply a local 
concentration of the electromagnetic field. The 
opposing dualistic tendency resulted in theories such 
as Lorentz's (174) involving both charged particles 
of matter and a non-mechanical aether. The latter was 
just the Maxwell fields of electric and magnetic force 
and was also regarded as substantial because it 
carried energy. 
Although Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity 
demonstrated the redundancy of the aether for electro- 
magnetic field theory it also gave support to the 
substantial nature of energy by associating it with 
2 inertial mass via E= mc The Equivalence Principle 
of General Relativity then took this association one 
step further by relating energy to gravitational mass. 
G. R. initiated a monistic programme to construct a 
unified field theory in which the electro magnetic 
field, as well as the gravitational) would be given 
geometrical significance, and matter would again be 
identified with local concentrations of this unified 
field. 
Thus if substance is regarded as that which carries 
energy, then# since fields carry energy they must be 
substantial. Fields then become amenable to a 
Lockean description in which they have T. I. attributed 
to them. Against this conclusion, however, one can 
argue that closer examination of the nature of energy 
reveals serious deficiencies in the view that it 
should be regarded as substantial. This can then be 
used to support the alternative view that fields are 
no more than the properties of the points of space-time 
and one could no more give a field an individuating 
label than one could so label the colour red, for 
example . 
With a view to rescuing fields from this conclusion, 
it may be asked whether properties are, or can 
be, 
individuals. The answer is no. To say otherwise 
174. See R. McCormach (1970) p. 459 
would be to confuse two categories which should be 
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kept distinct. Properties are not perceived on their 
own., disembodied; they are merely general predicates 
instantiated in certain cases by individuals. This 
distinction is reflected linguistically in the 
separation of subject from predicate which suggests 
that the individual is related to 'its' properties 
as an owner is to his/her possessions. 
The correctness of this suggestion is confirmed by 
the inability of a thingt propertiest which are 
general and applicable to many things, to individuate 
it, i. e. to pick that thing out as the unique 
individual that it is (175). 
Properties cannot even serve to individuate# for 
the reason already given. They are predicable of 
many individuals and so cannot serve to individuate 
any one of them (176) .A possible exception is position 
in space-time, but this involves an ineliminable 
reference to another individual, such as the 'here-and- 
now', which grants this property a special status - 
This if fields are regarded as properties of space- 
time points then they cannot be individuals, nor can 
they serve to individuate these points. As regards the 
argument that fields are substantial because they are 
characterised by the presence of energy, the following 
points should be, noted. 
Firstly, it has been argued that the energy of a 
system can be used to reidentify that system (177) 
and that energy therefore provides the fixed point 
of reference which is invariant, through change and 
which is necessary for the world to be comprehended. 
175. If things are regarded as bundles of properties 
instantiated at points in space-time then either 
these points must be taken as the individuator 
in which case our conclusion stands,. or the 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles must be 
invoked* in which case it is the collection of 
all properties which individuates, not the separate 
properties themselves. 
176. See Quinton op cit p. 12 ff or K. Popper (1959) 
p. 66 R 
177.19. Theobald (1966) p. 151 andAFowler (1926) 
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(178). It is then argued that sincetvariance through 
change is a fundamental characteristic of the 
substantial substratum, energy should be regarded as 
re 
substantial and as serving toAidentify. 
However relativity theory implies that energy is 
OA( 
a conserved scalar quantityA ithin a given frame of 
reference and is not itself universally conserved 
under general coordinate transformations. As far as 
Lorentz covariant physics is concerned the true scalar 
invariant is a function of momentum and energy (179), 
Although the energy of a system may not vary with time 
with respect to any chosen frame of reference it will 
vary if the reference frame is changed. In particular 
energy is not an invariant of the field; the invariant 
quantities associated with the electro-magnetic 
field are in fact scalar quantities such as E. H and 
E2_H2, where E and H are the electric and magnetic 
vectors respectively, obtained from the six component 
antisymetric field tensor. 
This argues against regarding the energyXsubstantial, 6a- seAse&A 
at least in,, which it is taken above (180). In 
particular the energy of a system cannot always serve 
to reidentify that system because a change of reference 
frame will produce a change in the observed energy 
value of a system, which cannot therefore be used to 
'tag' and hence reidentify that system. 
A second argument is that energy is at least like 
the substantial substratum in being a primitive concept 
which cannot be represented by a model or said to possess 
any structure. However, this does not necessarily 
imply that energy must be regarded as substantial, since 
it could be viewed as merely a property of systems. 
Thus we speak of particular system possessing so much 
energy and being possessed by something may be taken to 
178. E. Mach (1942) p. 607 
179. In the case of a free particle this function is 
E2-CZpZwhere E is the energy and p the momentum. 
180. See P. W. Bridgman (1961) Ch. l. 
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imply being a property of that thing. Substance is not 
possessed in this way and so energy should not be 
regarded as substantial. 
Thermodynamical considerations of a 'flow of energy' 
may also suggest that energy is substantial (181) and 
in this case problems associated with a change in 
reference frames do not arise since heat is random 
kinetic energy and is unaffected by such changes. But 
then statements concerning the 
e 
ocity of heat'flowl V 
and energy 'flow' in general make no sense. Assignments 
of absolute values to energy would also support the 
substantivalist position but in thermodynamics these 
depend on the assumption that substances can be 
obtained in their lowest energy forms at an absolute 
zero of temperature, and it is possible that these 
substances may possess other forms of lower energy 
at this temperature - 
Electromagnetic field theory appears to provide 
firmer support for absolute energy values since the 
field energy apparently has a natural zero when 
E=H=0. However, this also is not conclusive 
since only those processes in the field involving energy 
differences are of physical interest and therefore no 
physical consequences result from the addition of an 
arbitrary constant to the expression for the energy 
density. obviously the energy will be zero in the above 
situation since then there is no field anyway! (This 
conclusion is true in classical field theory but not 
in QFT where the energy eigenvalue contains a constant 
term giving the so called 'zero point energy' of the 
field, which is present even when the excitation numbers 
of the field modes are zero). 
One can also cast doubt upon the supposed acquisition 
by energy of a substantial nature through Einstein's 
mass-energy relation. (182) This does not, 
in fact, 
181. This suggestion was embodied in the caloric 
theory of heat. 
182. See Ruddick's discussion in Munitz op cit p. 241 
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explicitly assert the identity 
, 
of mass and energy, since 
such an identification is patently false. All that 
Special Relativity requires is that a change in energy 
corresponds to a change in mass and vice versa. It does 
not demand that they possess the same set of properties 
and clearly they do not. (183) Energy is a measure of 
matter's ability to do work and undergo change, whereas 
mass, being a measure of the inertia of matter, can do 
no work by itself and is thus a measure of matter's 
ability to resist change. The two concepts are thus 
concerned with contrary aspects of reality and the fact 
that high concentrations of energy display inertial 
properties and that mass can be transformed into energy 
does not justify the statement that they are identical, 
at least not in the sense of being predicatively equiva- 
lent. 
Although the electromagnetic field is characterised by 
the presence of4energy it is not clear whether one can 
say the same for the gravitational field. Thus it 
has not yet been conclusively established whether matter 
in motion propogates energy as charges in motion do and 
whether this energy is radiated in the form of waves. 
However, the gravitational fieldmay acquire a substantial 
status in another way. General Relativity identifes this 
field with the structure of space- time itself, and as 
we have seen, there are good grounds for adopting the 
substantivalist position with regard to the latter. This 
identification then presents an obstruction to any 
putative unification of the gravitational and electro- 
magnetic fields since this would require the unification 
of the two forms of waves involved, the electromagnetic 
waves in space and the gravitational waves of space. It 
woulO have to be decided whether the space-time metric 
depends totally upon the matter present or not. If it 
does then it would not be possible to distinguish between 
183. We are denying here the unification of mass and 
energy, both in the sense of identification and as 
being different manifestations of something else. 
For a brief discussion of the different meanings 
of'unification'see M. Redhead (1984) p. 274 
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matter as the source of the field and matter as depen- 
dent upon the field, and the energy field would then 
become the most fundamental 'ultimate 1 (184) of reality. 
We conclude then that strong arguments can be given 
against the view that energy, and hence, also the 
electro--ýmagnetic f ield, (185) can be regarded as 
having, in some sense, a substantial nature. This 
leaves open the possibility of adopting the alternative 
namely that fields are simply properties of the points 
of space-time and it is the latter which should be 
regarded as substantial, Thus space-time and the 
electro-magnetic field stand in the same relation to 
one another as oto substance and property in the 
traditional accounts of these notions. 
Just as f ielcls cannot be said to possess T. I neither 
can waves in the field, nor can they have space-time 
individuality attributed to them, at least not in the 
same form with which it can be attributed to particles. 
Waves in the el! ctro magnetic field, for examplee clearly 
satisfy the first requirement of space-time individualityo 
that of continuity. Maxwell's equations can be regarded 
as the equations of motion of the electromagnetic field 
and thus characterise the fact that as the wave 
propagates it traverses a continuous space-time 
trajectory. (186) The field equations ensure continuity, 
just as the equations of motion do for classical 
particles - (187) 
However it is equally clear that such waves do not 
satisfy the Impenetrability requirement, since in general 
any particular point of space-time can support more 
than one field. For fields a complete* spatial and tem- 
poral* position can be polygamous* to use Quinton's 
terminology. This failure thus destroys the efficacy 
of position as individuator since to state the spatio- 
temporal location of a field will not uniquely 
distinguish it and will not therefore necessarily 
184. Quinton devotes a whole chapter to this idea of 
lultimates' which is good philQsophically but rather 
thin on the physics. op cit p. 81. 
185. Presumably the same conclusions apply to the weak 
nuclear field also. 
186. J. Jackson (1975) 
187. A. Einstein (1961) p. 146 
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individuate it. obviously the form of space-time 
individuality attributable to particles cannot be 
attributed to f ields or to waves in f ields 
A The latter also encouter severe problems with regard 
to their reidentification through time, principally 
because of this failure to satisfy I. A. For example, 
if two indistinguishable waves meet, pass through 
one another and then separate then simple observation 
cannot supply an answer to the question which wave is 
which after this interaction. The criterion of spatio 
temporal continuity although satisfied, cannot help 
because it is consistent with either of the two answers. 
In other words in situations where two, or more world 
lines intersect because I. A. is not satisfiedo 
continuity alone cannot ensure reidentification. 
This is because at the actual point of superposition 
the two waves cannot be distinguished and this it is no 
longer possible to uniquely trace the career of each one 
as a succession of wave stages under some sortal term. 
Thus, at the actual point of crossing there is no way 
of telling which wave is which and one cannot individuate 
two waves which sharel for some period of time, their 
trajectories, as in the following situation (188): 
.-L, 
4 (o , >t 
t, 
This behaviour of waves and fields compelled Reichenbach 
to develop the notion of functional genidentity' (189) - 
This applies to processes or chains of events where the 
impenetrability and labelling characteristics of 'material 
genidentityl are violated 
I 
and only the continuity 
requirements is satisfied. Thus he put forward water 
waves and energy as examples of things which possess 
functional genidentity. As regards the relationship 
between the two forms of genidentity Reichenbach believed 
188. Strawson considered similar arguments with regard 
to the reidentification of sounds. He concluded 
that sounds could not be reidentified at different 
times and used this to support his view that material 
objects embedded in space-time form the primary 
individuators. 
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that 'We can define genidentity to suit our purposes' 
(190), in the sense that we can move from one level of 
description to another as we wish. 
Redhead has captured much the same idea in the sugges- 
tion that waves belong to a new category of entities 
called lephemerals, (191). These can be distinguished 
from one another at the same time but cannot be 
reidentified through time via T. I. as 'continuants' 
can, such reidentifications only being possible if the 
continuity criterion is satisfied. As we have indicated 
however, continuity alone may not be enough, given 
ephemerals' violation of I. A. Redhead particularly 
emphasises the ease with which creation and annihilation 
processes can be envisaged in terms of ephemerals as 
compared to continuants and therefore this is a category 
which is most readily applied to the entities of Quantum 
Field Theory. 
Our conclusion then is that there are good reasons for 
rejecting the view. that fields are substantial, and 
can therefore have T. I. attributed to them, and the 
form of space-time individuality that applies to the 
waves in this fields is metaphysically weaker than 
that which can be attributed to particles, justifying 
the inclusion of, waves in a different category of 
entities. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We have argued, in this chapter, that there are two 
metaphysical positions which can be adopted with regard 
to the individuality of classical particles. The 
first, corresponding to a naive Lockean approach, casts 
an underlying substance into the role of individuator 
and. this form of individuality has been called 
'Transcendental Individuality' as the individuator 
transcends the properties predicated of the particles. 
190. Ibid p. 226 
191. M. Redhead (1983) p. 39 
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By considering the way in which classical particle 
theory can be rewritten in field theoretic terms we 
were then led to the view that particles could be 
individuated in terms of their location in space- 
time. This view can be most eatily accommodated within 
an absolutist, or substantivalist, approach to space- 
time as the relativist alternative induces circularities. 
These results were then supported by an historical 
account of the development of Boltzmann's statistical 
mechanics which examined in detail the differences 
between his Combinatorial and H-Theorem approaches. 
In particular we showed that just as T. I. is not 
necessary to classical physics, so the former approach 
may not be entirely free from spatio-temporal 
considerations, as they must be invoked if some 
justification of the weighting assignments is sought. 
Finally we discussed the individuality of fieldso arguing 
that they should properly be regarded as properties of 
the space-time points and that waves in these fields can 
have only a weak form of individuality attributed to 
them. 
Thus just as there is an underdetermination for the 
particle and field descriptions, so classical physics 
is essentially agnostic with regard to our two views 
of particle individuality. It is philosophical rather 
than physical, arguments which must be called upon if 
we want to choose one position over the other. 
In the next chapter we shall consider quantum physics 
and we shall see that a similar situation arises there 
also, although rather more analysis is required to draw 
out those metaphysical positions regarding particle 
individuality with *-hich the theory is consistent. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN QUANTUM 
PHYSICS 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was shown that classical 
physics can be taken to support either of two views 
regarding particle individualitye which we called 
'Transcendental' and 'Space-Time' - Individuality 
respectively. It is our intention in this chapter 
to demonstrate that a similar situation exists in 
quantum physics also. The two positions which we 
shall arrive at, namely individual particles plus 
accessibility restrictions imposed upon the individuated 
states and 'Non-individual' particles plus individual 
states, are related to, though obviously not identical 
with, the two views above. 
There are two points worth noting here. The first 
is that the situation as regards particle individuality 
is somewhat more complicated in quantum mechanics 
(Q. M. ) than in classical mechanics (C. M. ). This is 
because in the latter there is only one form of 
particle statisticso Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, where- 
as in the former theory there are three: Fermi-Dirac, 
Bose-Einstein and para-statistics. The type of 
statistics obeyed in Q. M. is embodied in the 
symmetry restrictions imposed upon the particle 
wave-functions. As we shall see it is through a 
consideration of these underlying symmetry principles 
that we are led to our two views above concerning 
particle individuality. 
Our second point is that the majority of discussions 
of particle individuality in Q. m. have tended to 
emphasize only one viewo namely that quantum mechanical 
particles should be regarded as'non-individuals' in 
some sense. The ancestry of this position can be 
traced back to Ehrenfest, who realised very early in 
the development of Q-M- that the 'new physics' implied a 
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conception of particle individuality which was very 
different from the classical view. However, we shall 
try to show there is an alternative view which can equally 
well be held. 
In 3.2 we shall lay down the basic theoretical 
structure in the context of which particle individuality 
will be discussed. In particular we shall emphasise the 
crucial role played by the 'Indistinguishability 
Postulate in the, se discussions. 
In the next section we consider the implications of 
this postulate and its various interpretations. This 
leads to the explication of our two views of particle 
individuality, supported by theoretical considerations 
from the previous sections. Thus we establish the second 
half of our central thesis. 
We then present a historical outline of the conception 
and development of the three forms of quantum statistics, 
drawing attention to those points which support our 
philosophical position above. We also note that, with 
only one exception, the early work in this area 
used a suitably adapted form of Boltzmann's Combinatorial 
Approach. 
In the final two sections we briefly consider quantum 
field theory and the Gibbs Paradox in the light of our 
previous arguments. 
3.2 The Theoretical Context 
We begin by considering a system of N indistinguishable 
(in the sense given in the introduction) particles, taking 
them all, for simplicity, to be of the same kind and wih 
zero spin (1) - Using Dirac Is notation (2) we can 
distinguish the states which one particle of the system 
can be in by writing the kets thus: I CL'> ý10,7-> )--- 
Here we have labelled the states with the superscripts 
1. These restrictions will not affect the argument. The 
problems which arise when particle production is 
. allowed 
will be touched upon later and are discussed 
in 0. Greenberg and A. Messiah (1964). p. 253 
2. P. A. M. Dirac (1978) 
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1., 2,,... and. clearly they are being regarded as 
individuated. They can be distinguished and assigned 
labels in this way because different states are 
characterised by different wave-functions. These labels 
will be called state, or place, labels. 
A second set of labels can be introduced which specify 
which particles are in which states. Thus the particles 
can be distinguished by writing the kets thus: 
I Cý I>) 
I CC" :;;, 
-> - -, - 
Here the particles have 
been labelled with the subscripts 1.2, ... and can thus 
be regarded as individuals. As we shall see it is 
the permutation of these labels in the Schrodinger form- 
ulation which leads to the claim that the particles 
have somehow lost their individuality and must therefore 
be regarded as 'non-individuals'. 
Thus the two essential ingredients of both views, the 
individuated states and the individuality of particles, 
are present in our initial theoretical structure. (3) 
Let a-II x) I cLýL I >"ý ... be the kets for the 
first particle considered as a dynamical system by itself. 
There will be corresponding kets 
for the second particle by itself and so on. A 
representation of the complete system can then be built 
up and a ket for the whole assembly obtained by taking 
the tensor product, (8).., of kets for each particle by 
itself: CLII >>0 a'j > (4) 1 Ilu 
Kets of this form shall be denoted quite generally by 
These product functions 
do a q!, 'v'; > =I a', 7 2. 
atJ SCLL't_&ý Pei-^ickte 
span a Hilbert space which can be constructed as 
follows, (5) 
Considering only one species of spinless particle and 
supposing for the moment that the number of particles is 
fixed, we first of all assume that the one-particle 
states are in one-to-one correspondence with the rays 
of the space 
"'R* 
I made up of all 
L2 wave functions 
of one ccý, ordinate. The states of a system of N 
3. cf J. Hartle and J. Taylor (1969) p. 2044 
4. Dirac op cit p. 207 
5. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2044 
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indistinguishable individual particles, assigned labels 
ri = l,..., N corresponding to the subscripts in the 
ket 1, would correspond to the vectors of the 
space which is the tensor product of N single 
particle spaces. 
This is the space of all L2 functions of N coordinates 
which can be spanned by our product functions mvd (--ýR 
pem&,. teel vo-akAtS. It should be noted that the space 
is defined in such a way that the order of the particle 
labels in a product vector is relevant. Thus the 
vectors I UL kr> and I V- (, k-,;; p are quite distinct unless 
u=V. 
This construction can be generalised to allow for 
systems with an arbitrary number of particles of 
different species in the following manner. 
In this case state vectors and observables are defined 
in the Fock space which is the direct sum of 
spaces J-ý A) , each of which is spanned by vectors 
representing states with af ixed number N,, of particles 
in each species s ; ýE 'Y tj CA) = (A),. ) AJz_) A)s 
4 
N OV) 
is a direct product of spaces which are themselves 
direct (or tensor) products of single particle spaces 
for each species. Thus, denoting the space associated 
with a single particle of species s by 
S we have "'ý I 
5 ý4 WA 
4 
A)L 
S 14. S S, 
A) .-I 
(R) 
L-CJA 4e- S) 
Clearly the 
14A) 
Of 3 correspondSý to the A), S 
of 5 and 6. (6) 
In most of what follows we shall restrict our attention 
to only one of the subspaces 
1-ýA) defined above 
and consider for simplicity only systems containing one 
species of particle whose number is fixed. However, 
we shall have occasion to move to the more general 
Fock space description, in particular when we come to 
discuss Quantum Field Theory. 
6. Greenberg and messiah op cit p. 250 
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The basic elements in any quantum mechanical des- 
cription of a system of particles are the Hilbert 
space-of-state vectors and the operators corresponding 
to observables whose expectation values are the 
measurable numbers. Having outlined the structure of 
the first of these, we shall, in what follows, 
consider the nature of the second. 
The ket 'given by 1 corresponds to a particular kind 
of state for the assembly which can be described by 
saying that each particle is in 'its own state' (the 
values of the subscripts and superecripts within each 
ket are the same). The general ket for the assembly 
is of the form of a weighted sum or integral of kets 
such as that given in 1 If the kets CL11>1 I CL I >) 
are a set of basic kets for the first particle by 
itself, then the kets 0- CL z 
7- > will be 
a set of basic kets for the second particle by itself, 
and so on, and. the kets of the form given in 1 
will be a set of -basic kets for the assembly. The 
representation provided by such kets for the assembly 
treats all the particles on an equal footing. (7) 
Another ket for the assembly may be obtained by simply 
interchanging the kets for the first two particles in 
1, giving 
I a'2-> 01 aý > (8) 1 aý > (3) vv- (g) 
I CLt >7 
This process of interchanging the first two particles 
is a linear operator which can beapplied to any kets 
for the assembly. In fact the process of interchanging 
any two particles is a linear operator and by repeated 
application of such interchanges one can obtain any 
permutation of the particles appearing as a linear 
operator which can be applied to kets for the assembly. 
In general if the particle labels are permuted than 
another ket of the form 1 in the tensor product 
^4 1 is obtained. Thus inside each space r-L,, ) 
4 -C "i 
one can define unitary operators describing the permutation 
7. Dirac op cit p. 208 
137 
of particles belonging to the same species. These 
permutation operator form a group usually denoted by SA) 
and can be def ined by 
P. 7, -S 
%, r2ý r38 
where Pi is the particle permutation operator. 
Let us consider the application of such a permutation 
to a ket for the assembly of particles. We shall 
apply. the operator Pi to a ket of the type given in 
1 noting that Pi operates on the particle labels, 
corresponding to the subscripts in the kets. Thus, 
9 
(omitting the tensor product signs for convenience) 
In general one will obtain N! such states, 
corresponding to the number of permutations of N 
particle labels among themselves. 
A particle permutation is essentially just a re- 
shuffling of the particle labels and so, because the 
particles of the assembly are all indistinguishable, 
such 4) permutation cannot lead to any observable 
effects. Thus we now introduce P e- tv'4L&L-cA_&Lýo/k 
The Indistinguishability Postulate : If a particle X 
PI is applied to any ket for the assembly then there 
is no way of distinguishing the resultant permuted ket 
from the original unpermuted one by any means of 
observation at any time. (9) 
This assumption lies at the heartof the theory of 
indistinguishable particles and characterises the 
basic requirement that indistinguishable particles, 
possessing all intrinsic properties in common, cannot 
be observably distinguished. Thus the observables for 
such particles are those for labelled, individuated, 
particles which do not distinguish the labels. (10) 
A more formal expression of this postulate can be given 
as follows 
8. H. Margenau and G. M. Murphy (1956) p. 558; 
Y. Hammermesh (1962) 
9. Greenberg and Messiah op cit p. 250 
10. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2044 
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The observables which do not distinguish the particle 
se lables are those who4expectation value for any vector 
in '" " ej is the same as that for P,; > TL 
Thtks the requirement that dynamical states represented 
by vectors I C, -> and Fj[> cannot be distinguished in 
any measurement can be expressed by the relation 
P,; :. s c, 4; ý, ov'-, (-ej P,: f> 
10 
S(_ý, C., _ 
P,: C: s Lc"LLOC& 
< [IQ I PC-( a (2ý 
*V. 3 where Q is some suitable defined Hermitian operator. (11) 
This is the formal statement of the Indistinguishability 
Postulate (IP) - 
It is sorretimes said that this postulate necessarily 
implies what is known as the 'Symmetrization Postulate' 
(S. P. ),, which says that states containing several 
indistinguishable particles are, according to the species, 
either symmetric (bosons) or antisymmetric (fermions), 
(12). Now if it is supposed that a particle permutation 
applied to the ket I f> gives only symmetric or 
antisymmetric states then clearly this implies equation 
(10) i. e. 11 
So a sufficient condition for I. P. is that a particle 
permutation gives only symmetric or antisymmetric states, 
for all observables Q. 
Howevero this is not a necessarv condition,, as Messiah 
and Greenberg made clear. S. P. absolutely forbids those 
states which cannot be represented by either symmetric 
or anti-symmetric wave functionso and is thus a very 
strong selection rule. As Messiah and Greenberg remarked 
'This is an extremely strong condition, very much stronger 
that what is implied by the indistinguishability of 
identical particles'. (13) They then went on to 
demonstrate that the arguments usually employed to 
insert S. P. into the Q. M. formalism are ad- hoc in nature 
and do not proceed unavoidably from first principles as is 
11. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2044; Greenberg and 
messiah op cit p. 251 
12. Greenberg and Messiah Ibid p. 248 
13. Ibid p. 248 
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sometimes thought. They also showed that many experi- 
mental facts which are apparently tests of the S. P. 
selection rule are in fact merely tests of I. P. 
The difference between the two postulates can be 
expressed thus: 
S. P. is a restriction on the states for all observables 
Q. whereas I. P. is a restriction on the observables Q 
for all states. The latter claim can be demonstrated as 
follows. Equation 10 must hold for any vector 
and so will hold with )ý; >replaced by any linear 
combination of vectors. Applying this relation to the 
two superpositions > and V> 
gives 
< C? ><>E V-(w 12 
or equivalently E P4;.;, 0 := 13 
This must hold for all the possible particle permut- 
ations of the N indistinguishable particles. Thus all 
physical observables, in the sense of all observables 
associated with an actual measurement, must be particle 
permutation invariant. (14) 
What we are doing here is identifying or 'picking 
out' the observables of a system of N indistinguishable 
particles. Since 10 holds with IC> replaced 
by any linear combination of vectors it also holds for 
off diagonal matrix elements and so is an operator (0 f'P- identity. ThereAthe observables for N indistinguishable 
particles are that subset of observables for N, labelled 
particles which commute with the particle permutation 
operators. I. P. thus restricts the possible observables 
to this subset. 
Having thus identified the observables of the system 
the next step is to establish a correspondence between 
the states and vectors. of We shall consider this 
14. It can further be shown that the condition imposed 
on the evolution operator U (t) by the requirement 
that dynamical states represented by If, > and 
should not exhibit any observable 
dif f erence at any time t., EP, ý ,U 
fee) a U(, t)j =0 
is in fact automatically fulfilled. See Greenberg 
and Messiah Ibid p. 251 
140 
later,, where the concept of paraparticles will be 
developed, but for the moment we wish to discuss some 
further points of interest. 
First of all the permutation invariance expressed in 
13 is a rigourous invariance property holding for 
all physical observables and the evolution operator. 
Contrary to what is often assumed the state vector 
space 
J-ý, 
j is not irreducible with respect to the algebra 
of physical observables and it is through consideration 
of the manner in which 
AJ /' 
can be decomposed into I-CA) 
irreducible subspace that one is lead to paraparticles. 
It is also important to realise that 10 implies that 
the operators denoted by Q must be symmetric functions 
of the particle labels, as can easily be shown thus 
<>q jý: > f2 
a eL (2ý Q 
Thus Q is unchanged by the application of any 
particle permutatione acting on the particle labels and 
must therefore be a symmetric function of these labels. 
This result is the basis of the claim that I. P. should 
be interpreted as a restriction on the observables, 
to the effect that they must be symmetric functions as 
just stated. 
The most significant observable of a Q. N. system is 
of course, the Hamiltonian and the indistinguishability 
of particles is usually taken to require that this 
Hamiltonian be a symmetrical function of the dynamical 
variables (15). The importanceof Greenberg and Messiah's 
work lies not so much instating the above restriction 
but in placing it within the context of what is meant 
by 'indistinguishability', as given by I. P. and in 
clearly separating it from S. P. 
Having defined the particle permutation operators 
Pip which permute the particle labels in our general ket, 
it is now necessary to introduce a place permutation 
operator Ti which permutes the state labels (i. e. it 
operates on the superscripts). These operators are 
defined by 'J 14 r"U 
15. Dirac op cit p. 207 
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Consider the application of such a place permutation 
to a ket for the assembly of particles. Let us apply 
the operator Pi to a ket of the type given in 1 
noting that Pi operates on the state labels. Thus 
we obtain: 15 
-1 W 0, 
The difference between the particle and place 
permutation operators has been expressed by Dirac thus 
: 'Let us consider a permutation in the general sense, 
say that consisting of the interchange of 2 and 3. 
This may be interpreted either as the interchange of 
the objects 2 and 3 or as the inter change of the objects 
in the places 2 and 3. these two operations producing 
in general quite different results. The first of these 
interpretations is the one that gives the operators 
P [the particle permutation operators] the objects 
concerned being the similar particles. A permutation P 
can be applied to an arbitrary ket for the assembly. 
A permutation with the second interpretation [i-e-a 
place permutation] has a meaning, however, only when 
applied to a ket of the form 
EP +ý -= I CCIkr, > I t)es;;;, -0&I CLPZ>3 for which each of the particles is in a place specified 
by an 0C or to a sum of kets of the form E PIP> = etc] 06) 
The place permutation, unlike the particle permutation, 
operators depend upon the basis with respect to which 
they are defined. 
The exact nature of the relationship between these two 
kinds of operator can be elicited as follows: 
Let us consider a state function iFý; - given by 
IC ;>-: - 
I CL I CL's 0 ý- - 0- 
N> 16 
1 1%) 
and let us operate on this function with the particle 
permutation operator Pi as defined above: 
17 
16. Dirac op cit p. 217 
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If we now apply a place permutation TI again as 
defined above, to this new state function we obtain 
'I, PL P'ý I CL > 
a rt Ck POJ > 
> i CL , 0. '. .a IV 
Thus 
P 
Pý 1?, ;> 
This gives 18 
In other words, the place permutation operators are 
simply the inverses of the particle permutation 
operators, when acting on a ket of the form given by 
Iý ý> 
. 
A plausibility argument can be given for this res, ult 
using a 'ball- and-box model in which there are a number 
of boxes, representing the states and a number of balls 
representing the particles. The P, s will permute 
the balls among the boxes and the Pi Is will permute 
the boxes among, or rather, around the balls. Suppose 
initially there is ball a in box 1 and ball b in box 2. 
A particle permutation is then applied and a and b are 
interchanged, giving b in box 1 and a in box 2. Now 
a place permutation is applied and boxes 1 and 2 inter- 
changed, giving the original arrangement. Thus the 
result of first applying aPi followed by applying a 
PI is simply identity* the initial arrangement. 
1 Hence PI. 
Since the P's are linear operators which can be applied 
to any ket for an assembly of N particles, they can be 
regarded as dynamical var3-ables in the N particle system. 
However, as Dirac has pointed outo they are not, in 
general, real dynamical variables because their Hermitean 
conjugates are equal to their reciprocals. (17) 
The T's can be considered as dynamical vars'ableso again 
only with states obtainable by superposition of the 
states given by 14 - 
it must now be asked whether these two kinds of permut- 
ation operator can be regarded as observables. The 
17. Dirac op cit. p. 212 
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condition for an operator'Q to be an observable is 
that it must commute with the particle permutation 
operators i. e. Pz , "ý' 
(5? 1= C) for all 
observables Q. 
Taking the Pi Is first, it can be shown that these 
do not in general commute with one another i. e. 
0 This is because the 
Symmetric group SM is non-Abelian i. e.. the 
elements do not in general commute. Therefore given 
the above condition, the particle permutation 
operators cannot be regarded as observables. 
An entirely different situation holds for the 
P. 1s. It can be shown that these do commute with the 
particle permutation operators i. e. PZý 0 
The PI Is act without regard to place and the Is 
act without regard to the identities of the particles. 
Another plausibility argument can be given for this 
commutability in terms of the ball and box model. 
Suppose initially ball a is in box 1, ball b in box 2, 
ball c in box 3 and ball d in box 4. A particle 
permutation is then applied interchanging balls c and 
d. This gives a in 1b in 2c in 4d in 3. A place 
permutation is then applied, interchanging boxes 1 and 
2. This gives the final arrangement a in 2, b in 1, 
c in 4, and d in 3. 
Returning to the initial arrangement, suppose a place 
permutation, interchanging boxes I and 2 was applied 
first, followed by the particle permutation inter- 
changing'balls c and d. This gives a in box 2. b in 1'. 
c in 4 and d in 3. which is the same as the final 
arrangement obtained above. Thus applying aP followed 
by ap gives exactly the same result as first applying 
a then a P. In other words the order in which 
these two operations are performed does not matter. 
It therefore follows that a_4_j sR_j[ al I C) CA C-' 
CL (, c cL o & 
0 CS 0_/L 
C,, L S_p cC_ýuvk, 'S ý 3, -3). Further arguments 
based on physical 
grounds can be given to support this conclusion, CLAJ 
18. Dirac op cit p. 218 
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it has been suggested that a general definition of 
indistinguishable particles should be that there are 
no other observables, apart from those which are 
functions of the T's, that distinguish between 
states differing only in the ordering of the indis- 
tinguishable particle variables. (19) This result, that 
any self-adjoint function of elte- 
ýjsshould 
be considered observable, following as it does from 
the above commutation relation, means that I. P. is all 
that is needed to make the formalism of distinct 
particles suitable for the description of indistinguish- 
able particles. (20) 
These results have important implications for the 
individuality of particles in Q. M. The first, that the 
P's are not observables, is what lies behind the non- 
classical counting of states in quantum statistics 
which has led some authors to say that quantal particles 
cannot be regarded as individuals in a classical sense. 
The second conclusion, thatAthe P's are observables, 
suggests that there is more to it than this, and that 
individuality resides in the states, in a sense. The 
distinction between the P's and the ýils, although of 
quite general validity, manifests itself only in the 
case of para-statistics of order greater than 2 i. e. 
not in the case of Fermi-Dirac or Bose-Einstein statistics, 
as we shall see. 
it can also be shown that any symmetric function of 
the observables Q, can be expanded in terms of the 's 
(21) and thus that the place permutation operators are 
canonical observables of the system, in a sense which 
will become apparent shortly. This result follows 
directly from theorem (3.4 A) of Weylls book 'The 
elassical Groups', Dirac has sketched a proof for the 
particular case of the observable being some perturbing 
energy v, defined by ,:: 
ý ýIVP1ý> (23) 
19. P. V. Landshoff and H. P. Stapp (1967) p. 73 p. 77-81 
20. R. H. Stolt and J. R. Taylor (1970) p. 6. 
21. C. F. Landshoff and Stapp p. 90 
22. H. Weyl (1946) ch. IV. 
23. Dirac op cit p. 218 
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A more general proof can be given as follows: (24) 
Theorem: < 19 
where and are kets for the assembly 
of the form given on p-1-7)4 
Proof: We note first of all that 
< e-IX "-, 0t This is because ( (2ý 
, Otý&k 
P 
and < and are orthogonal. so <f I p, p, p -ij [> 
has to equal unity but can only do so if 
P P P., 4"tf; -, i 
Thus this expression <FI Pi 7ý P. 
-, 
IF> reduces 
to a kind of Kronecker delta function: 
ýO )-e- g:: 
ý FI PIZ rz, rt- I (, > =- S P, 
_, 
pizz 
ThereX using this and substituting for PI we have 
Ti P4-lf> Q Pi P, I lrý i. 
= <-, < F ,I P- a P4 1 F> CI (a's a 6O,, A,.. L&, kaS P, < P. > 
Thus we have s hown tha t< C2 P., IP Jt><f1fj > 
which following Dirac, we can write as 
C MV 20 
where the C_ < V1 GPC > and the 
sign means an equation in the restricted sense, the 
operators on the two sides being equal so long as they 
are used only with kets of the form P and their 
conjugate imaginary bras. 
This result, that the observable Q is equal, in the 
restricted sense,, to a linear function of the 
TI Is with 
coefficients Ci given as above# will play an important 
role in our [ater discussions of paraparticle theory 
in particular with regard to two-body transitions between 
'triangular' paraparticle states, 
Having identified the observables for N indistinguishable 
particles as being that subset of observables for N 
labelled particles which commute with Pi Is, this result 
24. See also Landshoff and Stapp op cit. 
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following frcm the I. P., the next step is to estaDlish 
the correspondence between the states of the system and 
the vectors of the Hilbert space 
The first point to note is that two vectors which give 
the same expectation values for all observables must 
represent the same state. Thus the I. P. implies that 
whenever a vector I ý. > in corresponds to some physical 
state then the vector P,. I for anii must correspond 
to the same state - 
It is usually assumed that every physically distinct 
state of N indistinguishable particles must correspond 
to some unique ray in J-ýtv. 
If represents some state then (> and P ,ý 
I[> must 
lie in the same ray and hence must be proportional. 
This immediately leads to the Symmetrization Postulate. 
However, as Hartle and Taylor emphasise: 'There is 
... no a priori reason to insist that every state of N 
identical particles correspond to a unique ray in 49 tj 
The possibility that a single state of identical 
particles could correspond to some larger collection 
of vectors in ý-ý A; must be considered, and it is this 
possibility which leads to the notion of paraparticles'o 
(25) 
The problem then is to decide what collection of 
vectors in J-ý, j can correspond to physical states and 
the solution lies in the fact that any state can be 
completely characterised by specifying the expectation 
values of all observables. Thus these sets of vectors 
must possess the following properties: 
1) Two vectors If> and IF'> representing the same state 




< p) 01f CQ. ý P': a= 0) 
2) Two vectors 1[> and I C";;;, representing different states 
must give different expectation values for some 
observable i. e. (50.4A#- Q,; 4-, L-4 
The apparatus of group theory can then be used to determine 
25. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2045. Also see Stolt 
and Taylor op cit p. l. 
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the sets of vectors possessing these qualities (26) 
We begin by considering an arbitrary vector ý:; P in 
V and the N! dimensional subspace spanned L tO 
by the vectors for all permutations i in the group 
SM 
* This subspace can be decomposed into irreducible 
subspaces invariant under the P. 's. Each subspace 1 
14 carries an irreducible representationP oý S.,, ) and the 
number of subspaces carrying ani irreducible 
representation 0'4 is equal to the dimension 
N., of D144 . The problem now is to construct basis 
functions for the various irreducible representations 
of S- ej - 
The following procedure for obtaining these functions 
is given by Hammermesh. (27) 
We note first of all that in general any function 
is expressible as the sum of functions which can act as 
base functions in the various irreducible representations: A 
C-0 
z 21 d-, 
Ii;: ý, 
The base functions for the -V th irreducible (unitary) 
representation satisfy the equations 
N) - ::! ý 
(V) C-9) 
Z) 
where is any operator of the group considered. 
The necessary and sufficient condition which a given 
function must satisfy in order that it may belong to 






23 :E PLý('Pz) QK II>--" K 
Thus given a function jf, ->ý")which satisfies the above 
requirement, one can associate with it 'partners' 
given by 
CV) )C4 ý) Oe > Z4. >=-C 
K 
so that the set of functions satisfies equation Z3. 
Returning toAthe question now is, given the function 
C-0 - how does one f ind the fe> in the f irst place? 
In other words, how does one resolve the given function 
into a sum of functions, each of which belongs to a 
26. Hartle and Taylor op cit. -,, 
A ppe-A, 4N p, 3ý8 
27. Hammermesh op cit P- 85 and p. 111 ; c: fApp e- 
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particular row of some irreducible representation? 
Hammermesh shows that the operator 
CA) A j91T1k(K) 001Z 
(A GA) 
is a projection operator i. e. 25 




Constructing the basis functions is therk, 18- two stage 
process. First the projection operator T 
iu) 
is 1 L'6 
applied to the given function I f7' to obtain the 
functions Then the operator C 
is applied to find the (Av-1) partners of this 
function, such that the whole set satisfies equation 
Z'3 thus giving the functions Ip kv) 
which form a basis for the -V'th irreducible 
representation. 
Applying this procedure to the arbitrary state 
vector If> we note first of all that the operators 
Q will be the particle permutation operators PZ 
The projection operator can then be written 
VIAA P IT C (z) 4 Od -h 27 
whilst the second operator given above, which we shall 
the transfer operator* will be given by 
4 c 28 
Applying. these each in turn one then obtains the 
base functions ýZ>: 
-Trz 29 
These satisfy the equation PL 11ýc: ý> 30 
as we shall demonstrate. 
At first sight this seems rather a complicated 
procedure but we can simplify it by eliminating one of 
the stages. We can in fact dispense with the projection 
operators altogether since z, T 
ut which Hartle and a result which we shall now provc, 
Taylor clearly already knew. 
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To Prove 
DV (. S) F(. S) j2 PCA) 
57 




c tv (s) PC IV 
p(s) 





CT) CK C)'k 
Phi c rt) L, s uvLc: t-, n 
P C--o 
r) 
T c-r) Por) 





-TT! - 3I 
Thus to obtain the basis functions one simply 
I--, applies the transfer operator 11., to the state 
function I (; ý- :I[C, 




32 I> 0ýý4, c, PCK) > 
Before we actually use this method to obtain a set 
of basLs functions there are two more results which 
must be established. We must show that these functions 
support representation of the P's and the T's. 11 
To Show that f! LýJ(,? ýSupports a Representation of the Pcs) Is 
v RA Ok 
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jI[>-: -- ': 
ý PC 
iC r7, 
) > k 
ra, 
Fix j, allow i to be a variable (the significance of 
this will be revealed shortly). Apply a particle 
permutation operator P (S) to the function 
formed by applying I/-(,, to If> : 
C P(S) PCS) 0 0 C (Z) t CIZ) IT. (6) 
PC 
S) 
kie. ) k tz 
Write P (S) P (R) =P (T) 
. S) 
















'Aa h) 0 (S> C S) 
Therefore the functions 0-support a representation 
of the P (S)'s i. e. they satisfy the equation 
CWA) Pes) I C4 > 
-; 
ýE IP6C R) 
L1 14-4 
To Show that I ý> Supports a Representation of the TP (S) Is 
Again we have 
Crz) PCP, ) 
JXA) 4 
and cr, ) Pce') > 
Now fix i. allow j to be variable and apply a place 
permutation operator T(S) to 1'1ý 
P(S> A( S> Z) PC tz) 
6"A 1E crz) PC ýc Z) PCO iý>(S ZA ce- r PC tz), TC 03 z C? ) ý, tt 11AA 
" ::, 
9 &, 71 Cg) P(- r) PP 
, 
ý, > R -= .rS Rewri 
te P (R) 





Pc -r) i> 
C V(Li -. S > S) 11 L: A ýe L) 
PCs) 
I [J >> PI-r)c S 
Therefore the base functions -fTc; jIP> support a 
representation of the T(S)'s i. e. they satisfy the 
equation P(S) :: E4 1 ýd > "(S) 34 
Thus we have shown that the base functions rjýiIF> 
support representations of both the particle and 
place permutation operators. 
Under the P(R)'s the base functions transform as 
->> C 
as we have just shown. This means that for fixed j 
and for i 
, )these 
functions span an 
irreducible subspace invariant under the P(R). Within 
this subspace - or generalized ray as it has been 
called (28) - the function I transforms as the 
i1th basis function of the irreducible representation Dý") 
The fact that the P(R) leave any function in the same 
subspace, or generalized rayt reflects the fact that 
two state functions which differ by a permutation of 
the particle labels must represent the same state, o-S 
we have noted. 
We have also shown that under the T(R)'s the base 
functions satisfy 
>> 
That is, for fixed i and j 1,1 ..., N the functions 
span a subspace invariant under the (R) and within 
this space IFC> transforms as the jIth basis 
function of the irreducible representation 
A). 
Clearly in general the place permutation operators carry 
a function from one subspace, or generalized ray to another, 
which is consistent with the fact that place permutations 
can change the physical state. 
The complementary role of the particle and place 
permutations, in the case of a two dimensional 
representation D/4# can be illustrated thus: 
28. Greenberg and Messiah op cit p. 251 
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(29) 
ýý zZ ý-- gercemýýzeý +rýy 
In this case i, j=1,2. The P(R) map the vectors 
of any row (fixed j) among themselves, whereas the 
'T(R) map the vectors of any column (fixed i) among 
themselves. The subspace spanned by the two vectors, 
or basis functions, in any row is a generalized ray 
and all the vectors in this subspace represent the same 
physical state - 
obviously in the case of an n-dimensional 
representation one would have 
with j fixed and i variable the row number is fixed 
and one is ranging across the columns, which gives the 
particle permutations. With i fixed and j variable the 
column number is fixed and one is ranging up and down 
the rows, giving the place permutations, 
Before continuing it is worth noting that in the 
case of the one dimensional symmetric and anti-symmetric 
representations D=1 or + 1. Thus P(R) and _T(R) 
are the same for the symmetric and. anti-symmetric 
vectors, and so the distinction between particle and 
place permutation is not manifested in the case of 
ordinary bosons and fermions. 
Thus we are now able to generate a set of basis 
functions for any representation. (30) Furthermore 
we have shown that this procedure can be reduced from 
a two-stage to a one-stage process and also that the 
basis functions so formed support representations of 
both the particle and place permutation operators. 
Using I. P. and Schur's lemma (31) it can easily be 
shown that these basis functions, do indeed 
satisfy the two requirements for vectors to represent 
29. Stolt and. Taylor op cit p. 9 19 
30. M. Tinkham (1964) p. 39-43 , o-Iso see- Atyetcux P. '347. 
31. See Appendix P-342.. 
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states (32) Thus having shown, following Greenberg and 
Messiah and Hartle and Taylor, that every state of a 
system of N indistinguishable particles corresponds 
to Some multi-dimensional subspace, or generalized ray, 
the next step is to discuss which irreducible represen- 
tations correspond to states. In the case of ordinary 
bosons and fermions, for example, this is quite 
straightforward as only the rays of the totally symmetric 
of totally anti-symmetric representation actually 
represent states. 
If is defined to be the subspace spanned by 
the basis functions +>, (with U fixed) then the 
Hilbert space can be decomposed into a number 
of subspaces thus: 35 
Although F, 
., a 
is defined with respect to a definite 
basis it can be seen that it is actually basis 
independent. contains all functions associated with 
the irreducible representation D. *'" and since every 
pure state must be associated with a definite 
irreducible representationo each such state 
is represented by a generalized ray of vectors contained 
in some 
Although every pure state is associated with a 
definite irreducible representation, not every one of 
the latter is associated with an attainable state, as 
the example of ordinary bosons and fermions makes clear. 
In general the statistical type of a paraparticle is 
identified by specifying the set of all irreducible 
representations in each SM which corresponds to 
attainable states of the particle. 
At this point it is perhaps worth making clear the 
difference between 'ordinary' particles and paraparticles. 
For the former the states correspond to one-dimensional 
sub-spaces, or rays, in the usual way because they 
correspond to the one-dimensional completely anti- 
t^r 
symmetric and symmetric A reducible representations. 
However, in general the irreducible representations of 
32. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2045 
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the permutation group are multi-dimensional and thus 
the states of a parapaticle correspond to multi-dimension- 
al subspaces, or generalized rays. 
Hartle and Taylor demonstrated that not every family 
of irreducible representations corresponds to a possible 
statistical type. (33) These results were then extended 
by Stolt and Taylor who showed that all possible types 
of first quantized paraparticles can be divided into 
two kinds: those of finite order and those of infinite 
order (34), The former can be classified further into 
parabosons and parafermions of order p=1,. 2,3,.... 
Parabosons of order p have states corresponding to those 
irreducible representations whose Young diagrams have 
no more than p rows, whereas for parafermions the same 
holds for the columns. There are infinitely many para- 
particles of infinite order, all of which have states 
corresponding to Young diagrams of arbitrarily many 
rows and columns3Csee Aplý, eikaLx p340, 
The space appropriate to a paraparticle of a given 
statistical type T will be the subspo-ce- of J-tA) 
containing just those vectors which correspond to 
allowed irreducible representations. If the set of all 
irreducible representations associated with the 
attainable N-particle states of a particle of type T is 
denoted by T,, then the appropriate space is simply 
the direct sum 05) 
Ir 6) 4! ýa 36 
, AA-. 
e'fýj 
In particular for a paraboson or parafermion of order 
state_$ 
p this sum runsoverall4whose Young diagrams have no more 
than p rows or columns respectively. 
The next step is to eliminate the 'generalized ray' 
and restore the usual connection between states and rays 
in Q. M. (36) 
33. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2050 
34. Stolt and Taylor (1970b) p. 2226 and (1970c) p-1759 
35. Stolt and Taylor (1970a) p. 10 
36. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2046-2047; Stolt and 
Taylor op cit 10-11 
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A particle of type T will have N-particle states 
corresponding to the generalized rays in each EA4 
such that 61r. v- Any state associated with the 
irreducible representation D*v corresponds to a 
n. 4 -dimensional subspace of any vector 
of which can equally well be taken to represent 
that state. Each subspace E can be further 
decomposed thus 
(D 
;, =1 37 
where j is the space spanned by the for 
f ixed t. ý and 4- Since all observables commute 
with the P's each subspace E Xý,, Z is invariant under 
all observables. In particular since this applies 
to the Hamiltonian all representative vectors will 
remain in E,, uz for all times if they are chosen there 
initially. Since each generalized ray 6 has a 
unique one-dimensional intersection with each 
one could agree always to label states of symmetry 
by vectors from one specific EIA, ý 
-, 
ýý I say, 
and then each state is labelled by a unique ray. (37) 
The FAA,, z t4aý--ýý-Ican be ignored because of the invariance 
of FZ&, I under all observables. 
Thus the formalism in which states of symmetry D-1" 
are represented by generalized rays in E., 44 can be 
replaced by one in which the same states are represented 
by rays in E, 4A)j . For a particle of type T the 
new smaller space is 
_r_ - 3S 
AJý 
The essential point behind this elimination is that 
any state represented by a multi-dimensional subspace 
(S with basis 
ýI Cý >j can be represented 
arbitrarily by the number one basis vector I fl> - 
Every state can then be labelled by a unique ray in E, (A, l 
rather than a generalized ray in E, 4A, ý ') 
thus restoring 
the normal connection between states and rays. 
This restoration is achieved however at the expense 
of symmetry under the particle permutation operators 
37. Ibid, 
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since these carry the space E, ýKj onto the other 
spaces E, 4A., j (38) (i variable for the P(R)'s, 
ranging across the Columns). In other words, with 
attention restricted to E (39) 
. IA, 
i the P's are undefined 
This is to be expected however, as the redundancy of the 
generalized ray is caused by the complete symmetry under 
the P's and to remove this redundancy we have moved to 
a smaller subspace on which the P's are not defined. 
The P's on the other hand, are well defined on 
alone since they map each , onto itself (i fixed, 
j variable). Again this is to be expected since the 
self adjoint functions of the P's are 
OýS4CI-Va_ýie-g 
. 
With this restoration of the 1-1 correspondence between 
states and rays the first quantized formalism can be 
compared directly with that of the second quantized 
theory. Stolt and Taylor have shown that for every 
particle of type T of finite order there is a natural r isomorphism between 'J-ýAý, Auand the N-particle space 
for the corresponding parafield (40). Thus they 
established that every type of second quantized 
parafield is equivalent to a unique first quantised 
parapaýticle of finite order and vice versa. 
Having outlined the general theory of indistinguishable 
particles, embracing parapaiticles as well as ordinary 
bosons and fermionswe shall now discuss its 
consequences through a consideration of three particle 
states. 
3.2.1 The Generation of Basis Functions for Three 
Particle States 
We begin by recalling that to obtain the basis functions 
one simply applies the transfer operator 
to the state function ;> thus, 
> 
obviously the first step is to write down the real 
orthogonal matrices of the irreducible representations 
38. Ibid p. 2047 and p-11 
39. Unless of couse D-44 is one-dimensional in which 
case is the same as and the P's 
'9A) 
are defined. 
40. stolt and Taylor Ibid. 
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of the permutation group S3i. e. the 2x2 matrix 
representat s of R in the irreducible representation 
i JVO 




W*- (A) denoted Aby j9, 'ý I is real sot?, 9)=P, 
These are given by Hammermesh with their corresponding 
permutations, written in cyclic notation (e. g. (123) or 
(13) indicating that we permute the first and third 
'objects') : 
Matrix Corresponding Permutation 
I 
©i 











Z C2 13) z 
Remembering our previous notation, and the fact that 
the P's permute the particles regardless of the state 
they are in, and the P's permute the states regardless 
of which particles are occupying these states, the effect 
of these permutation operators on our basis functions can 
be expressed as follows : 
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Particle Permutations Pi (Permuting the subscripLs) 











s a QZ, Q 
33> 
P6 i a',, a z, a3 > 
Cizi(: l Gý37 
_I ýL3 aZ, O> 
.=l 







Place Permutations Ti (Permuting the superscri ts) 
CL CLI, co, > CJ2- Q, c 
s 






















The equation above, rewritten in fhe form. 
I CL 1, Ccý OLý Pcfe) a', C tz) 
cc II CLýz CL-51 > -I -- -Ia 0' CO, > 39 LI f- 3# Z- 
says that to obtain each basis function each particle 
permutation should be multiplied by the (ij) Ith element 
of the matrix to which that permutation corresponds, 
the sum of these products is then taken and multiplied 
by some normalisation factor. Thus to obtain the first 
?_- AA 
basis function Ct 11 oI OC3"- we multiply P by the L1 
element in the first row, the first column of the first 
matrix above* mult'Ply P2 by the element in the first 
row first column of the second matrix and so on. We 
then add all these products and multiply the sum 
by To obtain the second basis function 
we multiply the Pi Is by the elements in the first 
row second column of the matrices, and so on. 
Thenapplying this projection operator method, our four 
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basis functions, chosen to be eigenvectors of P. are: I 
a-', el. cO > -"4 - 71-, 11a1a 
1- o-, T, ' > ljý (a, az. 0, W, a 3 ;> 33 
Ol Cl- 
aý2 at' 6-51 ci- 
;L_S 
ý. 
z all CF-I at- aý, cL' a7i cA-3 2 z- 
oL I, a', > a, cL-1, 
CL 
cL, ja' a Z- 3 
Z- S1 
= j, a1za-I Gý cä -1 cý> 't (cý 
ää> 3ý 1t3zZ3i 3ý 2 
I 
o. -' a 1- C4- -3 
-; > 44 =t '2- -3 IT > --Lýo I- o -t a CýCL 43- 
1 OL f 
4 




-aZ3ti33 I a: - c4- 0-a>f Icyc a>(c, a> z2Z3lii 
a; C 3> 
Z TZ L Z1cßcý 
(ý3> 
3 ctý -1 Ci 
ý2 (cL c(1c 't 
-ý 1 cicý3ä>-z 
L3 
( al 0- 
., -ýZ (' Z C4 > -, Z1'Z cý >f1äZ c3 > 
LZ3L11Z 
1- c& c eZ> -- 1 ctZ CLi> -- ! cZ 3c1c:,, > 
i 
Following Hartle and Taylor we shall refer to these 
as C1 // respectively. ?_ 30 
C 
12- 
These are the 'mixed symmetry' basis functions 
spanning the 'triangular' subspaces. To obtain the 
symmetric and anti-symmetric functions we follow the 
same procedure. The matrix representatives are simple. 
In the symmetric case it is just (1) for all 
permutations, and in the anti-symmetric case it is 
(1)for the permutation (1) (2) (3) and (-l) for 
permutations given by (ij). Thus the symmetric basis 
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0 C ZI 
L3kZI function is Z" 
13+ Z' I CýQýC'L cLa;; - CL 0, _ý' t- Iý 7410M. 0_,, -ý 
and the antisymmetric function is 
ilaý -1 
IZT 7-1 z -2 0- aa 
,, 
8La7- i aý%alý> -i cý oa_ý +Iaa a>. f Ic& a 2.3 1 :g .7z Operating on these functions with the P's or _P's 
can give the eigenvalue for the operator concerned. 
Thus the eigenvalues of the particle permutation 
operator P2 for our basis functions can be obtained as 
follows. Consider for example, the function 
'; W2 XfXId2 
RI= ýLiý f, 2 -3 1 ?_3, &a;;. 
-I ixý 
" 
-; > -I, 
'3> fit d(' d? 4- 7,1 C( 0, CL C'C ( 1- 2- 1 .33aII rz 2- 31 TIZ 
Z Z_ _S tT C(, a 4- XI Ckýt OOL;; - 
7- S-(S3 2_1 a 
2-3 2-: 1 










()f 12- 2 
are -1, +1, -1, +1 and -1 respectively 
Thus we have obtained a set of basis functions, chosen 
to be eigen-vertors of P2* spanning a six-dimensional 
subspace which can be decomposed into ýE of 'X 3 
irreducible subspaces invariant under S3 thus 
E -: - Zs (p 
40 
and are the one-dimensional subspaces def ined, 
respectively, by the symmetric and anti-symmetric functions 
CS and FIq - The remaining four-dimensional space 
splits into two irreducible subspaces transforming 
under the same two-dimensional representation of S3, i. e, 
that of the triangular Young diagram (41). our choice 
for these two subspaces is given by I and 
spanning and and z 
(01 spanning 
(42). 
As runs overIH-3 it can be decomposed in this 
way into three sectors 
41 
1-( 3 Wý -(So '1 -(11 ý__ (4; ) ý, 
The irreducible subspaces of *1-(, and are one- 
dimensional whereas those of are two-dimensional. 
41. See Appendix P-34-6 
42. Compare with Hartle and Taylor's basis functions. 
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Pure states may be represented by any irreducible 
subspace in any of these sectors. Two states re- 
presented by subspaces of different representations 
are physically distinct as are the states represented by 
different subspaces of the same representation. These 
points will play an important role in our determination 
of the statistics of paraparticles. 
Given the relation 1: Pcrz), ý 
Q2 -= 0,,, Schur's Lemma 
implies that all matrix elements of the observable 
Q connecting different representations are zero. It 
then follows (43) that if there exist states corresponding 
to subspaces of different represeirtions of S/v then they 
must be separated by a super-selection rule. In other 
words, transitions between such states, for example 
those corresponding to the symmetric and anti-symmetric 
representations, or the symmetric and triangular 
representations and absolutely forbidden. Thus a boson 
cannot, by some peculiar mechanism become a fermion 
nor a fermion a paraparticleo for example. 
However, states corresponding to subspaces of the same 
irreducible representation, such as the two triangular 
subspaces and where there is the same 
irreducible represenation repeated twice, can be connected. A 
Transitions can therefore occur between such states. (44) 
The situation in the general N-particle case is quite 
analogous. The Hilbert space then decomposes into a 
number of subspaces and transitions between states 
corresponding to certain of these subspaces i. e. those 
of different representations are not allowed. Thus 
restrictions have been imposed such that certain states 
are rendered inaccessible to particles of the same 
species. If we consider the time evolution of the system, 
as effected by some Hamiltonian, then we can conclude 
that what the I. P. as expressed by CP(_r, *>Qj =0 
effectively says is that if the system starts in one 
irreducible representation then it will always stay 
inihat representation. Bosons will always be bosons, 
fermions, fermions etc. 
43. Greenberg an#+vIVsiah op cit p. 251 
44. Although wit A wo body collisions these transitions 
will also be forbidden as we shall see. 
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The I. P. can thus be thought of as an extra 
postulate of QY,, or an initial condition in the 
specification of a situation. We shall return to these 
accessibility restrictions in section 3.6 where its 
consequences will be considered in more detail. 
3.2-2. The Cluster Principle 
In order to obtain the eigenvalue for various permut- 
ations it is convenient to rewrite the basis functions 
in terms of the P's given above. Thus as 
x1 C4 
-z- 11 (2 z CL-L Qý-; > Q- C( Cý Ck3; 7 0-2- Cý';; p 1 A. 
9'1 
- 
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The result of applying two permutations consecutively 
can be evaluated very straightforwardly and expressed 
in the following two tables, where the columns give the 
permutation applied first and the rows the permutation 
applied second: 
P PZ P P P 
p, (i PZ Pý Pý Ps P6 
PZ P ; P 
P3 P1 PS S PC, 1P P 
P P P PS P, P PZ 




Pý n- p3 e 
--rA ßi-t-1 













r4. P401 l>A ýu- Al 
iy, 
ýrr 





Thus the result of operating on the basis functions 
with P 2' for example, can 
be discovered very quickly 
and simply. The same eigenvalues are obtained as in 
the longer method above. 
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It is of some interest to discover the eigenvalues of 
P2 for our basis functions. These can be rewritten 






-- -, (- , 2z 7( es- e6 )% 
Ft ýý * PS t() 
E =(z-2--? ) 
The eigenvalues of TP 2 for these basis functions can 
now be found. using Table 2) and they are as follows: 
+I (A +I ZI 
We can summarise these results and those for p2 in 
the following table: 
IA GLE 3 
B a- s, ý s C- cý tol ve, (I, - t C, 0( kAm, CeCOA S P; X. 
An immediate consequence of these results is that 
eigenvalues of the place permutation P2 serve to 
distinguish the symmetry types for 'clusters' of 
paraparticles whereas the eigenvalues of the particle 
permutation operator do not. (45) 
Hartle and Taylor believed that it is possible to 
have basis vectors for a triangular representation 
of S3 which are eigenvectors of P2 with the same 
eigenvalues. (46) However this is not true, as our 
45. It can be shown that the basis functions chosen 
by Hartle and Taylor are not eigenvectors Of P2' 
it is possible that their basis vectors were 
misprinted. This does not affect the substance of 
their arguments. 
46. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2048 
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results above demonstrate, and as one can prove in 
the following way. 
It is well known that any group can be separated into 
classes of elements which are conjugate to one another. 
(47) Thus the permutation group S3 separates into three 
classes, 1<1= JPJ 
) f<, = 
Jr,, r,, (, I , K: s F4> having the cycle structure (1 3 ).. (12) and (3) 
respectively. 
It is also well known that the traces of the matrices (1A) 
are invariant under a change of basis (i. e. 
a transformation of the co-ordinate axes). With regard 
to group representations the trace PCý6R) is called 
the character of R in the representation D and is 
denoted by C C)e,: c rz) It can also 
be shown that conjugate elements in the group always have 
the same character (48). Hence when the group is 
des6ribed by listing the characters of its elements in 
a given representation, the same number is assigned to 
all the elements in a given class Thus the re- 
presentation will be described by a set of characters 
where V is the number of 
classes in the group. Thus S3 will be described by 
three characters, 3 for the 
symmetric, triangular and anti-symmetric representations 
respectively. 
The characters of a group can be deduced using 
Frobenius's theorem (49) or by applying graphical 
methods involving Young tableaux (50). For S3 the values 




given in the following character table : (51) 
-r A 13 t-iýF 41 X1, I K, Iz 
KZ Io `" 
Ks i-iI 
47. Hammermesh op cit p. 23-25-, Arrettd, ýx p-3zs. 
48. Ibid p. 79; A pFe#tcL-x p, 340 
49. Hammermesh op cit p. 182-197, 
50. Ibid p. 201-208 ; Appe-, 44. x p, -3426 
51. Ibid p. 186; Also Yjargenau and Murphy op cit p. 100 
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Let us suppose that , and 
(-ý 
are basis functions 
supporting an irreducible representation of S3 which 
transformsunder the triangular representation. We 
assume that f, and rz are eigenvectors of P2 with 
the same eigenvalue, +1 say. Thus =ýj and F CZ 
'i- So the matrix representing P is 10):: P(P 2 (0 
The trace of this matrix is equal to 2 i. e. Tr-1)09, 
.)=7 
42 
But by our assumptions D(P 2) is related to the 
triangular representation by a similarity transform- 
ation which does not alter its trace. Thus, since 
P belongs to the class K we have 22 
43 A I-0(Q -_ ; I('r 
Clearly 42 and 43 contradict one another and thus 
it can be concluded that r-I and cannot be eigenvectors 
of P2 with the same eigenvalue. 
Since D (P2) can always be diagonalized and the 
eigenvalues must be different and since P2=1. the 2 
eigenvalues of P must be 
+ 1. Hence cpý' 
.X) can 
which has the always be brought to the form 
( 
C? 
correct trace of zero. Then Fx (I and (9; x 
rz 
Hence F, is symmetric under exchange of particles 
1 and 2 and CA is antisymmetric under this inter- 
change. This is indeed the case for our basis functions 
as we have seen. 
Paraparticle theory came under attack by Steinmann (52), 
following a result suggested by Paulif (53) on the 
grounds that it was inconsistertwith the Cluster 
Principle. This states that systems sufficiently 
separated in space may be treated as isolated systems 
or, in other wordsf that the presence of particles on 
Mars, sayf should not affect the results of experiments 
performed on Earth. 
The argument runs as follows* Steinmann considered 
a three particle system consisting of a two particle 
cluster on Earth and the other particle a long way away, 
on the Moon. He stated correctly, that the general 
triangular state made up from one-particle wave functions 
will appear to an Earth bound observer as a statistical 
52. o. Steinmann (1966) p. 755 
53. W. Pauli (1958) p. 110 
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mixture of boson and fermion two-particle states (54). 
However, he then went on to argue that the observer 
can make a measurement on the two particle system to 
determine its symmetry type and that such a measurement 
changes the observed two-particle state to either 
pure symmetric or pure antisymmetric. Thus, he claimed 
if the history of the whole three particle system is 
considered then the measurement has introduced a 
distinction between basis functions which are supposed 
to be indistinguishable. Hence the inconsistency. 
In other words the argument is that if the symmetry 
type of particles 1 and 2 on Earth, when 3 is on 
the Moon, is measured then [I and (z can be 
distinguished, yet they are supposed to be indistinguih- 
able since they support the same irreducible represent- 
ation of S 3* The logical structure of this reasoning 
can be illustrated thus 
CP _ý; ) C 
(_*V Aj 
13 L&C- c P. 




where CP denotes the Cluster Principle, 4 the triangular 
symmetry of the functions and IP denotes the 
Indistinguishability Postulate. 
The basic fallacy inihis argument is the supposition 
that the symmetry type of a two-particle cluster is det- 
ermined by the eigenvalue of P 2* It is assumed that 
because P2 has opposite eigenvalues for 
tit and F,, 
_) 
for example, that the symmetry types of two-particle 
clusters are differpt for and However, this 
e- 
is not true. It can be shown that both 
Fit and zi 
give sYmmetric type functions for two-particle clusters 
and. furthermore that and both give anti- 
symmetric types although they also possess opposite 
eigenvalues for P2' 
54. It can be shown that a particle which has three part- 
icle states corresponding to the triangular Young 
diagram must have both boson and fermion-type two 
particle states. See Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2048 
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The three particle wave function can be written 
I CL 
I az Cks 
> where a, and 
OL, are functions localized on Earth, say, and CL 
localized on the Moon. With Subscripts 1 and 2 as 
C0 - the Earth coordinates we have ,- CLI 
0 
Operating on this wave function with P's gives: 
Cýj ajýks> a- o- CL. 3> 
CL C)'I> 0, Ck t Z- 7- A- 13 
Cl- a CL 3 
CJ C(s> (D 
Considering now a state + where 
OL 4- Xz 19Z 4- #t X6 
PG Cý clý- C, 7'ý7 
then the probability distribution for finding one 
particle localized at I, one at Z and one at 3 
_IP 
Ppj7- 4 -4 _r P1 7- is co C- Z -) 
3) 
+ is now set equal to our four basis functions in 
turn and the probability distribution for the case 1 
is considered in each case. 
Thus setting 4-Y equal to using the expression 
for this function in terms of the P's and Table 1) 
A 
(2 1', -t 2- 197 we obtain ; -tL 
P, 
ýp -7L, 3 ( ; Z- P, -t. 2 e- - (, q - e, - P, - e, ) 
JI (2& 
e3 -f Z ei- - pl - p(7 - Cz - e4 ) pi 4Z e(, - 
Z-AT3 
2- 7 ýs- 
) 
For the case 1 we obtain 
C, NP = -L z -a 
( 2, 
_ 
I' +ZP, ) 
f 
3 ( . 2, 
r, +. 7, pz ) 




The probability distribution is therefore 
12- 0,3 i Z- 16(1 Ctl ý- a( 
a7 
.> 
Integrating over co-ordinate 2, ( as our Earth bound 
observer does not take into consideration the 
particle on the Moon) then gives the two-particle 
probability distribution 
(ýJ c i) A-) CL 
Z+ 6L ,L1 1 CL 1 Z- Z 
which is clearly symmetric. 
I 
Repeating the whole procedure for CZ-( 
one obtains the probability distribution for case 1 
c, %. ) c(7, ) =1 al, a 
'- +- az 
2 Z- 7- 1 
which again is symmetric. 
ý, P =: 
(0 tl With M and 
ýLzý one gets 
coo, k) = jala' - a' a'lz- o_^j woz) zI al, e, -al az(, z Z_ zIz( 
which are both antisymmetric distributions. 
We conclude that for two-particle clusters 
and give symmetric distributions 
whereas and both give anti- 
symmetric distributions. Thus measurements of the 
symmetry type of two-particle clusters distinguishes 
not between rill, and 
fzj as Steinmann 
claimed, and which must be indistinguishable as they 
belong to the same irreducible subspacee but between 
and which is perfectly consistent 
since these functions belong to different irreducible 
subspaces. 
As Hartle and Taylor said 'The essential point is 
that the measurement carries the three particle 
vector from one irreducible subspace to another. There 
is no question of its distinguishing between vectors in 
the irreducible subspace ... 
Esuch as and 
(, 
ZI 
which are certainly indistinguishable'. (55) 
0 
55. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2048 
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Similar results can be obtained using the T's as well. 
These commute with the P's i. e. ERý , 
23 =0 
which means that if we consider a state where where 
Z3 P, + C4,2- c4c ? 
the nF j 4.1 - Thus if 
* is an eigenstate of 
P2 then P, is also an eigenstate with the same eigen- 
value. Taking 11 for example then this implies 
that as is an eigenfunction of P2 with eigenvalue 
) 
(2 +1 then F, ýjj PZ (11) 6 C11 II* 61 . will also be eigen- 
functions oXwith eigenvalue +1, i. e. 
IAf (06 (v 






With our choice of 
wave functions CX(I L 
.) 
OL _) OL suc that a and OL 
Tz 
are localized on the Earth and a3, is on the Moon, 
the only terms in PZ etc - which need to 
I be considered are those involving P, ck. 
IZI an(9 CC, C'___ý_C1_3> Furthermore the4results 
above mean that etc. must Pi FIIP 
P, I Cý 
7- 3 ?_T 
involve I Cýt Ck., ý; o and 
(p, Cý, OL, Ck, -; -, ' in 
the symmetric combination C P, -I- acL "z-_ cc _', > 
Hence the two-particle probability distribution 
must be a symmetric one, as we have already shown. 
Similar results are obtained for the other three 
functions the symmetry Ftl ;, FIL ) I-Z. 
of is determined by the eigenvalue of 
P2 if P2 has eigenvalue +lj as it does for and 
then 4jCj,; _) is a symmetric distribution. If P2 
has 
eigenvalue -1 as it does for 1. and then cO C 
F 
ZZ 
is an antisymmetric distribution. 
These results support our previous conclusion and 
reiterate the point that the eigenvalues of P2 serve 
to distinguish the symmetry type for clusters whereas 
the eigenvalues of P2 do not. 
one can generalize these conclusion and show that if 
paraparticle theory is to be consistent with the Cluster 
Principle then the particles must possess states 
associated with whole families of different permutation 
symmetries, according to the following rule : If a given 
particle has N-particle states associated with a given 
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Young Oiagram then it must have (N-1)-, (N-2)0 ... 1 2- 
particle states associated with all Young diagrams 
which can be obtained from the first by successively 
removing squares. (56) This implies that all the 
infinitely many possible types of paraparticle would 
have both symmetric and antisymmetric two-particle 
states. In other words they would behave in pairs 
like bosons and fermions, as we have shown. 
3.2-3. The Statistics of Paraparticles 
Although the statistical behaviour of paraparticles 
has been the subject of some research in the past it 
has obviously not received the same degree of attention 
as the conventional Bose-Einstein and Fermi- Dirac 
Statistics (and with good reason as no paraparticle has 
ever been found to exist in nature). It is our 
intention here to examine a certain aspect of this behav- 
iour and to consider some of its consequences. 
We have already noted the fact that transitions 
between states corresponding to subspaces of different 
representations are not allowed, (there is a superselection 
rule existing between such states), whereas transitions 
between states corresponding to subspaces of the 
same irreducible representation are possible. We shall 
now demonstrate that although there is no superselection 
rule imposed on these states the latter transitions 
cannot in fact occur for -some 
two- 
body collisions. 
Such transitions may occur 
("04) 
for three-body collisions4however, since the basis 
vectors we have chosen are noteigenvalues of 
T30 
These results have important consequences for both the 
statistics of paraparticles and the question whether a 
particle of one statistical type could be transformed 
intp one of another type. 
56. Hartle and Taylor op cit p. 2050 
6a. tk. ýe ii- ý L. C, 'LS 0-&4AO. j e- 
ýoJ co e-SCOAS L-)e Me-CLA C-OU'L'-s' 




It is assumed al fZ t/ 3? 
/ 
that all states a', > .) 
at) CL z-) Ck 3. ) 0 are 
JL/ orthogonal and that ? CL OL ýz', CL are wave 
functions localized on the Earth, whereas CL- CL 3/ 3 are 
localized on the Moon. I and 2- are then the 
Earth coordinates and the Moon coordinate. 
According to the Cluster Principle terms of the form 
CL I 0ý1 0 t- CL, 1 0... 1 are then identically zero, i-e. 
there is no overlap between the wave functions localized 
on the Earth and Moon respectively. 
The first step in our demonstration has already 
been dealt with on p. 14ý', where we showed that any 
symmetric function of the observables, Q, can be expanded 
in terms of the T; 's- Thus, 
< 
(2 
; 55' i. e. 
where CC: <F") opcýj and the sign means 
an equation in the restricted sense. 
This if Q is taken to be some interaction energy V we 
have 
V P, 
or 44 C Pý 
Thus the interaction energy V is equal, in the restricted 
sense of course, to a linear function of the T's, with 
coef f icients C4ý given by <V Pý 1 
We now assume that there is only a t- wo - ýo C, force 
acting between the particles (57) which means that the 
interaction energy V will ccnsist of s sum of parts each 
referring to only two particles. This will result in all 
the matrix elements Vi vanishing, except those for which 
Pi is either the identical permutation or simply an inter- 
change of two places, i. e. P1=P1 or P 2* 







where the subscripts refer to place interchanges. Our 
expression 44 will then reduce to 
V4 -Vlrs Pl_s 45 






is the matrix element referring to the inter- 
change of places r and s occupied by the particles. (58) 
It should be noted that this assumption implies that 
we are only considering first order perturbation terms 
anO thus the eigenvalues of 45 will give only the 
first order corrections to the energy levels. 
Given this assumption we can now write 
our expansion of V as 
/, a V 
V C, P, 4- Cz- (, 2; L 3ýC 4- C-s- 
where Pl, P 2' 'Of P6 are the place permutation operators 
defined above. We have to show that certain terms in 
this expansion are zero. To do this means looking at 
the coefficients Cz i. e. o-L- the first term in the product 
V Cý >< 19: > 
as it is this that will in general be zero for ce, -eaAý, i 
In the second term, for any value of T1 that might 
give us zero we can always find values of Pý and Pt 
that give 1. In other words , there is no generality 
to be had from the second term because of the particular 
nature of PI- and 
We suppose that V is some suitable short range inter- 
action such that Zt cannot reach to the Moon and thus 
cannot induce transitions between the eigenstates a3 
and a3' of the Moon bound particle and eigenstates 
II/Z -L/ 4X o, ý, 6( ,a of the 
two particles located on the Earýh- 
Thus all interaction terms containing either a3 or a3C tk, 9- 
3 CýJlvj I 4aý, WV, cý, are zero. The only 




are those for which both (aý and a-" are 
outside the interaction term, which means that the only 
58. We are essentially following Dirac at this.. point, 
although out demonstration will be more general since 
he ronsidered. only the same state funrtion 
See Dirac op cit p. 218 and p. 224. 
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terms in 46 which are not zero are those containing 
interaction terms of the form V12 between 6L' aý a',, ar- 
only. Thus the only coefficients in our expansion 
which are not equal to zero are c1 and c2 associated 
with P1 and P 2* these being the only ones with inter- 
action terms V 12 of the form just described. 
As an example we shall consider the coefficient 
C3 in 46 associated with P3 
v 193 1 IIVV P3 olZ d3 
Expanding V, I and we have 
CL33 + VZ 3 
(21 cl 1, a2 0-ý d) 
Sý 
S CLI CL 
1 7- -1 dI z4(V, a Ol Ck SS ot; a 
Sýal, 
a. I "'t V, , 0"- Cý ) CA Id 7- 
d3 --t- 
a t-a-3, (o,, '-" a., "' V, , a, QL 
dI cA Z- 
d '3 3 
/"4- Z. (c 
. tl/'* 
'S (0- VI-S cL' Ct3l Z- 
J3 S Oý CL7- 
/ CL3 3-- 
S CCL I/ -t 3V OL'2 *aý CL I dz d3 
S Otl t# 3 z1f 7- /* 
, 6L , a. az- Z- a3 0- 3 Ct I Cj Z- 
J 
-3 -f SS3 Vl_s CLZ- 33-- 
Nowconsider each of these terms in turn. In the first 
one has 
I/ -k 's viz it 2- CL Lz 1 7, 
C- 
but V is short range and cannot connect c0, anct 
eJ. -_ 
. 
Thus V cannot reach between CLS and. CL 
Z 
2- so this 12 1 
term is zero. In the second term we have 
/* 
, Z. s 
a 
Again the short range nature of V means that V-23 
cannot induce transitions between CL4 and 
GO so 
A3 
this term is zero. Finally in the third term we have 
6L3 CL 4; L V1 3 a3 3 3/ 
which again is zero as V, -, cannot connect 
OL, with aj. 
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Thus all three terms involving V,, #Vz_5 , Vj-S are zero 
and so 
similarly it can 
and C6 are 
However C1 and. 
fall outside the 
finite non-zero 
for example, the 
be shown that the coefficients C4. Cf 
all also zero. 
C2 contain terms for which both aýcLvl 0-3 
interaction term, thus giving 
values to these terms. Let us consider 
coefficient C2: 
c/i r'4- di jýý jý 
Expanding gives 3 YSýa, a ai C V, + 
V, cý o, VP a 2 
1 
mf ?-/ rf a-d Z- ZZ, a, a. c 
V, 
2 4V ,? -, 
ý, Vr) o, ý '-, cj, 3 
Cov *a, (a , "'fa z /, f V, , CL 
Ia -z 
IIIC, Z- J- -f- 
IVýaýj* (021* 3? I J- 
X3-- _4 
M Cý ,za. 
VZ-3 Ctl aD 01 %ý ?-j -3 
7- 11- 1 1/ aL CL2 V,: s a cL' )diJz. 
d3 
cO, (a I /-*-az- V, -, a' a" id -z- 
d3 4- ýS CL I Z- z- 
t* 
,4 Cj, - 
j3 -4- V, 3a5, "* a') - cc,, 
CL CL 2- 
aý. qaz_ z- CL4'- 
V7 
aý31*, CL37 I C, Z- 3 
The first of these three expressions contains the 
interaction term 
az 7- Z- 
It can immediately be seen that t is is non-zero, as 
the short range nature of V does allow V 12 to induce 
I tý- ZI -if ZI transitions between Ct, and az or CL I and a, _ 
However, the expression as a whole can only be finite 
if St - 60 This follows from the orthogonality of Ct - 







Thus a and cL3 must not only overlap in order f or 
C2 to be non-zero, they must in fact be equal. 
The second term contains d, a' V, ' 
3q Ck I which is zero Z C-IL-3 :S 
as V 23 cannot connect 
a. 
- with 
CL, or a z_ with a,, 
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In the third expression we have 
OL 114- Z \4-3 1 0-1 33 
but again the short range nature of V prevents V13 
from inducing transitions between ctf, /*and or 0, 
and a3 , so this term is also zero. 
We thus obtain 
C CL S/ = CO 
It can be shown similarly that the only term in C, 
which is finite is that containing V 12 and then only 
if Cý, = aý - 
Thus we have shown that C, and C2 are both non-zero 
13CC and f initeo but only if d =a , and C3. C4' 5' 6 
are all zero. The expansion given by 46 is therefore 
cut-off above C2* We therefore have 
F' 
,z 47 
48 Thus V commutes with T2" written as LV>P; L eke- and therefore, for the particular case ofýtwo-body 
Lot I ei-CLS C4., - S szo A -7 collisions, between the particles, there can be no 
transitions between states which possess opposite 
eigenvalues of the place permutation operator P 2* 
Since the two subspaces of the same triangular 
representation are spanned by two sets of eigenVectors, 
and respectively, which FI& zz_ 
- possess opposite eigenvalues of P2,1 we conclude that 
transitions are forbidden betweEn states corresponding 
to these subspaces. In other words, given our 
conditions there can be no transitions between states 
corresponding to equivalent irreducible representations. 
Thus our demonstration is complete. 
We shall now consider the bearing this result has on 
the possibility of a particle changing its statistical 
type. This was first suggested by Pauli in 1927 (59). 
He considered the collision between an electron and 
some N. -particle system and concluded that such a 
collision could induce transitions between states of the 
system corresponding to different irreducible represent- 
ations of SIV . Thus, for example, a system of 
bosons 
59. W. Pauli op cit p. 112-113 
1-7 6 
could be transformed into a system of fermions via some 
mixed symmetry state. 
We note, first of all, that the existence of the 
superselection rule, separating states corresponding to 
subspaces of different representations of S. 4 , means that 
transitions induced by interactions between the N-particles 
cannot occur between states corresponding to the 
symmetric and anti-symmetric representations (60), for 
example, nor between the symmetric and triangular 
representations. No such rule exists for states 
corresponding to equivalent representations. As we shall 
see directly transitions between these states can, in 
general, occur. 
The relevance of this circumstance to the Paull 
problem is as follows. If the third particle interacts 
with the two-particle s. ubsystem, transitions between 
bosonic and fermionic states can occur, as Pauli 
suspected. Haoevz_r 5 if the third particle 
is located 
on the Moon our discussion of the Cluster Principle 
above confirms that its mere existence cannot produce 
such transitions for two-particle systems on the Earth. 
We now proceed to show how the general three-body 
collision can produce transitions between equivalent 
representations. 
60. E Wigner (1927) p. 883 and W. Heisenberg (1930) 
p. 156 
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The demonstration proceeds as before but now 
II/33/ CL a, ) CL, 3 and 6L, are taken to be the wave- 
functions localized on the Earth with GLý,, a, ' on the 
Moon. The Cluster Principle then dictates that terms of 
the form CA I CL Z. or 3 OL Z are identically zero. I1 0-1 1 
our result from p. 14-S- is obviously still applicable 
and so the interaction energy can still be written as 
where the equation is taken in the restricted sense. 
If V is again short range then all interaction terns 
containing either a or a Z-f i. e. of the form 
or CL2/ 
V, 
2_ a' are zero. Thus the V1 2 CLI-2-- CL 1 7- 1 
only terms of the expansion to survive are those 
containing interaction terms of the form 
V13 
between OL' al/ 6L3 0- 3/ only. The only coefficients 
11) ý> > 
not equal to zero are therefore and C3 
associated with P and P., 
ConsiOer for example the coefficient c2 associated with 
p2 
CA. CL IV rx 
ýfscz 
,I 6lLlA-6L31-'-(Vi7-4 
V IV di dz z1 'Z3 
Expanding as before we obtain 
I Z- 3 
a Viz + 
V2 
s4 
Vc, ) oLýo, - 
A, 
10-3 
Ll (a I/,, aa 
d2. J3 
a3, " a. I- 
I /t- 2 az- /* Ik .. 
) dI dZ d3 a, a, az, a! 7 
z I* / -i-CA VI 3 a3 I -*-Cl 
33 )d, C) 
-Z 
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Considering each term in turn the short range nature of 




a Z/ f=0z (* (/*- v 3+ 3 C) IIzaz CL -z Z: 3 a, a, = and (/#- U3 CIL CLZ 1*3 CL CL I133 
and c3 however contain terms for which both 
aL and atý fall outside the interaction term, 
giving finite non-zero values. 
Expanding c3 gives 
Iq- Z I* t OL CL' C V12 4 VL3 ý Vtj) CL 0, 
J. 
3 Ck, 21 2aZI 




(ý01"* '3 (OL"CLI 




a, aý \12 3 -s a, 3)di z- 
d 
LI tjý 3 CL'3 a"") J3 CL I 
and now 14 3 \/. ' "* is non zero. Proceeding as CL 1 13 CL 3 6L) 
before we therefore obtain 
C- (. ý'3 
48 
Since we chose our wavefunctions to be eigenfunctions of 
P2 we could conclude from our previous result 47 that 
transitions could. not take place between states 
possessing opposite eigenvalues of 92 No such 
conclusion can be drawn from our result 48 above 
because our wavefunctions are not eigenfunctions of 
P 
This can be seen by referring back to Table 2 on p. 162- 
As we have noted ý11 can be written in the form 
F6 
AJS 
Using Table 2 we have 
P3Il, 




Similarly and f/ are not eigenfunctions of 
P,, either. 
Thus our two particle- cluster on the Earth is in 
this case not bosonic or fermionic. Of course, we 
could make it so, as it was before, through a unitary 
transformation which would make the wavefunctions 
eigenfunctions of P,, However, they then could not 
simultaneously be eigenfunctions of P2 since P and P2 
do not commute. 
We therefore conclude that, with three-body collisions, 
transitions can occur between states corresponding 
to subspaces spanned by the vectors and z, and -Z 
anO through the collision of particle 1 with 
particle 3. A In this case states corresponding to 
et 0' and E, /" can be connected. Thus in a three- 
body collision involving particle 3 colliding with 
particle 1 followed byZ,, the first collision can take 
the particles from a state supported by one subspace 
to a state supported by another whereas the second 
can induce transformations between states supported by 
the same latter subspace. 
These results obviously have important consequences 
for the weighting assignments in the statistics of 
paraparticles. The statistical weight of an arrangement 
of particles arises from the number of ways in which 
that arrangement can be realised. Thus the arrangement 
represented by 
10101 is given weight 2 in Faxwell- 
Boltzmann statistics, as it co responds to the two 
possible microstates 








but only weight 1 in Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac 
statistics since in both the latter there is only 
one possible microstate as particle permutations are 
not observable. The sum of the weights for a 
particular kind of statistics gives the total number 
of possible arrangements of the particles for that 
kind of statistics. 
cc., le- i o4c a ot LO L 0ýtý L-kg_ sto-te- cL' &AJ_ (9, j. 
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For two particles distributed among two states the 
statistics are no different from ordinary quantum 
statistics, (parabosons and parafermions of order 
2 exhibit the same statistical behaviour as bosons 
ancl fermions respectively). Thus to bring out the 
extraordinary nature of parastatistics we shall 
consider three particles distributed over three states. 
Our procedure is as follows. The central question is 
whether or not transitions are possible between our 
initial arrangement and some final 
arrangement. The statistical weight given to this 
final arrangement will then depend upon which of these 
transitions are allowed. Although any given 
arrangement corresponds to two possible states repre- 
sented by different subspaces of the same representation 
(e. g. EL. ' and it is not necessary to consider 
transitions from both initial states since we would 
obviously obtain the same results whether the initial 
states are represented by subspares spanned by ri( 
an(9 or by and Also we need only 
consider one vector out of either of the above two 
pairs since there are no transitions within a subspace. 
Thus we shall represent our initial state by 
and the final state will be represented by the vector 
obtained from this by setting certain wavefunctions equal 
to one another depending on the final arrangement 
considered. (of course the subspace representing 
the final state is actually spanned by two vectors 
obtained from and Fxj We recall that 
pit is 
given by 
1 2- 'S I -z- -S 3 
cýýt -IcLaa-;; ý icL_cLd*, > CL CL -Ia 
?_ CQ; ' 2, Z I (I- Ct_ ct; > +, Z I o- a, a ý> -I, _ý "S 2- 1 Z3 1311 
III 
/'AS I Z_ 3 ;LI :S1 2- 
The first states to be considered are those 
a corresponding to the arrangement aý i. e. one 
on 
ionsa (aý ano aý particle in each state. The wavefunct 
are then all different and the derived function is 
simply the same as ril - In this case, with three- 
body collisions as we have seen, there is the possibility 
of transitions occurring between states corresponding 
to subspaces of equivalent representations, i. e. 
between states represented by and giving a 
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doubling of the allowed states and hence also the 
weight. Thus in this case a weight of 2, rather 
than 1, is assigned to the arrangement. 
With the arrangement given by 
M. 
i. e. all 
three particles in state a'. the three wave-functions 
are all equal to one another, thus a' -_ CLz-= CL I 
The derived function is then 
41 Lit C" Cý 0- 
'W -Iý afiý 11 4 Mid ,I CýCýai> -i Cý - _16ý = (9 Transitions to the final state represented by this 
function are therefore not allowed and weight 0 is 
assigned in this case. It can easily be shown that 




With the arrangement we have aa and 
the state function for the final state is given by 




2- :S313 2- 
ý 




CL CL CL LcL. L; > d- c, - cL, -;;,. 4zI 1- 3 Z. 
0 
F 
In this case there is no doubling of s atesAand 
Qs 
there is only one set of transitions from the initial 
to the final state. Accordingly weight 1 is 
assigned to this arrangement for three-body collisions. 
By continuing in this manner with the other possible 
arrangements of three particles over three states we 
obtain the table of weights shown in Table 5. We 
have included for comparison the weights for particles 
obeying Gentile's 'paragas' statistics (61) In this 
theory the average number of particles in a group 
of states is dependent upon a parameter d giving the 
maximum number of particles which can occupy any 
given state. There is therefore simply a form of 
generalised quantum statistics with F-D and B-E 
statistics as special cases, obtained when d=1 and 
d= oo respectively. In particular there is no 
r1oubling of weights due to transitions between 
61. G. Gentile (1941) p. 10 
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subspaces supporting equivalent representations as in 
our case above. Thus when d=2 the arrangement 
Ej 
is given weight 1 along with all the others, except 
those with all three particles in one state which are 
assigned weight 0, and so we obtain the set of weights 
shown. 
Thus we can see immediately that the statistical 
behaviour of paraparticles is not the same as that 
exhibited by a 'paragas'. Table 5 demonstrates that 
the total number of allowed states for the former 
is greater than for the latter. From this table we 
obtain Table 6 which gives the weights for the various 




, giving the number 
of particles in the states a'j ctý and qý Again 
we see that for one particle in state al a and cO 
respectively the paraparticle weight is different from 
that of the paragas. This table can in turn be used 
to give the probability of finding a certain number 
of particles in a given state by simply dividing the 
above weights by the total i. e. by the total number 
of accessible states. 
This gives the set of figures displayed in Tables 
7 and 8, which clearly illustrate the differences between 
both paraparticle and paragas statistics and 'ordinary' 
quantum statistics and between paraparticle and 
paragas statistics themselves. Thus comparing paragas 
ane 'ordinary' quantum statistics we clearly see the 
so-called 'intermediate' nature of the former. For 
example for paragas statistics the probability of finding 
one particle in any state is greater than for B-E 
statistics but less, of course, than the corresponding 
probability for F-D statistics, (and also less than 
the probability for classical lvý'-B statistics). To 
give another illustrative example the probability of 
finding two particles in any state is greater for 
paragas statistics than for any of the others, including 
paraparticle statistics. Thus in this limited sense 
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to cluster together than bosons do, although this is 
not true of course for three particles in any state. 
If we compare our paraparticle statistics with 
classical and ordinary quantum statistics we arrive 
at similar conclusions, not surprisingly. Thus the 
probability of finding one particle in any state is 
greater for the former than for both B-E and Y-B 
statistics, but less of course than the corresponding 
probability in F-D statistics. Again, the tendency 
for there to be two particles in any state rather 
than one particle in each state is greater for para- 
particle statistics than for M-B or B-E statistics. 
The most interesting comparison, however, is 
between paraparticle and paragas statistics themselves. 
We notice, first of all, that the probability of 
finding two particles in any state is greater for 
the latter than fcr the former. On the othbr hand 
the probability of finding one particle in any of 
CX k) CLZ- or CO and also the probability of finding 
one particle in each state, is greater for para- 
particles than for paragas particles. Furthermore 
the probability of finding at least one particle 
in any of the three states is thus also greater 
for the former than for the latter. We conclude from 
these results, which arise as a conse ence of the 
doubling of the weight assigned to 
I- 
noted above, 
tlýat paragas particles exhibit a greater tendency to 
cluster together than paraparticles do, or, conversel 
that the latter exhibit a statistical repulsion as 
compared to the former. Thus as we have said, the 
statistics of paraparticles is not the same as that 
for a paragas. 
Finally, to complete this section, we shall turn our 
attention to the question of whether a theory of para- 
particles can be embedded ino-theory of fermions or 
bosons. 
A trivial answer can be given by taking the Kronecker, 
or inner product of a representation with its conjugate 
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an(ý using the Clebsch-Go on coefficients to give 
fermionic and bosonir represent tions. For our purposes a 4 this can be done entirely in terms of the characters 
of the represen- 
The Kronecker 
D CY) is given by 
tt-lu< >9 RIk., 4t CR) 
tations involved. 
product of the representations D CAk) and 
eW", 
-( PCAk) XL 
(", k) 
-V) 7-7_ 9(y? o C 
( (Z) )ýýz ýt= 12 Pý. z c P, ) 4 CO 
The reduction of this product representation is then 
performed by 
(Ak x V) CAA) 
using,. first of all Zc(z, ) = 
(, ")d 
(where the XIs are the group characters), to compute 
the character of each element in the product represen- 




to find the number of times each irreducible represent- 
ation is contained in the product representation. These 




Alternatively the two steps can be combined and 
> 
c rIZ) 
C-Y) Zc :; - ,/ (cr) (Z) (65) C4- 
CL 
used. 
Let us now apply the procedure as outlined above to 
the symmetric group S3* The character table for this 
group has already been given on p-164t - Using 50 
62. Hammermesh op cit P. 128 
63. Ibid p. 105 , ApfeAci&, x 64. Ibid p. 148 
65. Ibid p. 147 
52 
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we obtain the following characters of all the product 
representations 
A 0"), ( 13 )X CA (2) 1), COX (3) , 
(3 )x Czj 1), C; Z, i) xý, 1) 
13) Q-) 1) 1 4 
TA lSk, 6 41 
- 
Most of the results can be obtained by inspection. It 
should be noted that the product of two one-dimensional 
representations is a one-dimensional representation and 
must be irreducible, and also that the product of the 
representations (2,1) with any other gives (2,1) 
again. 
Weare interested in the inner product of two triangular 
representations i. e. (2,1) x (2,1), which is the only 
reducible product in the table. This is a four- 
dimensional representation and the sum of the absolute 
squares of its characters is (4) 
2+ 2(l) 2= 18. From 
AA 




.1 5_ý a, 
This has the unique solution 
so 
CX(J-5) = C; L(j) GL(Z)1) 
53 
(2 
? 1) X C21 1) 
C1 3) 4- (3) + CZ 0 
Alternatively using 51 we have 
J- (I) + C-2 Cj) (0) Cýl S) 
CL cs) ra 
[-( 1) (4-> C 1) -1- CZ )CO C 1) -t 
0Q )I 
CL _L EC C 4) C ? -) 4- 1C 1) C- (3) COP '(0) 6 
which gives the number of times each irreducible 
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representation is contained in the pr, 
This gives the same result as before, 
Cz" 1) XCz"I)=CI 'I) f (V 
of Young tableaux: 
[FX FzH+ 
This result arises from the fact that 
conjugate, i. e. 
duct representation. 
namely 
or, in terms 
+ I-T-1 FF 
(2,1) is self 
+C 3) + 54 
Thus we conclude that the inner product of the triangul- 
ar representation with itself gives both symmetric, (3) 
anO the anti-symmetric (1 
3) 
representations. 
Although this method is straightforward, it does not 
lead to general formulae. It is known that the Clebsch- 
Gordon series gives a completely general result for the 
rotation group (66), and it is interesting to see 
whether there exist similar general formulae for the 
symmetric group. These will be more complicated because 
of this grou]ýs more complex structure. A straight- 
forward procedure for the general reduction of inner 
products has been given by Murnaghan and Gamba (67) and 
the formulae useful for our purposes is 
CA- 1) XC /L 1) : ý: ý C "'0 4- CA-ý 1) 4- C "L-7-), 2-) 4- C/L -7,? 155 
For n= :3 thi s give s (Z) QX( z-) 1) -= 
(Z2 lý -f- ýI 3 Z) -f (13) 
Again it can be seen that we obtain the symmetric and 
anti symmetric representations (68). 
Now we have shown that the inner product of the triang- 
ular representation with itself contains both symmetric 
and anti-symmetric representations. Applying Murnaghan 
and Gambab method leads to the general result that if 
ýAt) and C-ýP) denote representations then the product 
jC4k)xC-9) contains the 
identity representation once if and 
only if (1A) -= and (1A) X C->>) contains the 
alternating representation (I') once if and only if 
66.1 6jct p. 361 ff 
67. Hammermesh op cit P. 253-256 
68. These results can also be obtained using graphical 
methods. See Hammermesh Ibid p. 257-259. 
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IV 
(69) where (V) is the conjugate of (Y) 
In other words, the inner product of any representation 
( OA, > n) say with itself always contains the 
symmetric representation and the inner product of any 
Cm,, vt) with its conjugate always contains the anti- 
symmetric representation. 
We conclude that symmetric (bosonic) representations 
and anti symmetric (fermionic) representations may be 
obtained from the inner product of representations 
(corresponding to paraparticle states with themselves 
or with their conjugates respectively. In this sense 
a paraparticle theory can be embedded in a bosonic or 
fermionic theory. The conversee however, is not true. 
4eý eAeral 
We cannoýIA gene iate paraparticle states within a bosonic 
or fermionic theory which incorporates extra degrees of 
freedom, such as spin, because of the consequent 
restriction to symmetric and anti-symmetric representations 
respectively. 
Thus, let us consider, as an example, an assembly of 
N electronso neglecting, for the moment, their spins. 
(70) At first sight it would seem that the statistical 
behaviour of such an assembly is identical to that of 
an assembly of paraparticles of order 2. However, in 
the former case one obtains certain representations, 
for example those corresponding to the situation where 
all spins are parallel, which do not occur in the latter, 
owing to the restriction that the wave-function for the 
assembly must be symmetric on interchange of 2 
particles and4symmetric on interchange of more than 2. 
Thus the statistics of parafermions of or(ýer 2 corresponds 
to the case in ordinary Fermi statistics where the 
existence of the spin parallel state obtained by neglecting 
the extra degrees of freedom represented by the spin, 
is forbidden. 
69. Ibid p. 256 
70. T. Okayama (1952) p. 523 
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Essentially the same point was also made by Wigner, 
who, noting that the number of different eigenvalues for 
the assembly corresponds to the number of different 
irreducible representations but that only certain of 
these correspond to allowed energy states, wrote 
'Eigenvalues of other representations do not correspond 
to actually existing stationary states but are forbidden 
by a principle independent of the eigenvalue equation, 
the Pauli exclusion principle' (71) - Thus he chose 
a set of basis functions narrowly defined as linear 
combinations of 2 linearly independent functions of N 
variables each of which can have two values. He then 
demonstrated that with such a set one can only 
generate all the representations of the symmetric 
group of degree Nf or N<4.. but that f or N>4 an ever 
increasing number cannot be produced. (72) However, 
these latter are precisely the ones whose eigen values 
eke 
do not obeyXexclusion principle and so those representa- 
tions which can be generated using these basis functions 
are the only ones necessary for a treatment of electrons 
taking into account the spin. 
This result, that one can generate all the represent- 
ations from a consideration of the spin part of the 
wave-function only up to N=4 finds its analogue in 
the theory of quarks. These can be regarded either as 
particles obeying 'ordinary' statistics but possessing 
an extra degree of freedom known as Icolour' or as para- 
Fermions of order 3. (73) By considering the problem 
of forming bound states from a para-Fermi field of 
order p Ohnuki and Kamefuchi demonstrated that only 
forp,, -, -"3 could all bound statesbe described by parafield 
theory (74). Furthermore for p=2 no fermion bound 
states are possible and so para-fields of order 1 and 3 
are accorded privileged status in the theory. The ýrs&er 
corresponds to the three triplet Icolour' model and the 
latter to the paraquark model. As regards the formal 
relationship between these two models, the state 
71. A. P. Wigner (1959) p. 128 
72. Ibid P- 139-140 
73. We shall consider this paraquark model in the 
context of the history of quantum statistics 
in section 3.4. 
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vector space of the latter is a subspace of the space 
corresponding to the general space of the former. The 
introduction of the colour index then allows a corres- 
pondence to be established between the states of the 
space of the paraquark model and certain states of 
the space appropriate to the Fermion description. These 
states are those which form singlets with respect to 
the SU (3) colour group in the latter, which restriction 
implies that the colour index is unobservable. In 
general every bound state in the latter theory corres- 
ponds to one bound state in the former, but the converse 
correspondence does not hold; certain bound states in 
the paraquark model have counterparts in the colour 
theory which are degeherate. 
Thus we conclude that any type of parastatistics 
together with some sort of 'hidden variable machinery', 
such as SU (3) will give any representations desired, 
but that the converse is not true. In particular the 
statistics of any given paraparticle theory can be 
reproduced by an ordinary bosonic or fermionic theory 
in which hidden variables are introduced (75). 
Ho, ving given the most general quantum mechnical theory 
of indistinguishable particles we shall now explicate 
its consequences regarding the individuality of these 
particles. 
3.3 Identity and Individuali: ýy in Quantum Physics 
Perhaps the most striking and fundamental difference be- 
tween classical and quantum statistics is that in the 
former a permutation of indistinguishable (in the sense 
74. Y. Ohnuki and S. Kamefuchi (1968) p. 1290. See 
also A. N. Fitra and. S. A. D/, oszkowski (1968) 
p. 1474-1475. 
75. Y. Ohnuki and S. Kamefuchi (1982) p. 353-355. 
LanOshoff and Stapp make a similar suggestion and 
give an example in which a particular para-Fermi 
model is reduced to a theory containing only 
'ordinary' fermions. P. N. Landshoff and H. P. Stapp 
(1967) P. 74-77- 
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Of possessing all intrinsic, non-spatio-temporal 
properties in common) particles leads to a new 
state whereas in the latter it does not. Particle 
permutations are not regarded as ol? servable in Q. M. C- 0 Lk 't k: k CLS 0 
as we have seen. Since eXpermut1d and unpermuted 
arrangements in classical physics is what led to the 
attribution of individuality to the particles, it 
can obviously be expected that the quantal counting 
will have serious consequences as regards a similar 
attribution in quantum physics. 
Thus the arrangement 
IoI* le I is given weight 
6 in Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, corresponding to 
the 6 possible permutations of 3 particles, between 
3 states, where it is only given weight 1 in Fermi- 
Dirac, Bose-Einstein and Gentild? s paragas statistics, 
and weight 2 in paraparticle statistics as we have 
seen. Similarly if we consider the possible states 
available to two indistinguishable particles 
distributed over two distinct one-T) rticle states, then 
the arrangement represented by 
I a- is given weight 
2 in classical statistics but only weight 1 in the 
quantum form.. In Q. M. the two classical arrangements 6 01 Ze 16 obtained through 
a permutation of the particles, are regarded as one and 
the same state of the two-particle system and counted 
as such. In quantum statistics, as we have said, a 
particle permutation does not lead to an observably 
different, separately countable arrangement. 
Historically, there we-re two responses to this 
peculiar statistical behaviour. One was to argue 
that the loss of the particles' statistical independence 
implied that they were subject to rather strange 
acausal forces. The alternative rejected such abnormal 
forces and discussed this behaviour in terms of the 
particles having lost# in some way, their classical 
individuality. We shall discuss both of these responses 
before presenting our own view which argues that there 
are two positions, one of which is the second response 
above, which can equally well be adopted, at least 
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if we keep within the domain of first-quantized theory. 
However, as we shall see, the implications of Quantum 
Field Theory (Q. F. T. ) and also metaphysical prejudice, 
may lend support to one position over the other. 
3.3.1 Individual particles + acausal forces 
This view was first suggested by Ehrenfest early in the 
history of quantum statistics (76) - He argued that 
Planck's quantum theory involved a choice of those 
states assigned equal apriori probabilities which was 
different from that made in classi cal statistical 
mechanics. Ehrenfest returned to this argument several 
times, notably in 1911 when he constructed a generaliza- 
tion of the apriori probability, or weight function, 
as part of an attempt to rationalize Planck's work. He 
had also long been puzzled by Planck's combinatorial 
formula for the distribution of quanta over oscillators. 
In 1914 he and Kamerlingh Onnes published their famous 
intuitive proof of this formula (as we shall see in the 
next section) t and Ehrenfest noted that if it were 
correct then the quanta could not be statistically 
indpPendent but must exhibit some kind of non-classical 
correlation. 
Some years later this point was taken cLr by Reichenbach. 
(77) As we discussed in Ch. 2 Reichenbach held that 
classical particles possess 'material genidentity' 
whereas quantal particles do not and are said to possess 
functional genidentity. He noted that this latter 
interpretation assumes a weighting assignment (78) which 
gives equal apriori probabilities to all distinguishable 
arrangements. He then asked if this was the only possible 
assignment which could be given and answered that it 
was not (79). Reichenbach's conclusion was that there 
76. P. Ehrenfest, (1905) p. 1301 and (1911) p-91 
77. H. Reichenbach (1956) p. 224-249 
78. He called it an 'extension rule'. 
79. c. f. Ehrenfest's work. 
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two ways of looking at quantum statistics, neither of 
which is any more correct than the other. Roughly equat- 
ing material genidentity with indiviýluality ancý 
functional genidentity with non-individuality (of 
a sort to be discussed shortly), this choice is as 
follows. 
The particles can either be regarded as non-individuals 
with an associated weighting assignment of equal 
apriori probabilities, or they can be taken to be ineiv- 
iduals, in which case the apriori probabilities 
are not equal. This second case implies that the 
statistics are not independent and hence that there 
exists causal anomalies in the behaviour of the particles. 
For bosons these anomalies consist in a mutual dependence 
in the motions of the particles (the famous Bose-Einstein 
condensation), which could effectively be characterized 
as action at a distance since the particles could be 
far apart (80). For ferrions, on the other hand, the 
causal anomaly expresses itself in the Exclusion 
Principle, if this is interpreted in terms of a force 
acting between the individual particles (81). 
The choice is therefore between regarding the particles 
as non-individuals which behave 'normally' or as 
individuals whose behaviour displays causal anomalies. 
Both are equivalent descriptions. However, as only 
the first of these descriptions supplies a 'normal' 
system, in the sense of one free from-causal anomalies, 
Reichenbach rejected the second on the grounds that 
acausal interactions are inadmissable (82). 
Thus the Ehrenfest-4Reichenbach claim is that if the 
particles are regarded as individuals then there must 
exist acausal interactions between them. This is 
perfectly valid as one could always'mimic' the statistics 
by postulating some peculiar ad hoc non-local (action 
at a (ýistanre) acausal forces acting between the 
80. Ibic9 p. 234 
81. Ibid p. 235- This force has been accorded a quasi- 
realistic status in some discussions of the so 
called 'exchange interaction' 
82. Ibid p. 235-236. Elsewhere he suggested that acausal 
anomalies might be suppressed through the adoption 
of a three-valued logic in quantum theory. See 
H. Reichenbach (1965 reprint) p. 160-166. 
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particles. However this view can be discarded, as 
Reichenbach himself indicated, on the grounds that 
its implication of acausality simply ýIoes too much 
violence to our view of reality. This is therefore 
another good example of the underdetermination of 
theories by experimental data, and the way in which, 
given such underdetermination, other factors come 
into Play. Thus one description is rejected on 
the metaphysical grounds that its implications of 
non-locality bring it into conflict with Special 
Relativity, regarded in this context as a set of 
regulative maxims. By metaphysics we mean here some 
sort of justification of the conceptual rationale 
of a theory and we shall discuss the way such 
considerations can be used to decide between two 
theories, or interpretations, in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
We shall now consider the alternative response to 
the statistical behaviour of quantal particles. 
3.3.2 Non-individual particles 
The non-observability of particle permutations in Q. M. 
anO the consequent assignment of weight 1 to the 
arrangement Eip I has been taken to imply that the 
particles cannot, as in C. Y., be labelled or at least 
that such labels are meaningless, because they are all 
'mixed up' by the particle permutations. Therefore, it 
is argued, the particles cannot be regarded as individuals 
but must be, in some sense 'non-individuals'. This 'non- 
individuality' isnot, as Post has pointed out (83), 
mere indistinguishability taken to the limit. In both 
classical and quantum statistics particles of the 
same species, or natural kind, are indistinguishable, as 
we have argued. Non-individuality obviously means 
more than this. Something which could be attributed to 
the particles in classical statistics cannot now be 
attributed to them in the quantum theory. Different 
opinions have been held as to what this 'something' is. 
83. H. Post (1963) p. 16 
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Some authors have argue(9 that the non-inOividuality 
arises through a denial of the existence of well- 
defined distinct spatio-temporal trajectories for 
quantal particles. Thus Landau and Lifshitz stated 
that the difference between classical and quantum statis- 
tics '... follows at once from the uncertainty principle'. 
(84) They argued that I ... by virtue of the uncertainty 
principle, the concept of the path of an electron ( for 
example) ceases to have any meaning. If the position of 
an electron is exactly known at a given instantr its 
coor(: Iinates have no definite value even at an infinitely 
close subsequent instant. Hence by localising anO 
numbering the electrons at some instant, we make no 
progress towards identifying them at subsequent instants; 
if we localise one of the electrons, at some other 
instant, we cannot say which of the electrons has arriveO 
at this point. 
Thus, in quantum mechanics, there is in principle no 
possibility of seperately. - following each of a number of 
similar particles and thereby distinguishing them. 
We may say that, in Q. M. identical particles entirely 
lose their 'individuality'. The identity of the 
particles with respect. to their properties is here 
very far reaching: it results in the complete 
inOistinguishability of the particles. 
1 (85). 
This form of argument can be given the following gloss: 
1). A necessary condition for an object, such as an 
elementary particle to be an individual is that it must 
possess a well defined continuous trajectory in space- 
time. (This, we recall, is the second criterion of 
classical space-time individuality). 
2). If the distance between two particles of the same 
species becomes so small that there is an appreciable 
overlap in their ranges of possible positions then it 
cannot be said that the particles possess well 
defined trajectories, and hence an unambiguous assign- 
ment of individuality can no loner be made. (Re-identi- 
fication after such a close encounter also becomes 
84. Landau and Lifshitz (1965) p. 209 
85. Ibi(; p. 209; Also D. ter Haar (1958) p. 72 anO J-F. 
Jauch (1966) p. 276 
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problematic. ) 
3) Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle implies that 
particles in Q-Yý- are not in general localized 
an(ý that their wave functions and hence ranges of 
possible location, do overlap. Therefore such 
particles cannot be said to be individuals but must 
be regarded as 'non-individuals'. 
According to this argument then, particles in Q. V. 
are non-individuals because their space-time 
trajectories are not well defined and thus the second 
criterion of classical space-time individuality is 
violated. 
Post has criticised this argument on the grounds 
that the Uncertainty Principle does not abolish 
loralizabilityp it only limits it (86). The spread 
in position can be reduced in many ways, by taking a 
a more massive body for example. or one could imagine 
two indistinguishable particles far enough apart to 
make any overlap of their wavefunctions negligible. 
Space-time individuality could thus be attributed 
to these particles and they could be identified and 
individuated through a permutation, as long as the 
distance between them always remains large. This 
woule result in the particles changing positions and 
since they are regarded as individuals the final 
configuration can be said to be different from the 
initial one. Yet particle permutations are not 
observable in Q. Y_Iý- and the final configuration would 
not, in fact, be counted as distinct from the 
initial one. This apparent paradox leads to the 
conclusion that non-individuality must be due to some- 
thing else other than the supposed loss of well defined 
trajectories through the Uncertainty Principle. 
As post has indicated then the no-well-defined- 
trajectories argument turns on the interpretation of kka 
Uncertainty Principle. 1ý, ryullin has argued that the 
principle has been interpreted in at least four 
different ways. (87) 
86. H. POst (1963) p-19 
87. E. ycyullin (1954) 
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1). It is impossible to measure simultaneously 
conjugate variables; 
2). It represents a limitation on the precision of 
measurements in the sense that the accuracy of 
knowledge of one variable decreases by measuring 
its conjugate, 
3). It is a statistical principle which relates the 
scatter of one sequence of measurements with that 
of another. 
4). It is a mathematical expression of the funýlamental 
complementarity of phenomena in Q. M. 
In terms of this classification Landau and Lifshitz 
have adopted interpretation 1 whereas Post appears 
to hold interpretation 2; thus they are arguing from 
different ideological viewpoints. An even more 
extreme position is to adopt interpretation 3. 
Proponents of the 'statistical' (or more properly 
'stochastic') approach to Q. M. (88) regard particles 
as classical individuals possessing simultaneous 
position and momentum and traversing a classical spatio- 
temporal trajectory. The state vector is regarded as 
a description not of an individual system but of an 
ensemble of similarly prepared systems and thus 
quantum phenomena is considered to be the manifestation 
of the statistical behaviour of a collection of basically 
classical individuals. The difficulties associated 
with this approach are well known and we shall not 
consider them here (89). However, we will remark that 
classical space-time individuality is only partially 
reinstated in this. interpretation, 
o-iit is still not 
possible to predict uniquely the particular trajectory 
which would result from a particular causal Oisturbance. 
(90) 
If one accepts the inherent indeterminism of Q. Y., 
embodied in the Uncertainty Principle, then it is 
clearly not possible to ascribe classical space-time 
88. K. popper (1967) p-7.; H. Yargenau (1963), p. 469 
A. Lande (1973) 
89. See M. Jammer (1974) p. 440-469 
90. Y,. Audi (1973). 
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individuality to the particles, even granted Postýs 
argument If the particle is localized at one instant 
then it is not possible to predict its position at 
subsequent future instants. Thus if one were an 
advocate of space-time individuality for classical 
particles one would. have to relinquish this view 
for quantal particles and adopt some alternative. 
As we have tried to indicate these arguments are 
heavily influenced- by ideological prejudice and to 
the extent that each interpretation possesses certain 
difficulties the question of which one should be 
adopted over the others is not one which can be decided 
by purely rational argument alone. 
Another possible reason for rejecting classical space- 
time individuality in Q. F. is that the superposition 
Principle implies the inapplicability of the Impenetrab- 
ility Assumption for quantal particles. Thus the 
general ket for an assembly of particles corresponds 
to a state for the assembly for which one cannot say 
that each particle is in its own state, but only that 
each particle is partly in several states, in a way 
which is correlated (91) with the other particles being 
partly in several states (92) . In other words, each 
particle partakes of all the states of all the other 
particles. There is a sense, then, in which one could 
say that two, or more, such particles can be in the 
same place at the same time - in fact they can be in 
several places at the same time. 
The oft-quoted example of two -bosons both in the same 
one-particle state is therefore unnecessarily restrictive. 
n-, To fermions distributed among two distinct one-particle 
states will also partake with equal probabilistic 
weight of each state in the superposition demanded 
by anti- 
symmetrization (93). So in this sense, two particles, 
whether bosons or fermions, are always in the same state. 
91. Compare with Ehrenfest's position. 
92. Dirac op cit p. 207-208. 
93. This is not true of the higher paraparticles 
but then 
there is no way of telling which particle is in which 
state because of the restriction to symmetric 
observables. 
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As Post says 'Any one labelled particle occurs 
simultaneously in all positions occupied by like 
particles'. (94) and '... the location of an electron 
at a given moment is as numerous as the number of 
electrons in the universe 1. (95) 
This is a well known and fundamental feature of 
Q. M. embodied in the Superposition Principle which 
requires the existence of strange (i. e. non-classical) 
relationships between the states of a dynamical 
systemsuch that whenever the system is definitely 
in one state it can be considered to be partly in 
each of two or more other states. The nQn-classical 
nature of this principle is further revealed through 
the probability of a certain result for an observation 
being intermediate between the corresponding 
probabilities for the original states, rather than 
the result itself being intermediate between the 
results for the original states, as it woule be 
classicaTly. Thus when an observation is made on any 
system in a given state the result will not in general 
be determinate. The Superposition Principle therefore 
demands indeterminacy in the results of observations 
and philosophical arguments based upon it are obviously 
closely related to those using considerations of 
indeterminacy, as above. 
In this, non-classical, sense then, particles in 
Q. Yi. do not obey the Impenetrability Assumption, 
which, we recall, is the first criterion of classical 
space-time individuality. Thus, if two, or more, 
particles can occupy the same state at the sarre tirr, e. 
albeit in this nonclassical and perhaps restrictive sense 
this form of individuality cannot be attributed to them. 
Such particles must therefore be regarded as non- 
inOividua-Ts. 
94. Post op cit P-19 
95. Post Ibid p. 20 
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However, it may be objected that this argument derives 
its conclusion from an aspect of Q. ý, . which is by no 
means unproblematic, namely the status of so-called 
'entangled states' within the theory. These lie at 
the root of many of the fundamental conceptual problems 
in Q. M., such as the EPR argument and the 'Schrodinger's 
Cat Para("oxl (96) for example, and represent what 
Schrodinger has called the characteristic trait of 
Q. Mý (97) 
Thus let us consider the situation mentioned above, 
that of two fermions distributed over two one-particle 
states. The anti-symmetrised wave function for the 
assembly is then given by 
c , ki, C, a a' IY> r-- 'r, Z_ 1 21 
Now the statistical operator (98), or density matrix,,,,, 01, ) 
of particle 1 can be written in terms of projection 
operators thus: 
A oc I-;;, 'E 1a', ><o, 1, ) + '' ' tPI ý_-! -1 or - 'L I PI- 2- Pa 2- rIL 
Similarly, for particle 2 we have 
I+ 
Ck aZ 
or ri LC ,IJ Z_ a ctý 
Thus the two particles have the same statistical operators. 
Furthermore, it can easily be shown that they possess 
the same one-particle probability distribution. Thus 
the two-particle probability distribution k_? cO 
for finding one particle in state al and the other in 
s ta te cL 7- is given by 
e. 
ýe 
I> 2- ) :: --- < 4,1 ý1, / 'k > 
where 
Thus one oor-ains 
CLI V- 4- 1 a' CL' ke. a, a, ex', Cq 8cL) CL 
wkepe cLI =, <I(O-1%'7 e-6-C. The one"particle probability distribution giving the 
q6. -SýLO&wý Or Cýt C-klo 
97. E. Schrodinger (1935) p. 557 
98. See B. J)'Espagnat (1976) Ch. 6 for the definition 
of this operatqr ada discussion of its properties. 
qsc,. -Tke- ýýCtvt- '17- kA CES ýAUCLld_ ) O's 
(, O'oKrJO, -,, 
d 
C-01-tk 
0A CLte_ C4764or-O'xeý 
4e_. Ae_ OLrk e-4e- 
e ie 5 6ý1 5 &_aý cre- Si CLK 
IZ 
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probability that particle 1 occupy state cký regardless 
of, the state of particle 2 is then obtained by 
integrating the above over the space of particle 2. 
Thus we have 
al W L() (I Zil I- ý_ 
( O-Z 
Similarly the one- particle distribution for particle 
2 is given by 
CJ CZ0,1x Iz 4- Q 
Hence we conclude that the individual particles have 
the same statistical operator and the same one-particle 
probability distribution. It is this which underlies 
our earlier argument that the two fermions partake 
with equal probabilistic weight of each state in the 
superposition and thus can be regarded as being 'in' the 
same state. They are in the same state precisely insofar 
as they have the same oni-particle probability 
distribution and thus cannot be distinguished by any 
one particle position measurement. 
However, expressed in these terms one can easily discern 
how the argument threatens to come undone. First of all 
the following well-known counter argument can be 
given. (99) Referring again to the two-particle 
distribution one can easily show that the probability 
of f inding both C_ei-mýoAs in the same one-particle state 
is zero, i. e. 
LJ CT_ý, C j 
), I) -- 0 
This, of course, is what lies behind the Pauli Exclusion 
Principle which can be naively expressed in the form 
that no two fermions can exist in the same one-particle 
state, or that a quantum state in which two fermions 
possess identical sets of one-particle quantum numbers 
cannot exist. (100) Thus it can be argued that in this 
sense two fermions cannot be in the same state and the 
I. A. is satisfied. Indeed the Exclusion Principle 
may be regarded as a generalisation of the I. A. 
in the 
99. See y Shadmi (1978) p. 844; and H. Fargenau (1950) 
Ch. 20, (1944) p. 187. 
100. Shadmi op cit p. 847 
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sense that it applies not simply to the spatio-temporal 
coordinates of the particles as in the classical case, 
but to the one-particle quantum numbers (101). 
Thus on the one hand, regarding the one-particle 
distributions, it can be argued that the particles can 
be in the sametstate, whereas on the other, a 
consideration of the two-particle distribution leads to 
the conclusion that they cannot. A resolution of 
this apparent conflict can be effected through a 
consideration of the nature of theselentangled states' 
in general and of the statistical operators in- 
particular. t9l and ý4 are not in fact state 
ascriptions since they describe improper mixtures (102) 
rather than pure states. As these operators effectively 
'encode' all the measurements that can be obtained by 
operating on the particle concerned these measurements 
will not be maximall in the sense of giving the maximum 
amount of information about the system. In other words 
since the state function of the system is no longer the 
product of the separate state functions of the particles, 
one cannot, from a knowledge of 1 +-ý; - ascribe to each 
of the particles an individual state function. This is 
a manifestation of the peculiar, non-classical 'holism' 
inherent in Q. M. in which complete knowledge of the 
whole does not generally entail complete knowledge of 
the parts. 
Thus one cannot attribute pure states to each particle 
and so the question of whether the particles can be 
(9escribed as being somehow in the 'same' state simply 
Ooes not arise. This consideration of the formalism of 
the theory therefore leads to the conclusion that the 
question of whether the I. A. is violated or not is in 
fact obviated in Q. Y. This is an important point and 
as it has an obvious bearing on the sta-bASof Leibniz's 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles in quantum 
101. This is effectively what Shadmi argues. Ibid 
p. 847 
102. The terminology is due to d'Espagnat op cit pp. 
pp. 58-62. 
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physics we shall return to it in our discussion of 
this Principle in Chapter 4. 
Finally it should be noted that we are assuming 
here that Q. M. is complete. If the positions of 
particles are introduced as hidden parameters then 
the above conclusions no longer follow and a form. 
of space-time individuality could be reinstated. 
However, as the question of the viability of the hidden 
variables programme is still the subject of much 
discussion and has been extensively dealt with elsewhere 
(103), we shall not consider the possible consequences 
of these theories here. 
It has also been argued that particles in Q. M. should 
be regarded as non-individuals because T. I. cannot be 
attributed to them. Thus Post argues that individuality 
or non-in(ýividuality must be assigned at the very 
beginning (104). Quantum Field Theory does this 
hutomaticallyl and does not refer to individual 
particles at all, treating all particles as field 
excitations and hence as 'non-individuals'., only the 
first quantised theory, he claims, and in particular 
Schrodinger's formulation starts off 'heavily on the 
wrong foot' (105) by initially assigning a label and 
hence T. I. to each particle. The individuality is then 
immediately 'wiped out' by systematically permuting 
these labels and constructing a wave-function for the 
assembly out of all the wave functions obtained by 
permuting the particles, subject to certain symmetry 
restr&'ctions. 
This position therefore asserts the denial of 
classical T-I_ which, in first quantised Q. M. is lost 
in the particle permutations and in Q. F. T. is not 
exhibited to begin with. Thus it is claimed quantal 
particles are hon-individuals'. 
103. See Jammer op cit 
discussions and r, 
Swinburne (I cl 3 71 
d'Espagnat op cit 
104. Post op cit P-19 
105. Ibid p. 19 
p. 252-339. For more recent 
eferences see N, Redhead in R. 
p4and (1981) p. l., and 
Ch-11. 
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'Non-individuality'is, for Post, a primary concept 
which cannot be explicated in terms of other, more 
fundamental, notions (106). Non-individual 
particles are not only indistinguishable they are 
also devoid of T. I. and thus are regarded as lieentical' 
in a strong sense. They can differ only as regards 
location, or, more generally, the state they are in. 
He concludes that one should not refer to individual 
particles in Q. N-',. at all but shoule speak instead of 
a state being occupied by 0,1,2,..., etc. particles. 
Material particles are thus regarded as merely states 
of disturbance in an unidentifiable, substanceless 
medium. They are without secondary qualities, without 
individuality, without substance; 'There is no sub- 
stance left in physics, only form'. (107) 
However Post's argument cannot be conclusive because 
it is perfectly possible to give a consistent account. 
of quantum statistics in which labels or proper names 
are ascribed to the particles, as we shall demonstrate. 
Thus the apparent loss of particle individuality evident 
in the Q-M. contraction in the number of states has been 
accounted for in three different ways, each involving 
the negation of some aspect of the two forms of 
classical individuality. We shall now argue that 
there are in fact two alternative positions which can 
be consistently adopted, although metaphysical consid- 
erations may lead to one being preferred over the other. 
3.3.3. Non-Individual Particles + Individuated States 
or Individual Particles + State Accessibility 
Restrictions 
Our view is that there are two ways of looking at particle 
individuality in Q. M. One considers particles to be 
106. Schrodinger held a similar view. See E. Schrodinger 
(1957) p. 194. 
107. Post Ibid p. 20. 
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non-in(-Iividuals, but regards the states as indiv- 
i('uated. Alternatively the particles can be regarded 
as possessing T. I. but then restrictions must be imposed 
upon the set of possible states, Still regarded as 
individuated, such that certain of them are no longer 
accessible to the particles. The first position can 
also be arrived at through a consideration of Q. F. T. 
The second is obviously open to the philosophical 
criticism which has been directed at the notion of T. I. 
As we shall discuss later this can be taken to 
mitigate against the particle approach in favour of the 
field-theoretic description. 
We recall that in the ket for an assembly of 
indistinguishable particles both the states and the 
particles were labelled. The most general ket for the 
assembly is then constructed out of those kets obtained 
by permuting the particle labels and such a particle 
permutation has been regarded as rendering these labels 
meaningless. Thus it has been concluded, as we have 
seen, that quantal particles are 'non-individuals'. 
However.. particle permutations are, as we have seen, 
only one of two kinds of permutation which can be defined 
in Q. M. The other kind are the place permutation 
operators, which permute the place labels in the ket. 
When applied to the purely symmetric or anti-symmetric 
state vectors these operators produce the same results, 
and so the practical distinction between them, although 
not of course the conceptual oneo disappears for 
$ordinary' fermions and bosons. it is only when we move 
to, the multi-dimensional subspaces of paraparticle 
theory that this difference becomes apparent. By 
restricting its analysis to ordinary quantum statistics 
only the account of particle 'non-individuality' 
Oiscussed in the previous section fails to take into 
consideration the effect and possible implications of 
the T's. 
We recall that the effect of the P's when operating on 
a ket is to produce another, indistinguishable from the 
first one. This is enshrined in the Indistinguishability 
Postulate expressed, as the commutation relation, EO, ) 
PIý: -_ 0 
zu/ 
which can be interpreted as stating that it is not 
possible to (listinguish states differing only in a 
permutation of the particle labels. It is this which 
actually underlies the arguments to the effect that 
particles cannot be regarded as individuals in Q. M. 
In other words, since the P's do not commute with 
one another the I. P. implies that they are not 
observables of the system. Any vector on which they 
operate is left in the same subspace, which reflects 
the fact that two state vectors differing only by a 
permutation of the particles must represent the same 
state. 
The T's, on the other hand, can take a state vector 
from one subspace to another as a place permutation 
ran change the physical state of a system. Since they 
commute with the P's the P's do satisfy I. P. and there- 
fore any self-adjoint function of them can be regarded 
as an observable. Indeed, I. P. implies that any 
observable Q must be a symmetric function of the 
particle labels and we then demonstrated that any such 
function can be expanded in terms of the P's thus 
CZ 
where the equality is taken in the limited sense as 
explained on p. 
It is worth noting however that, contrary to what is 
often written (108) the T's themselves are not self- 
adjoint and therefore are not real dynamical variables 
(109). Thus the 'T's themselves should not be regarded 
as observables, although combinations, or rather 
(self-adjoint) functions of them are. 
As we have emphasised in classical physics a 
particle permutation is regarded as observable and giving 
rise to a new micro-statep This is taken as justific- 
ation for the particles being regarded as labelled and 
for these labels to have meaning in the sense that 
they designate that which confers individuality 
upon the particles. In quantum physics, as we now see, 
108. Landshoff and. Stapp op cit. Y. Ohnuki and S. 
Kamefuchi (1971) p. 20 and p. 27-31 
109. See the discussion in Dirac op cit p. 212 
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the P's are not observable and do not produce new, 
distinct complexions. Thus the particle labels uay be 
regarded as meaningless and quantal particles as 'non- 
individuals However the place permutations do give d 
rise to new, countably distinct micro-states as they 
project the state vector from one irreducible subspace 
to another. Thus the state, or place, labels are not 
meaningless and the states themselves can be regarded 
as individuated. Underlying this view, and hence also 
of the requirement that all observables that distinguish 
between states differing only in the order of the particle 
labels,, are functions of the PIs, is the f act that the 
wave-functions are completely distinct entities and 
the particles are experimentally identified by these, 
as given by the state labels, and not through the 
positions of the particle labels. 
Thus the P's are not observable since the particles 
are indistinguishable, whereas functions of the T's 
are observable because the states can be distinguished. 
If the substantivalist approach is adopted then this 
could be interpreted as implying that the underlying 
substratum is truly 'unknowable' in quantum physicso 
in the sense that it cannot even be designated by a 
meaningful label. Alternatively the above statement 
could be taken to support the view that the particles 
should be regarded as nothing more than 'bundles' of 
qualities, corresponding to the intrinsic properties, 
which can be distinguished one from another by the 
states they happen to be in (110) - 
Thus we have arrived at the position where we have 
non-individual particles together with individuated 
states. Insofar as the particles exist 'in' the states 
and the latter in turn are embedded in space-time, 
this may be regarded as a form of 'space-time 
individuality', albeit a very weak one, not equivalent 
to the classical version. Thus the particles are 
distinguished at any one time by the states they are 
in. As regards reidentification through time 
it is 
110. Thus Post has proposed an ontology of 'states of 
eisturbance in an uni0entifiable medium, without 
substance'. Post op rit p. 20. 
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true that instead of the position x as in C. Y. one has 
kP (x) but to reidentify the latter one still has to 
effect a reidenti fi cation through the forrrer. Thus one 
still has the space-time background in Q. V. with all 
the attendant problems regarding its interpretation. As 
in the classical case adopting the relational view 
leads tocircxllarity whereas the alternative absolutist 
approach suggests that the points of space-time 
underlying the states should be regarded as individuals 
themselves. 
As we have said, however, the form of S. T. in this 
case is much weaker than the classical version since 
there are no well-defined spatio-trajectories in Q. N'. 
and, as we have seen, there is a sense in which it 
can be said that the I -A - is violated. As we saw at the 
end of Chapter 2 this is precisely the situation which 
holds in the case of fields and the above position 
regarding particle 'individuality' - or rather the 
supposed lack of it - finds its most coherent expression 
in Quantum Field Theorys where an account of many-body 
systems can be given without referring to particle 
labels at all. (111) In this case the P's are undefined# 
which is to be expected as the creation operators in 
Q. F. T. already contain the effects of 'particle' 
indistinguishability, but the P's are not and allow 
a correspondence to be established between the first 
and second quantised theories (112). We shall briefly 
consider this situation in section 3.5. 
In section 3.4 we shall also indicate how the above 
view can be found running through the history of quantum 
statistics where one approach was to count the energy 
states occupied by various numbers of particles rather 
than the number of particles in various states. 
Before discussing these further points however we 
111. Thus Redhead has argued that quantal particles also 
belong to his new category of entities called 
lephemerals' and that the latter can be regarded as 
bereft of individuality in the sense that a collection 
of indistinguishable particles is itself an 
ephemeral. Redhead (1983) p. 38-39 
112. Stolt and Taylor op cit. 
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must consider the alternative conclusion regarding 
particle individuality in Q. N. which can be arrived 
at through further examination of the nature and 
consequences of the I. P. 
We noted in section, 3.2 that the IP- acts as a 
super-selection rule which partitions the Hilbert 
space into a number of irreducible subspares. Thus# 
for example, in the three particle case the six- 
dimensional subspace E of Y-: S , spanned by the vectors Piý> decomposes into irreducible subspaces 
invariant under the P's as follows : 
E ý: -- ES0( Ec- "0 Et // ) (ý eA 










Given I. P. Schur's Lemma implies that all matrix 
elements of an observable Q connecting different 
representations are zero. It then follows that 
if 
there exist states corresponding to subspaces of 
Oifferent representations then transitions 
between 
such states must be forbidden. States corresponding 
to subspaces of the same representation are not 
separated in this way and transitions may 
therefore 
occur between them as we saw in section -ý. 
2.3. 
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These considerations also hold for the general case of 
an N-particle system. The Hilbert space then decomposes 
into a number of subspaces and transitions between 
states corresponding to certain of them, viz, those 
of different representations, are forbidden. 
Thus I-P imposes a restriction on the states such 
that certain of them are rendered inaccessible to the 
particles. If we consider the time evolution of the 
system as effected by some Hamiltonian, then we conclude 
that I. P. implies that if the system starts in one 
irreducible representation then it will always remain 
in that representation. Bosons will always be bosons, 
fermions fermions etc. 
The I. P. can therefore be thought of as an extra postulate 
of Q. M., an initial condition in the specification of a 
situation. It divides up the Hilbert space into a 
number of subspaces and once a system is placed in one 
of these subspaces the dynamics is such that it can 
never get out of it. 
Thus quantum mechanical particles can be regarded as 
individuals which are prevented from occupying certain 
states because of an extra initial condition which 
has been introduced into the formalism. once it has 
been decided which states are inaccessible the dynamics 
is such that the particles can never get into them. 
Thus, for example, let us consider again the 
distribution of two indistinguishable particles over 
two one-particle states. If the two states are 
specified by orthogonal wave functions OL and OL and 
the two particles are labelled 1 and 2 (note: we are 
effectively introducing some form of individuality here) 
then for B-E statistics the three product wave 
functions corresponding to the three possible 
IZI 
0V arrangements EE 
are iaiaIi CL >t CJ-z > a, aýz. 
respectively. For F-D statistics we have 
-I- CL CL 7- > cez-> > 
57 
""r, Zý 
corresponding to the arrangement 0 56 and 
57 are chosen to retain certain simp, e symmetry prop- 
erties under a particle permutation, viz 56 is symmetric 
212 
anO 57 is anti-symmetric. 
We have noted that I. P. can be interpreted as 
stating that every observable, in particular the 
Hamiltonian governing the time development of the 
statevector, must be symmetric under a particle 
permutation. It then follows that a symmetric state 
will always remain symmetric and an anti-symmetric 
state always anti-symmetric. In other words if the 
initial condition is imposed that the state of the 
system is either symmetric or anti-symmetric then 
only one of the states 56 or 57 is ever available 
to the system and this explains why the statistical 
weight attaching to the pair of states 56 and 57 
is half the classical value. 
On this view 56 and 57 are not regarded as the 
same state any more than the classical states 
and are, just 
that there exists a dynamical restriction on the 
accessibility ofcertain states. This restriction arises 
from the symmetry of the Hamiltonian under the P'so 
which in turn can be deduced as a necessary condition 
for the indistinguishability of the particles, as 
we have seen, and hence follows from I. P. 
On this view then* the non-classical weighting 
assignment of quantum statistics is 'explained' not 
in terms of 'non-individuality', but as being due 
to the accessibility restrictions imposed on the 
states as an initial condition. In the above exa--nple 
only one of the two possible states is accessible 
to either kind of particle because the Hamiltonian 
is such that they cannot get into it - transitions 
to that state are forbidden. More generally states 
formed through a particle permutation are not counted 
not because they do not exist but because they are 
not available to the particles. We therefore have the 
rather odd situation in which certain states exist, 
ontologically speaking, but they cannot be reached by 
the particles, and this is due, not to the laws of 
Q. m., but to the restrictions imposed by an initial 
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ronOition - the I. P. 
So once the symmetry type of the particle is fixed 
the I. P. ensures that some states are never accessible 
to the particles. Thus, for example, the state 
corresponding to the symmetric combination above is 
inaccessible to fermions and the triangular paraparticle 
state is not accessible to either bosons or fermions. 
In general* as we have seen, states carrying different 
representations are separated by a superselection rule, 
although states carrying the same representation are not. 
koweve-1- 
collisionsAthese latter states 
are connected and hence the statistical weight is 
increased accordingly. These considerations of state 
accessibility conditions are then a little more 
complicated for paraparticles than for ordinary particles 
as we shall see. 
Before discussing this, however, there are two further 
points to note. The first is that what we have given here 
is a description in which the particles are labelled. 
The fact that we cannot tell which label attaches to 
which particle, because they are permuted, does not 
necessarily compel us to give up such a description. 
only an extreme form of positivism would hold that we 
should. Thus the particles can be regarded as individuals, 
with the labels designating the underlying substantial 
substratum. According to this view then the particles 
possess T. I. exactly as in the classical case* and 
are therefore simply classical particles which are 
subject to restrictions on the possible states they can 
occupy. 
The second point is that this notion of state 
accessibility restrictions can also be found in classical 
statistical mechanics, although in a much weaker 
form. 
The fundamental problem of statistical mechanics is to 
rct stationary states of (9iscover how to select the cor 
r, 
an assembly of a large number of particles. A 
decision 
-nust be made as to whether the assembly, when 
left to 
itself, tends to settle down mainly into one or other of 
a small preferred group of stationary states whose 
properties control the equilibrium properties of 
the 
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assembly, or whether it wanders at ran6om over the 
whole range of stationary states made accessible by 
the general conditions of the problem. In the latter 
case the assembly's equilibrium properties will be 
determined by the properties of the vast majority 
of states. These equilibrium properties can only 
then be calculated by taking a suitable average over 
all stationary states or by selecting the properties 
of the most probably occupied type of state, or by 
some other method which will require justification. 
The choice of states can be made in a number of 
ways all of which, fortunately give the same physical 
results for large assemblies (113). Each involves some 
necessary fundamental hypothesis underpinning the 
choice. Thus, the equilibrium value 5 of any property 
Q of the assembly can be obtained by averaging over 
all the distinct states of the assembly, consistent 
with a given energy or energy range and any other general 
conditions, and assigning an equal weight of unity 
4; ý: r, e 
to each state i. e. 
4J 
I "a/ (114). In this 
S 'ý4, tes S -S case states of a given energy have been selected for 
the averaging process. The energy is a uniform integral 
(115) of the equations of motion of the assembly 
which restricts the assembly's representative point in 
the phase space to a hypersurface in this space 
determined by H( x0 p. 3c 
)=E where H (x, p.. ) is the 
Hamiltonian, x stands for all the positional co-ordinates 
of the particles, p stands for the corresponding momenta 
an(ý E is a constant. 
Other uniform, integrals may exist for classical 
assemblies in certain circumstances, for example the 
linear momentum. Any such integral hasa profound effect 
113. R. C. Tolman (19-18) Ch-1. See our discussion of 
the choice of weighting assignments in Boltzmann's 
statistical mechanics in Section 2.3.5 of Chapter 2. 
114. R. H. Fowler and E. A. Guggenheim (1939) p. 7 
115. An integral of the equations of motion is a function 
of the generalised coordinates and momenta and time, 
whose value remains constant along a path in phase 
space. A uniform imtegral is a time independent 
integral, also called a 'constant of the rrotion'. 
See D. A. Lavis (1977) p. 258. 
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on the trajectory of the representative point in 
phase space, confining it to a particular surface 
in this space, or, if a small range of the constant 
is allowe(ý, to the region enclosed between two such 
neighbouring surfaces. When such additional uniforTri 
integrals exist they must be incluOed in the general 
condition lai6 down in the formulation of the fundamental 
hypothesis. It is then necessary to average over only 
such regions of phase space, or over such states of the 
assembly, as conform to the extra requirements , 
Such regions or states are called accessible phase 
space regions or accessible states, respectively. 
However, it can be shown that as regards thermodyna7ic 
consequences, it makes no difference whether these extra 
integrals are considered to exist or not. (116). Thus 
it is generally assumed that it is only the energy 
integral which imposes any constraints on what phase 
space regions are accessible to the system (117) 
In quantum statistical mechanics, on the other hand, 
further constraints on state accessibility are introduced 
over and. above those imposed by the energy integral. 
In this case, as we have seen, not all of the states 
of an assembly of inOistinguishable particles are 
accessible one from another; they may be analysed into 
groups of non-combining states by means of their 
symmetry properties. The symmetry type of any suitably 
specified set of states is an absolute constant of the 
motion (118) equivalent to an exact uniform integral 
in classical terms. The set of accessible states for 
the purposes of the 'fundamental hypothesis' is that set 
in the correct energy range, of the appropriate symmetry. 
Thus the notion of accessibility can be formulated 
for both classical and quantum systems, although in 
the latter case there is the added complication of the 
symmetry requirements imposed on the wave functions 
CorresponOing to these there are various accessibility 
postulates which can be invoked, each giving a 
116. Op. 
117. P. Penrose (1970) p. 124-125. 
118. I)irac op cit p. 213 
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different statistical mechanics. In order to 
completely specify a quantum system therefore it is 
net, essary to specify not only its Hamiltonian but also 
which type of statistics - that is, which of the 
various accessibility postulates - it satisfies (119). 
out of all the non-combining groups of eigenfunctions, 
Oefined according to their symmetry properties, the 
symmetric and antisymretric groups in particular stand 
out on account of their simplicity. In the former 
the eigenfunctions are all symmetric under a particle 
permutation and the eigenfunctions of the assembly are 
then restricted to the symmetric subspace of the 
Hilbert space. Only the states within this subspace 
are accessible to the assembly and B-E statistics is 
obtained. The anti-symmetric group consists of 
eigenfunctions which are anti-symmetric under the P's 
and in this case the eigenfunctions of the assembly are 
restricted to the anti-symmetric subspace of the whole 
Hilbert space. Only the states within this subspace are 
accessible to the assembly and F-D statistics are 
obtained (120). 
However, as we have emphasised, these two are 
merely the simplest examples which can be taken from the 
set of all possible symmetry groups. The other, 
more complicated, types of symmetry which are possible 
are obeyed by paraparticles, whose wave functions 
are symmetric in a certain number of particles and anti- 
symmetric in the rest (121). The question of what 
states are accessible to paraparticles is, as we have 
indicated, more problematic than in the case of ordinary 
particles. 
For particles obeying Gentile's paragas statistics 
the number of accessible states will simply be 
119. If no symmetry requirements at all are imposed then 
one recovers classical iv. -axwell-Boltzmann statistics 
120. Penrose op cit p. 930 
121. For example a parafermion of order n has a wave- 
function which is symmetric in n particles but 
anti-symmetric under the exchange of one of these 
with all particles other than the n. 
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intermediate between the number accessible to 
ferTrions an(7 bosons. This number will increase as 
the statistics becomes less fermionic ane more 
bosonic. In the case of paraparticle statistics 
however, where there is the possibility of transitions 
occurring between states carrying the same representation, 
it is a linear combination of states that now becomes 
accessible to the particles. 
Thus after taking into account the above considerations 
the 'fundamental hypothesis' must be re-written as 
a='. 5 r- 1 (122) 
1 Loe_ Uas e-S The purpose of this digression was to emphasize that 
the concept of state accessibility restrictions occurs 
quite naturally in both C. Y. anO Q.. ýI. 7,1' Obviously it plays 
a larger ane more prominent role in the latter because 
symmetry constraints are imposed over and above the 
energy constraint laid down in the former. This goes 
some way towards explaining the greater role played by 
symmetry in QM compared to CIV. 
We conclude that there are two alternative positions 
which can be adopted with regard to particle individuality 
in Q. T, -.: 
1). Non-individual particles + individuaEvAstates; 
2). Individual particles possessing T. I. + state 
accessibility restrictions. 
This conclusion lends support to the argument that one 
can 'do' quantum statistics with the particles regarded 
either as individuals or non-individuals so that 
arguments over individuality become irrelevant. In this 
context it is interesting to note that Dorling has 
suggested that counting states and arguing about the 
individuality of particles is a totally irrelevant 
exercise as far as the statistics are concerned, whereas 
122. Fowler and Guggenheim op cit p-18 
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a consideration of the dynamics, specifying the transition 
probabilities, is absolutely crucial. Thus he has 
written 'You can't get out the statistics without 
putting in the dynamics, and .... it is then quite 
irrelevant what you count as distinct states and 
whether you consider the individuals themselves as 
ieentical or non-iOentical'. (123) In terms of this type 
of approach the statistical behaviour of quantal 
particles, or their tendency to display certain 
correlations of the kind exhibited in B-E and F-D 
statistics* can then be regarded as an 'ineependent and 
fundamental property of the particles' (124). Thus 
this view, with its emphasis on the dynamics, can be 
regarded as a version of the 'Ehrenfest-Reichenbach 
description' outlined in Section 3.3.10 in which quantum 
statistics is interpreted in terms of 'peculiar' inter- 
actions, possibly non-localo existing between the 
particles. 
This underdetermination of the philosophical 
interpretation by the physics implies that one cannot 
determine any particular distribution of particles over 
states on the grounds of apriori considerations of 
particle individuality, or non-ineividuality, alone. 
Such a determination can only be obtained by paying 
, ýue regard to the various transition probabilities 
involved and hence to the dynamics of the situation. 
As in the classical case our conclusion regarding 
particle individuality is supported by historical 
considerations of the development of quantum statistics. 
indeed this development cano to a certain extent, be 
viewed in terms of successive shifts from one inter- 
pretation to another. 
123. J. Dorling (1978a) and (1978b) p. 7-9 
124. W. De muynck (1975) p. 334. This work was explicitly 
based on mirman's attempt to analyse the experimental 
meaning of the concepts 'identity', 'individuality' 
etc. R. Yirman (1973) p. 110. 
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3.4 The History of Quantum Statistics 
The birth of quantum statistics coinciOes with the 
birth of quantum theory as a whole, in Planck's 
famous paper of 1900 (125). In order to change the 
status of his raOiation law from a happy conjecture to 
a statement of some physical significance Planck was 
forced to abandon his electro-magnetic H-Theorem 
Approach and turn to the Combinatorial Approach 
developed by Boltzmann for gas thermodynamirs (126) 
(thus also changing the status of this approach from 
a relatively obscure response to a particular criticism 
to a major component of physics). However, the 
details of the statistics used by Planck were radicallyzLAJ- 
fundamentally different from Boltzmann's. 
The statistical step in Planck's derivation of 
his law lay in a consideration of how a given total 
energy could be distributed over N lineari oscillators, all 
vibrating with f requenry)) He divided this energy into 
a finite number, P, of energy elements which were then 
distributed over the resonators. The number of ways 
of doing this, i. e. the number of 'complexions', is 
given by 
(AJ+ P-1) ! (127) It is not C/o-[)! pi. 
immediately clear how Planck arrived at this expression 
although Rosenfeld has suggested that he discovered it 
by working backwards from his distribution law. (128) 
The rest of the derivation is straightford and has 
been extensively discussed and analysed elsewhere. 
However, it is worth noting Plack's comments at the end. 
He considered his deduction to be based on only two 
theorems: the well established relation between the 
radiation energy density and the average resonator 
energy and Boltzmann's relationship between the entropy 
of a system and the logarithm of the total number of 
125. V. Planck (1900) p. 202, reprinted in D. terHaar 
(1967) p-80 
126. M.. Klein (1970) p. 221; T. Kuhn (l978)p-7X[f, * 
A. Pais (1982) p. 368-372; also see Planck in ter 
Haar op cit p-81 anO p. 83 
127. Planck IbiO p. 237 
128. L. Rosenfeld (1936) p-149; R. Cranfield (1968) 
p. 69; Kuhn op cit p-100-101; for a ("iscussion of 
the source of this expression see Kuhn ibi(ý p. 
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possible complexions. Planck split the latter into 
two parts: 1 (1) The entropy of the system in a given 
state is proportional to the logarithm of the 
probability of that state anO (2) The probability of 
any state is proportional to the number of correspon0ing 
complexions, or, in other words, any definite complexion 
is equally as probable as any other complexion (129)' 
The first part is just a definition of the probability 
of the state as far as radiation is concerned. The 
second was regarded by Planck as the core of his whole 
theory and its proof must rest ultimately on empirical 
groun0s. He considered it to be a more elaborate 
and detailed expression of his hypothesis of natural 
raOiation, previously stated in the form that the energy 
of the radiation is randomly distributed over the various 
partial vibrations present in the radiation. 
Thus the statistical component of Planck's work follows 
Boltzmann's Combinatorial Approach in broaýl outline but 
differs from it in certain profoundly significant 
respects. First of all, whereas Boltzmann let the size 
if his energy elements decrease to zero, as we have 
seen, Planck did not but left them as finite and related 
to the frequency via E= 
k-x, >(l30)- Secondly, and more 
importantly from the point of view of this thesisj 
Planck's combinatorial expression above is very different 
from Boltzmann's. Planck considered, at least implictlY 
only the number of energy quanta assigned to each 
oscillator ancý not which quanta were possessed by which 
oscillators. Thus the numerator of his expression gives 
simply the total number of ways of arranging the 
quanta and oscillators, regarded as N+P-1 distinct 
elements. (We shall discuss the significance of the -1 
when we come to consider Ehrenfest's analysis of this 
result). 
129. Planck in ter Haar op cit p-87 
130. It is not clear whether Planck regarded his energy 
quanta as having real physical significance or as 
merely convenient mathematical artefacts. See 
Kuhn op cit and Dorling (1967). 
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The division by P! implies that perrutations of the 
quanta are not to be regarded as giving rise to new, 
countably (ýIif ferent arrangements. one interpretation 
of this is that the quanta should be regarded as not on- 
ly indistinguishable but also unlabeled and hence 
devoid of individuality (131). Thus whereas Boltz- 
mann considered the distribution of indistinguishable 
( in the weak sense of possessing all intrinsic 
properties in common), individual atoms over energy 
states or cells in phase space, Planck could be 
regarded as considering the distribution of indisting- 
uishable (in the same sense), non-individual quanta 
over resonators (132). Alternatively the quanta could 
be regarded as individuals but with certain arrange- 
ments now forbidden. 
The non-classical nature of Planck's expression 
and the questions surrounding its interpretation became 
a focus of early criticism, particularly from Ehrenfest 
who undertook to expose the conceptual foundations of 
the new quantum theory. 
Finally it should be noted that Planck's second 
sub-theorem aboveo regarding the probability of a state, 
is simply a restatement of the crucial assumption 
that equal apriori weights should be assigned to the 
various complexions. As we shall see it was again 
Ehrenfest who subject this assumption to critical 
examination and who first discussed the way in which 
the weighting assignments of classical statistical 
mechanics had to be revised in the light of the new 
physics. 
In 1901 Plack presented a more complete but condensed 
version of his (: Ierivation which would be difficult to 
follow if considered separately from, his earlier work. 
131. See for example, Pais op cit 0.370 or Kuhn op cit 
1.101 
132. Cranfield remarks in Planck's TethoO, energy 
elements were the distributed quantities rather 
than oscillators whose distribution over phase 
space would have been the analogue of Boltzmann's 
approach. ' Cranfield op cit p. 70. 
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(133). As a result many of his contemporaries 
foun(: 1 his work obscure and it was not until he 
published the 'Lectures on the Theory of Thermal 
Ra(-Iiation' in 1906 that comprehension of the nature 
an(: ' implications of his results became more wi(7ýespread- 
Howevero Lorentz briefly mentioned Planck's work in 
1902 and in 1903 remarked that the latter's r-riethod of 
introducing probability was not the only one that 
could be chosen (134). As Ehrenfest was attending 
Lorentz's lectures at the time and had read extensively 
on the problem of black body radiation, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that his later detailed analysis 
of the probabilistic assumptions underlying quantum 
theory, and his investigation of possible alternatives, 
were greatly influenceA by Lorentz's comment. (135) 
Ehrenfest's first thoughts on this subject were 
set down in his 1905 paper in which he expressed his 
puzzlement over the exact nature of the relationship 
between Planck's work and Boltzmann's Combinatorial 
Approach (136) - In particular he noted that Planck's 
choice of those states to be given equal apriori 
probabilities was different from Boltzmann's. This 
Oifference arises from the different choice of events 
to be counted, and whereas Boltzmann atta cYed equal 
apriori probabilities to each region of phase space 
Planck assigned them to each energy distribution (137). 
Ehrenfest was well aware that a definite hypothesis 
concerning such assignments was crucial to the 
Combinatorial Approach and six years later he presented 
a generalised weight function suitable for the new 
statistics. 
Rayleigh and Jeans were also puzzled by Planck's 
derivation (138) - In particular 
Jeans argued that 
13?. Kuhn op cit p. 102-103 
4? 6 and (1903) p. 666 (1901) 134. H. A. Lorentz p. 
1? 5. 
136. 













p-54; J. Jeans (1905) p. 
293 
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Planck's combinatorial expression violated the 
classical probability calculus because he has not 
specified the population from which such probabilities 
coulO be calculated. Such a population coul(ý not' be 
introduced with an apriori weighting assignment 
consistent with Planck's arguments. 
1905 also saw the publication of Einstein's famous 
paper in which he proposed the hypothesis of 
independent energy quanta in radiation. (139) The 
central argument of this paper is based, not on 
Pl. anck's, but on Wien' law which is strictly incorrect. 
However Einstein was able to obtain the correct quantum 
conclusion because he treated his quanta as individual 
maxwel 1 -Boltzmann particles instead of as bosons (140). 
It is precisely in the Wien limit that the latter behave 
like the former. Cranfield has demonstrated that 
Einstein's result can also be derived using the correct 
distribution law, Planck's, and the correct statistics, 
Bose-Einstein, as expected. 
Thus it was effectively shown that quanta which are 
statistically independent will behave in accordance with 
Wien's law. The fact that Planck's law is actually the 
correct one therefore suggested that the light quanta 
were not statistically independent. This point, anO the 
related question of the nature of the interdependence 
between quanta, was subsequently the subject of much 
discussion by Ehrenfest and others as we shall see. 
The following year Einstein pointed out that Planck's 
theory pre-supposed the existence of light quanta (141) 
ane in 1907 he noted that if this theory were correct, 
then energy values other than those given by 
kV are not 
accessible to the oscillators (142). His analysis of 
1-3 cl A- 1': 7 ý, xs tecýA C 19057) tet Ho-o-j- op L, &7(-- p-qI 
140. As Cranfield. has demonstrated. Cranfield op cit 
p. 125 
141. A. Einsteain (1906) p. 199 
142. A. Einstein (1907) p-150 
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energy fI uctuations in black boeýy radiation in 1909 
pro(: ', uced an expression for the mean square energy 
fluctuation which was the sum of two terrrs (143). 
The classical wave theory of light woulO give the 
second term, the wave term, only, an(' the first, the 
particle term, corresponded to I ... independently 
moving pointlike quanta with energyhv'. (144) This 
is the first intimation of 'wave-particle duality' 
in which light, and eventually matter as well, is 
conceived of as a fusion of wave and particle aspects.. 
There are two points to note regarding Einstein's 
statement above concerning light quanta. Firstlyo 
he obviously regarded them as being statistically 
independent. The non-classical statistical inter- 
dependence of quanta, which was to be subseque-ntly 
emphasized by Ehrenfesto for example, could then be 
explained by referring to their wave like aspect. 
Regarded as crests in a system of waveso quanta woule 
become properties of the whole system and there would 
be no reason to attribute individuality and statistical 
independence to them. The probability of a quantum 
existing in a particular state would then be 
dependent on the other quanta in the system. Thus 
the separation into particle-like and wave-like aspects 
allowed the former to be regarded as independent 
whilst the non-classical statistical interdependence 
was invested in the latter. As we have said this 
was the first example of the wave-particle duality 
which became a way of interpreting the lack of 
statistical independence between quantal entities. 
Thus Einstein justified the Bose-Einstein counting 
procedure by referring to de Broglie's suggestion that 
particles are analogous to crests in a syster of waves; 
a suggestion that was subsequently taken up by 
Schrodinger 
and elaborated into his so-called 'wave mechanics'. 
143. See Pais op cit p. 402-410 for a good discussion of 
this analysis. 
144. A. Einstein (1909) p. 185-817 
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Two alternative views of the statistical dependence 
inherent in quantum theory thus came to be developed. 
one regarded it as a manifestation of the wave-like 
nature of all quantal entities, light quanta and material 
particles. The apparent loss of individuality for 
quantal particles could then be explained in terms of 
their complementary wave-like aspects. The other 
regarded such particles simply as particles which 
behaved in strange, non-classical ways and. could be 
thought of either as 'non-individuals' in some sense, or 
as classical individuals restricted as to the states 
they could occupy. 
To a certain extent the difference between these 
positions corresponds to that between people like 
Schrodinger, who believed that an electron, for example, 
is, in some non-visualizable sense, also a wave, and 
others like Born who argued that the electron is really 
just a particle whose position and velocity are 
fundamentally random and which, therefore, exhibits 
non-classical behaviour. This is, of course, painting 
the picture with a very broad brush but nevertheless it 
is true to say that much of the argument over this 
statistical interdependence was concerned with the 
question of in what aspect of quantal entities should 
this non-classical behaviour reside. 
The second point to note concerning Einstein's state- 
ment is that he referred to the light quanta as 
point-like. it is clear that by 1909 he was thinking 
of quanta as particles (145). This view was reinforced 
by his work on spontaneous and induced radiative 
transitions in the course of which he derived the result 
k -0 (146). Thus that a light quantum carries momentum C 
emerged the concept of a photon as a particle carrying 
both energy and momentum. 
Planck's 1906 'Lectures ... 
(147) contained a re- 
arranged version of his 1900 derivation which gave the 
combinatorial expression after the law itself. it was 
145. See Pais op cit p-403 
146. A. Einstein (1916) p. 47 and A. Einstein (1917) p-121 
147. N. Planck (1906) Ch. 4. 
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emphasized that this law restricted the discussion to 
the equilibrium case, this distinguishing Planck's 
problem from Boltzmann's. However the latter counting 
procedure could also be applied although it would then 
be necessary to take the sum over all possible Boltzmann 
distributions compatible with the constraints on the 
total number of resonators and total energy, to obtain 
the number of complexions relevant to Planck's problem. 
Rather than actually go through this summation Planck 
produced his own combinatorial formula as its result. 
He also introduced an alternative approach involving 
a phase-space description of the equiprobable regions 
accessible to a resonator. These regions were elliptical 
rings of area h on the energy hypersurface, within 
whirh lay the resonators, and consideration of the 
distri ution of the reslatoVs over these areas týe4 
complexions corresponding to given state. 
This formed the basis for a quantised statistical 
treatment of the distribution of entitiest particles or 
resonators, over certain regions of phase space, which 
was much more akin to the classical combinatorial 
procedure. Quantal results were ensured, however, by 
the fixed size given to these regions as determined 
by h. (148) 
Shortly after the publication of Planck's book, 
Ehrenfest presented a general study of some aspects of 
radiation theory in the light of Planck's work (149). 
In particular he derived the distribution law without 
recourse to resonators and showed that the entropy 
function obtained was common to Boltzmann and Planck. 
Ehrenfest therefore concluded that the source of the 
difference in distribution laws must lie, not in the 
entropy equations but in the imposed constraints, 
i. e. 
in the quantization requirement. 
148. Thus Cranfield has shown that whereas the results 
of classical statistics are invariant with respect 
to a change in the volume of the cells 
in phase 
space, those of quantum statistics are not. 
149. P. Ehrenfest (1906) p. 528 
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It is clear from this work that Ehrenfest regarded 
Planck's energy quanta as nothing more than a formal 
(3evice. Einstein, * however, believed that the 
quantization procedure represented a new limitation 
on possible motions at the molecular level. His 
consequent application of this procedure to the 
problem of the specific heats of solids contributed 
greatly to the general acceptance of the quantum 
theory (150). 
in 1910 Debye gave a derivation of Planck's law, 
very similar to Ehrenfest's, in which the field vibration 
modes were quantized directly without using resonators. 
(151) Lorentz also published a derivation in the line 
of Planck's 1906 approach, in which the classical 
Boltzmann combinatorial formula was used and each 
(ýistribution was specified by a set of integers giving 
the number of resonators possessing so many energy 
elements. (152) 
Ehrenfest's observations of 1906 were developed in 
a further paper published in 1911, in which he analysed 
the restrictions imposed on the weight. function of a 
statistical theory of radiation by the properties 
of black body radiation. (153) He now realised that 
Planck's derivation could be brought into a logical form 
not by introducing additional constraints but by 
generalising the apriori probability or weight function 
assigned to the phase space. Thus he abandoned the 
classical uniform weighting and by considering the 
restriction imposed upon the generalised weight function 
by the known properties of black body radiation, showed 
that this function could depend only on the ratio 
and possessed non-zero values only for the points 
, -1/y = 0,1,2# .e* 
150. Kuhn op cit p. 206 
151. P. Debye (1910) p. 1427 
152. H. A. Lorentz (1910) p. 1234 
153. P. Ehrenfest (1911) p. 91 anO (1959) p. 185 
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He then examined the difference between Planck's 
quantized resonators and Einstein's light quanta. The 
tke prevailing opinion at the time was thatXmain difference 
lay in the separate existence of quanta in empty space. 
However, Ehrenfest also pointed out that the statistical 
independence of quanta was another source of contention, 
with Einstein affirming and Planck denying it. He 
emphasized that Planck had not assumed this in his 
derivation and that it led, in fact, to Wien's law 
which Einstein had used. This problem of interdependent 
statistical behaviour of Planck's quanta clearly 
troubled Ehrenfest and he returned to it three years 
later, as we shall see. It was also discussed by Joff6 
and Natanson ane was the subject of an interesting 
controversy between Krutkow and Wolfe in 1914. 
Natanson was also interested in the differences 
between Planck's and Einstein's conceptions of quanta. 
In his 1911 paper he probed the assumptions underlying 
Planck's consideration of the distribution of energy 
elements over 'receptacles', and identified three 
different 'modes of distribution', depending on whether 
the quanta or receptacles or both were regarded as 
individuals (154). 
Thus he used the term 'mode of distribution' for the 
correlation of energy elements with receptacles in which 
the distribution is characterised only by the number 
of receptacles containing a given number of quanta. 
In this case no account is taken of the possible 
individuality (li0entifiability') of receptacles or 
energy elements. However if the former are regarded as 
inOividuals then every 'mode of distribution' branches 
out into a number of'modes of collocation't which specify 
the number of energy elements in each individual 
receptacle. This, he argued, corresponded to Planck's 
microstate. If energy elements are also regarded as 
individuals then each Imodeof collocation' splits up 
154. L. Natanson (1911) p. 659. 
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into a number of 'modes of association', which associate 
individual energy elements with individual receptacles. 
This corresponds to Boltzmann's complexion. (155) 
As Natanson noteJ, the thermodynamic probability 
of a given mode of distribution depends on whether all 
modes of collocation or all modes of association are 
regarded as equally probable. Whereas Einstein took 
the latter view, Planck took the former and thus, 
according to Natanson, implicitly regarded his recep- 
tacles, the resonators, as individuals but not his energy 
elements, the quanta. The odd notation is an attempt 
to distinguish the meaning of the term 'complexion' 
as used L4 quantum and classical statistics. In the 
former a complexion specifies only how many elements 
are in each receptacle and this is called a mode of 
collocation. A permutation of two elements between 
receptacles does not lead to a new mode of collocation. 
In the latter, a complexion specifies which individual 
element is in which individual receptacle, and this 
is termed a mode of association. A permutation of 
elements between receptacles does lead to a different 
mode of association. 
Joffe also attempted to modify Einstein's idea of 
quanta so as to reconcile it with Planck's law (156), 
and three years later a controversy arose between 
Krutkow and Wolýe over just this question. 
Krutkow, following Ehrenfest, demonstrated that if 
classical statistics are used then the assumption of 
independent quanta leads to Wien's law. Planck's law 
can only be obtained, he argued, if this assumption 
is abandoned. Wolýe, however, argued that one must 
Oistinguish between two meanings of the word lindepen- 
dent'. If the quanta exist independently then, he claimed 
c, A A, vo-ot 
da M &- 0 e- 
155. A. KastlerX (I Iq 33)p. 620 This js an interesting 
although rather broad, account of these 
developments. 
156. A. Joffe (1911) p. 534. 
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Planck's law is obtained, but if, in addition, the 
quanta are regarded as spatially independent then 
Wien's law will result (157). Thus he concluded that 
Einstein hact implicitly assumed the quanta to exist 
independently and to be also spatially independent 
whereas Planck has assumed only the former, leading 
to the suggestion that some sort of spatial 
correlation had to exist between Planck's quanta. 
Further light was shed on these questions by Ehrenfest 
and Onnes' paper of 1914,. (158), which gave an intuitive 
way of understanding Planck's combinatorial formula. 
Ehrenfest had not been satisfied with the standard 
derivation given in the text books as they appealed to 
proof by induction and offered no insight into the 
peculiar structure of the result. Thus he set out to 
provide his own. 
The problem he considered was to find the number 
of ways in which P objects could be placed in N 
containers where only the number of objects in each 
container is of importance. Two distributions were called 
identical when corresponding containers, i. e. oscillators* 
in each distribution possessed the same number of 
objects, i. e. energy elements. A distribution was 
represented symbolically thus 
-F 
6 c- e c- oE c- 00 EIT 
where the TT are the fixed boundaries , 4ff represents 
the energy units, and the 0 separate these units in 
successive oscillators, numbered from left to right. (159) 
k 
157. M. Wolýe (1914) p. 133 and 363 
158. P. Ehrenfest and H. Kamerlingh Onnes (1914) p-870 
anO. (1959) p. 353; Y. Klein (1970) p. 255-257 and 
(1959) p. 47-48. 
159. This notation is confusing in that the symbolO has 
a dual significance of both the separation of quanta 
in successive oscillators and also that an oscilla- 
tor possess no quanta. A clearer way of writing 
it is il e--, 6-6-CICe- 1 16 11 where the 
dividers separate the energy symbols for (ýifferent 
oscillators. Klein (1970) p. 256 
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With general values of N and P the symbol will contain 
6P times and 0 N-1 times, and Ehrenfest asked how rrany 
eifferent symbols for the distribution could be formed 
from the given number of C_ and 0 His answer was 
CA) P derived as follows. 
P! CA) -1) 
There are N-1+P quantities and () which, if 
regarded as distinguishable, can be arranged in 
(N-1+P) ! ways between the ends 11 - However the 6 Is 
and 0 Is can be permuted among themselves P! and 
(N-1) ! times respectively and two distributions differing 
only by such permutations are identical. Therefore 
as there are P! (N-1) ! symbols corresponding to these 
identical distributions one must divide (N-1+P) ! by 
P! (N-1)! to obtain the number of distinct distribu- 
tions. The result is (A) -1 +- P) 
!, Planck's 
P. 1 CA) -1 )! 
combinatorial formula. 
This 6erivation allowed some important conclusions 
to be (ýrawn regarding the status of Planck's quanta 
ane their relationship with Einstein's. It confirmed 
Ehrenfest in his old opinion that, the energy elements 
and. hence also Planck's quanta, were merely a formal 
Oevice, imbued with no more physical significance than 
the divider elements. (160) The failure to realise 
this, he believed, had led to the mistaken interpret- 
ation that these quanta were mutually independent and 
identical to Einstein's. The difference between the 
two was demonstrated by comparing their different 
statistical behaviour. Ehrenf est noteeL that the number 
of ways of distributing a number p of Einstein's light 
quanta, regarded as independent, over N1 and then over 
N cells in space stand to each other in the ratio 2 Is 
A) IP: A); LP 
If PlanckXquanta were also 
regarded as mutually independent then in passing from 
N1 to N2 oscillators, the number of possible distributions 
woulO increase in the same ratio. This, Ehrenfest noted, 
iSf. I eaýl- I tve &Akz 0, S; PI a-, VL C L'S AWA L& 
I 
CX Iý Ve-S -. 





According to Ehrenfest the explanation was simple, 
Einstein's quanta could be regarded as-existing 
independently of each othere whereas Planck's could 
not and were no more than a formal device. 'The 
real object which is counted remains the number of all 
the different distributions of N resonators over the 
energy grades 0_.,, E,. ZC, >& with a given total P1. 
(162) 
Finally Ehrenfest gave an example of the quantal 
reduction in the number of possible arrangements which 
illustrated the classical nature of Einstein's quanta 
anO the non-classical behaviour of Planck's. 
Ehrenfest thus contended that if Planck's quanta 
were to be considered as statistically independent then 
the traditional classical counting procedure should 
be applied rather than Planck's own. (163) Since the 
number of distributions obtained by Planck differed 
from that obtained by treating the quanta as independent 
the entropy change in any appropriately specified process 
would also have to be different. It is ironic that 
although Ehrenfest's derivation is now almost univer- 
sally given as an intuitive underpinning of Planck's 
procedure, it's original purpose was to argue that 
this procedure cannot be correct if the quanta are to 
be independent. This was also the substance of his 
criticism of Einstein's 1924 paper as we shall see. 
It thus follows, in a reciprocal manner, that if 
Planck's procedure is correct than the quanta cannot be 
regarded as statistically independent and must exhibit 
some sort of non-classical correlation. Also, the fact 
that a permutation of Einstein's quanta gives a new 
distribution whereas a permutation of Planck's does not 
implies that the former can be regarded as individuals 
whereas the latter, nor the oscillators either for the 
161. Ibid p. 873; Also see Jammer (19? 3) p. 51-52 
162. Ibid p. 873 




same reason, cannot. Klein4remarked that the blurring 
of the concept of particle when it comes to light 
quanta was already implicit in Einstein's results for 
energy and momentum fluctuations in black body radiation. 
(164) These results furthered the identification between 
Einstein's and Planck's quanta because they effective- 
ly allowed Einstein to explain quantum phenomena in 
terms of the wave-like aspect associated with his, 
individuall quanta, whereas Planck effectively had to 
appeal to the non-classical correlations between his, 
non-individual, quanta. The same phenomena was explained 
by both kinds of quanta and thus they came to be seen 
as identical. 
By the time this 1914 paper had been published, 
Planck's 1906 method of treating whole regions of phase 
plane of area h as a single event, had. been generalised 
and by 1913 it had been established that there was a 
natural unit for phase extension :h for each degree of 
freedom. This led to the result that each cell in phase 
space could be given the volume h3, thus giving an 
absolute value for the entropy via the Sackur-Tetrode 
Equation. 
These results implied that the classical assignment 
of equal apriori weights to equal volumes of phase 
space had to be abandoned and only certain regions of 
this space given non-zero weight. Thus for Planck's 
oscillators the area assigned non-zero weights 
were those particular ellipses of constant energy whose 
enclosed areas were integral multiples of h. As we have 
said, it was Ehrenfest who was virtually alone in 
recognising that the basis of Boltzmann's proof of the 
Second Law had been lost in principle as soon as 
pilysics had followed Planck in abandoning the classical 
weighting assignment (165). Thus in 1914 he returned 
to the problem of obtaining a suitably generalised 
weight function for quantum statistics and presented a 
164. Ibid p. 257 
165. Ehrenfest's letter to Bohr, given in Klein op cit 
p. 283 
234 
general discussion which did not re,,, ly on the notion 
of an oscillator (166). He proved that the statistical 
weights had to be adiabatically invariant) (167), a 
result which was fundamental in extending the 
Combinatorial Approach to quantum statistics. 
From about 1910 onwards attention shifted increasing- 
ly towards the problems of atomic structure and other 
questions, but the publication of Bose's work in 1924, 
and the subsequent elaboration of its consequences by 
Einstein, rekindled many of the old arguments concern- 
ing the statistical behaviour of quantal particles. 
As is well known Bose asked Einstein to translate 
his paper and arrange for its publication. In the 
accompanying letter he emphasized the division of phase 
space into cells of volume h3 as a basic assumption 
of his work, thus clearly indicating its ancestry. Bose 
presented a derivation of Planck's law on the basis of 
Einstein's light quantum hypothesis using the traditional 
combinatorial formula. (168) 
He regarded the quanta as particles localizable in 
space and considered their distribution over the cells 
of phase space. It was in determining this distribution 
that Bose deviated from the traditional line and 
adopted Planck's 1900 approach in specifying the 
distribution by the numbers of cells containing each 
possible number of quanta rather than the numbers of 
quanta in each of the cells. Thus he employed a quantal, 
166. P. Ehrenfest (1914) p. 657, (1959) p. 347 
167. In terms of adiabatic invariance his 1911 paper 
can be understood as having established that 
Boltzmann's relationship between entropy and the 
number of ways of obtaining the most probable 
(ýistribution remained valid precisely because 
Planck had quantized the oscillators' adiabatic 
invariant, the ratio of its energy to frequency. 
IV, ore generally.. he (Ehrenfest) had shown that 
if, 
and only if, the weight function was dependent on 
this adiabatic invariant, then the statistical 
168. 
thermodynamics of the oscillator was secure. 
S. N. Bose (1924) p. 178 rep. in H. A. Boorse and 
L. Motz'(1966) p. 1013; also see Pais op cit 
p. 423 ff. 
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rather than a classical, characterisation of the 
events to be counted : cells occupied by the quanta. 
However, he used a form of the traditional Boltzmann 
combinatorial formula, giving the number of ways W 
of distributing As cells over Ns quanta as 
where PT. is the number of T1 
S Pal - P11 
!&aa 
cells containing i quanta. Indeed Bose followed the 
classical Combinatorial approach very closely, but 
replaced everywhere 'particles' by 'cells 1. (169) 
The view (170) that this work represents a 
significant departure from traditional Boltzmann 
statistics, as modified by Planck in 1906, is there- 
fore rather simplistic. Bose did depart from the 
traditional line as regards what was taken as a countable 
event, although the departure was hardly strikingly 
original, merely a return to Planck's characterisation 
of 1900, but the combinatorial formula useO and his 
whole procedure in general, were located entirely within 
the traditional approach. It is worth remarking that 
just as Boltzmann's procedure implied that his atoms 
were statiscally independent so Bose's juxtaposition 
of the classical combinatorial expression with the 
quantal characterisation of countable events, implied 
the statistical independence of the cells. The statist- 
ical independence of the quanta had vanished. As we 
shall see, this aspect of Bose and Einstein's work 
was seized upon by Ehrenfest as a perpetuation of Planck's 
earlier mistake. Finally we emphasise again that by 
counting the cells containing the quanta, rather than the 
quanta themselves, and by asking how many quanta are 
in a cell rather than which quanta are in a cell, 
Bose was implicitly regarding the quanta as devoid of 
individuality in the classical sense. (171) 
169. Thus As is not the number of stan6ing waves as 
in Rayleigh and Jeans work, nor the number of 
particles as in Boltzmann's but the number of cells 
170. L. Wessels (1977) p. 315 
171. See M. Klein (1964) P. 29 
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Shortly after he had arranged for the publication 
of Bose Is paper Einstein presented a paper of his own 
in which he applied Bose Is methods to a gas of naterial 
particles. This paper and the two which followed it 
laid down the foundations of the quantum theory of the 
ideatgas embodying what is now called Bose-Einstein 
Statistics. 
In his first paper Einstein used- exactly the same 
combinatorial formula and techniques as Bose, suitabl 
modified to take into account the finite mass of the 
gas atoms and their fixed number.. and employed a 
similar characterisation of countable events, with 
'quanta' replaced by 'gas atoms'. (172) 
Thus Einstein followed Bose in using the traditional 
form for the expression for the number of ways of 
rnistributing Zs cells over N particles W =1T : Rtý i Sý together with the quantal 'Planck 1900' F, 
characterisation of the events to be counted. (173) 
The thermodynamic properties of Einstein's gas were 
consequently more complicated than in the classical 
case but tended to support his theory. Thus it 
predicted a value for the entropy at high temperatures 
which was equal to that given by the Sackur-Tetrode 
equation, which contained the correct additive constant. 
(174) Einstein also showed that at temperatures 
approaching absolute zero the entropy approached zero 
for all values of the volume thus demonstrating that 
his quantum gas also satisfied Nernst's heat theorem. 
Further support was to come several years later with 
the experimental verification of the famous low 
temperature degenerate behaviour of the gas atoms, only 
hinted at in this first paper. 
This behaviour was the subject of one of Einstein's 
letters to Ehrenfest where he wrote 'From a certain 
temperature on, the molecules 'condense' without 
attractive forces, that is, they accumulate at zero 
172. A. Einstein (1924) p. 261 
173. See pais op cit p. 428 
174. P. Ehrenfest and U. Trkal (1920) p. 162, also 
Ehrenfest (1959) p. 414. 
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velocity'(175), and he wondered how true his theory 
was. It is interesting to note that Einstein appears 
to have ruled out the possibility of the non-classical 
condensation phenomena being accounted for in terms 
of peculiar interatomic forces. In a reply, sometime 
that same year, Ehrenfest criticised this work on 
the grounds that the gas molecules were not statistically 
independent (176) . This criticism is pivotal to an 
understanding of the difference between Einstein's 
1924 and 1925 papers as we shall shortly see. 
Einstein's second. paper was published in 1925 and 
dealt first of all with this condensation phenomena. 
(177). He then went on to consider Ehrenfest's objection 
and accepted that it was entirely correct. In the course 
of the discussion of this question Einstein gave a 
combinatorial formula and a characterisation of countable 
events which were completely different from those given 
in the previous year. Thus he wrote down 
W TT (A)'+ A- 1) s /V II( A'- I) 
where As is the number of cells and NS the number of 
particles. which clearly is of the same form as Planck's 
of 1900. (178) However he now took a distribution to 
be characterised, in a classical manner, by the number 
of particles in each available cell, and counted the 
number of ways in which the particles could be distribu- 
ted over the cells. This is a combination which is 
the reverse of the one used in 1924. 
it is surprising that Ehrenfest directed his criticism 
not at this work as would perhaps be expected, but at 
the 1924 paper which explicitly used a version of the 
traditional combinatorial formula. To what then was 
Ehrenfest objecting? Clearly it was to the 
rharacterisation of countable events used in 1924 which, 
as we have noted, implied that the cells were statistically 
independent but the particles were not. Thus Ehrenfest 
175. Pais op cit p. 432 
176. Klein op cit p. 31 
177. A, Einstein (1925) p. 3 
178. If certain trivial substitutions are made 
then 
Einstein's expression is completely identical with 
the product over all frequencies of Planck's. 
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criticised Planck for the statistical interdependence 
inherent in his combinatorial formula of 1900 ane 
criticised Einstein for the same thing, manifested now 
in the characterisation of what was to be counted. 
Einstein admitteO the truth of this objection anO 
attributed the statistical Oependence to some kind 
of mutual interaction between the particles. Thus, 
referring to his expression above, he wrote, 'The 
formula, therefore, expresses indirectly a certain 
hypothesis on a mutual influence of the molecules which 
for the time being is of a quite mysterious nature. 1(179). 
It was absolutely crucial that this statistical 
dependence was not eliminated by the 1925 reworking of 
the theory, despite Ehrenfest's objections, because 
as Einstein obviously realised, it lay at the very 
heart of the condensation phenomenon to which he 
attached so much importance. But if the particles were 
now regarded as distinguishable (180), in a classical 
sense, in what did this dependence lay? The answer is 
that it lay in the wave-like aspect which Einstein now 
attributed. to his gas atoms. 
The 1924 paper also represents a return by Einstein 
to the study of fluctuations about equilibrium but 
consieered now in the context of material gas atoms rather 
than of radiation (181). He succeeded in obtaining 
an expression for the mean square fluctuation of the 
number of particles which was analogous to the one for 
the mean square energy fluctuation of electromagnetic 
radiation and which was also the sum of two terms. 
However, it was now the first term which was familiar 
179. Einstein-op cit. 
180. Thus Brush's brief analysis is both over 
simplistic and incorrect. S. G. Brush 
(1983) p. 131 
181. Einstein op cit. See also Pais op cit p. 
437 
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and which applied to a distribution of distinguishable 
particles. The second term was associated with waves in 
the case of radiation and thus Einstein was led to 
I ... interpret it in a corresponding way for the gas, 
by associating with the gas a radiative phenomenon'. 
(182) 
It was at t is point that Einstein turned to deBroglie 's 
icleas and suggested that a de Broglie matter wave-field 
should be associated with the gas particles thus account- 
ing for their statistical dependence As we have noted 
this suggestion was subsequently developed by 
Schro(linger into his theory of wave mechanics and the 
wave-like nature of material particles became a way of 
unelerstanding their lack of statistical independence. 
It is interesting to note that Einstein also showed 
that for a gas of independent particles the entropy 
must violate either the requirement that it be extensive 
or Nernst's heat theorem. The entropy expression for 
the quantum gas satisfied both of these and Einstein 
regarded this as a good reason for preferring his 
procedure, even if it could not be shown to be superior 
on apriori grounds (183). 
Following the publication of a third paper (184) 
tidying up some of the details, Einstein's theory provoked 
a number of responses (185). Planck's theory of the 
ideal gas was presented as a conservative reply to 
Einstein and derived the entropy on the basis of the 
former's 1906 work, employing the N! Oivision in order 
to avoicý counting 'redundant' complexions -formed by 
the permutation of two atoms (186). This procedure was 
justified on the grounds that such a permutation produced 
no change in the state of the gas. Thus Planck was 
insisting here on the use of what Gibbs called the generic 
rather than the specific phase (187). Unlike 
Einstein 
Planck was deeply sceptical of any strange statistical 
182. Pais Ibid p. 438; V. V- Raman and p. Forman 
(1969) p. 291 
183. See also A. Einstein (1925) p. 18 
184. Ibid 
185. See W. Pauli (1927) p. 81 and IVI. 1;, lein (1964) p. 
31 
186. M. Planck (1925) p. 49; See P. Hanle 
(1977) p. 177 
for a good discussion of these responses. 
187. J. W. Gibbs (1902) Chol5. 
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interaction between the atoms and thus his theory Oid 
not predict any degenerate behaviour at low temperatures. 
The procedure of dividing the number of possible 
arrangements, obtained by implicitly regarding the 
atoms as in(Ilividuals and statistically independento by 
N! in order to obtain the 'correct' quantal count hact 
been the subject of a dispute between Planck and Ehrenfest. 
(188) Planck had vigourously defended the division, on 
the above grounds, while Ehrenfest had argued that it 
was ad hoc and simply not cogent. These arguments 
greatly influenceel Schrodinger who believed that one 
could only divide by N! when the gas was in the 
condensed state in which the atoms were virtually held 
fixed, so the permutation number N! becomes physically 
meaningful and the atoms become 'identifiable' (189). 
A year later Schrodinger reconsidered this problem 
in the light of Bose and Einstein's work and again 
attacked Planck's justification for the N! division on 
the grounds that the molecules were either individuals 
or not and the theory should be constructed accordingly 
without first assuming theywere and then 'correcting 
away' the resulting multiplicity (190). Thus he 
adopted a holistic view which attributed Miantum states 
not to individual gas atoms but to the body of the gas 
as a whole. However, Schrodinger could not find a way 
to carry out such a programme in a physically plausible 
way - 
This defect forced him to arend his approach and in 
1926 he applied Boltzmann's combinatorial procedure to 
a gas considered, significantly) as a collection of 
de Broglie matter waves. (191) This gave a theory broadly 
similar to Einsteinýs but which ruled out the possibility 
of the condensation effect predicted by the latter. 
188. P. Ehrenfest anO V. Trkal (1920), (1921) p-609; 
M. Planck (1921) p. 365 (1924) p. 673 
189. E. SchroOlinger (1924) p. 41-45 
190. E Schro0inger (1925) p. 434 
191. E. Schrodinger (1926) p. 95; also see Pais op cit 
P. 438-439 
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In 1928 the He I- He II phase transition was 
r"iscovered. (192) an(9 this was subsequently interpreted 
as an example of B-E condensation, but not until 1938 
however, (193) Thus it was not the experimental 
verification of a crucial prediction which decided 
between Einstein's gas theory and the rival approaches 
of Planck and Schrodinger but rather, as we shall now 
see, the accommodation of this theory within a self- 
consistent theoretical framework by Heisenberg and 
]Dirac (194). 
Before discussing this it is worth noting that the 
above account serves to illustrate Klein's remark that 
... the same impasse which blocked the understanding 
of the statistics of photons was at least the case of 
a Oetour in the statistics of atoms and molecules. In 
both cases the classical concept of the particle was 
at fault, since non-interacting classical particles 
are necessarily independent'. (195) 
Following the construction of quantum mechanics as 
we now know it, during the years 1925-1927 (196), three 
different authors independently applied the new theory 
to the statistical mechanics of indistinguishable 
particles. 
Thus Fermi attempted to formulate a theory of the ideal 
gas which was consistent with both the new Q. Y. anO the 
third law of thermodynamics (197). He assumed the 
192. See W. H. Keeson (1942) 
193. F. London (1938) p. 947; Brush op cit p. 172-203, 
gives an excellent discussion of the developments 
surrounding this phenomenon. 
194. Planck continued to propound his approach, u til 
1926 but appears to have realised that he"ýOxrayed 
away from the mainstream of quantum statistical 
mechanics. 
195. Y. Klein (1959) p-55 
196. T, '. Jammer (1973) 
197. E. Fermi (1926a) p. 145 and (1926b) p-902; F. Rasetti's 
introeuction to Fermi's collected papers has a gooO 
discussion of the genesis of this work. E. Fermi 
(1962) P. 178 
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vali0ity of Pauli's Exclusion Principle (198) for gas 
atoms an(q obtained an expression for the number of 
arrangements of Nsmolecules (9istributed over Qsstates, 
subject to the constraint that not more than one 
molecule could be in any one state: 
IT QS) ( AJS The Boltzmann relation and standard thermo6ynamics then 
gave the equation of state for such a gas, now known 
as the Fermi gas formula. From this Fermi Oerived the 
Sackur-Tetrode equation thus demonstrating that his 
gas would exhibit the correct behaviour at low temperat- 
ures - 
With the publication of this work there were then two 
very different theories of the ideal gas, each 
embodying a different form of statistics. Shortly 
afterwards Heisenberg explicated the connection between 
these two forms and the symmetry characteristics of 
states of systems of indistinguishable particles. 
In his first paper, published in June 1926, Heisenberg 
showed that two indistinguishable systems, i. e. particles, 
which were weakly coupled, always behaved like two 
oscillators for which there were two sets of non- 
combining states (199). Thus he demonstrated that the 
eigenfunctions of one system were symmetric in all 
the co-ordinates whereas those of the other were anti- 
symmetric. The fact that the two sets of states 
were not connected then followed from the symmetry of the 
Hamiltonian of the system under a particle permutation. 
An example of such systems, according to Heisenberg, were 
the two electrons in the helium atom and in July he 
investigated more fully the theory of such two electron 
atoms using the Schrodinger approach (200). The 
conclusion he reached was that only those states whose 
eigenfunction are anti-symmetric in their electron 
co-or0inates can arise in nature. 
rirac had read Fermi's paper but claims to have 
forgotten it (zol) cLAJ haO not seen Heisenberg's at all 
198. W. Pauli (1925) p. 765 
199. W. Heisenberg (1926) p. 411 
200. W. Heisenberg (1926b) p. 499 
201. Archive for the History of Quantum Physics. 
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although it is mentioned in a note added in proof. 
Thus his August 1926 paper (202) represents a completely 
ineependent effort which went further than those above 
in setting the two forms of statistics and the 
corresponding theories of the ideal gas within their 
correct theoretical context. 
He began with the fundamental requirement that the 
theory should not make statements about unobservable 
quantities and noted that it then followed that two 
states which differed only by the interchange of two 
particles and which were therefore physically 
indistinguishable, rust in fact be counted as only one 
state (203) . This in turn implied that out of the 
set of possible two-particle eigenfunctions there 
were only two which satisfied the conditions that the 
eigenfunction should correspond to both of the above 
states and should be suf f icient to give the matrix 
representing any symmetric function of the particles, 
these-two being the symmetrical and the anti-syrmetrical 
eigenfunctions. Dirac then noted that the theory as it 
then stood was incapable of deciding which of these two 
actually applied in nature (204), indicating that it 
had not yet been realised that each symmetry type had 
its own domain of applicability. 
He then showed how these results could be extended to 
any number of non-interacting particles, writing the 
anti -symme tri c eigenfunction in determinantal 
form, 
from which the Exclusion Principle followed quite natually. 
(205) Dirac concluded by remarking that 'The solution 
with symmetrical eigenfunctions ... allows any number 
of electrons to be in the same orbit so that this 
solution cannot be the correct one for the problem of 
electrons in an atom. 
' (206). Thus as the theory cannot 
202. PAD,, Pira(- (1926) p. 661 
203. Ibi(I p. 667 
204. IbiO p. 669 
205. Ibirl p. 669-670 
206. IbiO p. 670 
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tell which solution is correct extra-theoretical 
considerations harl to be appealed to. 
rirac then applied this theory to the ideal gas, noting 
that the two possible types of eigenfunction would 
give two (ýifferent solutions of the probleF. 
By multiplying together the single particle eigen- 
functions he obtained the eigenfunctions for the 
assembly as a whole, from which the symmetric and 
anti-symmetric ones could be selected. The former 
were identified with Bose-Einstein statistics, taken 
to be applicable to light quanta (207)0 and the latter 
with what are now known as Fermi-Dirac statistics, 
regarded as applying to electrons in atoms anC gas 
molecules. 
The equation of state of an ideal gas was then derived 
on the assumption that the solution with anti -symme trica 1 
eigenfunctions is the corect one, so that not more 
than one molecule can be associated with each de Broglie 
matter wave (208). The set of such waves associated 
with the molecules was then divided into a number of 
sub-sets such that the waves in each sub-set are 
associated with molecules of about the same energy. 
Assuming that equal apriori weights are assigned to 
all stationary states of the assembly, the probability 
of a distribution in which Ns molecules are associated 





Boltzmann's relation was then used to give the entropy 
anO the equation of state was obtained very straight- 
forwarOly. 
rirac's combinatorial formula, above, is simply a 
suitably amen0ed. version of the well-known expression 
207. This is a rather odd ieentification given that rirac 
presumably knew of Einstein's 1925 papers. 
He may 
perhaps have been influenced by the controversy 
surrounOing this work ane the arguments against 
it 
put forwar(ý by Planck and Schrodinger. 
208. Ibicq p. 672 
209. Ibi(: ' p. 673 
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M for the number of ways in which4objects can be selected 
from a set of n objects, written as A! 
m37 i anO often referred to as the number of combinations of 
n things taken4at a time (210). Thus it gives the 
number of ways in which N molecules can be selected from 
a set of A Tolecules assoriated with A waves, or the 
number of possible combinations of , ýk waves taken Na 
time. We can un(ýerstand Dirac's formula in the 
following way: if we have Aswaves anc-ý Nsmolecules 
then the number of ways of associating theserrolecules 
with the waves, such that no wave is associate(' with 
more than one molecule is given by 
(As - A)s)! However a permutation of the molecules does not lead 
to a new arrangement and so this result must be 
(: ýivided by the total number of arrangements formed by 
such permutations, N!, giving 
A s. ' We 
A)s t (As-A)s) !0 
repeat this procedure for each set of de Broglie waves 
and the probability of a particular distribution is 
then given by the product of the above over all sets 
i. e. IT As ! 
S Ns! (As -A)s) In other wor(9s Dirac's formula is simply a version 
of Planck's non-tra6itional 1900 formula, suit-ably 
amended to take account of the Exclusion Principle. It 
is clear that Dirac was concerned with the distribution 
of particles over de Broglie waves, or states, anO thus 
he implicitly aeopted a classical characterisation of 
particles distributed over states as the events to be 
counted. 
It is not clear whether Dirac regarded the particles 
as classical individuals, subject to restrictions on 
the set of states they can occupy, or as'non-individuals' 
in some sense. In the former case the division by N! 
in the combinatorial formula above can be interpreted 
in terms of giving the required reduction in the 
statistical weights, whereas on the latter view 
it 
is intro0ured to eliminate the unobservable and hence 
210. H. margenau ane Yurphy (1956) p. 432 
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meaningless permutations of the 'non-individual I 
particles. There is certainly nothing in this paper 
which inOicates that Pirac supported the latter view. 
The great explanatory power of rirac's work, 
particularly as regards electrons in metals, for example, 
led to its rapid acceptance by the physics community. 
out of the very many papers exploring the consequences 
of this theory we shall just note Heitler anO Loneon's 
analysis of the hydrogen molecule in which they explained 
the consequences of Fermi-Dirac statistics in terms 
of saturable, non-(IynarTiic forces - the so-called 
'exchange' forces of attraction and repulsion - existing 
between particles (211). As we have seen this is one 
way of accounting for the statistical dependence of 
quantal particles and Heitler and London's suggestion 
follows very naturally on from Einstein's and Ehrenfest's 
remarks. 
Following the realisation that there were now three 
kin(-Is of statistics, classical, Bose-Einstein and Fermi- 
Pirac, several papers were published exploring the 
relationship between them. Thus Fowler, in 1926, mar'le 
the first attempt to construct a general form of 
statistiral Techanics embracing all three types. (212) 
Ehrenfest and Uhlenbeck tackled the question as to 
whether B-E or F-D statistics are necessarily requireO 
by the formalism of Q. M. or whether there were areas 
in which classical statistics was still vali(I. (213) 
They concluded that it is the imposition of syrrmetry 
requirements on the set of all solutions of the 
Schrodinger equation for an assembly of particles, 
obtained by considering the permutations of all the 
particles among themselves, which produce the syr-metric 
and anti-symmetric combinations and hence give rise to 
B-E and F-D statistics respectively. 
If no constraints are imposed then Vaxwell-Boltzrann 
statistir-s are the most appropriate form to use. Thus 
211. W Heitler anc3 F. London (1927) p. 455 
212. R. H. Fowler (1926) p. 432 
21? P. Ehrenfest and G. E. Uhlenberk (1927) p. 24 
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they ("emonstrated that the Q-Y- formalisrr does not, 
by itself, necessarily imply one or other of the 
two forms of quantum statistics. It is the i7position 
of specific symmetry requirements (214) on the wave- 
functions which determines which form is obtainee. 
We have noted. that the non-rlassical statistical 
depen("ence of the particles manifested in quantuF 
statistics could be 'explained' by reference to the 
Oe Broglie inatter waves associated with each particle. 
Thus Uhlenbeck contended that Srhrodinger had shown 
in 1926 that Einstein's gas theory could be obtained 
by considering the gas either as an assembly of particles 
and applying B-E statistics or as a system of standing 
de-Broglie waves and applying classical M-B statistics. 
(215) He used the recently developed wave mechanics to 
extend this discussion into a detailed analysis of the 
various interpretations of the three forms of 
statistics and their different areas of applicability. 
The conc-lusion he reached was that the lack of 
independence of quantal particles was introduced in a 
natural way in the appropriate wave interpretation. 
Thus Ehrenfest co-rrented 'one must distinguish between 
identity and independence, between the particle and the 
wave picture'. (216) 
It is interesting to note that the development of 
quantum statistics took place entirely within the 
Combinatorial Approach and therefore was capable of 
treating equilibrium situations only. The neglect of 
Boltzmann's alternative H-Theorem Approach ended in 
1928 with Nordheim's attempt to construct a theory of 
quantum statistical mechanics based on this approach 
which would give, not only all the results derived 
previously, but also expressions applicable to phenomena 
214. These can be regarded as initial conditions as 
we have noted. 
215. G. E. Uhlenbeck (1927). This is not strictly correct, 
as we have seen, because Schro0inger's approach, 
using matter waves, did not give the condensation 
phenomena to which Einstein attached so much 
importance. 
216. Klein op cit p. 58 
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associated with non-equilibrium states. (217) 
Nordheim began by following the classical H-Theorer 
approach but noted that the time variation of the 
distribution function for an assembly of particles 
could be separated into two parts. One was a 
flux term due to the particles own motion and external 
forces, which following Darwin and Kennard's demonstration 
that a single quantal particle behaved classically under 
the influence of external forces, (218) remained 
unaltered by the quantum theory. The other term was a 
collision term due to interactions between the particles, 
which Nordheim rewrote to take account of the fact that 
in Q. M. the probability of a collision depends not 
only on the number of particles in the initial states., 
as in C. M. but on the number in the final states also. 
(219). 
Having done this he then substituted for the number 
of particles undergoing collisions in his version of 
Boltzmann's transport equation from which followed 
the well-known distribution functions for quantum statis- 
tics. To justify this derivation he established the 
quantal version of the H-Theorem, obtaining an expression 
for H and showing that it could only decrease and that 
its derivative would be zero in the equilibrium case 
(220) 
However,. Nordheim's conclusion that he had constructed 
a theory of quantum statistics based purely on kinetic 
arguments is not strictly correct as combinatorial 
initial conditions were introduced in the consideration 
of the flux term in order to obtain the correct quantal 
behaviour. Thus he wrote 'The prohibition of certain 
states of motion, characteristic for quantum statistics, 
emerges here not out of the law of motion but out of 
the choice of the initial state ... of a proper wave 
group. Thus, for instance, it is prohibited in the Fermi- 
217. L. W. Nordheim (1928) p. 689 
218. ]Darwin (1927) p. 258 and Kennard (1927) p. 326 
219. Nordheim op cit p. 691-693 
220. Ibid p. 695 
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Dirac statistics to choose an initial distribution, 
the density in the phase space Of which is greater than 331 one particle per h /m . (221) In other words the 
results of quantum statistics can only be obtained if 
certain states are regarded as inaccessible and a 
particular initial state selected. once this choice 
has been made the laws of Q. m. can only ensure that 
there are no transitions to the forbidden states. Thus, 
on Nordheim's own admission, the H-Theorem alone cannot 
give the appropriate statistics, some external, non- 
kinetic constraint, such as the symmetry restrictions 
imposed upon the wave-functions, must be imposed. 
A similar attempt was made by Ornstein and Kramer to 
derive F-D statistics from purportedly purely kinetic 
arguments (222). However, their derivation was based 
on the Exclusion Principle whicho again, can be regarded 
as a non-kinetic initial restriction on the set of 
accessible states. Further work was continued along 
th6se lines by Halpern and Doermann and others (223). 
It was an historical accident that the sufficiency 
condition for particle indistinguishability embodied 
in the Symmetrization Postulate namely that the eigen- 
function should be either symmetric or anti-symmetric, 
was first demonstrated within the context of B-E and 
F-D statistics. The realisation that this was not a 
necessary condition only came later with the conception 
of parastatistics. However, even in 1926 Dirac realised 
that the symmetric and anti symmetric functions were 
merely the two simplest out of the set of possible 
eigenfunctions for the assembly. Thus he later wrote 
'It appears that all particles occurring in nature are 
either fermions or bosons, and those only anti-symmetri- 
cal or symmetrical states for an assembly of similar 
particles are met with in practice. other more 
complicated kinds of symmetry are possible mathematically 
221. Ibid p. 691 
222. L. S. Ornstein and H. A. Kramers (1927) p. 481 
223. o. Halpern and F. W. Doermann (1939) p. 1077; for an 
excellent review of these developments and quantum 
statistical mechanics in general see D. ter Haar 
(1955) P. 312 
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but do not apply to any known particles 1. (224) 
The investigation into these alternative symmetry 
types was initiated by Gentile in 1940. (225) He used 
Bose's combinatorial methods to derive an expression 
for the average number of particles in a group of states 
which was dependent upon a parameter d giving the maximum 
number of particles which could occupy any given state. 
F-D and B-E statistics were special cases of these 
intermediate statistics, obtained when d=1 or W 
respectively. From this Gentile arrived at an expression 
for the entropy of a gas of particles obeying these 
statistics also dependent on d from which the F-D and 
B-E entropies could also be obtained as special cases. 
ter Haar (226) and. Sommerfeld (227) objected on 
Q. F,. grounds thato apart from the purely academic 
cases considered by Miiller (228)o the only application 
of Gentile's statistics was in the case of a system of 
bosons in which d equals the number of particles in 
the system N. Several authors had discussed the 
implications of Gentile's formula when d=N and ter 
Haar concluded that in this case there would be no 
difference between intermediate and B-E statistics. From 
an inspection of integrals in the complex plane Wergeland 
(229) and Schubert (230) had both concluded that it did 
not matter whether one took d=N or d=00 - 
However ter Haar's demonstration that Gentile's work 
conflicted with the postulates of Q-M- was based only 
on S. P. from which, as we have seen, one can only 
obtain conventional quantum statistics- 
In 1952 a work was published in Japan by Okayama which 
received little attention then or since, but which 
anticipated several later results (231). Thus he 
distinguished between particle and place permutations and 
224. P. A. M. Dirac (1930), (1958) p. 211 
225. G. Gentile (1940) p. 493 
226. D. ter Haar (1952p-) p., Icici aAl CICIS-4) Ck. -(z - 
227. A. Sommerfeld (1942) p. 1988 
228. H. Willer (1950) P. 199. 
229.. H. Wergeland (1944) p. 51 
230. G. Schubert (1946) p. 113 
231. T. Okayama (1952) p. 517 
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realised. that the fact that a wave function operated on 
by the former represents the same state as the original 
function only implies the conventional statistics if it 
is assumed that the two functions must be proportional 
and must li9, in a one dimensional irreducible subspace. 
If this assumption is dropped and the possibility is 
allowed that a single state could correspond to some 
larger collection of vectors spanning a multi-dimensional 
subspace, then other statistical types will result. 
Okayama noted that these would be related to various 
representations of the symmetric group and could thus 
be investigated using the apparatus of group theory (232). 
He also inquired into the relationship between para- 
statistics and the degeneracy which results when certain 
degrees of freedom assigned to conventional particles 
are neglected (233), as we noted on p 199 and 
demonstrated that paraparticles also obey the Cluster 
Principle, upon which the practical utility of 
conventional statistics is dependent. (234). Finally 
he tried to develop a second quantised version of para- 
statistics but this was not particularly successful, 
as his generalised. commutation relations allowed only 
the trivial solution that the Hilbert space consists 
only of null vectors. (235) 
Apparently unaware of Okayama's contribution Green 
made a similar, but much more successful attempt in 
1953, (236) following Wigner's demonstration that the 
Q. M. commutation relations were not uniquely determined 
by the equations of motion (237), which suggested that 
more general forms of such relations were possible. 
Thus Green's aim was to relax the formal structure of 
232. Ibid p. 517-521 
233. Ibid p. 523 We considered this relationiship at 
the 
end of Section 3.2.3. 
234. Ibid p. 523-524. 
235. Ibid p. 530; see the comments by S. Kamefuchi 
& 
Y. Takahashi (1962) p. 200-202 
236. H. S. Green (1953) p. 270 
237. E. P. Wigner (1950) p. 711 
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Q-F. T. in order to allow a possible resolution of some 
of the problems with which it was beset. His basic 
requirement was that any quantization scheme would be 
regarded as satisfactory if it ensured the equations 
of motion. This permitted the introduction not only of 
the usual fermion and boson commutation relations, but 
also of wholefamilies of alternative commutation schemes 
obeyed by paraparticles. (238). Nowadays these schemes 
are labelled by an integer p and thus if we quantize 
with the p1th scheme one talks of a parafermion or 
paraboson field of order p. The conventional relations 
are recovered when p=1. 
Green noted that although this generalized theory 
implied that a new state would result from the inter- 
change of two particles, the particles would always 
divide into groups in such a way that such permutations 
within a group would not lead to a new statel and that 
furthermore interactions can be devised which prevent 
the formation of new states by permutations between 
the groups. These, suspiciously ad hoc, moves allowed 
him to say that the 'Principle of Indistinguishability 
of Identical Particles' is retained in parafield theory. 
The physical properties of Green's paraparticles were 
first studied by McCcu6u, )_ in 1955. (239) He argued that 
analysis of the spectra of certain bound states could 
give a means of conclusively identifying paraparticles 
whereas scattering experiments could not. The problem 
of distinguishing paraparticles in nature was later 
taken up by Messiah and Greenberg. McCarthy also 
concluded that the thermodynamic properties of a para- 
fermion gas were identical to those of Gentile's paragas 
and those for a paraboson gas corresponded to those of 
a number of superimposed Bose gases. (240) 
During the next few years it was shown that Green's 
parafield theory was consistente both internally and 
with the fundamental principles of physics (relativistic 
238. Green op cit p. 273 
239. I. E. mcCarthy (1955) p. 131 
240. Ibid p. 139 
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and non-relativistic) , (241) and that its formalism 
could be extended to allow for interactions between 
the fields (242) - The only problem, recognised by 
Volkov, for example, as a serious one, was the lack of 
evidence for the existence of paraparticles in 
nature (243). 
This problem was addressed by Greenberg and Messiah 
in the course of their construction of a consistent 
first quantized paraparticle theory (244). By 
rigo,,., rously examining the role of S. P. within Q. M. they 
concluded that it was neither necessary for a consistent 
quantal treatment of indistinguishable particles nor 
strongly supported by experiment. The first point 
led them to replace S. P. by a form of the I. P. which 
then permitted the existence of, previously forbidden, 
mixed symmetry paraparticle states through the reduction 
of the Q. M. state vector space into irreducible subspaces 
of dimension greater than one. The set of vectors 
spanning such a muti-dimensional subspace was termed a 
Igeneralised ray' and Greenberg and Messiah demonstrated 
that the associated indeterminacy causes no difficulty 
in the interpretation of the theory because measurable 
results on a state associated with such a ray do not 
depend on which state vector in the multi-dimensional 
subspace is chosen to represent the state. (245) 
They then showed that it follows from I. P. and Schur's 
lemma that there exists a superselection rule between 
vectors in inequivalent representations. (246) However, 
their proposal that any paraparticle would have N- 
241. Kibble and Polkinghorne (1957) p. 252; D. V. Volkov 
(1959) p. 1107; S. Kamefuchi and Y. Takahashi op cit; 
G. F. Dell'Antonio, O. W. Greenberg and E. C. G. 
Sudarshan (1964) p. 403 
242. D-V. Volkov (1960) p. 375; S. Kamefuchi and J. 
Strathdee (1963) p. 166 
243. Volkov op cit. 
244. A. M. L. Messiah and O. W. Greenberg (1964) p. 
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245. Ibid p. 251 
246. Ibid p. 252. We have discussed this Zj 5-ecu'oeL3.2-, 
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particle states corresponding to just one representation 
of the symmetric group was later shown to be incompati- 
ble with the Cluster Principle, discussed in Section 
3.2.2. 
It was also made clear that those arguments which 
purport to show that state vectors must be either 
symmetrical or anti-symmetrical can only be carried 
through if an extra assumption is introduced to the 
effect that states which cannot be distinguished by any 
observation are represented by the same vector to within 
a phase factor (247). Thus Galindo and Yndurain's 
conclusion that paraparticles cannot be regarded as 
indistinguishable in the usual sense, is incorrect 
because their argument assumes the existence of a 
complete set of commuting observables, which is 
equivalent to the assumption that the state vectors 
transform under a one dimensional representation of the 
permutation group (248). Perhaps the greatest and most 
fundamental achievement of Greenberg and Messiah's work 
was to demonstrate that assumptions such as this are 
not a necessary part of the Q. M. formalism and can be 
Ca-A 
replaced by the less restrictive rule that statesAbe 
represented by any multi-dimensional irreducible sub- 
space invariant under the permutation group. 
In the second half of their paper they gave a very 
detailed discussion of the direct experimental tests 
of SP and concluded that in many cases such experiments 
actually tested I. P. instead (249). This prompted 
them to lay down a set of criteria for valid tests of 
S. P. and some possible types of such tests were given. 
Finally, they surveyed the experimental evidence for 
S. P. for various kinds of particles and concluded that 
although the statistical character of many types of 
particles was accepted and well established, there 
were some for which it was not. 
247. Ibid. p. 253 
248. A. Galindo and F. J. Yndurain (1963) p. 1040 
249. Messiah and Greenberg op cit p. 259-267 
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Although Messiah and Greenberg thus demonstrated that 
the status of many known particles as regards their 
symmetry type was unclear, the question whether 
paraparticles themselves existed remained open. A 
possible answer was, however, given later that same 
year by Greenberg when he suggested that the 'statistics 
problem' in quark theory could be resolved if quarks 
were regarded as para-fermions of order 3. (250) 
It had been suggested, on various grounds, that 
quarks should be assigned spin 1/2 (251) and therefore, 
according to the spin-statistics theorem, they should 
possess totally anti-symmetric wave functions. This 
worked well in the cases of mesons but failed in that 
of baryons where the symmetric quark model, which 
demanded that the total wavefunction be symmetric, had 
proven successful in classifying the baryon spectrum. 
(252) 
Greenberg's way out of this dilemma was to propose 
that quarks be regarded as parafermions of order P=3. 
This allowed them to possess separate wave functions which 
were symmetric under permutation of any two quarkst 
as required by the symmetric quark model, and also 
overall, composite wave functions which were anti- 
symmetric under permutations with other composite 
states, as demanded by the spin statistics theorem, 
The price paid for this resolution was the intro- 
duction of three labels assigned to each quark (253). 
These labels were subsequently interpreted, in the 
three triplet quark model (254), as representing a new 
250. O. W. Greenberg (1964) p. 600 
251. F. Gursey and L. A. Radicati (1964) p. 173; A 
Pais (1964) p. 173; Gurseyo Pais and Radicati 
(1964) p. 299 
252. F. E. Close (1979) Ch. 5- 
253. Greenberg op cit p. 602 
254. MI. Y. Han and Y. Nambu (1965) p. 1006 
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three-fold degree (255) of freedom, later called 
colour. The colours possessed by a quark provided the 
extra degree of freedom which could be used to anti- 
symmetrise the otherwise symmetric wave-function. Thus 
there were two alternative models (256) which could 
solve the statistics problem : one regarded quarks as 
paraparticles, the other took them to be 'ordinary' 
particles possessing an extra degree of freedom. 
Insofar as all three triplet models have the same 
consequences with regard to hadron (baryon and meson) 
spectroscopy the above two models are equivalent 
experimentally (257). As regards the relationship 
between their formalisms we shall note the following. 
There exists a certain transformation (258) which 
effectively transforms paraquark fields into degenerate 
Bose or Fermi Fields. Thus it would appear that the 
paraquark and colour models are formally equivalent. 
However, the Hilbert space of the transformed para- 
fields is larger than that of the untransformed fields. 
It can then be shown that the Hilbert space generated 
e by the dege rate Bose and Fermi fields acting on the 
vacuum contains all physically different states for 
sets of local observables invariant under the groups 
So (p), O(p), and U(p). However, this is only true 
for para-fields for the last group, U(p). (259). 
Furthermore, all the irreducible representations of each 
e 
group are produced with the degenrate Bose and Fermi 4 
fields and so the physical states are represented 
255. It is only with three different values of colour, 
corresponding to a paraf ield of order p=3, that Fermi 
statistics are allowed for quarks, and unique baryon 
states are produced. O. W. Greenberg and C. A. Nelson 
(1967) p. 79-80. Recall Ohnuki and Kamefuchils point 
discussed on p. 190 
256. Various other kinds of models were also proposed. 
See Greenberg and Nelson op cit, for a taxonomy 
of the different types. 
257. Han and Nambu op cit p. 1010; O. W. Greenberg and M. 
Resnikoff (1968) p. 1844. Greenberg and Nelson op 
cit p. 84-88. 
258. The 'Klein' transformation. Ibid p. 85ff for details 
259. Greenberg and Nelson op cit p. 85-87. 
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redundantly. In the para-field case each different 
state is represented 'non-redundantly' by one vector 
in the Hilbert space generated by the para-field 
acting on the vacuum (260) - Thus it can be concluded 
that the para-quark and colour models have the same 
states only in certain cases, which depend on the 
choice of observables in the former, and so are 
'formally equivalent' only to this extent. 
If the required choice of observables is made however 
the two models can be regarded as equivalent, both 
formally and in terms of their observable implications. 
The question then arises as to why the colour model was 
subsequently almost unanimously chosen to be the 
fundamental interpretation of quark theory? (As is well 
known, a Yang-Mills gauge theory of Han-Nambu colour 
became the dominant theory of the strong interactions 
in the early 1970's and formed the core of the new 
theory of quantum chromodynamics). 
A possible answer is that, first of all, the formalism 
of the colour model was more familiar to elementary 
particle physicists and was easier to use, and secondly 
colour could be easily gauged whereas the parafield 
model could not (261). Thus although the two descriptions 
were equivalent formally, under the circumstances noted 
above, they were not equivalent heuristically, the 
colour theory being 'more fruitful' (262) in the sense 
of possessing a greater capacity for generating new 
and successful lines of development. 
There is one further point we wish to make concerning 
this historical episode. As we shall discuss in the 
next section the quantum field theoretic description 
of an N-particle system regards the 'particles' as 
merely excitations of the field. it is in this sense 
260. Recall our discussion on p. 
261. O. W. Greenbergo private correspondence 12/6/81. 
As regards the second point note the qualifying 
remarks in Greenberg and Nelson op cit p. 88 
262. M. Redhead (1975) p. 77 
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that one can say that the interpretation of the first 
quantised theory in which the particles are regarded 
as 'non-individuals I finds its most coherent expression 
in Q. F. T. However, the above equivalence between the 
parafield and colour descriptions suggests that the 
particle individuality 'lost' in the field theory can 
be regained, in a sense, by transforming to an 
alternative model in which the particles are regarded 
as distinguishable through the introduction of a 
new quantum number. Thus quarks become distinguishable 
through the attribution of different colours just as 
electrons with different spins can be regarded as 
, distinguishable. 
Furthermoreo it was subsequently shown, as we shall see, 
that parafield theory was (completely) formally 
equivalent to the first quantised theory of paraparticles, 
at least for particles of finite order. Thus following 
the 'chain' of equivalence we can argue that particles 
regarded as indistinguishable in one first quantised 
description may be considered to be distinguishable in 
another. 
If colour is regarded as an extrinsic property of 
the particles then one could interpret quarks with 
different colour as merely different states of the same 
particle, possessing different values of colour. On 
the other hand if colour is regarded as an intrinsic 
property then quarks with different colour are different 
kinds of quarks. Thus the introduction of colour 
may be regarded as corresponding to a further classifica- 
tion of particles into different natural kinds. 
An analogous situation exists in the case of neutrons 
and protons which may be regarded either as different 
kinds of particles or as different states of the same 
kind of particle, which may possess different values of 
isospin. (263) Thus the distinguishability, as far as 
the intrinsic properties are concerned, of the particles 
in the first case is 'taken up' by the states, in the 
263. A. Messiah (1962) Ch-14; See also Hamermesh for a 
group theoretical discussion of isospin. 
Hamermesh 
op cit. p. 433-435 
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seconde through the isospino regarded as an extra 
degree of freedom. 
These examples illustrate the general point that as 
an intrinsic property can always be reinterpreted as 
an extrinsic one, and vice versa, two different kinds 
of particles can be subsumed as different manifestations 
of the same kind of particle, and conversely, a set of 
one kind of particle can be further classified into 
different natural kinds. 
The theoretical consecruences of narafield fhpnrv Ana 
its relation to first quantised paraparticle theory, 
continued to be explored during the mid-160's. (264) 
In particular it is. -worth noting Greenberg and Messiah's 
conclusion, based on further theoretical work together 
with the experimental evidence then available* that no 
particle known at that time could be a paraparticle (265) 
Furthermore it was not possible for a paraparticle 
to decay into ordinary particles or vice versa. 
We have already dealt with Steinmann's claim that 
paraparticle theory is not consistent with the Cluster 
Principle (266) and a similar refutation of this 
conclusion can be found in Land-shoff and Stapp's general 
discussion of the problems involved in establishing a 
correspondence between first and second quantised 
paraparticle theory (267). In particular, as Greenberg 
had already pointed out (268), the particle permutations 
are not represented in the Hilbert space of Q. F. T. and 
so the I. P. is, in general, ill defined in the second 
quantised approach. Landshoff and Stapp suggested this 
problem could be overcome if a distinction were made 
between particle and place permutations. The latter were 
regarded as observables (269) and as well defined in 
264. O. W. Greenberg and A. M. L. Messiah (1965) p. 500, 
(1965) p. 1155 and O. W. Greenberg (1966) p. 
29 
265. Greenberg and Messiah op cit P- 1165-1166. 
266.0. Steinmann (1966) p. 755 
267. P. V. Landshoff and H. P. Stapp (1967) p. 72 
268. Greenberg op cit p. 35 
269. But note our comments on p-7-Oý 
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parafield. theory. Indeed, they argued, the I. P. is 
equivalent to the requirement that all observables 
that distinguish among states differing only in the 
order of the variables, are functions of the 'T's. 
(See our discussion týA -3.2,. i)- In this form the 
I. P. is equally applicable in both the first and 
second quantised approaches and can thus be used to 
establish the correspondence between the two. As we 
shall see this suggestion was subsequently taken up 
and elaborated by Stolt and Taylor. 
In 1969 Hartle and Taylor rewrote the formalism of 
first quantised paraparticle theory in a very lucid and 
cogent manner. (270) It is this form of the theory 
which we have used as the basis for the outline of the 
first quantised theory of indistinguishable particles 
given in Section 3.2. As we have already discussed it's 
most significant characteristics we shall not consider 
them again here. However it is worth repeating that it 
was shown how Greenberg and Messiah's generalised ray 
could be eliminated and the usual connection between 
states and rays in Q. M. restoredo by moving to a sub- 
space of lower dimension and using the one dimensional 
ray belonging to such a subspace to label the mixed 
symmetry states (271). Hartle and Taylor also showed 
that the theory was consistent with the Cluster 
Principle and argued that it then followed that 
for a given kind of paraparticle there is a whole 
family of allowed symmetry typeso with the property 
that whenever the family contains an (N+1)- particle 
symmetry type D 
OVI-I)VA it contains all N-j N-1p..... 2- 
particle symmetries whose Young diagrams can be 
obtained f rom that of D 
(A)+I)/A by removal of 
successive blocks. 
i (272). 
270. J. B. Hartle and J. R. Taylor (1969) p. 2043 
271. Ibid p. 2046 
272. Ibid p. 2050 
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Finally as regards the occurrence in nature of such 
particles they conclude ... although there is no 
theoretical reason to exclude para-particlesl their 
properties are sufficiently disagreeable for one to 
hope sincerely that there will continue to be no evidence 
in their favour'. (273) 
Further work by Stolt and Taylor demonstrated that 
paraparticles could be classified into those of finite 
and those of infinite order (274). A particle 
is said to have finite column (row) order p if it has 
states associated with some Young diagram of p columns 
(rows) , but no states associated with any diagram of 
more than p columns (rows) . If a particle has neither 
finite row nor column order then it must have states 
with diagrams of arbitrarily many rows and columns - 
Such a particle is said to be of infinite order. Finite 
order paraparticles can be further divided into parabosons 
and parafermions of order p, a division which closely 
resembles that of parafield theory. (275). However, 
another result needed to be established before an 
identification could be made between the first and 
second quantise approaches. 
Kamefuchi and Ohnuki had been pursuing their own 
programme since 1967 prior to which Ohnuki has published 
a study of the statistical properties of two-body bound 
states of paraparticles (276). Their 1967 work continued 
in this vein, (277) but in 1969 they embarked upon a 
general group theoretical investigation of the wave 
functions of indistinguishable particles (278). Their 
273. Ibid p. 2051 
274. R. H. Stolt and J. R. Taylor (1970) p. 2226 
275. Ibid p. 2228. A similar classification can be estab- 
lished for infinite order paraparticles except those 
with states corresponding to all Young diagrams. 
Hartle Stolt and Taylor (1970) p. 1759 
276. Y. Ohnuki (1966) p. 285 
277. S. Kamefuchi and Y. Ohnuki (1968) p. 1279 
278. S. Kamefuchi and Y. Ohnuki (1969) p. 337 
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main conclusion was that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for particles to obey parastatistics is that 
there exists one and only one irreducible invariant 
sub-space which uniquely corresponds to each Young 
diagram whose first row or column is shorter than or 
equal to p. (279) In other words the N-particle wave 
functions associated with a para-Fermi (Bose) field of 
order p support a representation of the permutation 
group containing every irreducible representation 
with p or fewer columns (rows) . This was exactly the 
result which Stolt and Taylor needed. 
Following this work Kamefuchi and Ohnuki went on to 
consider the necessary and sufficient condition for 
particles to be indistinguishable Arguing that the 
premises used to establish I. P. were too restrictive 
they adopted the following field theoretic condition 
those particles are regarded as indistinguishable which 
result from the second quantisation of a given field, 
since they share the same intrinsic properties (280). 
(C-f ov-rdistinction in the Introduction to Ch-1). The 
Q. M. of such particles then follows from the corresponding 
field theory. They then obtained a general theory of 
indistinguishable particles by simply translating the 
field theoretic results of many particle systems into 
the Q. M. language. This carried with it the surprising 
discovery that this formalism could be generalised 
even further to give a theory of particles not obeying 
either ordinary or para-s tatis tics - (281) These results 
are collected together and discusssed in more detail in 
their recent book. (282). 
The complete equivalence between parafield theory and 
first quantised paraparticle theory was finally 
established by Stolt and Taylor in 1970 
(283), although 
279. Ibid p. 345-346 
280. S. Kamefuchi and Y. Ohnuki (1970) p. 543 
281. ibid p. 569 ff; A similar generalisation was consid- 
ered by Carpenter the same year, following 
Landshoff 
and Stapp's work. See K. M. Carpenter 
(1970) 
282. Y. Ohnuki and S. Kamefuchi (1971) p. 19 and 
(1982) 
283. R. H. Stolt and J. R. Taylor (1970. p. l. 
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f or paraparticles of f inite order only (284) . Such 
an equivalence required two things : first, a 1-1 corres- 
pondence between the states of the two theories must be 
established by constructing a 1-1 isomorphism between 
the rays of the corresponding Hilbert spaces. Clearly 
this is not possible with Messiah and Greenberg's 
generalised rays so Stolt and Taylor used the alternative 
formalism of Hartle and Taylor in which the conventional 
correspondence between states and rays is preserved. 
Secondly, a correspondence must be established between 
the permutation operators in the two theories. This 
cannot be done with the particle permutation operators 
since these are undefined in the second quantised 
formalism. However, place permutation operators can 
be defined in both theories and as Landshoff and Stapp 
demonstrated, these do correspond to one another. 
Thus Stolt and. Taylor began their proof by showing 
that the physical significance of the PI 's in the second 
quantised theory is the same as in the first quantised. 
Ohnuki and Kamefuchils result, above, allowed them to 
demonstrate that the vectors in each theory transform 
under the Tils, and their second quantised analogues, 
in exactly the same way. (285). It was then shown that 
the Fock and Hilbert spaces of the second and first 
quantised formalisms respectively decompose into a sum 
of subspaces in exactly the same way also, and that 
the sums in these decompositions run over the same set 
of irreducible subspaces. Thus if the basis vectors in 
the two theories are identified with one another then 
this defines an isomorphism between the two state spaces. 
(286). Furthermore it is clear from the definitions 
of the ý; Is and their analogues, that they possess the 
same matrix elements between corresponding vectors and 
hence are corresponding operators. Thus Stolt and Taylor 
284. Paraparticles of infinite order have no second 
quantised analogues although stolt and Taylor 
conjectured that the Q. F. T. formalism could 
be 
generalised to include them. 
285. Ibid p. 13-14 
286. Ibid. p. 15 
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concluded 'Our construction of the desired isomorphism 
is complete; Every finite order first-quantised 
paraparticle has a second quantised analogue; and vice 
versa'. (287). 
Thus the Q. M. of indistinguishable particles of any 
statistical type (288) can be given a formulation 
in terms of field excitations, in which the particles 
are not labelled from the outset and the creation 
operators in the field theory contain the effects of 
particle non-individuality. We shall briefly return 
to parastatistics and Q. F. T. in the next section. 
Apart from the odd piece of work here and there* such 
as Green's suggestion that Aeutrinos could be para- 
fermions of order 2 (289) and Govorkov's study of the 
connection between parastatistics and simple Lie 
algebras (290)t there has been little further discussion 
of paraparticle theory. Presumably, one factor which 
could account for the sudden loss of interestt apart 
from the simple absence of anything new to add to the 
theory* was the realisation that the theory was, in a 
senseo unnecessary becauset as the development of quantum 
chromodynamics indicated* one could always devise an 
equivalent formalism, which was simpler and more 
accessible, by assigning extra degrees of freedom to 
the particles and using ordinary statistics. 
This concludes our history of quantum statistics. 
We particularly wish to emphasise the following points. 
First, questions of individuality# 'identity', statis- 
tical independence etc-P played an important and explicit 
role in shaping the development of 'ordinary' statistics. 
Secondly, the philosophical alternatives which we 
discussed in Section 3.3 find their analogues* or rather 
origins, in the development of the formalism of the 
theory and its interpretation. Thus* the use of a 
classical characterisation of the events to be counted 
287. Ibid p- 15 
288. Assuming, of course, that stolt and Taylor's 
conjecture (f n Z94- ) is correct and a similar 
equivalence can -be established for paraparticles 
of inf inite order - 
289. H. S. Green (1972) p. 1400 
290. A. B. Govorkov (1980) p. 1673 
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of, for example, particles in cells, implies that the 
former were being implicitly regarded as classical 
individuals. However, a non-traditional combinatorial 
formula was used, concomitant with this characterisation, 
which could be interpreted in terms of a restriction 
being imposed on the set of possible states accessible 
to the particles. Alternatively, a traditional 
formula could be employed but with a characterisation of 
countable events in which one counted cells continuing 
particles, thus implicitly regarding the latter as 
'non-individuals' and the cells, or states, as 
individuated. Another approach was to maintain that the 
particles were, in fact, classical individuals, but 
subject to peculiar interactions. Finally, the non- 
classical statistical behaviour of the 'particles' was 
also attributed to their 'wave-like' natures and thus 
they could be regarded as 'non-individuals' precisely 
in this sense, that they were 'also' waves. 
All four positions can be drawn from the history 
of the development of quantum statistics and thus, as 
in the classical case our philosophical conclusions 
are supported by historical considerations. Indeed, the 
development of quantum statistics can be characterised 
to a large extent, in terms of shifts from one position 
to another. 
Thirdly, the development of parastatistics demonstrates 
that the Q. M. formalism is not as rigid as is often 
thought and can be reformulated to admit entities, such 
as paraparticles and parafields, which were previously 
excluded. Thus formal restrictions as regards ontology 
should not be regarded as absolute. Philosophical 
positions also are not uniquely determined by consider- 
ations of the formalism of the theory. This point, 
already made in Section 3.3 abovet is reiterated by the 
equivalence between the paraquark and colour theories 
which demonstrated that the individuality lost by 
introducing a field theoretic description can be 'taken 
up' by the introduction of a new parameter. 
Finally# we note that although the first and second 
quantised approaches are formally equivalent, they 
differ heuristically, and, more importantly from the 
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point of view of this thesis, there may be strong 
arguments against the philosophical implications of one 
which undermine it in favour of the other. 
We shall now further discuss Q-F-T. albeit rather 
briefly. 
3.5. Individualily. and Quantum Field Theory 
As is well known we can arrive at a quantised field 
description of an N-particle system via two routes 
1). The N-particle Schrodinger equation is taken and 
subjected to the Foch space formulation i. e. to the 
formalisation of second quantisation. 
2). The 1-particle Schrodinger equation is taken, 
regarded as describing a mechanical field (i. e. resolved 
into normal modes) and the techniques of field quantisa- 
tion applied (291) 
Formally speaking these are completely equivalent, but 
the quantised field which results can be given two 
meanings according to the route taken. On the first 
one begins with particles which have T. I. attributed 
to them, both particles and states are labelled and thus 
both the Pi Is and the Pi is play an important role. 
On the second route modes of a field are considered 
and thus one begins with non-individualso only the 
states are labelled and thus only the PI Is have a role 
to play. 
Now when a many particle system is regarded as a 
quantised field one no longer talks of which particles 
are in which states but only one how many particles are 
occupying a particular state, as given by the occupation 
numbers. Thus the system is represented in occupation 
number space in which-only the states are specified and 
the number of particles or rather field excitations# 
occupying the states. 
The role of the Pi Is in Q. F. T. can then be understood 
as follows. We begin with the vacuum state which contains 
291. M. Redhead (1983), se-cttýoi. -I '3. 
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no particles and which we represent by the ket I O> 
The situation with one particle in the k'th state is 
represented by (Xk I O> , where 0(o, is a creation 
operator, and one particle in the k1th state, one in 
the kj'th state is given by tXk, O(K' I O> and so on. 
Using our ball and box analogy what we are giving 
here is a method of describing the distribution of 
balls among boxes i. e. 
k, K 7- 
If we consider a system of bosons then we can 
construct the general ket 0(1 O(z .,, I C) >- 
Applying a place permutation operator gives : 
e. a'-ý Oc'.. .. 10>= 6ý-r, DQ. - ---I O> but the creation operators commute i. e. 
Cq(' oqý =0 
OC tj 0( t O> 7= 




lk; L 6 iý f. 
1 
C» = o( t ix Z- 00t; 
, 
So the effect of a place permutation on a state is 
simply to reproduce that state. For bosons the 
states are symmetric under the T's and this translates 
into a certain type of commutation relation between the 
creation and annihilation operators in Q. F. T. In the 
case of fermions, the states are anti-symmetric under 
the T's and this translates into anti-commutators 
in the field theory. Thus in general there is a 1-1 
correspondence between the symmetry types in the 'ordin- 
ary' particle description and the commutators in the 
field theory. 
The situation is a little more complex in the case 
of paraparticles because one must give not only the Occu- 
pation numbers but also the irreducible representation 
under which the state transforms, and the symmetry type 
of the state under the T's, in order to distinguish 
states transforming under the same representation. 
(292). This is why the T's play a more important role 
in Q. F. T. than in the first quantised theory. 
292. c. f Y. Ohnuki and S. Kamefuchi (1971) p. 19 
especially pp. 21-23. 
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This is all translated into a field theory of 
paraparticles via Green's ansatz which supplies a 
generalization of the commutators and anti commutators 
mixed up in such a way as to characterise the symmetry 
type in the correct way. Simple commutation or anti- 
commutation of the creation operators would not capture 
the symmetry type of the paraparticles. If the anti- 
commutators of ordinary Q. F. T. are somewhat arbitrary 
then Green's ansatz is even more artificial in the way 
it is designed to reproduce the correct symmetry type. 
This supports the view that field quantisation is 
really just a formal device. (293) 
Thus Q. F. T. is the most 'natural' framework in 
which to regard the particles as 'non-individuals' 
because they are represented as merely field excitations 
and are not labelled at the very outset. Thus there 
are no shuffling of particles as in the Schrodinger 
formulation and the P's remain undefined. The T's 
are well defined however, and the states are labelled, 
leading one to conclude that the states can be regarded 
as individuated. 
Insofar as the states are embedded in space-time this 
is a form of space-time individuality. However, as in 
the first quantised case, it is a very weak form because 
the Impenetrability Assumption is clearly violated in 
the case of quantum fields. When we discussed a possible 
field description of C. M. we noted that T. I. could not 
be attributed to the field configurations, but that 
they could be individuated through their trajectories. 
This cannotbe done in the case of Q. F. T. because of the 
overlapping wave functions of the 1-particle states. 
Together with our remarks above this supports the view, 
already outlined in the classical case, that quantum 
fields are merely properties of the points of space-time, 
to which individuality is attributed. 
In the first quantised approach we noted that the 
statistical dependence of the particles could be accounted 
for in terms of the wave-like aspect attributed to 
them. As waves they become, in a sense, properties of 
293. Redhead op cit p. 24 
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the entire system, a description which clearly invites 
a holistic approach. However, we must be careful 
here. The problems concerning the interpretation of 
de Broglie's 'matter waves' and the wave function in 
general, usually centering on the question 'what is 
it that's doing the waving? ', are well-known. Further- 
more as Dirac had pointed out, this notion of 'wave-like 
aspects I and the term 'wave mechanics' in general 
arises* both historically as we have seen, and formally, 
out of hothing more than an analogy between the systems 
of Q M. for which the quantal Superposition Principle 
holds* and systems in C. M. , such as vibrating ropes# 
for which also a superposition principle holds, 
accounting for the vibration in terms of the super- 
position of a number of waves (294). However, the nature 
of the superposition relationships between the states 
in Q. M. is very different from that in the classical 
theory because they require us to accept that whenever 
a system is definitely in one state it is also partly 
in each of two or more other states. Thus it is the 
non-classical Superposition Principle of Q. M. which lies 
behind this idea of the particles having some sort of 
wave-like aspect, and it is this which must be 
addressed, as we have done, briefly, on p. 1991 in 
any discussion of particle non-individuality and 
statistical dependence. 
it might be though that these problems could be 
circumvented by turning to Q. F. T. whiche it is said, 
offers a 'natural' description of particles as field 
excitations and which therefore resolves the wave-particle 
duality problem. (295) Unfortunately, however, this is 
not correct, as Redhead has demonstrated (296). 
294. The source of the analogy is that in both cases the 
superposition principle leads to a mathematical 
formalism in which the equations governing the 
behaviour of the system are linear in the unknowns. 
295. P. A. M. Dirac (1927) p. 243 
296. Redhead op cit p. 26-28. 
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The representation in which the field amplitude is 
diagonal can be called the field representation and 
likewise the representation in which the number operators 
are all diagonal can be termed the particle representation. 
However, in this latter representation the field 
amplitude is not sharp because the number operators 
do not commute with the creation and annihilation 
operators. Thus one cannot simultaneously ascribe 
sharp values to both the particle number and the field 
amplitude and so wave-particle duality is manifested 
again, albeit in a different form. 
Thus the creation and annihilation operators can be 
interpreted either as creating or destroying particles 
or as increasing and decreasing, in a discrete way, the 
excitation level of the oscillators comprising the 
field. The latter view allows, again, a very 'natural' 
description of the situation where the number of 
'particles' is not conserved. Particles are then 
regarded as simply quantised excitations of particular 
modes of the field and the field configurations can 
come into and go out of being without the kinds of 
conceptual and philosophical problems associated with 
creating and destroying individuals which occur with 
the particle interpretation. 
If a particle is annihilated and ceases to exist then 
clearly, existence not being a predicate, any individ- 
uality that was attributed to it is destroyed along 
with the particle. The annihilation of a particle 
followed by the creation of another, indistinguishable 
from the first, is not a process involving the same, 
i. e. identical in our sense, individual. 
One possible way of retaining individuality in 
this situation is to talk not of the creation and 
annihil , ation 
of particles but of particles undergoing 
transitions from 'active' to 'frozen' states in which 
they cannot be observed through any physical interaction. 
Thus Dirac originally interpreted photon radiation 
as such a transition from an unobserved to an observable 
state and similarly regarded electron-positron pair 
annihilation and creation in terms of transitions to 
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LLA 
and from unoccupied states in anAobservable negative 
energy I sea I- (297) Reichenbach has also demonstrated 
that a consistent description of quantum statistics 
could be given in these terms (298). 
With this interpretation the particles can obviously 
still be regarded as having T. I. attributed to them 
although they cannot always be reidentified because 
there are periods in their histories during which they 
are completely unobservable and ' ... exist in the form 
of nothingness'. (299) There is an obvious analogy 
here with the case of 'inaccessible states' which we 
oiscussed on p. 210ff. Likewise the particles still 
exist, ontologically speaking* when they are 'frozen' 
they just cannot be observed in any way. They are 
there but we cannot see them. Of course it might be 
objected that physics should not be concerned with 
unobservable quantities and this gives another reason 
for preferring the field description over the particle 
representation - 
It might be argued that given all this one should 
drop all reference to hon-individuall particles and 
refer iný; tead to field excitations. This is perfectly 
permissible of course, but it must be remembered 
that we are not compelled to give up a description 
in which the particles are regarded as individuals. 
On the other hand if we do insist on adopting the particle 
representation then we must be prepared to face the 
philosophical objections to the notion of T. I. and to 
the idea of 'inaccessible' states, which will come as 
a result. As we have already said, although the represent- 
ations are formally equivalent, objections such as these 
may mitigate against one in favour of the other. 
3.6 The Gibbs Paradox 
The Gibbs paradox has two aspects. 
297. P. A. M. Dirac op cit. 
298. H. Reichenbach op cit p. 259 
299. Ibid p. 262 
The f irst is that the 
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expression for the entropy obtained from classical 
Boltzmann counting is not extensive and thus when a 
sample of gas is mixed with a sample of the same 
kind of gas there is an entropy increase. This is 
unsatisfactory on two grounds. First it is not in 
agreement with the results of classical phenomeno- 
logical thermodynamics. Secondly, it can be argued 
that insofar as thermodynamics is a phenomenological 
theory, in which no reference to 'particles' need be 
made, nothing physical happens when two gases of the 
same kind are mixed. Thermodynamically speaking 
'mixing' is a concept which is only applicable to 
different kinds of gases and only becomes meaningful 
when applied to the same kind when kinetic-atomic 
considerations are introduced, as in the 'reduction' 
of the theory to statistical mechanics. Thus from a 
purely thermodynamic point of view the mixing of a 
gas with itself is not a 'real', or at least not 
a physicalo event and so the entropy change should 
be zero. 
A resolution of this form of the paradox can be 
obtained if the classical expression for the number of 
possible complexions is divided by N! . This gives 
an expression for the entropy - the Sackur Tetrode 
equation - which is extensive as required (300). The 
justification for this N! division is that it 
eliminates redundant complexions obtained through a 
permutation of the particles. This suggests a result 
which, as we have emphasised, is absolutely fundamental 
to Q. M. namely that particle permutations are not 
regarded as observable and the quantal combinatorial 
formula takes account of this fact. It is in this 
sense that Q. M. has been said to 'resolve' Gibbs paradox 
(301). 
300. W. Yourgrau, A. van der Merwe and G. Raw (1966) 
p. 236-237. 
301. T. H. Boyer (1970) p. 849. See also D- Hestenes 
(1970) p. 840 and R. Rosen (1963) p. 232 who 
sweep the problem under the carpet by adopting an 
operationalis& approach. 
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However, even if the N! division is carried out and 
an extensive entropy obtained there is still the 
second aspect of the paradox to contend with, which is 
the form in which it was originally given by Gibbs. 
Let us consider a box divided into two halves of 
equal volume by a partition. Suppose that one half 
contains a mole of gas A and the other a mole of 
gas B, both a sufficiently low pressure that deviations 
from ideal behaviour are negligible. If the partition 
is removed the gases mix at constant temperature and 
pressure and there is an entropy change of 2Rln2, 
where R is the gas constant per mole. However, if the 
two halves initially contained the same gas, A say, 
then upon removing the partition the entropy change 
would be zero. Now it would seem reasonable to assume 
that we can make the two gases as much alike as we want; 
in other words there is no limit to the degree of 
resemblance which they might have. Yet we would 
still get this abrupt decrease in the entropy as the 
two gases became identical. As Gibbs said I... the 
increase of entropy due to the mixing of given volumes 
of the gases at a given temperature and pressure would 
be independ. ent of the degree of similarity or 
dissimilarity between them '. (302) 
It is this mismatch between the continuous change in 
the entropy and the apparently continuous change in 
the distinguishability of the gases which constitutes 
the essence of this aspect of the paradox. 
It is worth noting that Gibbs himself does not appear 
to have regarded this as a paradox, but rather gave it 
as a plausibility argument for choosing generic 
phases over specific phases. The latter are phases 
which are altered by a particle permutation the 
former are phases which are not. one can define the 
entropy with respect to either but Gibbs argued that 
we should choose the former because we would not 
regard the diffusion of a gas into itself as producing 
any change in the entropy. Thus, after giving a 
302. J. W. Gibbs (1948) \/4_r p. I(vb - 16 4. 
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version of the 'paradox' he wrote, 'It is evident 
therefore that it is equilibrium with respect to 
generic phases and not with respect to specific, with 
which we have to do in the evaluation of entropy... ' 
(303). 
Attempts at resolving the paradox typically fall into 
one or other of two groups. Some authors have argued 
that the indistinguishability of the particles is a 
simple Yes/No concept and thus eliminate the 'mismatch' 
and resolve the paradox, by denying that the gases 
can pass continuously from distinguishable to indis- 
tinguishable. A typical example is Mandl who writes 
I... there is no sense in which we can gradually 
let the properties of two kinds of molecules tend to 
each other and hence the entropy difference ... tend 
to zero ... The molecules either are identical or 
they are different. In the latter case their differ- 
ence in properties can be used to actually effect a 
separation by means of semipermeable membranes ... 
and similar devices. ' (304) This view is justified by 
an appeal to the quantal character of elementary 
particles whose intrinsic properties can possess only 
discrete values. Substances composed of such particles 
cannot therefore be infinitesimally distinguishable. 
However, this does not account for the fact that the 
entropy change is the same whether the two substances 
are very similar, i. e. the particles possessing the 
same values for all intrinsic properties except one, 
say., or very different. It seems implausible that the 
constituent particles can differ as regards only one, 
and any one, intrinsic property and the entropy change 
remains the same, whatever the property that is different# 
but that as soon as they possess the same value for this 
property the entropy change falls to zero. It also 
seems implausible that the change in the value of the 
entropy change should be the same whatever the change 
in the value of the intrinsic property taking the 
303. Gibbs (100) r-2-06, -, ýLOT. 
304. F. ManOl (1971) p. 131 
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particles from being distinguishable to indistinguishable. 
In other words two kinds of particles can possess the 
same values for all intrinsic properties except one. 
Then the entropy change falls from 2Rln2 to 0 whether 
this property is the spin which becomes the same, or 
the rest mass. Furthermore the change in the value of 
the entropy change is the same whether the difference in 
the value of the one remaining non-equal intrinsic 
property changes from x to 0 or y to 0. 
Thus this view cannot account for the observations 
that the change in the value of the entropy change is 
independent of the degree of similarity of the two kinds 
of particles, of which intrinsic property the two 
kinds of particles happen to differ with regard to, and 
also independent of the change in value of this property 
which makes the particles indistinguishable and of the 
same kind. 
However although this 'Yes/No' position is incorrect 
with regard to indistinguishability* it is true for 'non- 
individuality'. Thus Post has written that '... there 
is an important difference between mere indisting- 
uishability and identity in the strong sense, that is, 
being exactly alike and devoid of individuality. 
Identity is not simply extreme similarity pushed to the 
limit ... You do not approach identity gradually. 
' (305) 
one of the most fundamental points which we have 
tried to emphasise has been the difference between 
indistinguishability and non-individuality. The former 
applies to both classical and quantal particles of 
the same kind, and is concerned with the intrinsic 
properties possessed by the particles, whereas the 
latter only applies to quantal particles and is concerned 
with the loss of the classical individuator, whether 
it be the underlying substratum or the particle's 
spatio-temporal trajectory. Thus non-individuality 
cannot be continuously approached from indistinguishability 
305. Post op Cit P- 16-17 
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and in this sense non-individuality is a Yes/No concept, 
particles of the same kind are either non-individuals 
or they are not. As we shall see, consideration of non- 
individuals, rather than indistinguishability, can in 
fact lead to a resolution of the paradox. 
An alternative to the 'Yes/No' approach is to use 
the overlap of the particle wavefunctions as a 
continuous measure of indistinguishability and then 
show that the entropy change varies continuously 
from 0 to 2Rln2 as the overlap decreases from 1 to 0. 
Thus in this case the 'mismatch' is removed by denying 
the discontinuous change in entropy. 
This view has been propounded by von Neumann (306) 
and Schrodinger (307). who suggested that the overlap 
of wave-functions representing two quantum states 
could be used to give a continuous measure of indis- 
tinguishability. Thus von Neumann demonstrated that 
the entropy change could be made to decrease to zero 
continuously if the two gases differed only in their 
quantum states and if these states could be continuously 
varied from orthogonality to proportionality. Lande 
used this argument in reverse and argued that the 
thermodynamic assumption that any two gases are 
either strictly separable by a filter or strictly 
inseparable, is false for two gases which are alike but 
whose molecules are in two different quantum states, 
as this leads to states lying between complete 
separability and inseparability. Thus he wrote 
'Actually there must be some scale of equality degrees, 
observable as a gradual scale of diffusion entropy 
values from Nk2lg2 to zero, changing from total 
separability to lack of separability' - (308) Lande 
's 
argument hinges on a demonstration that the expression 
for the diffusion entropy can be made dependent upon 
a continuous function expressing the degree of 
distin- 
guishability of the gases. 
306. J. von Neumann (1955,1943) p. 370 ff. 
307. E. Schrodinger (1952) p. 58 ff. 
308. A. Lande (1973) p. 83 
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Klein has developed this approach further by 
analysing the mixing of two isomers containing nuclei 
in different energy states. (309) He calculated the 
value of the entropy of mixing as a function of the 
overlap of the states of the particles that are mixed 
and showed explicitly that the entropy change varies 
continuously from 0 to 2Rln 2 as the overlap decreases 
from 1 to 0. 
As we have remarked one can regard the non-individuality 
of quantal particles as a manifestation of the wave- 
like aspect of the particles and explain it in terms 
of the overlap of the wavefunctions. Thus this 
approach above resolves the paradox by turning to the 
non-individual character of quantal particles. 
However, one can raise the objection that if the wave 
functions are overlapping then it is difficult to 
see how one can talk about distinct things at all, 
indistinguishable or not. In the limit there is just 
some sort of smear and it seems nonsensical to talk of 
indistinguishability. The concept simply ceases to 
apply. 
Despite this the above work does establish an important 
point by demonstrating that the entropy change of 
2Rln2 is obtained not only when two particles of 
different kinds are mixed but also when two gases 
composed of particles of the same kind but in different 
states are mixed, for example a monatomic gas A 
diffusing into a gas B consisting of the same substance 
as A but with all its nuclei in an excited metastable 
state. This emphasis on the states of the constituent 
particles was seized upon by Lesk who argued that 'There 
is an element of convention in regarding particles 
as distinguishable or indistinguishable - what in 
these cases is indistinguishable is not the particles 
themselves but theset of allowed states' (310) 
Furthermoreo in order to decide whether a continuous 
measure of indistinguishability is possible, and there- 
fore whether some sort of partial indistinguishability 
309. M. Klein (1948) p. 80 and (1959) p. 73 
319. A. M. Lesk (1980) p. 112 
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is really feasible, ' ... one must examine not the 
particles themselves but the restrictions on transitions 
between sets of allowed energy levels'. (311) 
A useful example which he gives is that of conforma- 
tional isomers, where the molecules may share the high 
energy levels, so that there is no distinction between 
the isomerst but not the low energy ones. When samples 
of such isomers mix the shared energy states constitute 
a partial indistinguishability which does decrease 
the change in entropy upon mixing although not to an 
observable extent. However, as Lesk notes, it is 
unlikely that such partial indistinguishability could 
ever be realised in practice. If two species of 
molecules did share populated sets of energy levels in 
this way then transitions would occur between these 
sets and the two species could not be regarded as 
distinct. If. on the other hand, the rate of inter- 
conversation was so slow that the species could be 
regarded as distinguishable then the shared energy 
states would be insufficiently populated to cause any 
observable decrease in the entropy change. 
This approach to the paradox can also be obtained 
very straightforwardly from our discussions of particle 
individuality in Q. M. Thus in terms of the view in 
which quantal partic-I. es are attributed with individuality 
in the form of T. I. but subject to state accessibility 
restrictions, the difference in the entropy change 
can be said to arise from the fact that many states of 
a system of distinguishable particles correspond to 
a single state of a system of indistinguishable ones. 
There are very many more states accessible to the 
particles of the mixed system of distinguishable gases 
than there are to the particles of the mixture of indis- 
tinguishable gases. Thus it is not distinguishability 
of the particles which is important here but the 
accessibility of possible energy states. In both cases 
the particles are individuals, in the classical sense, 
311. Ibid p. 113 
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but in the second there is a reduction in the number 
of accessible states, which is a consequence of the 
symmetry restrictions imposed upon the observables of 
the system by I. p., corresponding to the reduction in 
the entropy change. 
On the other hand, regarding the particles as non- 
individuals cannot alter the entropy change of 2Rln2 in 
the case of the mixing of distinguishable gases because 
the particles of one gas are distinguishable from the 
particles of the other; they possess different 
values of at least one intrinsic property. More 
significantly the states of the mixed system are 
distinguishable because it is they which, on this view, 
'carry' the individuality. In the case of the mixing 
of two gases of the same species the particles are then 
all both non-individual and indistinguishable, and there 
is then an equivalence of states for the gases, so 
questions of indistinguishability do not arise. The 
entropy change is still zero. 
To illustrate this choice let us take Lesk's example 
of the mixing of two isomers. (312) Any state of either 
molecule can then be regarded as a state of the system 
consisting of the constituent atomso which of course 
will be the same in both cases. We may choose to regard 
these systems either as individual particles with 
independent sets of quantum states or as non-individual 
particles occupying different regions of phase space 
separated by activation energy barriers. Aeopting 
the latter alternative cannot alter the entropy change, 
as Lesk realized, because the states of the mixed system 
are distinguishable. The difference in the internal 
states of the system then allows the two states differing 
only by the permutation of one isomer with the other 
to be different. 
Thus we agree with Lesk that it is through a consider- 
ation of the states of the particles, rather than the 
particles themselves, that we arrive at an understanding 
of this aspect of Gibbs paradox. The sudden reduction 
in the entropy change is to be expected because the 
number of available states decreases. However, this is 
312. Ibid p. 113 
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not to be taken to imply that indistinguishability 
is a straightforward Yes or No affair. It is 
theoretically possible for there to be a form of 
partial indistinguishability in the sense that 
particles may share certain sets of energy states, but 
it is Oifficult to see how this could be realised in 
practice without either destroying the distinction 
between the particles or reducing the effect on the 
entropy change to negligible proportions. 
3.7 Conclusion 
By considering in detail the formalism of Q. M. with 
particular regard to the role of particle and place 
permutations and. to the consequences of the Indistin- 
guishability Postulate, we have concluded that, as 
in C. M., there are two positions which can be consis- 
tently adopted concerning particle individuality. One 
regards the particles as non-individuals, in some sense, 
but with the states as distinguishable. The other 
attributes T. I. to the particleso but then non- 
classical state accessibility restrictions must also 
be imposed. It must be emphasised that both views are 
consistent with the I. P. and, as we have tried to 
indicate, manifestations of each can be found in the 
history of quantum statistics. 
It has been argued that quantum physics has so degraded 
the concept of a 'particle' that it can no longer be 
meaningfully applied to the entities concerned (313). 
To a certain extent this is obviously true. By 
virtue of the profound differences between C. M. and Q. M. 
quantal 'particles' possess very different characteristics 
from classical 'particles', and these differences may 
be held to be so great that it is impossible to 
establish a correspondence between the two terms. Thus 
if it is taken to be an important, or 'essential', 
characteristic of particles that they be individuals then 
it is clearly difficult, even self -contradictoryo to 
conceive of 'non-individual' particles. 
313. See, for example, Coburn in Munitz (1971) p. 84 
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As we have remarked, the most 'natural' framework for 
this view is Q. F. T. where all reference to particles 
can be dropped from the very beginning. The above 
contradiction only arises because the view of particles 
as non-individuals is an imperfect translation of the 
field theoretic approach into the language of first 
quantised Q. M. 
it can therefore be argued that the only way to 
preserve a particle approach, in the above sense, within 
Q. M. is to adopt the alternative view of particle 
in(-: Iividuality and introduce T. I. In this case the 
particles can be regarded as classical individuals 
but only at the expense of accepting that non-classical 
correlations must exist between them such that 
certain states, although existing, are rendered 
inaccessible. Of course, we are implicitly assuming 
that the characteris6ic of being an individual has a 
higher priority than that of being statistically 
independent so that we can still refer to 'particles' 
in the absence of the latter as long as the former still 
applies. 
In other words if our first position is adopted then 
conceptual difficulties are encountered regarding 
'non-individual particles'. These can be avoided by 
choosing the alternative view in which one can refer to 
the particles as individuals, but then some other 
classical characteristic must be abandoned. Q. M. itself 
only dictates that there should be some differences 
in the characteristics of quantal and classical particles, 
but we still have a certain degree of choice as to 
where these differences lie, corresponding to the choice 
between the two views above. 
As would be expected, and as we have shown, this choice 
between two metaphysical credenda can be found running 
through the history of the development of quantum 
theory. Thus for example the statistical dependence of 
quantal 'particles' was explained, by Einstein and 
and others, by appealing to their wave-like aspect, which 
was a predecessor of Q. F. T. The generalisation of this 
to material particles as well as photons and, in particular, 
Schrodinger's mathematical formulation of de Broglie's 
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'matter wave' ideal seriously threatened the particle 
nature of entities such as the electron for example, 
On the other hand their corpuscular aspect was strongly 
implied by collision experiments which led Born to 
suggest that Schrodinger's wave function does not 
actually represent, in some way, the system, but 
determines the probability that the particle is in a 
certain region of space (314). As Jammer remarks, 
Born's original probabilistic interpretation of the 
wave-function * can be summarised. as saying that 
1.00 measures the probababilityof finding the 
particle within the elementary volume J-Zý . the 
article being conceived in the classical sense as a 
point mass possessing at each instant both a definite 
position and a definite momentum. Contrary to 
Schrodinger's view, * -does not represent the physical 
system nor any of its physical attributes but only our 
knowledge concerning the latter'. (315) Thus Born 
maintaineO that quantal entities, like the electron, 
could be regarded as individual particles, but only 
at the expense of accepting that the statement 'the 
system is at a given time and place in a certain state' 
314. M. Born (1926a) p. 803 and (1943) p. 23. This 
interpretation was also influenced by Einstein's 
conception of wave-particle duality for light 
quanta (Interview 18/10/62, Archive for the 
History of Quantum Physics) . However, although 
Born claimed that Einstein regarded the wave 
field as a 'ghost field' whose waves guided the 
photons along their trajectories there is little 
evidence for this view in Einstein's own work. 
For a more detailed and comprehensive discussion 
of Born's interpretation see Jammer op cit 
p. 38 ff. 
315 Jammer op cit p. 42-43 
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no longer has any meaning. (316) 
Furthermoree although T. I. is the only way of 
making sense of the particle approach in Q-N -- it has 
attracted a great deal of philosophical criticism, as 
we shall see in the next Chapter. Thus, as we have 
said, although the field and particle approaches are 
completely equivalent, formally speaking, they differ 
both as regards their heuristic value and their under- 
lying metaphysical principles. The adoption of one 
approach rather than the other will therefore depend 
to a certain extent, on one's own philosophical 
disposition. 
316. M. Born (1926b) p. 129. As is well known, Born's 
original interpretation runs into severe 
difficillties in accounting for the electron 
diffraction phenomena revealed by the two slit 
experiment, which suggested that the wave 
function must be something physically real rather 
than just a representation of our knowledge. In 
an attempt to achieve some sort of resolution of 
this conflict Heisenberg suggested that Born's 
probability waves could be conceived as a 
quantitative formulation of the Aristotelian concept 
of potentia, which determined the prv6cAýU& 
for 
an event to take place. 
See Jammer op cit p. 44 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A PHILOSOPHICAL EPILOGUE 
4.1 Philosophical Criticism of T. I. 
The concept of T. I. involves, as we have seen, the 
notion of the substantial substratum, a notion which 
has been regarded with suspicion by many philosophers, 
especially those within the empiricist tradition, ever 
since Berkeley's celebrated criticism of Locke. The 
grounds for this suspicion rest, at their most basic 
level, on the supposedly unknowable character of this 
underlying ý§ubstance- If it cannot possibly be known 
then it is no more than a philosophical myth, which 
is unnecessary and can therefore be dispensed with. 
A 'thing' is no more than a set, or bundle of 
co-existing qualities with nothing existing separately 
over and above this set. 
There are two points which can immediately be made 
about this gloss. The first is that the empiricist 
tradition finds a natural ally in the positivist- 
operational ist-ins trumenta 1 is t attitude (1) which 
permeated physics at the beginning of the century and 
which played such a fundamental role in the develop- 
ment of Q. M. and its orthodox interpretation (2). The 
empiricist's treatment of lunknowables', like substance, 
finds its analogy in the positivists' rejection as 
metaphysical and scientifically useless anything which 
is not experimentally vindicable. Given the initial 
difficulty of constructing a suitable theoretical 
framework capable of consistently accounting 
for and 
accommodating the phenomena of quantum physicso POsitivismo 
with its implicit admonition to be content with 
the 
partial knowledge that could be gained as a reault of 
observation and experiment onlyo clearly seemed a very 
1. We realise that by grouping them together 
like 
this we are ignoring important differences 
between 
these positions. 
2. See Jammer (1974) 
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attractive position to adopt (3) - However, it can 
also be characterised, less nobly, as a retreat from 
the fundamental aspiration to obtain knowledge of 
everything and, more importantly, may unduly restrict 
or impede the progress of science. The most well- 
known example of this is Ma,.,, ch's opposition to Boltz- 
mann's atomicist ideas, and the recent debate about 
hidden variable theories in Q. M. testifies to the 
live nature of the issues involved(4). 
Secondly, the empiricist argument is by no means 
conclusive. It can be argued that although admittedly 
substance cannot be presented naked, without the 
accompanying properties, this does not imply that they 
cannot be distinguished. Substance and properties 
are logically, but not practically, distinct, in the 
sense of the subject predicate distinction. There can 
be no properties unless there can be substancesfor them 
to be properties of and to which they can belong. The 
relationship between substance and properties is akin 
to that between an owner and his/her possessions, as Oe- 
have said. Thus the defence of 'substance' can be 
anchored to the subject-predicate distinction in logic 
or the noun-adjective distinction in lanýuage. 
The sanctuary of this anchorage has been threatened 
by the empiricist analysis of logic and language. Thus 
Russell's theory of descriptions has been used to 
replace singular terms by variables and purely predica- 
tive general terms (5). Quine has suggested that 
lanqQage should be tightened up so that vague sentences 
of ordinary speech can be replaced by eternal 
3. The influence of the opponents to the mechanist 
approach in the 19th centuryp such as Mach, also 
played an important role of course - 
4. Jammer op cit p. 253-339. The connection between the 
anti-atomic stance of the late 19th century and recent 
no hidden variable proofs is provided by Mach and the 
logical positivists who, as we have said, greatly 
influences the development of the 'orthodox' inter- 
pretation of Q. M. with its rejection of hidden varia- 
bles. 
5. B. Russell (1972) p. 56. Russell hilself did not 




sentences using definite descriptions to identify the 
subjects of discourse. (6) These descriptions would 
then contain only general predicative terms. Like- 
wise Ayer, and others, have tried to show that lang- 
uage is, or at least need only be, purely predicative 
and that one can do without the proper names which 
are used in T. I. to designate the underlying substance 
(7). 
However, the question of whether a thing can, or 
should bet regarded as anything more than the set of 
its properties is quite separate from that of whether 
we can talk about that thing entirely in terms of this 
set. In fact it is not at all clear whether we can, 
in practice, limit ourselves in this way and still 
'do' everything we want to. In particular the 
empiricist 'bundle' theory runs into severe difficulties 
with regard to individuality, which can be resolved 
very simply by invoking the notion of substance. 
Furthermoreo one must be clear as to how the properties 
in the 'bundle I are to be regarded. The view that 
they are particulars has been advanced as a solution 
to the problem concerning the multiple location of a 
property (8), but this approach has been rejected as 
incoherent (9). it is more common to regard properties 
as universals but then the bundle theory requires. 
that the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (P. I. I. ) 
be true. This can easily be seen as follows- If things 
are merely bundles of properties which are universalso 
then it is necessarily true that if two such things 
possess exactly the same set of properties then they 
must, in fact be one and the same thing, i. e. in the 
absence of any individuator besides the properties, 
6. W. Quine (1960) p. 191, and (1950) p. 220 
7. A. J. Ayer (1954) p. 16. Strawson has argued that there 
are no logically proper names nor any Russellian 
definite descriptions. P. F. Strawson (1960) p. 320 
8. G. F. Stout (1930) 
9. ID. Armstrong (1978) Vol. I p. 77-79. Armstrong 
presents a whole range of arguments against 
both the 
bundle theory, Ch-9 especially p. 98-101, and the 
Lockean account of particulars, Ch. 10 esp. p. 104- 
107, before advancing his own 'objective theory of 
universals' in Vol. II. 
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the bundle theory must require that indistinguishability 
implies identity and hence the necessary truth of P. I. i. 
However, there are, as we shall see in a later section, 
grounds for rejecting P. I. I. 0 in physics, which clearly 
weakens the empiricist Position. 
On the other hand the relation ship between the 
substratum and the properties stands in need of 
explication. It is not sufficient to say that substance 
P stands in the relation of sup)ort to the properties 
because, as Berkeley showed, the term 'Support' in this 
sense is an empty metaphor. Substance clearly does not 
lie beneath the properties supporting them as the walls 
of a house lie beneath and support the roof. To say 
that substanceo and the relation of support, are 
Isui generis' and can be acquainted with by anybody 
who grasps that things 'have' properties, is very weak 
and amounts to no more than saying that the substratum 
is something unique untoitself standing in a relation 
to the properties which is also unique to itself. The 
absence of any satisfactory explication of this relation 
represents one of the most serious drawbacks of the 
substantivalist position. 
Despite this the introduction of the notion of 'sub- 
stance' does provide a very coherent and plausible 
solution to the problem of individuality, In particular 
it can account for the individuality of two indistinguish- 
able things, such as two classical electrons, whereas 
the bundle theory must either appeal to P. I. I. in a forr 
in which spatial location is included as one of the 
properties of a thing, or turn to what we have called 
space-time individuality. Both putative solutions 
presuppose the truth of the Impenetrability Assumption, 
which is violated, in a sense by the 'particleslof 
Q. M. and therefore has only a limited validity. Arm- 
strong has argued that it is logically possible 
for 
Act 
there to exist particulars which areAspatio temporal at 
all (10) which casts further doubt on the role of 
spatio-temporal location as individator. 
10. Armstrong op cit P- 119 & vol. II Ch-18. 
The Scholastic 
angels would be one example of such entities. 
See T. 
Aquinas (1947-8) Part 1, Q. 50, Art. 4. 
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Furthermore, if it is claimed that the complete set 
of a thing's properties must include it's Positional 
characteristics, which necessarily distinguish that 
thing from other, indistinguishable, things, then it 
must be acknowledged that the status Of Position is 
different from that of other properties in the set. 
To. ascribe a Positional predicate to a thing involves 
anAeliminable reference to another individual or 
position, unless of course some sort of absolute view 
of space is adopted. The invocation of some coordinate 
system cannot provide an answer since the origin of 
such a system must still be specified. As Quinton 
says 'Individuals cannot be decomposed into sets of 
properties that are sufficient to individuate them unless 
positional properties are included in the set. But if 
positional properties are included the decomposition 
into properties is incomplete. Further individuals 
remain to be decomposed, inviting us into an infinite 
regress 
There are various ways of escaping this regress. one 
is to take the position where '1' am at the present 
moment as the absolute point of origin of all one's 
positional characteristics of things. This is the one 
position which does not have to be picked out by its 
relation to anything else, and by their relation to 
which everything else is, in the final analysis, related. 
Thus position as individuator connects a thing to the 
'here-and-nowl. (12) 
However, it is logically possible, as we noted in 
Chapter 1, to imagine a universe containing, for example, 
only two indistinguishable spheres and nothing else, 
not even an observer. The above account cannot then 
answer the question of how individuality can be 
attributed to the spheres since there is no fundamental 
III to which their spatial positions can be referred - 
unless of course, some sort of idealist view is also 
11. Quinton op cit p. 18 
12. Ibid p. 19-20 
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adopted (13). A relational view of space clearly cannot 
help as the spatial relation of each sphere to the other 
is the same and thus cannot be used to individuate them. 
The only choice left is to take up the absolutist position 
and say that the spheres are individuated via their rela- 
tions to the points of space regarded as some sort 
of absolute, underlying matrix or substratum. 
We shall return to this example in Section 4.2, for 
the moment it is sufficient to note the difficulties it 
poses for the bundle account. 
Thus we conclude that spatial position must be 
regarded, not as one of the properties of a thing, but 
as a substratum underlying these properties. The notion 
of substance is therefore resurrected, in the form of 
absolute space and in the sense of the individuator. 
Thus it would seem that the bundle theorists, in 
rejecting material substance as individuator and turning 
to space-time individuality, are forced to accept spatial 
substance in the same role. A concrete individual can 
then be thought of as a set of properties manifested 
at a certain point in space-time. (14) The label or 
name attached to a thing then designates the underlying 
substratum of space-time which acts as the individuator. 
In this way space-time individuality degenerates into 
a form of T. I. 
This absolutist view of space-time is not, as we have 
seen, conclusively precluded by either the Special or 
General Theories of Relativity; indeed certain interpre- 
tations of the latter, to the effect that space-time would 
possess a structure even in the total absence of matter 
would obviously strongly support this position. 
Having argued that individuality can be conferred 
upon things through the points of an absolute space- 
time, the question is how are these points themselves 
individuated? One possible answer is to relate the 
points to some macroscopic reference frame 
(15), identi- 
fied by some unique set of predicates, such as 
the human 
13. This is rejected by Quinton himself. 
14. Quinton op cit p. 28-29 
15. Strawson op cit p. 37 
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body. However, this is Obviously just another version 
of the 'here-and-now' argument and suffers from the 
same defects. Furthermore, it is clearly open to 
ate accusations of circularity. Macroscopic objects, on A this view, individuated through their relations to 
the points of an underlying absolute space-time, 
and these points are then individuated through their 
relations to the macroscopic objects acting as some 
sort of reference frame. 
Alternatively one could answer that the points 
themselves possess T. I. Each space-time point can, 
in principle, be labelled and these labels designate 
the substantial substratum which acts as individator. 
Now, howeverl there is the epistemological difficulty 
of individuating these points. With material entities, 
such as particles, this is achieved via their spatial 
positions; T. I. is revealed through space-time 
individuality. This option is clearly not available 
to the points of space-time themselves. For one thing, 
it would invite an infinite regress, for another one 
cannot conceive how a position could move in time 
This difficulty serves to illustrate the mutual 
dependence of material objects and space-time objects 
as regards individuation. This interdependence could 
be broken by those interpretations of General 
Relativity, mentioned above, which suggest that space- 
time would possess some curvature in the absence of 
matter. This internal structure might then allow the 
points to be individuated. Thus the answer to the 
question whether the points of space-time can be 
individuated by the internal structure of space-time 
itself would seem to depend upon developments in the 
theory of General Relativity. 
Strawson's example of a chess board provides a useful 
illustration of the points at issue here 
(16). This 
would appear to possess an internal structure which 
allows every square to be individuated 
(c. f. the 
16. strawson op cit p. 122-123 
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procedure used in writing down the moves in chess) 
However, the board is finite and bounded and it is 
by reference to this boundary that the squares are 
actually individuated. Thus in writing down the moves 
the convention is introduced that rows are numbered 
beginning with the nearest to the white player and 
columns are labelled by the piece occupying the 
square at the foot of the column. This provides a two- 
dimensional macroscopic reference frame which allows 
each square to be uniquely individuated. Thus unless 
the universe is similarly taken to be bounded in some 
way then some sort of external reference frame must 
be introduced. 
Attributing space-time individuality to an object 
requires that a relation be established 'downwards' 
between the object and the underlying space-time point. 
For elementary particles, regarded as point like, 
this relation is one of coincidence between unextended 
point-like entities. Every particle is coincident 
with some point of space-time. The Impenetrability 
Assumption can then be regarded as stating that no 
two material point-like objects can be coincident, 
or n6 space-time point can be coincident with more than 
one material object. In other words the I. A. required 
there to be a 1-1 correspondence only between point- 
like particles and the points of space-time. 
This relationt whether it be one-one as I. A. requires, 
or many-one, is passive in the sense that it does not 
determine in any way the relations between the points 
of space-time themselves. In other words the 
structure of space-time is not affected or altered by 
the existence of material objects. A similar independence 
does not obtain, however, in the Riemannian generaliza- 
tion of the four-dimensional pseudo-Euclidean Minkowski 
space-time appropriate to General Relativity. In 
this case the structure of space-time is connected in 
lawlike manner with the distribution of mass 'in' it 
(although it is not clear, as we have seen, whether 
one can go further and say that the mass distribution 
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causes changes in space-time) p and the relation between 
the material and space-time points can be described 
as active. This, therefore, strengthens the inter- 
dependence regarding individuality. 
The other aspect of space-time individuality, that of 
reidentifying things through time via their continuous, 
well defined spatio-temporal trajectories, also 
requires that a relation exist between the points of 
space-time themselvesl 'side-ways' along the trajectory 
between successive points of the parth. This relation 
clearly does not exist independently of the material 
object travelling along the path as it is established 
by the various requirements of continuity, causality 
etc., discussed in Chapter 2. As we remarked therer 
there is an obvious connection between the possibility 
of reidentifying, or 'tracing', a thing and the 
impenetrability Assumption. As Robinson has demon- 
strated it is, at the very least, difficult to argue for 
such a possibility and against this assumption. (17) 
Penetrability implies no possibility of reidentification. 
This situation occurs most obviously in the case of 
fields, as we have seen, but in the case of Q. M. 
particles also, it is difficult to see what meaning can 
be given to the notion of the space-time trajectory 
of a single particle, when the particles manifest the 
sort of holism which is a consequence of the Super- 
position Principle and which is exemplified by the so 
called 'entangled states'. 
Also to reidentify some thing through time it mustbe 
established that the places occupied by that thing 
at successive times are either identical or connected 
by a continuous path. However this requires that the 
places themselves be individuated and again the question 
arises whether this can be done internally, through 
some inherent structurep or externally, through some 
kind of reference framel Taking the second option 
17. D. Robinson (1982) p. 320-321 
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requires the selection of some privileged continuant 
in order to avoid any circularity involving. the mutual 
dependence of material things and space-time points. 
The identity of this privileged continuant must be 
established independently of any consideration of 
spatio-temporal trajectories. Eliminating 'myself' and 
the 'here-and-now' as possible candidates, for the 
reasons given aboveo those things which are continuously 
observed throughout the period of time during which 
other things begin and cease to be observed, may fulfill 
this role (18). However, although such things can 
form a sufficiently complex positional scheme which could 
precisely specify spatio-temporal locations, there 
is still the problem of how these primary continuants 
are themselves individuated and again the possibility of 
circularity arises. It would seem that a combination 
of T. I. together with some sort of internal structure, 
still offers the best solution to this dilemma. 
Thus although T. I. must face empiricist criticism, 
directed principally at the notion of an unknowable 
substance, it does at least give a credible account of 
individuality. Advocates of the view that things are 
mere bundles of qualities must therefore appeal to some 
other principle of individuation. one possibility is 
the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, but this, 
as we shall see in the next section, has a dubious 
validity. The alternative is to invoke some form of 
space-time individuality which involves a circularity 
from which it is difficult to escape. Insofar as the 
notion of a particle as a labelled individual can only 
be retained in Q. M. if one is prepared to admit T. I. 
any arguments against this concept will serve to under- 
mine the particle approach as a whole. Similar 
conclusions apply to the field approach and space-time 
individuality. Thus although they are formally equival- 
ent each approach carries with it it's own metaphysical 
problems and any weighing of the two must place these 
in the balance also. 
18. D. Wiggins op cit 
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4.2 Physics and P. I. I. 
As we saw in Chapter 1 Leibniz gave several different 
versions of P. I. I. as his position shifted in response 
to Clarke 's criticism and derived it both from the 
Complete Notion of Individual and the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. In particular it is worth noting 
the difference between I ... it is not possible for 
there to be two inOivid. uals entirely alike or differing 
in number only. ' and '... there are not in nature two 
indiscernible real absolute beings'. In the first 
statement Leibniz is saying that the principle is 
necessary (19), in the second that it is contingent. 
This is a distinction of great importance as we shall 
now see . 
In terms of second order logic with equality P. I. i. 
can be written thus: 
where a and b are any two individual constants and 0 
is a variable ranging over the possible attributes of 
these individuals. The question arises, what sort of 
attributes should be included in the range of 
If the attribute 'being idential with a', which is A 
certainly true of a, is included then P. I. I. becomes 
simply a theorem of second order logic. If such 
trivializations are ignored however, a weak and strong 
form of the principle can still be distinguished (20): 
1) Weak form of P. I. I.: The range of includes 
properties of spatio-temporal location. 
The principle can then be read as saying that it is 
not possible for there to exist two things possessing 
all properties in common. 
19. Leibniz actually distinguished at least two senses 
of 'necessary', a principle could be absolutely 
necessary in the sense thay its denial was self- 
contradictory, or it could be morally necessary 
in the sense that God wills it to be so and it 
could not possibly be otherwise. see his fifth 
letter to Clarke in H. G. Alexander op cit. 
20. Quinton op cit p. 24-25. 
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2) Strong form of P. I. I.: The rar)ge of 0 excludes 
properties of spatio-temporal location. 
The principle can then be taken as stating that it is 
not possible for there to exist two things possessing 
all properties, exclud nes, in common. 
The weak form of P. I. I. has been described as trivial 
(wiggins) (21), and necessary (Quinton) (22). In fact 
it is neither. It is not trivial because as we shall 
see, interesting consequences follow from it when placed 
in a physical context. It is necessary only if the 
I. A. is accepted, and, as we have seen, there may be 
grounds for rejecting this assumption. Obviously, if 
I. A. were not trueo so that two numerically distinct 
particles could possess exactly the same spatio-temporal 
properties, i. e. occupy the same place at the same time, 
and be qualitatively indiscernible, then weak P. I. I. 
would also not be true. (23) 
The strong form does not presuppose I. A. and is always 
only contingently true. Leibniz himself emphasised the 
importance of non-spatio-temporal properties in 
distinguishing two separately indiscernible things: 
'It is always necessary that beside the difference of 
time and place there be internal principles of 
distinction... thus although time and place (external 
relations, that is) serve in distinguishing things, we 
do not easily distinguish them by themselves ... The 
essence of identity and diversity consists ... not in 
time and place '. (24) 
However, as Wittgenstein notes, (25) strange results 
follow from the strong form of p. i. I. because it denies 
the possibility of a universe consisting only of two 
qualitatively indistinguishable spheres, a point which 
was subsequently taken up by Black and others. 
21. D. Wiggins (1967) R. Adams (1979) p. 11, makes this 
claim also. 
22. Quinton op e,, it p. 25 
23. Thus the weak form of P-I-I- is not logically 
necessary, as is sometimes claimed, because it 
is 
possible to conceive of two things occupying 
the 
. lenk 
same space-time point and using some other principle 
of individuation, apart from spatial location, such 
as T. I. to individuate them & count them as separate. 
24. Leibniz (1916) 11 27.1,27.3 
25. L. Wittgenstein op cit 5.5302 
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(26). We shall consider this in more detail below. 
We shall now examine the status of these two forms 
of the Principle in both classical and quantum physics. 
P. I. I. and Classical 
_Physics 
Classical particles obey the I -A. and particles of the 
same kind., or species, are considered to be 
qualitatively indistinguishable as we have seen. 
Clearly then such particles are examples of things 
which violate the strong form of P. I. I. Insofar as the 
latter seeks to reduce the individual to a bundle of 
properties or qualities, this implies that an alternative 
principle of individuation must be sought for (27). 
There are tao possibilities: space-time individuality 
or T. I. 
If space-time individuality is attributed to classical 
particles then strong P. I. I. cannot be true, as we have 
seen, because such particles possess all qualitative 
properties in common and only differ as regards spatial 
location, which is inadmissable. Weak P. I. I. is not 
violated because of this difference. If the particles 
are attributed with this form of individuality then it 
follows from I. A. that they cannot also possess the 
same spatial properties and therefore cannot have all 
properties in common. 
However, this last conclusion suggests that an 
absolute view of space must be held as we noted in 
section 1.3 of chapter 1. 
We recall that the argument runs as follows- 
We assume that it is possible for there to exist a 
universe consisting of only two distinct indistinguish- 
able particles and. no observer or any other material 
thing. On a relational view of space there is then 
no way of distinguishing the particles since there is 
26. M. Black (1952) 
27. In other words it implies that things cannot 
be individuated by their properties only. See 
our discussion in the preceding section and 
Chapter 1. 
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no external reference frame to which they can be relateýl 
differently, and the spatial relation of each particle 
to the other is exactly the same. Thus on this view of 
space, the particles possess all properties and relations 
in common, including spatial ones, and therefore violate 
the weak form of P. I. I. 
The only alternative would appear to be the adoption 
of an absolute view of space in which it is regarded as 
some sort of substratum. This would provide the 
necessary frame of reference which would allow the spatial 
positions of the particles to be differentiated. They 
would not then possess all properties in common, the 
spatial ones being excluded from the shared set, 
and weak P. I. I. is satisfied. 
Although this latter alternative is ruled out by Special 
Relativity (which may be regarded, as we saw in Section 
2.2.4 of Chapter 2, as having merely replaced absolute 
space by an absolute 'space-time'), either possibility 
would be anathema to a Leibnizian. Weak P. I. I. together 
with a relational account of space implies that the two 
particle situation above is not possible. Therefore 
if our assumption, that it is possible, is accepted 
then we have the dilemma, particularly acute 
for a Leibnizian, that either weak P. I. I. is false or 
an absolute view of space is adopted. 
Black has presented similar arguments in which a 
possible universe is imagined containing two iron spheres 
and nothing else, and he concludes that P. I. I. is then 
violated. More elaborate universes were theA6 devised 
in which the same violation could occr. These arguments 
have failed to convince many philosophers, including, for 
example, Ayer who wrote ... such examples seem 
intelligible to us only. because we tacitly introduce 
into them some further feature by reference to which 
we do in fact discern between the objects which we are 
supposing to be indiscernible' (28). In other words our 
28. A. J. Ayer (I c(5'4-) .. 
Z3. 
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initial assumption is rejected and the dilemma 
evaporates. Presumably Ayer would accept that this 
'extra feature' need not be 'the observer' but could 
be the substratum of absolute space, for example. 
However,, someone who accepts Berkeley's dictum 
that the statement 'physical objects exist 
unperceived' is self-contradictory would argue that 
it is not possible to even conceive of a state of 
affairs in which 'the observer' is absent. The very 
act of imagining a situation involves some kind of 
observer al beit a mental one - 
In similar vein Cassullo has argued that the dispute 
between Black and those who would defend the truth of 
P. I. I. can be resolved through an investigation of 
how the possibility of a state of affairs is determined 
(29). Thus he suggests that the clearest sense of 
conceiving of a state of affairs, as well as the sense 
relevant to determining its possibility, is to 
visualize it. Whenever one visualizes a group of 
objects one visualizes them in some spatial configuration 
and consequently whenever more than one object is 
visualized each occupies a different position in the 
visual field. However, if one accepts Russell's account 
of the spatial structure of the visual field then 
objects in this field occupy different positions by 
virtue of a difference in their positional qualities. 
Thus, in order to visualize or imagine two particles 
one must visualize them as occupying different positions 
in the visual field. But then they must differ in 
their positional qualities and hence do not possess all 
properties in common. p. I. I. is therefore true. 
There are a number of places at which this argument 
can be attacked, such as the correctness of Russell's 
theory of the visual field, but we shall content 
ourselves with remarks which also apply to the Idealist 
29. A. Casullo (1982) p. 591 
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position in general. 
Thus one can criticise Casullo for failing to distin- 
guish between the statement 'one cannot think of two 
objects as existing, without a mind which is doing 
the thinking' and the statement 'one cannotihink of 
two objects as existing apart from, i. e. outside of, 
a mind'. The first is obviously true, the second may 
not be and, through the attitude it generateso 
characterises the difference between the Realist and 
Idealist positions. A clear distinction must be 
drawn between what is involved in the process of thinking 
about, or visualizing a state of affairs, and what is 
entailed by the state of affairs itself. The fact that 
the process of vc*, sLta1c7_&&Lo, 1 of two objects involves a 
difference in their positional qualities is a function 
of one's thought processes only and does not entitle 
one 1-o infer that such a difference must actually 
exist in the external state of affa±rs (30). of course 
it is impossible for me to imagine two spheres without 
the 'me' which is doing the imagining, but it is 
possible for me to imagine a situation in which the 
spheres existed batthe 'me' did not, and in which there 
is no way of ascribing a difference in spatial predicates 
to them on a relational account of space. 
This is a well-known argument against the Idealist 
account in general (31). Although it is true that thoughts 
cannot exist without minds thinking them, this does 
not prove that objects cannot exist separate from or 
in the absence of such minds. The question of whether 
such objects 'really' exist may be open but it is not 
a logical impossibility, as Berkeley claimed. AS With 
thinking so with perception also. Perception cannot 
occur without a mind. doing the perceiving but it is 
at least logically possible that that which is perceived 
can - 
30. The same mistake is made by the Indian mystic 
Krishnamurtý who argues that since we cannot think# 
or conceive, of death, in the sense of absolute non- 
existence, so true death, in this sense, cannot 
actually occur. 
31. There are others, of course. 
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It is not our intention here to give a detailed analysis 
of the Idealist arguments in general, we merely wish to 
point out that such arguments cannot be conclusive in 
resolving the dilemma regarding P. I. I. 
As we suggested in Chapter 2, space-time individuality 
could be taken to imply that the points of space-time 
themselves could possess a form of T. I. Regarding 
these points as individuals then implies, as they are 
indiscernible, obviously, that they must also violate 
P. I. I. However they only violate the strong form as 
they cannot, by definition possess the same spatial 
properties! (32) Leibniz himself would have argued that 
the points of space-time lie beyond the domain of 
applicability of the Principle as he believed that 
it applied to substances only, (although, as we have 
seen, space-time could be regarded as substantial in 
a certain sense, perhaps even in the Leibnizian sense). 
Classical particles can also have T. I. attributed to 
them. In this case it is possible for them to violate 
both forms of P-I-I- since they are indistinguishable 
and yet also regarded as distinct, and T. I. says nothing 
about their spatio-temporal properties. If in addition 
it is assumed that the- I. A. is obeyed than only the 
strong form is contingently false. However, as we have 
i MO-4 be seen, tX possible for there to exist entities, 
fields for example, to which T. I. can be attributed 
but which also violate I. A. In such cases the weak form, 
of the Principle would also be false. Even though it 
is not entailed by T. I. there are good grounds for 
assuming that the I. A. is obeyed by classical particles. 
In the quantal case there is a sense in which it is 
not and thus both weak and strong P-I-I- 
MA 
violated, 
as we shall see, although a case could be made for saying 
that things which violate the I. A. cannot be 
regarded as'particles'. 
In both kinds of individuality the particles are 
labelled# the label designating that which confers 
32. The I. A. does not apply to the points of space- 
time since they obviously cannot move. 
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individuality - the underlying spatial location or 
substantial substratum respectively. If these labels, 
or proper names could be regarded as properties of the 
particlesi in some sense, then the particles could 
be regarded as distinct through a qualitative 
Oifference and both forms of P. I. I. would be obeyed. 
of course, if this were so then there woulO be no 
need for either T. I. or space-time individuality 
since the particles would no longer be indistinguishable. 
In Chapter 1 we noted that, broadly speakingo there 
were two views of proper names. The 'sense theory' 
regards proper names as no more then a sort of 
disguised definite description whereas the 'no sense' 
theory holds that proper names simply stand for 
objects and have no meaning other than standing for 
objects. The difference between the two is that the 
latter view holds that naming is prior to describing 
whereas the former contends that describing is prior 
to naming for a name only names by describing the 
object it names. As we have said, although it seems 
implausible to claim as the sense theory does, that 
proper names are just shorthand for definite descriptions, 
this view ýoes at least give an account of identity 
and existential statements which present problems for 
the no sense position. 
On the sense theory then proper names are only a kind 
of shorthand for a description of an object. But since 
a description is simply a list of the object's properties, 
proper names, on this view, are no more than 
shorthand summaries of the properties of objects. There- 
fore a difference in proper names must signify a 
difference in properties somewhere on the list there 
must be a difference. Thus iP the proper names used 
to label- the particles are taken to fall under this view 
then the particles must be discernible and P-I-I- 
is 
obeyed. 
This line has recently been followed by De Munyck who 
aOvocates the view that indices, or labels, should 
be 
regarded as intrinsic properties of the particles 
(33) 
33. W. M. De Yluynck (1975) p. 327 
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He acknowledges that this implies that particles become 
distinguishable in C. M. and Q. M. . but then argues that 
this says more about the theories than about the 
experimental meaning of the labels. The languages 
of both C. M. and Q. M. are those of distinguishable 
particles and are therefore inadequate for dealing with 
particles which are experimentally indistinguishable. 
Thus it is argued that two particles are indistinguishable 
if they agree on all their dynamically relevant 
intrinsic properties and that they can thereiore be 
indistinguishable with respect to one set of experi- 
ments but distinguishable with respect to another. 
Accordingly a label can only serve to distinguish a 
particle when it is possible to extend the experiments 
under which the particle is regarded as indistinguishable, 
in such a way that the index becomes dynamically relevant 
with respect to some new property. 
This is certainly a rather odd way of looking at 
elementary particles. It is difficult to see how the 
particle labels introduced into classical statistical 
mechanics can be regarded as properties on a par with 
charge or mass. Unlike the latter these labels are not 
the subject of any theory nor are they invoked to account 
for the behaviour of the particles, their raison dletre 
being metaphysical: to stand for that which confers 
individuality upon the particles. If they were to 
be regarded as properties then they are rather 
artificial ones being not possessed by the particle 
itself but imposed somehow from without. They are not 
essential, in the sense that a particle could not 
possess them and still be a particle of that kind, and 
neither are they extrinsic in Jauch's sense of being 
dependent upon the state of the system. Particle 
labels could perhaps be regarded as extra-dynamical 
intrinsic properties of the particles (34) in the sarre 
way that the colour of a billiard ball iso (at least 
as regards collision phenomena). However, this is a 
false and misleading analogy. The colour of a billiard 
34. SuOarshan and Ivehra. op cit. pýz4E 
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ball is a secondary property related, by some body of 
theoryý to the primary properties of the particles of 
which the ball is composed. By definition these 
particles cannot themselves possess such secondary 
properties, and it is difficult to see what meaning could 
be given to a primary property that was both intrinsic 
and extra-dynamical - Even the hidden variables of Q 
have some bearing on the dynamical behaviour of the 
particles - indeed that is exactly why they are posited. 
Without this saving grace particle labels fall victim to 
Ockham's razor and must be excluded from the set of 
properties possessed by the particles. 
Furthermore, De Muynck's approach does not correspond 
to the way in which pcLrticle labels are regarded in C. M. 
itself. As we have emphasised, classical particles 
are considered to be indistinguishable individuals, 
with theýr individuality designated by the particle 
labels. If space-time individuality is attributed 
then the label stands for the spatio-temporaL location 
at which the properties predicated of the particle 
are instantiated, In the case of T. I. the, label denotes 
the substantial substratum which bears or possesses the 
properties. This is the important point : whichever form 
of individuality is attributed to the particles, the 
labels designate that which underlies the properties 
not the properties themselves. 
Thus the labels or proper names used in C. M. denote 
something other than the set, or any element of the set, 
of properties predicated of the particles and are there- 
fore used, or regarded)in a manner consistent with the 
#no sense' view. They do not, and cannot, plausibly., 
generate the qualitative difference necessary to 
preserve P. I. I. We therefore conclude that classical 
particles certainly violate the strong form of the 
principle, and may also render the weak form contingently 
false if the requirement that they satisfy the I. A. is 
dropped. This would be rather bizarre, however, and if 
space-time individuality is attributed or T. I. Plus 
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I. A. then the weak form remains true; classical particles 
of the same kind do not possess all properties in 
common, including spatio-temporal ones. 
5.2.2. P. I. I. and Quantum Physics 
The status of P. I. I. within Q. M. has been the subject 
of some debate among philosophers of science, particular- 
ly recently, We shall examine each of the various 
arguments in turn, indicating, where we can, their 
deficiencies, before setting down our own view. 
Most authors have argued that the Principle is refuted 
by Q. M. and the debate has then shifted to the question 
of the manner in which it fails to hold. Barbour, 
however, has argued that Q. M. definitely supports 
p. I. I. (35) a claim which is based on certain passages 
from the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence such as the 
following ''Tis a thing indifferento to place three 
bodies equal and perfectly alike, in any order what- 
soever; and consequently they will never be placed in 
any order by him who does nothing without wisdom'. 
(36). According to Barbour this is exactly the situation 
which pertains to Q. M. where only one out of the six 
possible permutations of three electrons is actually 
counted. 
This argument contains two mistakes. First in the 
passage cited Leibniz is arguing# from the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason, not that there must be only one 
arrangement of three particles but that there will be 
no such arrangement. Secondly* Barbour fails to make 
the distinction between p. I. I. as applied to the 
arrangements of particles and the Principle as applied 
to the particle themselves (37). it is clear 
from 
the passages given that Leibniz was arguing 
that one 
cannot distinguish arrangements differing 
in the order 
of the particles i. e. differing as regards a particle 
permutation. As we have seen, this is 
false in C-M- 
35. J. B. Barbour (1980) p. 34 
36. Leibniz in H. Alexander (1956)) 
, ý7 Lucas 
(1973) 
Lucas makes the same mistake. See J 
para. 25. 
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but true in Q. M. However* the fact that indistinguish- 
able arrangements are identical in the latter does not 
imply the same result for particles. Powers has recently 
made the same point, arguing that the reduction in the 
number of arrangements in quantum statistics may be 
taken to support P. I. I., as applied to arrangements 
obviously, whereas the particles themselves refute it. 
(38). 
Post has contended that quantal particles, being 
non-individuals, violate P. I. I. for the following 
reason (39). Such particles are, in his terms 'strongly 
identical' (40), in the sense of being both indis- 
tinguishable and devoid of individuality, and yet there 
is more then one of them. Thus they are numerically 
distinct and completely indiscernible and therefore 
Leibnizls Principle cannot hold. 
This argument immediately invites. the question, how, 
exactly are the particles numerically distinct? In what 
sense can it be said that there is more than one of them? 
Post's answer is that they differ as regards location, 
or more generally, bearing in mind the well-known 
problems concerning the non-localizability of the photon, 
that they differ with regard to their state. Indeed 
Post hasproposed an ontology of states in which all 
reference to individual particles is eliminated. 
However, this cannot be correct because first of all 
it is possible for two particles, two photons say, 
to exist in the same one particle state, and secondly 
as we have noted, the Superposition Principle can be taken 
to imply that there is a sense in which each particle 
partakes of all the states of all the other particles. 
Post himself contradicts his own answer by writing 
the location of an electron at a given moment is 
3 8- j. Powers (1982) p. 1-5'6(f 
3! ý post op cit p. 19 
40. The particles are not identical in our sense of 
the term since they are regarded as num_, erically 
distinct, 
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as numerous as the number of electrons in the universe 
(41) Clearly, some other principle by which the 
particles can be said to be numerically, or countably 
distinct must be sought for. As we shall see this is 
provided by a consideration of the particles energy ancl 
momenta. Thus on the two photon example we conclude 
that there are two particles in the state, rather than 
oneo because the total energy and momentum are twice 
that of one particle. 
Cortes has initiated a more recent debate by arguing 
that the logical form of P. I. I. is restricted to 
individuals and is therefore violated by the 'non- 
individual I particles of Q -M - which it cannot 
encompass (42) - His argument can be divided into two 
claims. The first is that the logical proof of Leibniz's 
Princi ple presupposes that all entities in the domain 
of discourse are individuals and that the question 
regarding the possible existence of non-individuals 
remains open. All that can be established by an 
analytis of the way names and variables function is 
that ' ... the quantificational logic as normally used is 
not capable of expressing anything whatsoever about 
non-individuals I- (43) 
Cortes adopts a form of space-time individuality 
and defines an individual to be a spatio-temporal thing 
which differs in some respect from other spatio-temporal 
things (44). Thus particles which do not differ in any 
respect, including their spatio-temporal properties, 
are, on these terms, non-individuals (45). Rather 
confusingly Cortes also defines a non-individual to be 
anything which violates P. I. I. so that this Principle is 
limited to the domain of individuals bV definition. This 
allows the possibility that quantal particles do not 
violate the Principle, but merely fall outside its range 
41. Post op cit p. 20 
42. A. Cortes (1976) p. 491 
43 Ibid p. 499 
44 Ibid p. 493 
45. See our discussion on p. 
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of application. In particular it does not apply to 
waves and, as we have pointed out, the supposed 'non- 
individuality' of quantal particles can be interpreted 
as being due to their wave-like aspect. This point, 
regarding the applicability of P. I. I. was brought up 
by Teller* as we shall see, and constitutes the essence 
of our own position. 
The second step in Cortes's argument is to demonstrate 
that non-individual entities actually exist and that 
p. I. I. is therefore violated in fact. To do this he 
A takes the example of photos in a mirror lined box or 4 
laser beam, which being bosons can simultaneously occupy 
exactly the same state, According to the Copenhagen 
Interpretation (46) such photons have all physical 
properties (47) in common and are therefore indistinguish- 
able. Furthermore they are spatio-temporally related 
to every other thing in the universe in exactly the 
same way and are therefore non-individuals, in Cortes's 
terms. Clearly their state cannot determine whether the 
photons are numerically distinct so Cortes must turn 
to some other justification for saying that, for example, 
there are two photons in the box. This is provided 
by the, observation that, in this example, the total 
energy of frequency V in the box us 2h-P , together 
with the theory of Q. M. which says that the energy of 
one photon in such a situation is h -P . Thus we surmise 
from these additional considerations* that there are 
two photons present. (48). 
However, it can be argued that two objects possessing 
all properties in common, even spatio-temporal ones, 
may be individuated by their distinct spatio-temporal 
trajectories. To counter this Cortes considersthe 
example of two indistinguishable objects with different 
historial origins but which occupy the same spatial c A 
location for a certain time before separating to different 
46. This states that the wave function for a given 
system of particles gives all the physically 
possible information about that system. i. e. hiýlden 
47 
variable theories are excluded. 




, Ibid p. 500 
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Cortes's argument is that if their history really 
does individuate the objects then it must individuate 
them at P and it should therefore be logically 
possible to decide whether the object that arrived at 
C can-Pfrom A or B or partially from both. This is 
impossible however, and he concludes that history cannot 
always serve to individuate objects, in particular 
it cannot do so for photons. This in fact is a general 
point about the failure of spatio-temporal trajectories 
to individuate in a situation where I. A. fails to hold. 
Thus Cortes concludes that photons are indistinguishable 
non-individuals which can be counted as distinct and 
which therefore violate P. I. I. Further more he shows 
that a proof of the logical form of P. I. I. suitably 
modified to take account of such entities, is impossible 
to carry through successfully. 
Barnette attacked the above argument, regarding the 
inability of spatio-temporal trajectories to individuate 
when I. A. breaks down, on the grounds that it confuses 
epistemological arguments with metaphysical ones. (50) 
The fact that there is no way of telling between t1 
and t2 which object came from A and which from B does not 
compel us to give up the metaphysical claim that the 
predicate I object which is identical with the object 
having history A' is satisfied by one and only one of 
the two objects for all times between t1 and t 2* Given 
that this predicate is satisfied by one and only one 
of the objects at all times, it follows that for all 
times, including t1 through to t2 there is some 
49 
* Ibid p. 503 50. R. L. Barnett (1978) p. 466 
309 
description which holds for one object and not the other. 
Therefore P-I -I - is not violated. 
However, as Teller has correctly pointed out, it is 
not the case that in practice we cannot distinguish the 
two photonso there is in principle nothing which can 
serve to individuate them. (51) This certainly makes a 
difference because metaphysical questions may depend on 
what characteristics are available which could, at least, 
in principle* serve to individuate the particles. Given 
this, and the absence of any such characteristics for 
the photons when they occupy the same state, it is 
begging the question to say that they are individuated 
by differences in some historical prcperty. 
Ginsberg responded to Barnette's paper by turning to 
Q. F. T. and the concepts of creation and annihilation of 
particles to break the spatio-temporal connection 
between the photons at P and those at A, B, C and D in 
Cortes's example (52). Thus he characterised this 
example as follows. The two-photon system can be 
represented by a two-particle state of the quantised 
electro-magnetetic field with each particle regarded as 
an excitation of one of the field modes. Such a mode 
may contain any number of excitation$ which in particle 
language means that any number of photons can occupy 
a field mode simultaneously. Thus a two-particle state 
of the field can be underst6od either as one in which 
one mode has two excitations or as one in which two 
different modes each have one excitation. This point was 
subsequently taken up by Teller as we shall see, 
Thus before t, the field is in a two-particle state 
with one photon, or field quantum, in mode A and one 
in mode B. From t, to t2 the field is in a two-particle 
state with both photons in mode P. After t2 the field 
is still in a two-particle state with one photon in mode 
C and the other in mode D- 
In the Q. F. T. description two photons are destroyed at 
t1 anO two 'new' ones created, these are then (festroyed 
in turn at t2 and two others created. Given this 
5 1. P. Teller (1983) p. 314 
52. A. Ginsberg (1981) p. 487 
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Ginsberg argues that it is false to claim that the 
predicate 'object identical to the object having history 
AI is possessed by either -one of the two photons 
existing between t1 and t2 since neither of these are 
identical to any of the photons existing before t1 
or after t 2' There is also no asymmetry in the relation- 
ship between the new and old photons so the former 
do not differ in their historical connections to other 
objects. 
Thuse granted certain assumptions such as completeness, 
it can be concluded that the photons existing before 
t1 and after t2 are excitations of different field 
modes and do not possess all properties in common. 
The photons existing between t, and t2 are not identical 
to any of these, are excitations of the same field mode 
and have all physical properties in common. Thus 
Ginsberg concludes that these latter photons have 
identical histories and since they are indistinguishable 
yet numerically distinct they violate P. I. I. (53) 
The first point to be made regarding this argument 
concerns the creation and annihilation operators 
which it involves. As we have noted these play a central 
role in Q. F. T. where a process beginning with a particle 
in some initial state and ending with a particle of the 
same kind in some final state, is not regarded as 
involving one and the same thing undergoing a change 
in properties, but as the annihilation of the particle 
in the initial state and the creation of a different 
particle in the final state. Thus, as Ginsberg noted* 
this description implies that particles are not identical, 
in the sense of being the same particle, through 
changes and therefore, precludes the possibility of 
reidenti fi cation through such changes (54). In Q. F. T. 
there is no enduring substance underlying the accidents. 
. This description could be applied to all temporal stages 
leading to an interpretation of motion in terms of a 
sequenc Ie of creations and annihilations. As we have 
53. Ibid p. 491 
54. Ibid p. 489 
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noted this was the view adopted by the Mutakallimun. 
On the other hand, as Teller notes, the objects of 
Q. F. T., separated as they are by the creation and annih- 
ilation processes, can be grouped together to compose 
enduring individuals, Indeed this is exactly what we 
will have to do if we are to describe a world in 
which things undergo change. However, we do not 
have a free hand in this matter, as certain groupings 
will be ruled out on grounds of inconsistency with 
theory or objective fact, we shall return to this 
point shortly. 
C The second point about Ginsberg's approach conerns A 
the assertion that the two photons in the same state 
are numerically distinct. They are if the particle 
interpretation is adopted in which the total energy 
2hV is regarded as being due to two particle-like 
photons each of energy hV . However, in the field, 
or wave, representation the above situation is 
described in terms of the level of excitation of a 
fieL& oscillator being raised by 2 units. In this 
latter case one clearly does not have two distinct 
indiscernible individuals and P. I. I. remains intact. 
This is the line adopted by Teller who takes the 
general view that we can slice reality as finely or as 
coarsely as we like, and how sensible such a slicing 
is depends on the context (55). Thus the entities 
of Q. M. can be regarded in certain circumstances as 
waves and in others as particles. In particular 
Cortes's two-photon example only works because of the 
wave-like aspect of photon behaviour. Thus Teller writes 
'We get a two particle state with both particles in 
exactly the same state only by virtue of a description 
of state by a wave-function which is analysable as two 
one-particle waves superimposed. 
) (56). But then, he 
55. Teller op rit 
56. IbiO p. 314 
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continues, there is nothing to prevent us from 
saying that we have one two-particle wave in the state, 
i. e. slicing reality more coarsely. Instead of the two 
indiscernibles things there is now only one and P. I. I. 
remains true,, Thus he concludes that whether or not 
Leibniz's Principle is violated depends upon an 
arbitrary decision as to how the two-particle state 
shoulO be regarded. 
This conclusion is then applied to Ginsberg's quanturr. 
field theoretic analU, sis. As Ginsberg himself noted 
the creation and annihilation operators can be interpreted 
either in terms of the creation and annihilation of 
particles or in terms of increasing or decreasing the 
level of excitation of the field oscillators by one unit. 
These units, or field quanta., are particle-like in 
certain respects, such as their discrete nature, but 
wave-like in others. Thus, as we have noted, Q. F. T. 
indulges just as much in wave-particle duality as 
fyt quantized Q. m. and the two interpretations above 
correspond to the two ways of arriving at a quantised 
field briefly discussed on p. X66 - 
Therefore, in the Cortes example, between t1 and t2 one 
could say either that there are two photons, or field 
quanta, in the same state, or that the level of 
excitation of a field oscillator has been increased 
by two units. The former case represents a violation 
of P. I. I. the latter does not. According to Teller it 
is arbitrary how the state is regarded. There is one 
total oscillatory state which can be regarded either 
as having no parts or as being analysable in an 
infinite number of ways into various components 
possessing certain individuating characteristics. The 
analogy he gives is that of two waves travelling in 
opposite directions. Where they cross we can say that 
we either have two waves in the same state or one partless 
wave of amplitude equal to the sum of the amplitudes of 
the waves before the crossing. 
The fact that the level of excitation of the field 
oscillators can only be changed in discrete units of 
hv does not compel us to adopt the particle interpreta- 
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tion any more than the fact that a certain bank may 
accept deposits or withdrawals in units of C1,000 
compels us to regard a deposit of E2,000 as two 91,000's. 
In other words the mere fact that the total energy 
in the two-photon state is 2hV does not compel us to 
say that there are two distinct entities existing 
in the same state. 
Finally, for the photons to violate P. I. I., they cannot 
be observed as distinct, for the 'obvious' reason that 
any spatio-temporal difference would serve to distin- 
guish them. This example must therefore be an unobserved 
state, and- since such states enter the theory as 
superpositions of an infinite number of other states, one 
is faced with the question of whether this state actually 
occurs. 
Thus Teller's overall conclusion is that the question 
of whether Q. M. refutes P. I. I. is one whose answer 
depends upon an arbitrary decision as to how certain 
states of the theory are to be regarded. 
Although this approach is, we believe, broadly correct, 
it contains several confused or dubious points. 
Firstly, Teller's analogy between the two photon 
example and two classical waves on a rope should not be 
pushed too far. As he indicatest but fails to make 
explicit, we get a two-particle state with both particles 
in the same state only by virtue of the Superposition 
Principle which requires us to regard any state as the 
superposition of two, or more, other states and conversely 
any twoor more, states may be superposed to give a new 
state. The fact that a similar principle holds for 
classical wave systems invite8 an obvious analogy but 
the difficulties involved in regarding the wave-function 
in a classical manner are well known (58) and as Dirac 
has 
said 'The analogies are ... liable to 
be misleading'. 
(59) It is the Superposition Principle which should be 
considered in any discussion of Cortes's example, rather 
58. See Jammer op cit p. 33 and p. 43-44 
59. Dirac (1978) p. 14 
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than the somewhat confusing notion of wave-like 
behaviour, and as we shall see when we come to our 
own account, this allows us to generalize the 
discussion to include fermions. 
Secondly, any metaphysical slicing of reality should 
be undertaken with caution. Teller himself has noted 
Kripke's argument that the answers to the question 
of which groups of temporal parts into larger 
individuals are sensible may be objectively determined 
and are not just a matter of convention (60). Neverthe- 
less Teller appears to believe in the doctrine of temporal 
parts which holds that for every period of time that 
an individual thing exists there is a temporal part 
of that thing, which is unique to that period of time. 
Thus he writes I ... we can string together distinct 
parts in various ways to make wholes. This holds for 
temporal parts of objects conventionally conceived. 
We can consider temporal stages as independently existing 
things which can be grouped together in larger 
individuals in various ways, which ones counting as 
sensible depending on the circumstances'. (. 61) 
This doctrine has been attacked by Chisholm on the 
grounds that it is not adequate to the experiences 
we have of the unity of certain things, such as our- 
selves, that it multiplies things beyond necessity 
and thus violates requirements of economy and simplicity 
and finally that the case for the doctrine is based on 
a false analogy between space and time (62). This 
analogy states that just as an object that is extended 
through space at a given time has, for each portion of 
space that it occupies, a spatial part that is unique 
to that portion of space at that time, so any obje 
' 
ct 
that persists through a period of time has, for each 
sub-period of time that it exists, a temporal part 
that is unique to that sub-period of time. However, 
Chisholm argues, we cannot say about time everything we 
60. Teller, preprint of (1983) p. 7 
61. IbiO p. 7. 
62. R. M. Chisholm in M. K. Munitz (1971) p. 14-15 
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can say about space because although one and the same 
thing can be at two different times in one and the 
same place, one and the same thing cannot be in two 
different places at one and the same time. 
Chisholm is wrong on this last point. The disanalogy 
is not between space and time considered in themselves, 
but exists only as regards the relations between objects 
in space and time since the Superposition Principle 
implies that there is a sense in which it can be said that 
quantal particles can be in two different places at the 
same time. Nevertheless the general thrust of Chisholm's 
argument is sound; the ill-considered slicing of 
reality and unrestrained grouping of temporal parts 
can lead to bizarre results. (63) 
Teller also fails to emphasise that it is not just 
the discrete nature of their energy which leads us to 
regard the field quanta as particle like; they also 
possess momentum and satisfy the dispersion law 
characteristic of a particle of zero rest mass. His 
analogy with integral financial transitions is therefore 
misleading and fails to support the view that the particle 
and field interpretations can be given equal weight, 
at least formally. 
Finally, as regards the argument concerning unobserved 
states, such states are required to violate the weak 
form of P. I. I. only; the strong form can, of course, 
still be refuted if there is a spatio-temporal difference 
between the photons. 
This brings us on to our own view in which we argue 
that the question as to whether weak P. I. I. is violated 
or not by Q. M. is dependent upon the way in which 'mixed 
states' are interpreted in the theory. 
63. Thus the doctrine of temporal parts has been used 
to defend the theological doctrine of original sin 
by arguing that God could regard you, I or anyone 
else together with Adam as merely temporal parts 
of one 'moral individual I and could. therefore punish 
you, I or anyone else f or the sins committed 
by 
Adam. Ibid p. 13. 
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First of all quantal particles, like their counter- 
parts in C. M. clearly violate the str6ng form of the 
Principle since, at the very least, they possess all 
intrinsic properties in common and are therefore indis- 
tinguishable, in the weak sense, yet countably distinct. 
As regards weak P. I. I. we can say the following. 
We noted in section 3.3 of Chapter 3 that the general 
ket for an assembly of particles can be interpreted as 
corresponding to a state for the assembly for which 
one cannot say that each particle is in its own state 
but only that it is partly in several states - In 
other words each particle 'partakes' of all the states 
of all the other particles, and this result is true 
not only for bosons, such as photons, but for fernions 
also. 
Thus, f or example, we have noted that two bosons or 
two fermions distributed over two distinct one-particle 
states partake with equal probabilistic weight in the 
superposition demanded by symmetriaation or anti-symmet- 
rization. In the boson case the wave function for the 
assembly is 
I 
%PS> - -L a-,. I ,aýI 
o_', >, 
z- >41 a7- >1 
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With two f ermions we have 
;z 
aI CLI a ;; P I CL > 
and statistical operators, 




In each case the two particles, bosons or fermions, 
respectively, have the same statistical operator. Thus 
as we also noted in section 3.3. they possess the same 
one-particle probability distribution. In the fermion 
case, as we have seen, this is given by 
C9 -IjJa ja 
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for particle 1 and 
6jci) 
for particle 2. In other words the observable 
distribution of the two particles is identical and 
hence they cannot be distinguished by any one particle 
measurement. (64) For example, the probability 
of finding particle 1 at position I, and particle 2 
at position 7- is the same as the probability of 
finding 1 at Z and 2 at 11 . This is true 
also for other observables such as energy and momentum 
and thus one can conclude that the two particles cannot 
be distinguished by a measurement of their one-particle 
properties (65) - 
It is in this sense that two particlest bosons or 
fermions, distributed over two one-particle states 
might be said to be in the 'same' state, namely in 
the sense that they possess the same statistical 
operators) the same one-particle probability distribution 
and thus cannot be distinguished by measurements made 
on one particle onlyo If this is accepted then, as 
we noted in Chapter 30 the Impenetrability Assumption 
cannot be taken to hold for quantal particles and since 
the validity of weak P. IoIo rests on this assumption 
this cannot be taken to hold either. 
If this were correct then the argument between 
Cortes et al over the two-photon example would be 
redundant since the particles are according to the 
above account 'in' each otherSstates before 
64. Such measurements involve operators of the orm 
Qý0 
-1 on the product space 
-ý4 jG 
-4-t?. - 
where'ýtj and are the one particle Hilbert 
spaces, QL is the operator pertaining to one 
particle whose states are described by vectors in 
one Hilbert space and I is the unit vector in the 
other Hilbert space. 
65. See H. Margenau (1950) p. 441 
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t1 (66). It could then be concluded that P. T. T- 
violated by the photons, not only between t1ar. r-- t2 
but also prior to t1 and after t 2, * in fact at all 
times. Thus the situation depicted by Cortes would 
be regarded as both unrealizable and unnecessary. 
On the other hand, however.. it has been argued 
that Q. V,. supports P. I. I. at least for fermions, 
since the Pauli Exclusion Principle implies that no two 
fermions can exist in the same one-particle state, or 
a quantum state in which two fermions have identical 
sets of one-particle quantum numbers cannot exist 
(67). In other words for two fermions in the same 
one-particle state the two particle probability 
distribution is zero i. e. Q ") C 1. ý' I) _= 0 
since the anti-symmetric wave-function vanishes when 
both fermions are in the same one-particle state. Thus 
the probability of finding particle 1 and particle 2 
at the same position, r, say is zero. 
Clearly the Exclusion Principle is here regarded as a 
generalisation of I. A. for Q. Ni. and it can therefore 
be concluded that weak P. I. I. is not violated for 
fermions precisely because the results above are 
interpreted as saying that fermions cannot possess all 
properties, in particular spatio-temporal ones, in 
common. A consideration of the statistical correlation 
(68) between fermions thus appears to lead to the 
conclusion that weak P. I. I. isp in this sense, supported 
by Q. M. 
66. One can also question the attribution of distincto 
well defined trajectories to the photons, given their 
supposed 'non-localisability'. The difficulties of 
constructing a position operator in the first quantised 
theory which satisfies the Newton-Wigner-Wightman 
conditions are well known - In the second quantised 
theory localisation involves the creation of addit- 
ional particles and so all particleso not just photons, 
are in this sense 'non-localisable'. See F. Redhead 
(1977) p. 72 for references and further discussion. 
67. Y. Shadmi op cit 
68. The operators then relate to two-particle observables 
and are of the formal(99z i. e. the tensor product of 
one particle observables pertaining to each particle. 
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Thus, onthe one hand, a consideration of the one 
particle distribution seems to imply that weak 
P. I. I. is violated, whereas on the other, a consideration 
of the two particle distribution suggests that it is 
not, that it is in fact supported by Q. V. This apparent 
conflict is in fact a result of a play, of sorts, on 
the word. I state (69) and it can be resolved as we 
saw in the last chapter, through an examination of 
the nature of the 'states' referred to in each account. 
We noted that the statistical operators 9 and 11 rz. 
in either case, represent in fact 'mixed states'rather 
than pure states and the first argument only works 
if the former are regarded as states I on a par with 
the latter. However ej and ý, cannot be regarded as 
state ascriptions because they represent 'improper 
mixtures' rather than pure states (70) and so one 
cannot attribute pure states to each individual particle 
in this case. Therefore, the question of the particles 
Sbake_ 
being somehow in 'the same'Asimply does not arise. 
It is important to realise that the whole crux of the 
matter lies in the fact that one cannot distinguish pure 
states and mixed states by means of observations made 
on one of the particles alone. The expectation value 
for any observable 0 on the pure state contains, 
in general, 'interference' or 'cross product' terms 
which do not occur in the expression for the expectation 
value of () in the mixed state. However these terms 
vanish when 0 is of the form Q4 0 
T-) 
where Q4 is any 
C-40-CO 
observable referring to one particle only. Observables 
69. Thus D 'Espagnat has discussed some aspects of this 
'play on words' noting that for some authors a 
statistical operator describes a state whereas 
for 
others it describes at best a mixture of ttates. 
D'Espagnat op cit p. 100 Z: V 
70. Ibid p. 61, el and are not idempotent 
i. e. 
7. -Oa. lkc 
ksc"-ssý.. ke-i-e- Les "e- o-ss-t-me e-L"- 
Fai-EUdes ate CIACLSL-ýA ucsý. OWe SO L--ýe 
dCLSS 4 06serv", We, 
etot VW-SL-eccýEzl 
&v of 
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such as this, which are unable to Oistinguish pure and 
mixed states are called 'insensitive I. Furthermore, it 
can be shown that the expectation value of Q: 01 when 
the assembly is in a mixed state is equal to the expec- 
tation value of Qý in the state represented by t2, or 
In other words pure states behave like mixtures with 
respect to measurements performed on one particle only 
(71). 
Therefore in order to distinguish between pure states 
and mixed states one must perform a correlation measure- 
ment between observables relating to particle 1 and 
observables relating to particle 2 i. e. one must 
measure the expectation value of an observable of 
the form Q, (2) R2 (72). The joint position measurements 
in the two fermion system, relating to the probability 
of finding both fermions at the same position, whose 
results are encapsulated in the Exclusion Principle, are 
precisely measurements of this sort. As we have noted, 
it is through a consideration of the statistical 
correlation exhibited by two fermions that the conclusion 
is drawn that P. I. I. is supported by Q. M. 
However no such conclusion can in fact be drawn since 
the relational properties involved in these correlations 
betweenthe particles lie outside the domain of appli- 
cability of P. I. I. In other words, the fact that no 
two fermions can exist in the same one-particle state 
expresses a relational property of the particles, to 
the effect that if one fermion is in a particular one- 
particle state all other fermions are excluded from 
that state. We noted in Chapter 1 that Leibniz attempted 
to reduce all relationsýin particular position, 
to predicates of the individual anO it is these latter 
properties, such as the one-particle properties discussed 
above, to which p. I. I. applies. It simply cannot 
encompass entities or collections of entities which 
manifest the irreducibly relational properties 
71. Note the comment in Jammer op cit p. 479 fn 
14 
72. For such observables to be 'sensitive' in this 
sense neither Q nor R must a-c-L- 0& cL-A eý 
eA S to-Ee- 0 
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rqarjý. tw consiOered here, and so the question 
A 
its vali(ýIity 
or otherwise cannot be well formed. 
Thus our overall conclusion regarding the status of 
P. I. I. in Q. M., given the existence of these 'entangled 
states', is as follows. 
First of all, although the particles have the same 
statistical operators, with regard to such states, and 
the same one-particle probability distribution, the 
question as to whether they are in 'the same' state, 
thereby violating P. I. I., is not a meaningful one to 
ask since the particles cannot be attributed with pure 
states. This is not true, of course, for states of 
the assembly which are simple products of one-particle 
states. In the case of two bosons in the same one- 
particle state, for example, the wave function is 
given by I V> =I CL II : ý> I ct-'Z > and one can 
attribute definite states to the individual particles. 
However the statispl operators representing the 
b 
entangled states givenýtor example, 
I \P, > 0ý 0,1 1 4, A > 
represent I improper mixtures I and so one cannot 
associate pure states with the individual particles 
when in such entangled states. 
Secondly, if we consider the two-particle probability 
distribution and those measurements relating to 
correlations between the particles then we are still 
not entitled to come to a definite conclusion regarding 
the validity of P. I. I. because such considerations 
involve the sorts of relational properties which are 
outside the scope of the Principle. These properties 
may be called 'inherently relational' since they 
cannot be reduced to non-relational properties 
(73) 
73. This can be expressed in the notion of Isupervenience' 
in the sense that inherently relational properties 
do not supervene upon the non-relational properties 
of the relato-. The view that there are such 
properties has been called the 'doctrine of relation- 
al holism' by Paul Teller, who recently argued, at 
the 1984 Annual Conference of the British Society 
for the Philosophy of Science, that Q. F. incorporates 
tois doctrine in an all pervasive way. 
I& 514-oJet 
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and the fact that they are incorporated in Q. I,,,. is a 
consequence of the theory's non-classical holism, as 
exemplified by the 'entangled states'. 
Therefore the question as to whether weak P. I. I. is 
vali6 or not is simply obviated by Q. M.,. in the sense 
that one cannot say that it is either true or false 
since it 6oes not apply to those particles which are 
described by the theory. 
As we discussed in Chapter 3 one interpretation of 
the non-classical statistical correlations which 
quantal particles display is that they should be 
regarded as 'non-individuals', in the sense that they 
are part of some 'grand cosmological' collective (74). 
Clearly P. I. I. is inapplicable in this case since it 
does not apply to parts of wholes. Indeed one could 
now try to argue again that Q. M. supports P. I. I. 
since the indistinguishable particles have become 
identical in the sense of being parts of some global 
'thing'. This is exactly the sort of reasoning 
which underpins Teller's argument regarding the wave- 
like behaviour of particles and its implication of 
Opartless wholes' which are not counter examples of 
P. I. I. 
one could in fact go even further and employ the 
Leibnizian argument that as each particle includes 
among its set of predicates all the states of all the 
other particles of the same kind, then from the 
viewpoint of the Complete Notion of an Individual, there 
is simply one global individual - the collective of 
all particles of the same kind, and the set of 
predicates of this individual, contained in its complete 
notion, includes the states of all the particles. 
However this argument does not take account of the 
fact that the energy and momentum associated with the 
assembly are integer multiples of the energy and 
momentum of one particle. Thus to take the example of 
two particles in a box, we can say that there are 
74. post op cit p. 20 
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two particles in the box because the total energy 
and momentum are twice what they would be if there 
were only one particle in the box. It is on this 
basis that we say that the particles are countably 
distinct and yet 'entangled' and thus P. I. I. is 
not applicable. (75) 
There are two further points to note. Firstly in 
the case of paraparticles the statistical weights are 
not the same so they do not partake equally of each 
others states. However, in this case the restriction 
to symmetric observables, embodied in the I. P., 
implies that there is no way of telling which particle 
is in which state - 
Secondly our account above does not hold if a hidden 
variable theory is introduced since in such cases 
the particles may be regarded as having definite 
properties of their own, and thus as being in 
definite states, even when the assembly is in an entangled 
state (76) - However, we shall not consider such 
possibilities here (77). 
Thus, to repeat our conclusion, Q. M. effectively 
sidesteps the question of the validity of P. I. I. since, 
as a consequence of their holistic behaviour, quantal 
particles lie outside the Principle's domain of 
applicability. In this respect we are in broad 
agreement with Teller and Cortes although we believe 
that our account illuminates more clearly the underlying 
reasons for this conclusion. 
4.3 Essentialism and Natural Kinds 
We have, at several places in this thesis, referred 
to particles 'of the same kind' without fullY 
explaining what we mean by this phrase. It is our 
intention in this section to attempt just such an 
75. cf Yargenau op cit p. 441 
76. D'Espagnat op cit p. 79 
77. Ibid Chll and Jammer op cit Ch. 7 
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explication and to examine briefly the doctrine of 
essentialism as it applies to elementary particles. 
The central idea of recent essentialist accounts (78) 
is that not all of the members of the set of properties 
predicated of an object are logically on a par with 
respect to that object's identity, but that there 
exists a subset of properties which are necessary to the 
objectis identity in the sense that if any member of 
the subset were absent the object would not be an object 
of that kind. The properties in this subset are 
called essential properties and their possession 
uniquely characterises a particular natural kind. Those 
properties predicated of the object which are not 
members of this subset can be called 'accidental' 
properties. 
Such accounts find a particularly useful role in 
characterising the conditions necessary for the re- 
identification of an object through time. Thus Hirsch 
has argued that '... the core idea of the identity 
of an articulated object is simply the idea of 
a continuous space-time path that is traced under an 
articulative E term'. (79), where 1E term broadly 
means 'essential term'. Likewise Brody has recently 
said that a necessary condition for an object o 
existent at tý to be identical with the object o existent 
at t is that I ... o must have retained some of 
its properties that it had at t, the ones that o 
cannot lose without going out of existence'(80). 
In other words for two objects at different times 
to be identical, in the sense of being actually the 
same 6bject, the object at the later time must possess 
the same subset of essential properties as the object 
at the earlier time. This distinction between essential 
ane accidential properties then allows us to Oistinguish 
between substantial and accidental change. The former 
78. P. T. Geach (1962) p. 44 and Ch. 2 in general; D. 
Wiggins (1967) op cit; E. Hirsch in Munitz 
(1971)p. 31 
79. Hirsch op cit p. 49 
80. B. Brody (1980) p. 83 
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occurs through the loss of essential properties, the 
latter through the loss of accidental ones. 
This doctrine and its associated notion of natural 
kinds, receives a great deal of plausibility from, the 
classification of elementary particles into different 
species characterised. by differences in the values of 
a certain subset of properties (81)., which we have.. 
following Jauch* called 'intrinsic', such as charge, 
rest-mass* spin etc. Indeed it may be that these are 
the only secure examples of natural kinds as we shall 
see - 
so, a typical, and plausiblee instance of a natural 
kind is that of 'being an electron'. Bearing in mind 
Putnam's distinction between the ontology of natural 
kinds and the semantics of natural kind words (82), an 
account of natural kinds can be given in terms of 
their properties thus: It is assumed that out Of all 
the possible properties which can be predicated of 
an electron there exists a ceftain subs; 
, 
ýLwhi, fý makes 6C e, CLet ejeC&rVA 4ý, t Celer-&MA, -rkLf-,, L C: &-keM CIL J-e- Ct Co 4U AC I-L 04 the predicate 'electron' can be applied. These., U 
intrinsic, properties are, or will be, comparatively 
few in number and are fixed by the relevant physical 
theory pertaining to the electron. This last point 
is an important one to which we shall return shortly. 
Thus the essential properties of a particle are 
those which we have, up until now, been calling its 
'intrinsic' properties, and this subset corresponds 
to the Lockean real essence of the natural 
kind concerned. 
In the case of elementary particles the real and 
nominal essences are identical, although this may 
not, of course. be true for other putative examples of 
natural kinds. Gold for example possesses a number of 
81. P. E. Hodgson (1980) 
81. H. Putnam in N. E. Kiefer and M. K. Munitz (1970) 
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properties.. such as colour, ductility etc, which 
indicate to an expert' whether or not the object 
they are observing is gold. These properties constitute 
the nominal essence of gold. However, underlying these 
there are others, concerned with the atomic structure 
of the element which correspond to its real essence. 
The reductive programme in science then ensures that 
the number of members of the subset corresponding to 
the real essence is less than the number in the subset 
corresponding to the nominal essence. Thus the nominal 
essence 'springs from' the real essence. As we shall 
now see it is the contraction of their nominal to 
their real essences which allows elementary particles 
to be regarded as perhaps the only true examples of 
natural kinds - 
it has been argued that the members of the subset of 
'essential' properties are no more important or 
necessary than any other in the general set of 
properties which can be predicated of an object. Thus 
Mellor has written. ) 
'So-called 'essential' properties 
are ... really no more essential than any other 
shared properties of a kind. They are just properties 
ascribed by the primitive predicates in a comprehensive 
deductive theory of the kind'. (83) If, as Pýellor, 
claims, the reductive programme in science required 
deducibility then the doctrine of natural kinds is 
caught on the horns of a dilemma. If deducibility does 
not hold then some of the macroscopic properties of a 
kind are not deducible from its microscopic structure and 
reference to things of that kind is still required. 
But then, of course, the whole reductive programme, taken 
to be characteristic of modern science collapses. 
If, on the other hand, such properties are deducible then 
they occur in any possible world that the microscopic 
properties occur in. Therefore, if the microscopic 
properties are 'essential' in this sense of being true 
of the object in all possible worlds then so too are 
83. D. Mellor (1977) p. 311 
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all the macroscopic properties which they explain and 
the term 'essential' loses its force. In other words 
Mellor's argument is that the deducibility required 
by the reductive programme carries the essential nature 
of the properties from the subset to the set as a whole. 
This analysis is correct in so far as the properties 
constituting the nominal essence are deducible from 
those constituting the real essence, However, the 
former set is not identical, ýoý&4the set composed of all 
possible properties which can be predicated of the 
object. The size and shape, for example, cannot be 
deduced from the microscopic properties comprising 
the real essence alone -the interaction of the object 
with others may have to be considered for example. 
There may also be microscopic properties which do not 
belong to the latter subset. In other words there 
are properties, both macro- and microscopic which 
are not included in the subsets comprising the nominal 
ancý real essences respectively, and which are not 
necessary for the object to be a thing of that kind. 
We are thus entitled to regard the properties in 
these subsets as essential. Of course Mellor is correct 
in saying that the nominal essence properties are 
deducible from those constituting the real essence and 
that therefore both sets should be termed essential. 
This is exactly what an essentialist does, with the 
addition that the two sets are distinguished by the pre- 
fixes 'nominal' and 'real'. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether Mellor's attack 
carries any weight in cases where the nominal and real 
essences are the same and there is therefore no chain 
of deducibility running between them. Examples of these 
sorts of natural kinds are elementary particles whose 
intrinsic properties constitute the real essence 
but 
which do not appear to have nominal essences in the 
way gold, for exampledoes. 
Elementary particles can be regarded as fundamental, 
if the reductive programme in elementary particle 
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physics is accepted (84) in the sense of lying on the 
bottom runlof some explanatory reductive ladder. They 
can be thought of as 'irreducible' in the theory, or 
conjunction of theories, in terms of which the 
explanation is expressed. of course the irreducible 
nature of theee fundamental particles is not 
absolute, since it may be revealed that a supposedly 
fundamental particle is not fundamental at all but composed 
of some other, more basic., particles. A good example 
is the proton which was for many years regarded as fun("- 
amental but is now considered to be composed of three 
quarks. In this case the chain of deducibility is res- 
tored and the proton's real essence becomes the nominal 
essence of the quarks to be explained or deduced in 
terms of their intrinsic or essential properties. Thus 
the reductive programme can create new natural kinds 
and what counts as a natural kind is contingent upon 
the state of physics at the time . The absence of any 
guarantee that our present theories are complete or 
'true' implies that the notion of a natural kind can 
only, at best, be a relative notion, relative, that 
is, to a given physical theory. 
This idea is strongly rejected by Mellor, although 
with no good reason so far as I can see (85). Fales, 
however, has argued that I... what natural kinds we 
believe there to be at any time will be relative to 
whatever most fundamental theory is at that time 
believed to be true; and what natural kinds there are 
is determined by whatever such theory actually is 
true'. (86) In order to generate a natural kind class- 
ification which avoids the Lockean problems of border- 
84. There is of course the 'bootstrap approach' to 
elementary particle theory, although this has 
decreased in popularity with the advent and 
develop- 
ment of quark theory. See Redhead 
(1980) p. 298. 
85. Mellor op cit p. 311 
86. E. Fales (1979), p. 350. 
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line cases and gradual substantial change we must look 
tothose theories lying at the lower levels of some 
reductive hierarchy. The clearest examples of these 
are the elementary particle theories of physics and, 
as Fales shows, such theories do indeed determine 
a problem free classification for the entities in 
their domain. They do this precisely in the way we 
have indicated above, by distinguishing, through their 
laws and symmetry principles, between the intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties of the particles and constructing 
a natural kind taxonomy based around the former. Thus 
Fales contends that at the most fundamental level 
elementary particles are classified into types 
in just such a way as to precisely reflect the 
systematically discriminable interaction-governing 
properties which they display'. (87) 
A commitment to a particular fundamental theory 
therefore implies a commitment to certain restrictions 
which determine how the fundamental entities belonging 
to the domain of the theory may be classified. It 
is the theories of physics which provide the sense 
in which it can be said that particular fundamental 
entities possess essential properties by distinguishing 
between the necessary and contingent truths about 
these entities. Thus '... putative natural-kind 
classifications are parasitic upon putatively true 
theories and are, like the theories themselves, subject 
to revision under pressure from empirical information 
about the world '. (88) 
However., although certain of the possible natural kind 
classifications of the fundamental entities of a 
particular theory may be seen to be infelicitous when 
viewed against the background of the theory, this 
does 
not mean that the theory uniquely determines which 
classification is applicable. For example, certain gauge 
theories in elementary particle physics apparently 
87. Ibid p. 364 
88. Ibid p. 350 
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'unify' different entities by reducing them to one, 
more fundamental entity, thus reducing two, or rrore 
natural kinds to one. Different kinds of particles are 
then regarded as merely different states of one kind of 
more basic particle these states transforming into one 
another under the gauge transformations. A good 
example of this procedure is the way in which neutrons 
and. protons are regarded as merely two states of a 
single particle of a different kind, called the 
nucleon, with these states transforming under isospin 
rotations. However, as Redhead has pointed out, 
although this is a convenient way of talking, it is not 
necessarily a reduction in our ontology: 'All we can 
say is that if the gauge symmetry were exact then 
physics could not decide for us which particle was 
a proton and which a neutron, but this is not the 
same thing as saying that neutrons are protons, nor does 
it compel us to the view that neutrons and protons are 
just two states of a single entity (the nucleon). ' (89) 
one can conclude from this that arguments based on 
gauge symmetries do not help to settle the question of 
whether there are many natural kinds of elementary 
particles. 
Another example is that of the coloured and para- 
quark descriptions of hadron behaviour as we noted CA 
cltap eet- Z- These descriptions may be regarded as 
'roughly' (90) equivalent in the sense that in certain 
cases, depending on the choice of observables in the 
latter, they have the same states, but they differ as we 
have noted on p.. Z! ýV as regards the natural kind 
classification they suggest. These examples support 
the general conclusion that although a theory may 
impose certain constraints upon the classification 
into natural kinds of the entities in its domain, and 
although this classification may have to be revised 
in the light of changes to the theory, the relationship 
between the two is not such that the theory uniquely 
determines the classification - metaphysical 
factors Fay 
89. Redhead (1983) p. 31 
90. Greenberg and Nelson op cit p. 79 
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also play a role in deciding which particular 
classification is to be adopted. 
4.4 The Undetermination of Theories 
We have emphasised that although there is an ontological 
difference between the particle and field representations 
of elementary particles there is no observable 
difference between them in the sense that no experiment 
could ever decide which is correct. This is therefore 
an example of the underdetermination of theories by 
empirical data. By this we mean that two theories may 
both be compatible with all actual and possible 
observations and yet be incompatible with one another 
as regards their ontological foundations - In such a 
situation the question as to which of the theories is 
'true' isempiricallYundecidable in the sense that there 
is no difference in the distribution of truth values 
over those propositions of the theories deemed 
observational. 
Quine has put forward the strong thesis that all 
theories are underdetermined by the data (91) whereas 
Newton-Smith argues in favour Of the weaker position 
that there can be cases of underdetermination (92). 
The response to this situation can swing between two 
extremes: the Ignorance response concludes that there 
are facts which are inaccessible and can simply 
never be de6ided by observation. The Arrogance response 
on the other hand, holds that if we cannot know about 
something then there is nothing to know about, 
i. e. there is no matter of fact at stake. Adherence 
to the latter implies a restriction of the Law of 
the Excluded Fiddle to exclude empirically undecidable 
propositions (93). Given the number of cases of 
underde termination this could be a rather severe constraint. 
91. W. O. Quine (1970) p. 179 
92. Newton Smith w. (1980) p. 68-73 and p. 
231-242 
93. Ibid p. 232 
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Furthermore adopting the Arrogance response has the 
consequence that empirically undecidable propositions 
cannot be regarded as expressing hypotheses about the 
facts. Some account of the role these propositions 
play in the theories containing them is then called for. 
Unless such an extreme positivist approach is taken, 
there are, of course, other factors, of a metaphysical 
or heuristic nature, which may be relevant in 
deciding between observationally indistinguishable 
theories. Thus the particle approach to quantum 
physics involves an ontological commitment to T. I. 
and any philosophical arguments against this notion 
may serve to adjudicate against this approach in favour 
of the field representation. Two theories may also 
Oiffer as regards their heuristic value (94). Thus 
as we have noted, the coloured quark description, 
in leading to the development of quantum chromodynamics 
was more heuristically fruitful than the formally 
equivalent para-quark model. Redhead has emphasised the 
fruitfulness of the field as compared to the particle, 
representation in Q. F. T. (95)_ other factors, like 
simplicity, may also play some role, although the 
difficulties involved in producing effective criteria 
of simplicity and economy are well known. 
We . can give several other examples of underde termination, 
taken from the history of physics. Thus the electrical 
theories of Maxwell and the Continental Physicists, 
although involving different formalisms and representations 
of the phenomena, were completely equivalent empirically. 
As Hesse has remarked 'At any given point of 
development it was generally possible to say that the 
empirical facts were explained as well by this continental 
action-at-distance theory as by the British fields'. 
(96) - 
However, the two theories were not equivalent heuris- 
tically or as regards the ease with which they expresse(ý 
certain phenomena; the field approach, involving 
94. Post has emphasised the role of heuristic guidelines 
'01 in the construction of theories'/, 
Jas regards inter- 
theory relations H. R. Post (1971) p. 213 
95. X. Pedhead. (1983) 
96. M. Hesse in E. McMullin (1978) p. 129 
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continuous action, was obviously more suited to the 
representation of continuous phenomena, rather than 
oiscrete which found easier expression in the 
continental theory. Thus ' ... the two theories were 
not equivalent for all scientifc purposes. Theories 
in science are sometimes rejected, not on grounds of 
inconsistency with empirical facts, but on the grounds 
of complexity, incoherence and lack of predictive power' 
(97) 
Another example of a pair of metaphysically incompatible 
yet empirically equivalent theories are the classical 
atomist and Boscovichean theories of matter. In 
simple terms, the former regarded matter as ultimately 
consisting of impenetrable corpuscules. This was 
rejected by Boscovich who adopted the view that matter 
was ultimately composed of point centres of force and 
should be regarded as active rather than inert. (98) 
By a suitable adjustment of their perioOic properties 
these centres of force could be mathematically 
defined so as to produce exactly the same physical effects 
as the extended impenetrable atoms. The difference 
between these two approaches was therefore not one 
which could be decided by observation alone. As Faraday 
realised (99), it was all a matter of choosing a 
particular ontology which would satisfy the demands of 
consistency and also provide the most effective heuristic 
aid to the future development of the subject. 
As Newton-Smith has pointed out (100) such cases of 
underdetermination clearly present problems to a realist 
who is going to want to say that theories are either 
true or false as determined by virtue of how the world 
'really' is, that if the theory is true then its 
theoretical terms are causally connected to certain 
observable (in the widest sense) phenomena which 
constitute the evidence of the theory, aný', finally 
that we can 'know I whether it is true or not. Thus a 
97. Ibid p. 129 
98. R. J. Boscovich (1763) see P. Yi. Harman (1982)p. 82 
99. M. Faraday (1844) p. 136 
100. Newton-Smith op cit p. 230 
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realist is led to hold that there is something in 
virtue of which either the particle or the field 
approach is true. However, there is no empirical 
(the reason for our emphasis will become apparent 
shortly) evidence for thinking that either description 
is more likely to be true than the other, which is 
incompatible with the last component in the 
characterisation of the realist position. To resolve 
this dilemma the realist must, according to Newton- 
Smith, either weaken this component and adopt the 
Ignorance response stated above, or weaken the first 
component and adopt the Arrogance response. The 
former maintains that those propositions responsible for 
underdetermination are either true or false but we 
cannot know which they are. The latter response 
involves dropping the assumption that there are things 
about the world in virtue of which empirically undecidable 
propositions are either true or false. As we have noted 
eke- this may involve restrictingA scope of the Law of 
Excluded Middle to exclude such propositions, and 
it can conceivably be asked of the ignorant realist 
what are the grounds for asserting that there exist 
the inaccessible facts required by this approach. 
However, these undesirable consequences may follow 
only because Newton-Smith is being unduly restrictive 
in claiming that '... nothing is going to count in 
favour of ... ' (101) one or other of the pair of 
empirically equivalent theories. As we have seen there 
are considerations, other then empirical ones, which 
may promote one theory over an9ther. Thus the realist 
may weaken or stretch the first component above by 
requiring that a theory should be approximately true 
in the sense that its empirical, theoretical, and 
metaphysical claims represent, with a certain 
degree of 
faithfulness, the way the world really is. A theory 
may then be true in certain respects but 
false in 
101. Ibiel p. 232 
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others. Thus a realist might regard a theory which 
involves a commitment to a philosophical position which 
he finds untenable as false or at least a worse 
approximation to the truth than one whose metaphysical 
commitments- he agrees with. Of course, this may be as 
much a relative appraisal as those based on simplicity 
criteria are. 
A claim which is less dubious and open to criticism 
would be to say that a theory which is more 
heuristically fruitful than another represents a closer 
approximation to the truth. Thus, for example, it 
seems plausible to claim that the coloured. quark theory 
is 'more true', or a closer approximation to the truth, 
than the paraquark theory because, unlike the latter 
it generated interesting consequences and novel 
preductions which were subsequently confirmed 
experimentally. A similar claim might be made for the 
field, as compared to the particle, approach 
in quantum physics. Thus by retreating from the 
requirement of truth to that of approximate truth a 
realist can introduce non-empirical considerations which 
may tip the balance one way or the other in the weighing 
up of two underdetermined theories. 
As well as playing an important role in theory 
appraisal metaphysics also has a crucial role to play 
in the generation of new theories and the advancement of 
science in general, as Watkins has emphasised. This role 
is I... to prepare the way for the most important 
scientific a6vances of all '. (102) Thus he argued that 
if one theory is to effect a 'revolutionary' reduction 
of another then their metaphysical components must 
conflict. Harman has also emphasised the role of 
metaphysics in the areiculation of theories, through a 
detailed analysis of historical case studies (103) - 
our conclusion thus giveysupport to this 'counter 
revolution' against logical empiricism, which argues 
that metaphysical considerations can and do play a 
102. J. W. N. Watkins (1975) p. 115 
103. Harman OP cit. 
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fun(lamental role in the articulation.. appraisal an,., ' 
advancement of scientific theories. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The primary concern of this thesis has been the 
inter-relationship between physics and that part of 
philosophy, or perhaps more properly, metaphysics, 
which deals with the individuality of things in the 
world of external perceptible phenomena. We have 
argued that either one of two broad views of individual- 
ity, which we have labelled 'transcendental' and 'space- 
time' individuality, can be consistently maintained 
in both classical and quantum physics, and that this 
rorrespon0s to the observation that either of two 
interpretations.. particle or field respectively, 
can be placed on the formalisms of these theories. 
Thus any conflict between philosophical positions 
involving, as fundamental principles, these two 
views, cannot be resolved by appealing to physics. 
For example, someone who advocates the 'bundle theory' 
of things, with its reliance upon either P. I. I. or space- 
time indiviLality, cannot legitimately claim support 
from quantum theory on the grounds that it disallows the 
view Of particles as 'transcendental', or 'substantival'.. 
individuals, because as we have seen, this view can 
be maintained within Q. M. so long as the notion of 
'inaccessible' states is also accepted. 
Conversel ya physicist cannot claim support for a 
particular interpretation of the formalism of some 
theory on the grounds that the rival interpretation lacks 
any coherent principle of individuality for the 
entities in its domain, since some such principle is 
possible for either interpretation. However, this symmetry 
regarding the reciprocal roles of physics and philosophy - 
or rather the lack of roles, at least as far as the 
above discussion is concerned - is broken when it comes 
to adopting a particular physical interpretation on 
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grounds other than the above - Thus given the noted 
un0erdetermination, in both classical anr' quantum 
physics, of the field and particle interpretations by 
the data, a consideration of empirically testable con- 
sequences obviously cannot be used to support a choice 
of one interpretation over the other. Other considerations 
VT i 11 then come into play such as metaphysical connections 
giving ontological reference to certain terms in the 
theory and the, related, notion of heuristic fruitful- 
ness. In so far as the former necessarily involves the 
adoption of a particular philosophical viewpoint, for 
example regarding individuality, any criticism of 
or arguments against this viewpoint on philosophical 
grounds, will serve to mitigate against 
the interpretation which it is entailed by. Thus, for 
example, it can be argued that a coherent particle 
interpretation can only be maintained within quantum 
physics if theltranscendental inOividualityl view is 
adopted. However as we have indicated, there are strong 
philosophical arguments which can be levelled against 
this view, especially by those within the empiricist 
camp, and these may be regarded as 'tipping the balance' 
infavour of the alternative field, interpretation. 
Thus our overall conclusion is that more than one 
$metaphysical package' is generally consistent with 
a given physical theory and therefore there exists a 
fundamental underdetermination regarding the 'picture' 
of reality which physics commits us to- In relating 
physics to philosophy, the bestwe can hope for is to 
rule out those 'packages' or descriptions of reality, 
which just do not fit', in the sense of being 
inconsistent with a particular interpretation. 
Although this may be regarded as a somewhat negative 
conclusion we feel, nevertheless, *, that it is 
significant that such results can be achieved 
in the 





Detailed expositions of the definitions and theoreT7s 
presented below can be found in M. Hamermesh (1962) or 
E-P-Wigner (1959). 
A-1 Abstract Group-Theory 
An abstract group G is a set of elements A96 qCj *eo 
such that a law of composition or 'group multiplication' 
may be defined which associates a third element with 
any ordered pair and which satisfies the following 
requirements : 
1- If A and B are in the set then so is A 9; that is, the 
set is closed under 'group multiplication'. 
2. 'Group multiplication' is associative; that is 
A (a c) = (A Wc - 
3. The set contains an element E called the identity, 
or unit element, such that Ac =CA, = A every element A 
of the set. 
4. Every element A in the set has an inverse 
denoted by 6=A1, such that A9= CA = E. 
If. in addition, all the elements of the group 
commute with one another, so that A= 6A for all 
A 
and (S. then the group is said to be 'commutative' or 
'Abelian'. 
The number of elements in a group is called the 
order of the group, 
An element 13 of the group G is said to be conjugate to 
an element A if XAX= (3 or X"18X= 4 If 6 is 
conjugate toA and C is conjugate to then C is also 
conjugate to A9 since if c= NJ 6 %1 -', 13 )(AX -1, then 
c= yK 4x -1 ý'= (Y)() A (AYX)-' . This relation between 
elements can therefore be used to separate the group 
into classes of elements which are conjugate to one 
another. A class is determined by stating one of 
its 
elements 
AI; the entire class is then found by forming 
339 
all products of the form 
Ai i, Ao, & A, **e, AhAzAko Thus all the elements of the group can be divided 
among the variuus classes and every element appears in 
one and only one class. 
With regard to our outline of the theory of 
representations below, it is worth noting that if the 
group elements are represented by matrices then tne 
traces of all matrices (i. e. the sum of their 
diagonal elements) in a class must be the same. This 
is because the operation then becomes that of making a 
similarity transformation which leaves the trace 
invariant. 
Two groups G and G' are said to be isomorphic if 
a. - unique one-to-one correspondence exists between 
their elements which is preserved under group 
combination. If the correspondence is not one-to-one, 
but is such that one and only one element of G' 
corresponds to every element of U and at least one 
element of G corresponds to every element of G', and 
this correspondence is still preserved under 
combination, then G and G' are said to be homomorphice 
A. 2 The Theory of GroupRepresentations. 
A representation of an abstract group G is, in 
general, any group composed of mathematical entities 
which is homomorphic to G. In this thesis we have 
restricted our attention to linear representations in 
terms of a group of linear operators D(G) in an n- 
dimensional vector space, the basis for which is 
provided by a set of n linearly independent basis 
vectors u,, ... , Rn. The representation 
is then said 
to have degree n, or is said to be an n-dimensional 
representation. If R and S are elements of G then the 
corresponding operators can be denoted by D(R) and 
D(S) respectively. We then have 
3-10 
-D(RS) = U(R)D(S) , D(R-1) = (D(R))- 
I, 
and D (E) =1. 
In this case, where the vector space is spanned by 
some chosen basis, the linear operators of the 
representation can be described by their matrix 
representatives. We then cbtain a homomorphic mapping of 
the group G onto a group of n-by-n square matrices D('11'14), 
with matrix multiplication as the group combination 
operation. This is then called a matrix representation 
of the group G and we have 
L) C 
-Dýj 
(RS) (S) Dýk (R)DIxi (S) 
Different representationsare distinguished from one 
another through the use of superscripts, e. g. D'ýý)(R). 
If the basis is changed in the vector space then the 
matrices D(R) will be replaced by their transforms by 
some matrix U. The matrices-DI(R) = CD(R)C-1, also 
provide a representation of G which is equivalent to the 
representation given by D(R). Equivalentrepresentations 
have the same group structure. Any given representation 
can be characterised by the trace, 'ý DýI(R)p known as 
the character of R in the representation D, which is 
invariant under such transformations. Thus we define 
the character of the/tth representation as being the set 






Thus equivalent representations have the same set of 
characters. Also, since the matrix representations of 
all elements in the same class are related by 
similarity transformations, (see, our note above), the 
invariance of matrix traces demonstrates, that all 
elements in the same class have the same character. Thus 
we can specify the character of any representation by 
giving the trace of one matrix from each class of group 
elements, denoted by ; C(Kk), where the classes of G are 
labelled by Kip Kzp eooy Kk9a 
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Given any two, or more reprk-: --entations D 
(I ýR) 
and Gt) 
D (R), then we can construct a larger representation 
from -lu-hem by simply combining the matrices into larger 






where D (A) and 
P(A) 
are the matrices representing 
element A in the original representation and D(A) 
represents A in the derived representation. If it is 
possible to reduce the matrices representing all the 
elements in the group to this form by the same 
similarity transformation, then the representation is 
said to be reducible. If this is not possible then 
theiýepresentation is irreducible and cannot be 
expressed in terms of other representations of lower 
dimensionality. 
In terms of our n-dimensional vector space a 
representation is said to be fully reducible if this 
space can be decomposed into the direct sum of 
subspaces of dimension lessthan n which are 
invariant under all transformations of the group. A 
basis for the entire space can then be formed from 
the sets of basis vectors spanning each subspace and 
in this basis the matrices of the representation will 
assume the reduced form above. If our vector space 
cannot be decompased. into subspace6 of representations 
with lower dimensionality then the representation is 
irreducible. 
Thus a fully reducible representation can be 
decomposed into t1ie sum of irreducible representations 
of lower dimensionality. lf this sum contains several 
irreducible representations which are equivalent to 
one another then, since these latter are not 
regarded as distinct, we can say that the sum contains 
the given irreducible representation avtimes, where 
the a. are positive integers. We can 
then write the 
sum in the form 
D ýa. YDC V 
ý42 
rC0 Furthepore it can be shownAthat for groups of finite 
order reducible representations can always be 
decomposed into a sum of representations. 
One can, however, obtain simpler criteria for 
irreducibility and also show that certain restrictions 
exist on the number of non-equivalent representations, 
through whatare known as the orthogonality theorems. We 
consider first the following lemmas. 
Lemma I. if D and D' are two irreducible representations 
of a group G, having dimensions n, and n2 respectively, 
and if a rectangular matrix A exists which satisfies 
D(R)A = ADI(R) 
f or all in G then it f ollows that , i) if n n.,. 
then A 0. or ii) if n, = n., then either D and D' 
are equivalent or A= OJX). 
Lemma II (Schur's Lemma). If the matrices D(R) are an 
irreducible representation of a group G and if 
AD(R) = D(R)A 
for all R in U, then A= constant .E . 
(3) 
In other words if a matrix commutes with all the 
matrices of an irreducible representation then that 
matrix must be a multiple of the unit matrix. Therefore, 
if a non-constant commuting matrix exists, i. e. one 
which satisfies the above relation but is not a 
multiple of E, then the representation is reducible. 
On the other hand if no such matrix exists, i. e. if we 
can find an A which satisfies the atove relation but we 
can show that A is a multiple of E, then the 
representation 1) is irreducible. C4ý 
These lemmas can then be used to proveAthe following: 
The Orthogonajity Theorem . If we consider all the 
non-equivalent irreducible representations of a group 
G then 
1. Hamermesh op cit p. 92-93 and p. 98. 
2. Ibid p. 100; Wigner 6p cit p-76-77o 
3. Hamermesh op cit p. 100-101; 'Wigner op cit p-75. 
4. Hamermesh op cit P-101-103; Wigner OP cit p. 
79-81. 
3ý3 
:: ýe ocý'( (z Iq &4' A 
MI 
el"44 
or, if the representations are unitary, 
P'Tc P) oPiv, *C P') -7 
S" S eý 8,, 
Iz A"Elk 
in other words for two non-equivalent irreducible 
C() a) representations and D we obtain 
cz C() 
, 
9ý5 Pý, C"C#Z) Oý - ((Z ) =0, (w aN if the 
representations are unitary, j0ei_ 6<) (, 'ý) - 
-0 
IIPI whereas if. /a =V then, Pcitc 
or SLM if D is unitary. 
One can then show that the number of non-equivalent 
irreducible representations of a finite group is 
finiteý'J'A)as expressed by the dimensionality theorem 
A& 
which is essential for actually obtaining the 
irredueible representations of any group. 
From the above one can derive orthogonality relations 
for the charactersý'fthus 
'g 
ý((A4-) (V)*- 
6&) X ce') =A S'CA-9 P, Collecting the group elements according to classes, 
x (, U) within which the Cp, )are the same this can be 
rewritten as 
CS"V v 
where Nk is the number of elements in the class K and 
the sum now runs over classes. For a given A the numbers 
(A. ) 
7(ek, ýýJqorm a vector in an ft- dimensional space. The k 
vectors obtained in this way from non-equivalent 
irreducible representations are orthogonal, and it can 
then be shown that the number of non-equivalent 
irreducible representations of a group must equal the 
number of classes, in the group. 
It can then be shown that the character of a reducible-. ----- 
representation D(R) is the sum of the characters of its 
5. Hamermesh P,, 103 and p. lU6-107; Wigner op cit p. 83 
6. fiamermesh cp cit P-103-104; Wigner op cit p. 83-84. 
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component irreducible representations, i. e. 




CKO. ) (, 4A 
One can then obtain a A)k zZt K ýAA 
giving the number of times a given irreducible 
representation is contained in D. and also the 
following simple criterion for irreducibility: 
AJiz 1,2ý(Kk) Iz=A 
These results allow one to draw up the character table 
for a group directly, without first having to 
explicitly work out the representation matrices. In such 
a table the columns are labelled by the various classes 
preceded by the numoer NK of elements in the class, the 
rows are labelled by the irreduciole representations, and 
; ((, 4-A), 
the entries in the table are the (Kký Thus we obtain, 













A-3 The Symmetric Group, 
The elements of the symmetric group of degree N. 
denoted by are the permutations of N objects, 
denoted by Z 
The order of Sou is clearly N! A permutation may also 
be 
denoted in terms of I cycles I. A cycle (r, rz e*. rX 
) is 
a permutation which replaces every element rk 
by the 
element following it, rk., , except 
for the last 
element , rA . which 
is replaced by the first r, . Thus 
the cycle (r, r, r. ) is just another way of writing z A 
the permutation denoted by rl 
) 
r 
Cycles which have no elements in commc . commute 
and 
any permutation can be decomposed 
into a product of 
7. Hamqrmesh op cit P-10, ý 
8ý lbid p. lil 
3 45 
cycles which commute. Thus, for example, the 
permutation denoted by 1 '2- 34'! C 6 can be resolved 
(1 
46 ; k-sj) 
into (136)(24)(5) and this is equivalent to 
(361)(24)(5) and (24)(5)(136) since the order of the 
cycles as well as the initial element of each cycle, is 
of no significance. 
The permutations of Ej can of course be divided into 
different classes and two permutations which have the 
same number of cycles and whose cycles are of equal 
length, i. e. contain the same number of elements, are 
contained in the same class. The number of classes is 
therfore equal to the number of different possible 
lengths of cycles. This is equal to the number of ways 
of dividing N into positive integral summands without 
regard to order and is called the partition number of N. 
Since the number of different irreducible representations 
is equal to the number of classes, as we noted above, 
it follows that this is also given by the partition 
number of N. Thus the symmetric group of degree 3 
has 3 classes, (1 ) (2) (3) 9 
(12) (3) (123) corresponding 
to 3 irreducible representation. 
Permutations which merely interchange two elements are 
called transpositionsg written, in terms of cycles, thus 
(ij). Every permutation can be decomposed into the 
product of either an even or an odd number of 
transpositions. The even permutations form a subgroup of 
S,, known as the alternating group. 
A permutation which when resolved into cycles has 
V. -V2. cycles containing 2 
, cycles containing 
1 element, 
elements, VA) cycles containing N elements is said 
V 'a j W). As we to have the cycle structure A 
have noted all permutations which have the same cycle 
structure form a class in 
&. For every partition of N 
there exists a corresponding c-4c-le- structure and so 
given the point noted above, every different cycle 
structure corresponds to a different 
irreducible 
matrices and representation of The characters, 
dimensions of the irreducible representations of 
S,. j 
346 
can be obtained by a variety of different methods (9). 
Given the results of Chapter 3 of this thesis we shall 
mention only one, the graphical method involving 
Young Tableaux (10). 
Thus we associate with each partition a graph of the 
form , which is obtained by placing objects one at 
a time on the diagram so that at each stage the number 
of objects in each-line is greater than the number in 
succeeding lines, until all the squares of the graph a-e 
filled. This is called a regular application of one 
square at a time. The number of different ways of 
building these graphs by regular applications of squares, 
for each partition then gives the dimension of the 
corresponding permutation. Thus for example we can find 
the dimensions of all the irreducible representations 
of S"3 as follows: 
I\j 
tJ :72. 
(z ý' 0 
IýLl 
3) A) 
A graph of a given shape, as determined by the 
partition, in which the numbers 1,... 9N are placed in 
the boxes is called a Young Tableau. When the graph is 
built up through regular application of numbers the 
tableau is said to be a standard tableau and the 
dimension of the representation corresponding to a given 
partition is equal to the number of standard tableau 
which can be constructed for that partition. This in 
turn gives, the number of equivalemt irreducible 
representations corrp'ýýponding to that partition. 
Young tableaux can also be used to obtain the 
characters (11) and basis functions of the irreaucible 
representations. Thus the irreducible representations of 
9. See Hamermesh op cit. Ch-7- 
10. lbid P. 198-201 . 
11. Ibid p. 201-208a 
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S,, can be found as follows. Une first draws the 'JaL. LA ) 
pattern for any partition of N and then put numbers 
1,..., N into the pattern in any order to give a Young 
tableau. Then one construuts the following quantities: 
ýff P 
-J PI 
where the P's and qs are permutations in the rows and 
columns respectively, ý$ is the parity of q and the sums 
are over all horizontal or vertical permutations 
respectively, of the given tableau. Application of the 
Young operator P then gives the 
irreducible representations of For different 
patterns the representations obtained in this way are 
inequivalent whereas equivalent irreducible 
representations are obtained from different tableaux 
with the same pattern. Thus for the group S3 the 
partitions (3) and C 13 ) have corresponding representations 
denoted by and 
0 
respectively, whereas there are 
two equivalent representations and 
EP 
correSponding 
to C2) 1) o 
With regard to the subject matter of this thesis we 
note that given a system of N indistinguishable 
particles one can construct basis functions for the 
various irreducible representations of 
SO by applying 
to the eigenfunction of the system the Young operators 
corresponding to all the standard tableaux for a 
given pattern, thus giving the required basis functions C 13) 
for the corresponding irreducible representation. We 
conclude by noting that there is a complete 
correspondence between the symmetry types of the 
wave functions and these Young patterns. 
12. Ibid p. 244. of uompare with the procedure of section 3.2.1. 
Chapter 3. 
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